Varela v. Martinez

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

JESUS MANUEL VARELA, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants,

v.

FIDEL GONZALEZ MARTINEZ, Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0620
FILED 11-10-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV 2023-001117
The Honorable Randall H. Warner, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

IBF Law Group, PLLC, Phoenix
By Sheree D. Wright
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants

Donaldson Law PLC, Carefree
By Brett T. Donaldson, Iman R. Donaldson
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

VARELA v. MARTINEZ
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge D. Andrew Gaona joined.

F U R U Y A, Judge:

¶1 Jesus Manuel Varela and Valentina Varela (collectively “the
Varelas”) appeal from the superior court’s denial of their motion for additur
or a new trial. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 The Varelas sued Fidel Gonzalez Martinez for negligence
arising from a car accident involving Mr. Varela and Mr. Martinez that
occurred in December 2021. The parties participated in mandatory
arbitration, and the arbitrator found Mr. Martinez 100% liable, awarding
the Varelas $48,000. Mr. Martinez appealed the award and went to trial.

¶3 At trial, the jury heard testimony about the accident, saw
photos of the damaged vehicles, and reviewed Mr. Varela’s chiropractic
bills and other documents. The jury heard testimony from expert witnesses
and three fact witnesses, including Mr. Varela, Mr. Martinez, and the
treating chiropractor. During deliberations, the jury asked if it could find
Mr. Martinez at fault and award no damages. The court explained the jury’s
verdict would be for Mr. Martinez if it found Mr. Varela was not injured.
After deliberating for four hours, the jury found Mr. Martinez was 100% at
fault and awarded the Varelas $1 in damages.

¶4 The Varelas moved for additur or a new trial based on
insufficient damages, which the court denied. Ariz. R. Civ. P. (“Rule”)
59(a)(1). The court explained that while the award “looks” nominal, the jury
must have found Mr. Varela’s injury was “very slight” and evidence
supported that finding. The Varelas timely appealed. Ariz. R. Civ. App. P.
9(a). They ask us to reverse the court’s denial of their motion, vacate the
jury award, and remand for a damages-only trial.

¶5 We have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona
Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) Section 12-
2101(A)(5)(a). See also Hall Fam. Props. v. Gosnell Dev. Corp., 185 Ariz. 382,
386–87 (App. 1995) (signed orders granting or refusing new trials are
appealable).

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VARELA v. MARTINEZ
Decision of the Court

DISCUSSION

¶6 Whether to modify a jury’s verdict through additur is
committed to the trial judge’s hands with “the greatest possible discretion.”
Creamer v. Troiano, 108 Ariz. 573, 577 (1972). We will not disturb the court’s
decision “except for a clear abuse of discretion.” Bond v. Cartwright Little
League, Inc., 112 Ariz. 9, 16 (1975). In making its decision, the trial court may
not reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for the jury’s. See Soto
v. Sacco, 242 Ariz. 474, 477–78 ¶ 7 (2017) (citing cases). This reticence
preserves the jury’s vital role and protects the right to a jury trial. Id.

¶7 The Varelas argue that, given the evidence admitted at trial,
the jury’s award constitutes impermissible nominal damages. We cannot
agree. Though the Varelas may view the $1 award incredulously, the
standard of review compels us to defer to the jury’s “good sense and
unbiased judgment[,]” Soto, 242 Ariz. at 481 ¶ 19 (quoting Meyer v. Ricklick, 99 Ariz. 355, 358 (1965)), as well as the court’s expansive and sound
discretion as it reviews that judgment, see Soto, 242 Ariz. at 478 ¶ 8; Reeves
v. Markle, 119 Ariz. 159, 164 (1978). And our hands are further tied when an
appellant fails to ensure the record has everything necessary to fully
consider the issues raised on appeal. See Baker v. Baker, 183 Ariz. 70, 73 (App.
1995) (citations omitted); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 11. When the record on
appeal is incomplete—such as when an appellant fails to file necessary
transcripts—we presume that the missing parts support the court’s findings
and that the evidence at trial was sufficient to sustain the verdict. See Baker,
183 Ariz. at 73; Bryant v. Thunderbird Acad., 103 Ariz. 247, 249 (1968).

¶8 During deliberations, the jury asked whether it could find
“Defendant at fault and award $0 compensation to the Plaintiff[.]” The
court responded with a legally accurate answer. See supra ¶ 3. The Varelas
contend the jury remained confused even after the court answered its
question because the award was a nominal amount, $1. But the jury took
careful notes throughout trial and spent four hours deliberating before it
returned a verdict. Moreover, we presume the jury followed the trial court’s
proper instruction on damages. See Hyatt Regency Phoenix Hotel Co. v.
Winston & Strawn, 184 Ariz. 120, 140 (App. 1995). Thus, because it was
instructed to find in favor of Martinez if the Varelas had failed to prove they
were damaged at all, we can infer the jury found the Varelas’ actual
damages totaled $1 in value when it concluded Mr. Martinez was at fault.

¶9 Further, the “amount of damages for personal injury is a
question particularly within the province of the jury.” Meyer, 99 Ariz. at 357.
And though the Varelas point to evidence in the record inconsistent with

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VARELA v. MARTINEZ
Decision of the Court

the very low value expressed in the verdict, where the record contains
conflicting evidence, the jury may choose what testimony or evidence to
believe or ignore when deciding the case. Creamer, 108 Ariz. at 576. We will
not disturb a verdict if adequate evidence supports it. Id. at 577; see
Kimminau L. Firm, P.C. v. Hoopes, __ Ariz. __, __, 2026 WL 2016992, at *6 ¶
25 (Ariz. App. July 13, 2026) (any substantial evidence leading a reasonable
person to find the facts support the verdict is sufficient).

¶10 Here, the Varelas failed to provide trial transcripts necessary
to consider the issues they raise on appeal. They highlight Mr. Varela’s
chiropractic bills totaling over $12,500 and claim these were the only
evidence regarding his damages. But Mr. Martinez observed that trial
testimony contradicted Mr. Varela’s alleged damages. The jury heard the
chiropractor, defense expert witnesses, and others testify about the accident
and damages. Because we do not have them to review, we presume the
missing transcripts of this testimony support the jury’s award of $1 in
damages. See Baker, 183 Ariz. at 73. And in any event, other evidence in the
record shows that Mr. Varela was in a car accident 10 years before this
accident and had surgery. So, the jury could have limited its verdict based
on Mr. Varela’s medical history. Further, the jury may have disbelieved Mr.
Varela’s testimony about the severity of his condition because he continued
working as an electrician after this accident, not taking any time off or
seeking any significant treatment until after he had consulted with an
attorney. Cf. Creamer, 108 Ariz. at 574, 576 (jury may have believed witness
testimony suggesting plaintiff exaggerated his injuries).

¶11 Because we have an incomplete record, we presume the
evidence at trial was sufficient to sustain the verdict. Bryant, 103 Ariz. at
249. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in upholding the verdict
because adequate evidence supports the verdict. Creamer, 108 Ariz. at 577.

¶12 Moreover, wherever appropriate, we must defer to a trial
court’s discretion. Though it must do so sparingly, the judge serves in a role
akin to a “ninth” juror when ruling on a Rule 59 motion for a new trial. Soto,
242 Ariz. at 478 ¶ 8. “The judge . . . has a special perspective of the
relationship between the evidence and the verdict which cannot be
recreated by a reviewing court from the printed record.” Reeves, 119 Ariz.
at 163. In considering a motion for a new trial based on insufficient
damages, the judge should not disturb a jury’s damage award unless firmly
convinced it is inadequate and contrary to the weight of the evidence. Soto,
242 Ariz. at 478 ¶ 8.

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VARELA v. MARTINEZ
Decision of the Court

¶13 Here, the judge acknowledged that negligence actions
prohibit nominal damages and also commented that the award “looks a lot
like nominal damages,” indicating he thoughtfully considered that
possibility. The judge’s role as “ninth juror” provided him with a special
perspective we do not have and cannot recreate from the record. See Reeves,
119 Ariz. at 163. With that perspective, he nevertheless decided the “jury
must have found [Mr. Varela] was injured, but his injury was very slight.”
The judge also stated the evidence supports such a finding. The judge’s
comments and ruling demonstrate appropriate reserve required to
safeguard the jury’s role. See Soto, 242 Ariz. at 477–78 ¶¶ 7–8.

¶14 The Varelas argue that allowing the verdict to stand results in
a miscarriage of justice. But the court serves as the primary buffer against
unjust verdicts, and it stood fast here. Soto, 242 Ariz. at 478 ¶ 8 (citation
omitted). We will not disturb a judge’s ruling on a motion for a new trial
unless the jury’s award is so inadequate that it must have resulted from
passion or prejudice. Carr v. Florian, 43 Ariz. 149, 155 (1934); Rule 59(1)(G).

¶15 Here, the trial judge was in the best position to evaluate
whether the damages award was unjust enough to require a new trial. He
heard contradictory testimony related to damages from the treating
chiropractor, defense experts, and Mr. Varela. Presuming at least some of
that testimony substantiated the jury’s award—as we must without
transcripts—we defer to the judge’s discretion. Baker, 183 Ariz. at 73. And
nothing in this record suggests the verdict resulted from extrinsic bias,
passion, or prejudice on the jury’s part. Assertions to the contrary are
speculation without specific citations to establish otherwise. Thus, the court
was within its discretion to deny the Varelas’ motion for additur or a new
trial based on insufficient damages.

CONCLUSION

¶16 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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