HULL v. WILLIAMS

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

DELILAH MAE HULL, et al.
Petitioner/Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

v.

LA SHAWN WILLIAMS,
Respondent/Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0605 FC

FILED 03-03-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2023-001200
The Honorable Laura J. Giaquinto, Judge Pro Tempore
The Honorable Jacki Ireland, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

LaShawn Williams, Phoenix
Respondent/Appellant/Cross-Appellee

Delilah Hull, Litchfield Park
Petitioner/Appellee/Cross-Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Jennifer R. Blum
Counsel for Appellee Department of Economic Security
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Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Andrew J. Becke delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

B E C K E, Judge:

¶1 LaShawn Williams (“Father”) appeals the denial of his
“Motion to Vacate Orders for Lack of Jurisdiction and Constitutional
Violations” and “Request for De Novo Review Immediately” regarding the
superior court’s order granting his petition to modify child support. Delilah
Mae Hull (“Mother”) cross-appeals from the underlying modification
judgment and child support order. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Father and Mother have one child in common, born in
December 2022. The Arizona Department of Economic Security (“ADES”)
filed a petition for paternity and to establish child support in February 2023.
In June 2023, the superior court entered temporary legal decision-making,
parenting time, and child support orders. In calculating child support, the
court attributed a monthly income of $7,000 to Father and $3,262 to Mother
and ordered Father to pay Mother $178 per month in child support.

¶3 In January 2024, Father and Mother executed a settlement
agreement under Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure (“Rule”) 69. The
court signed the Rule 69 agreement, which was filed in the record. But the
court never issued an order adopting the agreement or a decree
incorporating the agreement. The agreement provided that the temporary
child support orders would remain in place and that Father owed Mother
$5,500 in support arrears, with Father paying Mother an additional $250 per
month until the arrears were paid in full. The superior court ordered the
parties to submit a consent decree for its signature.

¶4 The parties began drafting documents to effectuate the Rule
69 agreement, addressing paternity, legal decision-making, parenting time,
and child support. In June 2024, Mother filed the parties’ signed parenting
plan agreement. Father’s counsel then withdrew. Mother submitted a
proposed order for paternity, legal decision-making, parenting time, and

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child support, asserting it mirrored the terms of the original Rule 69
agreement.

¶5 Father objected to the proposed order, arguing it did not
include edits he had requested. Mother countered that the order should be
approved because Father did not “indicate that the [order] contain[ed] any
errors or that it [did] not comport with the terms of the parties’ binding Rule
69 Agreement.” Mother contended that Father simply did not like the terms
of the agreement anymore.

¶6 Before the court ruled on the requested order, Father filed
three notices and an affidavit, all claiming he was not a citizen subject to
any jurisdiction. Despite these claims, Father then filed a “Request to
Reappear for Child Support,” a motion to continue on the dismissal
calendar, and a “Motion to Vacate Child Support Order.” Although the
superior court granted the motion to continue, it denied his other two
motions because there was no underlying petition to modify child support,
and there was not a change in circumstances to warrant review.

¶7 In March 2025, Father filed a petition to modify the temporary
orders, arguing his change in income constituted a “substantial and
continuing change in circumstances” warranting a modification of his child
support per A.R.S. § 25-503(E). About a month later, Father also filed a
“Special Appearance to Challenge Jurisdiction, Constitutional Objection to
Child Support Enforcement, and Insertion of My Constitution Rights,”
arguing lack of personal and subject-matter jurisdiction. Father argued that,
because he did not consent to the “jurisdiction of the Title IV-D agency,”
any child support actions against him should be dismissed. Both parties
filed affidavits of financial information.

¶8 The superior court held a child support modification hearing
where both Mother and Father testified, and counsel for ADES advised the
court of its position and recommendations. Based on the testimony and the
court file, the court found “a continuing and substantial change in the
circumstances of the parties warranting modification of the child support
amount” and granted Father’s petition to modify. In recalculating child
support, the court attributed a monthly income of $6,675 to Father and
$4,746 to Mother. The court reduced Father’s child support payment to $104
per month and his arrears payment to $150 per month. The court also
confirmed Father was in arrears for about $4,000. In May 2025, the court
entered a final modification judgment and child support order reflecting
these changes.

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¶9 Father filed a “Motion to Vacate Orders for Lack of
Jurisdiction and Constitutional Violations” and a “Request for De Novo
Review Immediately.” In his two motions, Father argued the superior court
violated his due process rights by not proving its jurisdiction over him and
for allowing ADES to provide a recommendation as to child support. Father
also argued the “ruling was issued without findings of fact or conclusions
of law.” The superior court summarily denied both motions in unsigned
minute entries.

¶10 Father filed a notice of appeal of the denial of those motions,
but we stayed the appeal for Father to obtain a Rule 78(c) judgment. After
entry of that Rule 78(c) judgment, we lifted the stay, and Mother then filed
a timely cross-appeal. We have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 9, of the
Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(2).

DISCUSSION

¶11 Father makes four arguments on appeal, all concerning
jurisdiction and due process. Mother makes two arguments on cross-appeal
targeting the final child support order.

I. The Superior Court Had Subject-Matter and Personal Jurisdiction.

¶12 Father first argues a court commissioner can only perform
“ministerial or preliminary functions unless both parties consent,” and
because the denial of his two motions was issued by a commissioner
without consent, the orders are “constitutionally invalid” and a violation of
the separation of powers doctrine and the Supremacy Clause. See Ariz.
Const. art. 3; U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. Father also claims the court lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction because the “Title IV-D administrative
enforcement proceedings were [never] properly converted into a judicial
action” and lacked personal jurisdiction because he “made only a special
appearance to challenge jurisdiction and did not consent to general
jurisdiction.” Subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction are
questions of law we review de novo. In re Marriage of Crawford, 180 Ariz. 324,
326 (App. 1994); Duckstein v. Wolf, 230 Ariz. 227, 234, ¶ 19 (App. 2012).

¶13 Contrary to Father’s argument, court commissioners are
authorized to preside over child-support cases and enforce child-support
orders by both the Arizona Constitution and statute. Ariz. Const. art. 6, §
24; A.R.S. § 12-298(A), (C); Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 96(a)(2). Therefore, the
commissioner had authority to rule on Father’s motions concerning the
final modification judgment and order. Father’s assertion that “Title IV-D
administrative enforcement proceedings” must be “converted into a

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judicial action under A.R.S. § 25-502” is similarly unpersuasive. The
superior court has original jurisdiction in proceedings establishing
paternity and in proceedings brought by ADES to “establish, enforce or
modify the duties of [child] support.” A.R.S. §§ 25-801; -502(A). The statutes
do not require any kind of “conversion.”

¶14 Father fails to make any cognizable argument to suggest a
court commissioner cannot resolve a motion for modification of child
support consistent with separation of powers and Supremacy Clause
requirements. A court commissioner is a member of the judicial branch and
has constitutional and statutory authority to rule on motions like those at
issue here, and this authority does not conflict with separation of powers
concepts or federal law. See Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 24; A.R.S. § 12-298(A), (C).

¶15 Finally, because Father made a general appearance by taking
“action[s], other than objecting to personal jurisdiction,” he has waived any
contest to personal jurisdiction. See Kline v. Kline, 221 Ariz. 564, 569, ¶ 18
(App. 2009); State ex rel. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Burton, 205 Ariz. 27, 29, ¶8
(App. 2003). Father fails to show the superior court lacked subject-matter or
personal jurisdiction.

II. Father Was Not Denied Due Process.

¶16 Father next argues he was denied due process because the
superior court denied his two motions without a hearing and without
factual findings or citation of legal authority. Father also argues his due
process rights were violated when he requested review by “an elected judge
under A.R.S. § 12-213 . . . but the matter remained before a commissioner.”
Father lastly argues because Mother was not properly served with his
petition to modify child support, any proceeding under the petition was
procedurally defective. Due process issues are questions of law we review
de novo. Backstrand v. Backstrand, 250 Ariz. 339, 346, ¶ 28 (App. 2020).

¶17 Father’s claims fail because Rule 35(c) allows the superior
court to “decide motions without oral argument, even if requested.” A
hearing is not required unless a “material contested issue hinges on
credibility,” Volk v. Brame, 235 Ariz. 462, 466, ¶ 14 (App. 2014), or the parties
“are directly in opposition upon any substantial and crucial fact relevant to
the [issue],” Pridgeon v. Superior Court, 134 Ariz. 177, 181 (1982). Here,
Father’s two motions to modify judgment do not fit either scenario.

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¶18 Moreover, Father testified in court at the child support
modification hearing, when both his motion to modify child support and
his first motion challenging jurisdiction were pending. The court decided
both motions “based on the discussion held on the record.” Father had an
opportunity to be heard on his jurisdictional concerns and the underlying
child support modification at the modification hearing. And because Father
has not provided a transcript of the proceeding, we presume the missing
transcript supports the court’s decision. Myrick v. Maloney, 235 Ariz. 491,
495, ¶ 11 (App. 2014); ARCAP 11(c)(1)(B).

¶19 Father fails to provide any real legal support for his claim that
only an “elected judge” can review the constitutional and jurisdictional
issues in his motions. As stated supra ¶ 13, court commissioners have both
the constitutional and statutory authority to rule on child support
modifications. Father cites A.R.S. §§ 12-213, -298, 1-601, “Rule 81(E),” and a
1999 Minnesota Supreme Court case to support his assertion. As an initial
matter, Rule 81 of the Arizona Rules of Family Law Procedure does not
contain a subsection (E).

¶20 As for the statutes, A.R.S. § 12-213 sets forth the procedure for
appointing court commissioners and setting their salaries. It also prohibits
commissioners from making ex parte orders that deprive “any person . . .
from custody of their child or children, or change of counsel of attorneys,
or deprive any person of the person’s liberty, or deprive any person or
entity from the person’s or entity’s property or the use thereof, or any
injunctive relief.” The court commissioner in this case did not make any
such ex parte order. And A.R.S. § 12-298 mandates the appointment of court
commissioners in certain counties to oversee the establishment and
enforcement of child support orders and spells out the specific procedures
of certain rulings. A.R.S. § 1-601 protects a parent’s right to raise their child
and prevents the state from infringing on those rights. None of these
statutes say or do what Father claims—prohibit court commissioners from
ruling on his petition to modify child support.

¶21 And Father’s 1999 Minnesota Supreme Court case, Holmberg
v. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. 1999), is inapposite. In that case, the
court struck down Minnesota’s administrative child support process
because it granted administrative law judges, who worked for an executive
agency, complete power over child support cases in violation of the
separation of powers doctrine. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d at 725–26. That ruling
has no relevance in addressing Arizona’s child support process, where
cases are decided by members of the Arizona judicial branch.

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¶22 Finally, Father claims the proceedings were defective because
Mother was never properly served his petition to modify child support, but
Mother waived any objection she may have had and Father lacks standing
to raise arguments on her behalf. See Goglia v. Bodnar, 156 Ariz. 12, 18 (App.
1987) (“When an error applies to only one party . . . another party cannot
make that argument on its own behalf.”).

¶23 Father fails to show any due process violation.

III. Father Has Waived His Arrears Argument.

¶24 Father next argues he was coerced into stipulating to a certain
arrears amount in the Rule 69 agreement, and asks us to declare the Rule 69
agreement void and vacate any judgment enforcing it. But Father has
waived those arguments because he did not raise them in his petition to
modify child support or in his two post-modification motions. See Cullum
v. Cullum, 215 Ariz. 352, 355, ¶14 n. 5 (App. 2007).

¶25 Furthermore, the validity of the Rule 69 agreement is not
before us on appeal. Father appealed his two post-modification motions
and the final modification judgment and order1—neither of which concern
the Rule 69 agreement. The superior court did not mention the Rule 69
agreement in its minute entry from the modification hearing or in its final
modification judgment and order, and there is no judgment enforcing the
Rule 69 agreement in the record. Father failed to provide a transcript of the
modification hearing, so we rely on the minute entry and order for the
court’s reasoning and presume the transcript supports the court’s findings
and conclusion. Myrick, 235 Ariz. at 495, ¶ 11; ARCAP 11(c)(1)(B).

IV. ADES and Mother Were Not Required to Respond to Father’s Two
Post-Modification Judgment Motions.

¶26 Father next argues because Mother and ADES did not
respond to his two post-modification motions, their silence constitutes
default, and the superior court was required to grant his unopposed

1 Father’s notice of appeal does not challenge the ruling granting his petition

to modify child support or the final modification judgment and order.
However, we liberally construe a notice of appeal if the appellee is neither
misled nor prejudiced by the result. Hanen v. Willis, 102 Ariz. 6, 8–9 (1967).
And here, Mother has not been prejudiced as she herself addresses the
court’s final modification judgment and child support order in her
answering brief and cross-appeal.

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motions. We review the denial of a Rule 85 motion2 to vacate the judgment
for an abuse of discretion. Quijada v. Quijada, 246 Ariz. 217, 220, ¶ 7 (App.
2019).

¶27 Under Rule 35(b)(2), a “court may summarily grant or deny a
motion” if no response is filed and the time to file a response has passed.
(Emphasis added). The superior court retains discretion and there is no
requirement to summarily grant an unopposed motion. See Schwab v. Ames
Constr., 207 Ariz. 56, 59, ¶ 14 (App. 2004) (“If the party opposing a motion
fails to respond in writing, the trial court may, in its discretion, dispose of
the motion summarily.”). Father fails to show the superior court abused its
discretion in denying his two post-modification judgment motions.

V. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Granted
Father’s Motion to Modify Child Support.

¶28 In her cross-appeal, Mother argues the superior court
attributed the wrong monthly income to Father and failed to credit her with
a $200 monthly family health insurance coverage premium. We review
modifications of child support for an abuse of discretion. Strait v. Strait, 223
Ariz. 500, 502, ¶ 6 (App. 2010).

¶29 Mother claims Father’s April 2025 financial affidavit shows a
year-to-date income of $39,000, meaning the superior court should have
attributed to him a monthly income of $9,750. Although Father’s financial
affidavit listed his year-to-date income of $35,829.71 and a monthly income
of $3,147, Mother failed to provide a transcript of the modification hearing.
Therefore, we presume the transcript supports the court’s factual findings
and rulings. Myrick, 235 Ariz. at 495, ¶ 11; ARCAP 11(c)(1)(B). Mother also
fails to provide any citations to the record showing the existence of a $200
monthly health insurance premium. Thus, Mother fails to show the
superior court abused its discretion in granting Father’s motion to modify
child support.

2 Father failed to identify the correct procedural rules under which he filed

his two post-modification motions. We treat each as a Rule 85 motion to
vacate the judgment, as each asks the court to vacate the judgment for lack
of jurisdiction and denial of due process. See Rule 85(b)(4), (6).

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CONCLUSION

¶30 We affirm the superior court’s denial of Father’s “Motion to
Vacate Orders for Lack of Jurisdiction and Constitutional Violations” and
“Request for De Novo Review,” and we affirm the court’s order granting
Father’s motion to modify child support and the resulting modification
judgment and order. Mother requests “reimbursement and sanctions”
under A.R.S. § 12-349 and ARCAP 25. In the exercise of our discretion, we
deny her request for sanctions under § 12-349 and ARCAP 25. Because we
affirm as to both the appeal and the cross-appeal, we deny taxable costs to
both parties.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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