gabrielsson/kowalski v. Rns

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

HANNA GABRIELSSON, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants,

v.

R N S CENTER LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, et al., Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0724
FILED 08-05-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2022-090521
The Honorable Melissa Iyer Julian, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Hanna Gabrielsson and Marek Kowalski, Mesa
Plaintiffs/Appellants

Jones Skelton & Hochuli PLC, Phoenix
By Michele Molinario, Joseph J. Popolizio, Ashley E. Caballero-Daltrey,
Stephanie D. Baldwin
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees R.N.S. Center Limited Partnership, East State
Street Limited Partnership, East State Street Inc., Robson Communities Inc.,
Pamela Gulsvig

Gust Rosenfeld PLC, Phoenix
By Charles W. Wirken
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Alerus Financial Corp., Concepcion Henderson

GABRIELSSON/KOWALSKI v. RNS
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

B A I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Plaintiffs Hanna Gabrielsson and Marek Kowalski
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) appeal from a final judgment.1 For the following
reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Plaintiffs personally guaranteed a restaurant lease between
Defendant R.N.S. Center Limited Partnership (the “Landlord”) and a
tenant, which is a nonparty affiliated with the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs allege
that, after the Landlord locked the tenants out due to nonpayment, the
Landlord unlawfully auctioned off—for less than fair market value—
Plaintiffs’ exempt personal property.

¶3 Plaintiffs, who represent themselves, filed a 15-count lawsuit
against (1) Landlord and its related entities (collectively, “Robson
Affiliates”); (2) individuals associated with the Robson Affiliates; (3) SRS
Real Estate Partners – West, LLC and its vice president, Scott Ellsworth
(collectively, the “Brokers,” who negotiated the lease); and (4) Metro
Phoenix Bank (now known as Alerus Financial Corporation) and its
assistant vice president, Concepcion Henderson (collectively, the “Bank”).2

1 We have considered Plaintiffs’ motions for judicial notice dated October

15, 2025; February 17, 2026; and March 11, 2026; and the four motions for
judicial notice filed on June 22, 2026. We deem these filings as improper
attempts to supplement the briefs with arguments concerning the
admissibility and relevance of various documents and to challenge the
superior court’s rulings. As such, we deny these motions.

2 For purposes of this decision only, the Robson Affiliates include R.N.S.

Center Limited Partnership, East State Street Limited Partnership, East
State Street, Inc., and Robson Communities, Inc. The individuals associated

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¶4 Plaintiffs alleged (1) fraud in the inducement; (2) fraud in
factum; (3) promissory estoppel/fraud/tenant improvement allowance; (4)
promissory estoppel/Covid Aid; (5) promissory estoppel/Covid Aid
verbal; (6) mock auction; (7) conversion: private property; (8) conversion:
exempt property; (9) theft and release of electronic records; (10) unjust
enrichment: third party property; (11) loss of future income; (12) intentional
infliction of emotional distress; (13) defamation; (14) civil conspiracy; and
(15) public apology demanded.

¶5 The superior court dismissed all claims against the Bank,
which held a security interest in blanket business assets that served as
collateral for a loan given by the Bank to an entity affiliated with Plaintiffs
and then later released their lien. It also dismissed the claims against all
designated defendants for promissory estoppel, mock auction, theft and
release of electronic records, loss of future income, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, defamation, civil conspiracy, and the demand for public
apology. In that same ruling, the court dismissed all claims against Pamela
Gulsvig, an individual alleged to be general counsel for Robson
Communities and/or Affiliates. The court then granted summary
judgment to the Robson Affiliates on all remaining claims against them
(fraud, conversion, and unjust enrichment).

¶6 Aside from the various dismissals and judgments on the
substantive claims, the superior court also issued rulings imposing
financial obligations on Plaintiffs. Specifically, the court awarded the
Robson Affiliates and the Bank attorneys’ fees as sanctions against Plaintiffs
related to a discovery dispute. The court also granted the Robson Affiliates’
motion to designate Plaintiffs as vexatious litigants.

¶7 Ultimately, the superior court entered final judgment under
Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure (“Civil Rule”) 54(c).3 The court awarded
the Robson Affiliates $327,353.00 in attorneys’ fees plus interest pursuant to
Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 12-341.01 and the lease agreement.

with the Robson Affiliates include Scott Teerink, Pamela H. Gulsvig,
Michael Robson, Edward J. Robson, Karrin Taylor Robson, Paula Robinson,
and Steve Soriano.

3 The superior court dismissed the remaining individual Robson-affiliated

defendants for the failure to serve. The court also disposed of all claims
against the Brokers. None of these individuals or entities are parties to this
appeal.

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Decision of the Court

¶8 Plaintiffs appeal from the final judgment. We have
jurisdiction to review the final judgment and the interlocutory dismissals,
summary judgment, and vexatious litigant rulings under A.R.S. §§ 12-
2101(A)(1), and 12-2102(A). However, we have no jurisdiction to review
Plaintiffs’ challenge to the attorneys’ fee judgments awarded to both the
Bank and the Robson Affiliates as sanctions related to a discovery dispute
because Plaintiffs either did not appeal those rulings or abandoned their
appeal.4 Lee v. Lee, 133 Ariz. 118, 124 (App. 1982); ARCAP 9(a).

DISCUSSION

I. Standards of Review & Waiver

¶9 We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint. Coleman v.
City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352, 355, ¶ 7 (2012), abrogated by Ctr. for Ariz. Pol’y Inc.
v. Ariz. Sec’y of State, 178 Ariz. Cases Digest 4 (2026). We assume the truth
of all well-pleaded factual allegations. Id. at 356, ¶ 9. The superior court
properly dismisses a complaint for the failure to state a claim when the
plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any interpretation of the well-pleaded
facts. Id. at 356, ¶ 8. Conclusory allegations are insufficient. Id. at 356, ¶ 9.

¶10 Summary judgment is proper when the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law and there are no genuine issues of
material fact. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We review the grant of summary
judgment de novo. See Dinsmoor v. City of Phoenix, 251 Ariz. 370, 373, ¶ 13
(2021). We view the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. See id.

¶11 We review de novo whether the superior court erred in
awarding attorneys’ fees to the Robson Affiliates pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-
341.01. Rudinsky v. Harris, 231 Ariz. 95, 101, ¶ 27 (App. 2012). We review a
vexatious litigant ruling for an abuse of discretion. Madison v. Groseth, 230
Ariz. 8, 13, ¶ 16 n.8 (App. 2012) (a vexatious litigant order grants injunctive

4 On March 29, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal from a March 1, 2024,

“judgment,” but there is no corresponding judgment entered on that date.
At best, we presume Plaintiffs intended to appeal from the superior court’s
March 1, 2024, unsigned ruling awarding attorneys’ fees to the Bank and
the Robson Affiliates. That ruling is not an appealable judgment. And
Plaintiffs never appealed the subsequent judgments entered awarding
attorneys’ fees pursuant to the March 1, 2024, ruling. Regardless, Plaintiffs
ultimately abandoned the appeal stemming from their March 29, 2024,
notice of appeal. Thus, we lack jurisdiction to review the later judgments
awarding attorneys’ fees as sanctions.

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relief); Flying Diamond Airpark, LLC v. Meienberg, 215 Ariz. 44, 47, ¶ 9 (App.
2007) (grants of injunctive relief are reviewed for abuse of discretion).

¶12 On appeal, Plaintiffs do not challenge the superior court’s
rulings on tenant improvement allowance, promissory estoppel/COVID
Aid, promissory estoppel/COVID Aid verbal, mock auction, theft and
release of electronic records, unjust enrichment, loss of future income, or
public apology demanded.5 And despite referencing the superior court’s
denial of their motions to amend the complaint or striking of pleading
amendments and their promissory fraud claim, Plaintiffs develop no
argument in their opening brief challenging either those rulings or their
promissory fraud claim. As such, these arguments are waived. See In re
Aubuchon, 233 Ariz. 62, 64-65, ¶ 6 (2013).

II. The Bank

¶13 On appeal, Plaintiffs challenge the dismissal of their claims
against the Bank for conversion of private and exempt property, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, defamation, and civil conspiracy.6

A. Conversion

¶14 Recovery for conversion requires proof of “an intentional
exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes
with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required
to pay the other the full value of the chattel.” Miller v. Hehlen, 209 Ariz. 462,
472, ¶ 34 (App. 2005) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222(A)(1)
(1965)).

¶15 As for the allegation of conversion of personal property,
Plaintiffs merely state, “Defendants Robson Affiliates and The Bank
Conversion by Wrongful Act Inconsistent with The Property Rights of
Plaintiffs.” This is not a complete sentence and is merely a conclusory
allegation at best. Other allegations in the complaint state the Bank
“refus[ed] to demand the release of the SBA collateral;” stole unspecified
“tools of trade,” “third party property,” and “SBA(7a) loan collateral;” and

5 The only allegations leveled against Henderson were in the mock auction

claim, which Plaintiffs do not challenge on appeal.

6 The superior court’s ruling references the statute of limitations, but that

appears to be a mistake because the court dismissed the claims “[f]or the
reasons set forth by Defendant” and the Bank’s motion did not make a
statute of limitations argument.

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Decision of the Court

sold or donated property to the Robson Affiliates, yet simultaneously
alleged that the Bank released its lien. None of these allegations explain
how the Bank’s release of its lien on business assets owned by another entity
constitute conversion.

¶16 As for the allegation of conversion of exempt property,
Plaintiffs cite generally Title 33, Chapter 8 of the Arizona Revised Statutes
as protecting exempt property from being seized by the Bank, and state in
another incomplete sentence and conclusory allegation, “Defendants
Robson Affiliates and The Bank Conversion by Wrongful Act Inconsistent
with The Property Rights of Plaintiffs.” They refer to an exhibit in which
they allegedly “ask[ed] for food and chest freezers” from the Robson
Affiliates. Presumably, Plaintiffs refer to A.R.S. § 33-1124, which provides
that “food, fuel and provisions actually provided for the debtor’s individual
or family use for six months are exempt from process.” But Plaintiffs allege
that they moved personal food into the premises for storage during the
COVID pandemic, which the Robson Affiliates−not the Bank—allegedly
disposed of. As such, Plaintiffs fail to state claims for conversion by the
Bank.

B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

¶17 A claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
requires (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant, (2) intention
to cause emotional distress or reckless disregard nearly certain to cause
distress, and (3) resulting severe emotional distress. See Ford v. Revlon, Inc.,
153 Ariz. 38, 43 (1987).

¶18 Plaintiffs allege “[t]he Bank intentionally disposed [of]
Plaintiff’s food supply during the pandemic,” “intentionally deprived
Plaintiffs of their livelihood,” “intentionally converted/stole Plaintiffs[’]
entire property,” “intentionally tossed away Plaintiffs[’] most cherished
souvenirs and memorab[ilia] and awards.” Again, Plaintiffs also alleged
that the Robson Affiliates, not the Bank, disposed of Plaintiffs’ food supply.
Plaintiffs also alleged that the Robson Affiliates, not the Bank, “confiscat[ed
the] entire content[s] of Plaintiffs’ restaurant” and removed equipment
from the restaurant. We find Plaintiffs’ allegations against the Bank
conclusory, ill-pleaded, and fail to state a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.

C. Defamation

¶19 Defamation requires proof of the publication of a “false and
defamatory communication” knowing the statement is false and

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defamatory, or the reckless disregard or negligent failure to ascertain the
falseness of the statement. Rowland v. Union Hills Country Club, 157 Ariz.
301, 306 (App. 1988) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 580(B)
(1977)). Plaintiffs only allege the Bank “made public that Plaintiffs’
property is being given away and sold to unknown individuals due to
nonpayment.” But Plaintiffs failed to identify with any specificity what
public statement the Bank made. Plaintiffs fail to state a claim against the
Bank for defamation.

D. Civil Conspiracy

¶20 Civil conspiracy requires that “two or more individuals agree
and thereupon accomplish ‘an underlying tort which the alleged
conspirators agreed to commit.’” Wells Fargo Bank v. Ariz. Laborers,
Teamsters and Cement Masons Local No. 390 Pension Tr. Fund, 201 Ariz. 474,
498, ¶ 99 (2002) (quoting Baker v. Stewart Title & Trust of Phoenix, 197 Ariz.
535, 545, ¶ 42 (App. 2000)); see also Dube v. Likins, 216 Ariz. 406, 413, ¶ 15
(App. 2007).

¶21 In support of their claim for civil conspiracy, Plaintiffs allege
the Bank “transfer[red] over $450,000.00 worth of Plaintiffs[‘] property to
Defendants Robson Affiliates for $4,500.00 1% (ONE percent of its fair
market value).” Plaintiffs fail to allege any agreement the Bank and the
Robson Affiliates had to accomplish an unlawful purpose, which is a
threshold requirement for a civil conspiracy claim. Wells Fargo, 201 Ariz. at
499, ¶ 100. Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for civil conspiracy.

III. Robson Affiliates & Gulsvig

A. Dismissals for Failure to State a Claim

¶22 On appeal, Plaintiffs challenge the dismissal of the claims
against Gulsvig for fraud in factum and defamation and challenge the
dismissal of the Robson Affiliates for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, defamation, and civil conspiracy.

1. Gulsvig

¶23 Plaintiffs allege that Gulsvig (1) “made libelous claim about
Plaintiffs’ defaulting on SBA Loan when The Bank contacted them
regarding release of the SBA Collateral” and (2) “made libelous claim about
Plaintiffs’ owing Defendants Robson Affiliates the astronomical sum well
more than $100,000.00 despite Defendants Robson Affiliates and The Bank
confiscation of Plaintiffs[‘] entire property.” Plaintiffs’ allegations are

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conclusory, and Plaintiffs fail to allege that Gulsvig knew any alleged
statements about Plaintiffs’ SBA loan status and balance owed were false or
that Gulsvig was reckless or negligent in failing to ascertain the truth. See
Rowland, 157 Ariz. at 306. Plaintiffs fail to state a claim against Gulsvig for
defamation.

¶24 Fraud in factum applies where a defendant fraudulently
causes the plaintiff to sign a document while believing the document is of
a different nature or contains different essential terms. See Garrett v. Holmes
Tuttle Broadway Ford, 5 Ariz. App. 388, 390-92 (App. 1967) (citing
Restatement Contracts § 475); see also Restatement (Second) Contracts § 163
(1981). Plaintiffs alleged Gulsvig “without authorization alter[ed] the final
version of the Lease.” But Plaintiffs also inconsistently alleged that they
negotiated with the Robson Affiliates until they signed the lease, requested
alterations, and that the Robson Affiliates directed Gulsvig to make those
alterations. Plaintiffs attached to the complaint a lease containing those
very alterations yet later alleged that the lease was altered after they signed
it. Plaintiffs’ allegations against Gulsvig are not well-pleaded. Plaintiffs
fail to state a claim for fraud in factum against Gulsvig.

2. Robson Affiliates

¶25 Plaintiffs allege the Robson Affiliates intentionally
misrepresented the true cost of expenses, altered/forged the lease, disposed
of their food supply during the pandemic, deprived Plaintiffs of their
livelihood, converted/stole Plaintiffs’ “entire property,” and tossed away
souvenirs, memorabilia, and awards. We find these allegations to be
conclusory and insufficient to state a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.

¶26 As for defamation, Plaintiffs allege the Robson Affiliates
“made public that Plaintiffs’ property is being given away and sold to
unknown individuals due to nonpayment.” Plaintiffs further alleged the
Robson Affiliates provided several false statements to the Attorney
General’s office in response to Plaintiffs’ claims against them. Further,
Plaintiffs alleged that the Robson Affiliates “made libelous claim about
Plaintiffs’ defaulting on SBA Loan when The Bank contacted them
regarding release of the SBA Collateral.” These allegations fail to identify
any particular defamatory statement and are insufficient to state a claim for
defamation.

¶27 Finally, in support of their civil conspiracy claim, Plaintiffs
make the same allegation against the Robson Affiliates as they did against

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Decision of the Court

the Bank. As we discussed, supra ¶ 21, this allegation is insufficient to state
a claim.

B. Summary Judgment

¶28 On appeal, Plaintiffs challenge the summary judgment
rulings on their fraud and conversion claims. In support of its motion for
summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ fraudulent inducement claim, the Robson
Affiliates provided evidence that, instead of falsely representing the cost of
certain lease charges, the Robson Affiliates informed Plaintiffs that those
costs were “estimated.” Plaintiffs also alleged that the Robson Affiliates
fraudulently altered the lease. But the very exhibits Plaintiffs attached to
the complaint establish that Plaintiffs negotiated alterations with the
Robson Affiliates up until they signed the lease, that the Robson Affiliates
ordered Gulsvig to alter the agreement pursuant to Plaintiffs’ negotiated
requests, and that the lease Plaintiffs signed contained those very
alterations. And in support of its motion for summary judgment on
Plaintiffs’ conversion claims, the Robson Affiliates provided evidence that
they had authority under the lease to perform a lockout, take title to or
remove abandoned property, and that they repeatedly offered Plaintiffs the
opportunity to collect their personal property.

¶29 Ultimately, Plaintiffs’ response to the Robson Affiliates’
motion for summary judgment and statement of facts failed to comply with
Civil Rule 56(c), did not cite any admissible evidence in the record, failed to
develop any substantive argument challenging the Robson Affiliates’
motion, and most importantly, failed to establish a genuine issue of material
fact sufficient to withstand summary judgment. The superior court
properly granted the Robson Affiliates’ summary judgment on the fraud
and conversion claims.

C. Superior Court Attorneys’ Fee Award

¶30 Plaintiffs argue the superior court erred in awarding the
Robson Affiliates more than $327,000 in attorneys’ fees because there was
no underlying contract and because the amount is unreasonable. Because
Plaintiffs failed to file a response or objection to the attorney fee application,
we do not consider their arguments, which Plaintiffs raise for the first time
on appeal. Scottsdale Princess P’ship v. Maricopa Cnty., 185 Ariz. 368, 378
(App. 1995).

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D. Vexatious Litigant Ruling

¶31 Plaintiffs challenge the superior court’s ruling declaring them
vexatious litigants.

¶32 Under A.R.S. § 12-3201, the superior court may designate a
pro-se litigant vexatious for conduct that unreasonably expands or delays
proceedings, abuses discovery with resultant sanctions, and involves the
“[r]epeated filing of documents or requests for relief that have been the
subject of previous rulings by the court in the same litigation.” A.R.S. § 12-
3201(E)(1)(f).

¶33 Plaintiffs argue the superior court erred in designating them
vexatious based on filings “without substantial justification.” They argue
their filings were “legally mandated under [Arizona] Rule [of Evidence] 103
to preserve rights, prove fraud, forgery, perjury, grand theft and fraud
against [the] Federal Government.” Rule 103 does not “legally mandate”
filing any documents and is inapposite.

¶34 The superior court declared Plaintiffs vexatious because it
found Plaintiffs had:

• Been abusive in their discovery demands, for which they have
already been sanctioned.

• Ignored the Court’s orders setting deadlines for disclosure and
dispositive motions.

• Littered the record with numerous substantively and procedurally
improper filings, with the Court being forced to strike more than 60
in this calendar year alone.

• Repeatedly and baselessly accused the Court and other parties of
criminal behavior.

• Repeatedly raised and re-raised arguments and issues previously
determined in this case.

• Filed a federal RICO lawsuit seeking to enjoin this matter dismissed
sua sponte by Judge Liburdi. Gabrielsson v. R.N.S. Ctr. Ltd. P’ship, 2024
WL 4651904, at *2 (D. Ariz. Nov. 3, 2024).

The record supports the superior court’s findings. The court did not abuse
its discretion in designating Plaintiffs as vexatious litigants.

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IV. Attorneys’ Fees on Appeal

¶35 The Robson Defendants request attorneys’ fees on appeal
pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-349 and A.R.S. § 12-341.01. The Bank requests
attorneys’ fees on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01, A.R.S. § 12-349,
Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure (“ARCAP”) 25, and Jhagroo v.
City of Phoenix, Mun. Ct., 143 Ariz. 595, 598 (App. 1984). We award the
defendants attorneys’ fees on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01 and as
sanctions for violating ARCAP 13(a) and for filing improper motions for
judicial notice after this court denied 20 other improper motions for judicial
notice and cautioned Plaintiffs against further filings. ARCAP 25.

CONCLUSION

¶36 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court’s
ruling. We award the defendants costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees upon
compliance with ARCAP 21.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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