Coconut Properties v. Friess

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

COCONUT PROPERTIES, LLC, Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

JULIE D. FRIESS, Defendant/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0728
FILED 09-16-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
No. S1300CV202580311
The Honorable John David Napper, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Evans Dove Nelson Fish & Grier, PLC, Mesa
By Douglas N. Nelson, Trevor J. Fish
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee

Julie D. Friess, Phoenix
Defendant/Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Angela K. Paton delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

COCONUT PROPERTIES v. FRIESS
Decision of the Court

P A T O N, Judge:

¶1 Julie Friess appeals the superior court’s judgment finding her
guilty of forcible detainer and awarding possession of the property at issue
(“the property”) to Coconut Properties, LLC (“Coconut Properties”). For
the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Friess had a loan secured by a deed of trust on the property,
and the lender foreclosed. On June 26, 2025, Coconut Properties purchased
the property at a trustee sale and acquired title by trustee’s deed. Coconut
Properties then served Friess with a notice to vacate, but Friess refused, so
Coconut Properties filed this forcible entry and detainer (“FED”) action.

¶3 Friess moved to dismiss, claiming the recorded deed of trust
had been “fraudulently altered” and the property’s title was subject to
ongoing litigation. Coconut Properties responded, arguing the trustee’s
deed constituted conclusive evidence in favor of a bona fide purchaser, the
trustee’s sale complied with statutory requirements, Friess waived all
objections to the trustee’s sale by failing to obtain an injunction beforehand,
and title disputes could not be litigated in an FED action. Friess’s reply
argued the deed of trust was “void ab initio” and waiver did not apply
because she received no notice of the trustee’s sale.

¶4 Friess also filed a counterclaim for “civil RICO, fraud, due
process violations, and declaratory relief,” alleging the lender unlawfully
foreclosed and Coconut Properties’s attempt to evict her was part of the
“fraudulent foreclosure scheme.” Coconut Properties moved to dismiss
Friess’s counterclaims because counterclaims were not permitted in the
FED action.

¶5 The superior court denied Friess’s motion to dismiss the FED
action and granted Coconut Properties’s motion to dismiss Friess’s
counterclaims. At trial, Coconut Properties introduced the trustee’s deed
into evidence, and a member of Coconut Properties testified that Coconut
Properties purchased it for $574,000. Coconut Properties also presented
testimony from a real estate appraiser regarding the property’s fair market
rental value. Friess testified that the deed was void and that she did not
know about the trustee’s sale.

¶6 The court found Friess guilty of forcible detainer and
awarded Coconut Properties immediate possession of the property, an
amount for the fair market rental value of the property during the eviction

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COCONUT PROPERTIES v. FRIESS
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proceedings, attorneys’ fees, and court costs. Friess timely appealed. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statute (“A.R.S.”) Section 12-
2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶7 On appeal, Friess argues the superior court: (1) lacked subject
matter jurisdiction; (2) erred in ordering her eviction due to alleged defects
in the deed of trust, foreclosure process, and trustee’s sale; and (3) violated
her due process rights.

I. The superior court did not err in denying Friess’s motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

¶8 We review challenges to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction
de novo. Tanner v. Marwil, 250 Ariz. 43, 45, ¶ 9 (App. 2020).

¶9 Friess argues the superior court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the FED action because a federal quiet title action
regarding the property was pending and a lis pendens had been recorded.
Accordingly, she contends, “[j]urisdiction over title-related issues had
attached elsewhere . . . .”

¶10 A lis pendens merely serves to provide notice of litigation to
parties interested in land; it does not restrict the superior court’s
jurisdiction. TWE Ret. Fund Tr. v. Ream, 198 Ariz. 268, 272, ¶ 16 (App. 2000)
(“A lis pendens . . . can never affect jurisdiction.”). Friess is correct,
however, that if a federal court has already asserted in rem jurisdiction over
a property, under the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine, a state court
cannot hear an FED action regarding the same property. Bank of N.Y. Mellon
v. Lehnerd, 2 CA-CV 2014-0160, 2016 WL 1554292, at *3-4, ¶¶ 14, 20 (Ariz.
App. Apr. 15, 2016) (mem. decision). But Friess failed to present any
evidence to either the superior court or this court that a federal court had
asserted in rem jurisdiction over the property prior to the FED action. In
her opening brief, Friess provided only a federal case number and claimed
it was a quiet title action regarding the property. Without more than her
conclusory allegation, “the appellate record [i]s insufficient to determine
the nature of [Friess]’s action in federal court.” Id. at *3, ¶ 13 n.2. We
therefore cannot say the superior court erred in denying Friess’s motion to
dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

II. The superior court did not err in finding Coconut Properties
had a superior right of possession.

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COCONUT PROPERTIES v. FRIESS
Decision of the Court

¶11 Friess next argues the superior court erred by awarding
Coconut Properties possession because the foreclosure was based on a
defective deed of trust and the trustee’s sale did not comply with statutory
requirements.

¶12 Forcible detainer occurs when a person remains “[w]ilfully
and without force” on a property after her right to occupy it has ended,
such as when the property has been sold through a trustee’s sale, and she
has received a written demand to vacate. A.R.S. §§ 12-1171(3),
1173.01(A)(2). “[A] forcible detainer action is a summary, speedy and
adequate statutory remedy for obtaining possession of premises by one
entitled to actual possession.” Casa Grande Tr. Co. v. Superior Ct. ex rel. Pinal
Cnty., 8 Ariz. App. 163, 165 (1968) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the
“only issue” in a FED action “shall be the right of actual possession and the
merits of title shall not be inquired into.” A.R.S. § 12-1177(A).

¶13 As evidence of its right of actual possession, Coconut
Properties introduced a certified copy of the trustee’s deed and the written
demand to vacate it served Friess. Friess, however, claims Coconut
Properties “took no valid interest” in the property because the trustee’s sale
did not comply with statutory requirements and the underlying foreclosure
was based on a defective and “void” deed of trust.

¶14 Friess has presented nothing beyond mere conclusory
allegations of defects in the deed of trust and trustee’s sale. But even if
Friess had evidence to support her assertions, all these arguments concern
whether Coconut Properties took valid title when it acquired the trustee’s
deed. And matters of title are not reviewable in a FED action. A.R.S. § 12-
1177(A).

¶15 Regardless, Friess has waived her arguments regarding
defects in the deed of trust and the lender’s authority to foreclose. Under
Section 33-811(C), the trustor “shall waive all defenses and objections to the
sale not raised in an action that results in the issuance of a court order”
enjoining the sale. It is undisputed that Friess did not obtain an injunction
prior to the trustee’s sale. Friess asserts, without citation to authority, that
“a defective deed cannot confer bona fide purchaser status.” But “[t]he
plain language of [Section] 33-811(C) does not condition the applicability of
the waiver provision on the existence of a bona fide purchaser.” Madison v.
Groseth, 230 Ariz. 8, 13, ¶ 14 (App. 2012).

¶16 Friess’s arguments concerning the lawfulness of the trustee’s
sale are similarly meritless. A trustee’s deed raises the presumption of

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COCONUT PROPERTIES v. FRIESS
Decision of the Court

compliance with the requirements of the deed of trust and statute “relating
to the exercise of the power of sale and the sale of the trust property,
including recording, mailing, publishing and posting of notice of sale and
the conduct of the sale.” A.R.S. § 33-811(B). And for purchasers “for value
and without actual notice,” the trustee’s deed is “conclusive evidence of the
meeting of those requirements.” Id. Friess claims she never received notice
of a trustee’s sale and argues no public sale happened. But she has
presented no evidence that Coconut Properties was not a purchaser “for
value and without actual notice” of the alleged title defects. Id. Therefore,
when Coconut Properties received the trustee’s deed, it received conclusive
evidence that the trustee’s sale complied with all statutory requirements,
including notice requirements.

¶17 Coconut Properties established its superior right of
possession to the property by presenting a certified copy of the trustee’s
deed. The superior court did not err in finding Friess guilty of forcible
detainer and awarding Coconut Properties immediate possession.

III. The superior court did not violate Friess’s due process rights.

¶18 Finally, Friess cursorily claims the court violated her due
process rights and failed to provide requested accommodations under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). But Friess failed to adequately
develop her argument or cite to any record evidence or legal authority to
support her assertion. Her argument is therefore waived. See ARCAP
13(a)(7)(A); Ramos v. Nichols, 252 Ariz. 519, 522, ¶ 8 (App. 2022) (failure to
develop argument or cite supporting authority waives issue on appeal).

IV. Attorneys’ Fees

¶19 Coconut Properties requests an award of attorneys’ fees
pursuant to Sections 12-1178(A) and 12-341.01. But Section 12-341.01 does
not apply because “a forcible detainer action following a trustee’s sale does
not arise out of contract.” Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Dodev, 246 Ariz. 1, 11-12, ¶
38 (App. 2018). And Section 12-1178 applies only to trial. Id. at 12, ¶ 40;
Montano v. Luff, 250 Ariz. 401, 407, ¶ 18 (App. 2020). Section 12-1182, which
applies to appeals, does not provide for recovery of attorneys’ fees, only
costs and damages. Dodev, 246 Ariz. at 12, ¶ 40.

¶20 Because Coconut Properties has failed to provide us with
authority to award attorneys’ fees, we deny its request. But as the
prevailing party, Coconut Properties is entitled to its costs on appeal upon
compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21.

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COCONUT PROPERTIES v. FRIESS
Decision of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶21 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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