STEWART v. ARIZONA BANK

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of the Estate of:

LYNDA L. STEWART, Deceased.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0748 PB
FILED 09-15-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. PB2010-001031
The Honorable Dean M. Fink, Judge Retired

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Jones Skelton & Hochuli, PLC, Phoenix
By Eileen Dennis GilBride
Co-Counsel for Respondent/Appellee

McNemar Law Offices, PC, Phoenix
By T. Troy McNemar
Co-Counsel for Respondent/Appellee

Aaron Stewart, Tacoma, WA
Petitioner/Appellant

Slade A. Stewart, Scottsdale
Respondent/Appellee

Sean Stewart, Bellevue, WA
Respondent/Appellee Trustee

STEWART v. ARIZONA BANK, et al.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Vice Chief Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court,
in which Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge Anni Hill Foster
joined.

W E I N Z W E I G, Vice Chief Judge:

¶1 Aaron Stewart appeals the denial of his motion to set aside a
final judgment. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Stewart is a beneficiary of the Lynda Stewart Trust (“Trust”),
which his mother created in 2004. Arizona Bank & Trust (“Bank”) serves
as its co-trustee.

¶3 In October 2024, the Bank petitioned the superior court to
approve a final accounting and distribute what remained in the Trust.
Before serving the interested parties, the Bank emailed Stewart’s last known
attorney of record to confirm he still represented Stewart. That attorney
never answered, so the Bank mailed a copy of the petition and notice of
hearing to Stewart’s last known address by certified mail on November 5,
2024.

¶4 The superior court held a hearing in December 2024. It found
that all parties had notice. Stewart did not appear at the hearing. Without
objection, the court approved the accounting, authorized final
distributions, discharged the Bank of liability and closed the Trust.

¶5 Five months later, Stewart moved to set aside the order. He
argued the judgment was void, that his default was the result of excusable
neglect and that extraordinary circumstances justified relief. See Ariz. R.
Civ. P. 60(b)(1), (4), (6). His arguments hinged on three things: late notice
of the hearing, defective service and an inaccurate accounting.

¶6 Following oral argument, the superior court denied the
motion. It found that Stewart had actual notice of the proceeding and that
his former counsel no longer represented him.

¶7 Stewart timely appealed. We have jurisdiction. A.R.S. § 12-
2101(A)(2).

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STEWART v. ARIZONA BANK, et al.
Decision of the Court

DISCUSSION

¶8 Stewart argues the superior court should have set aside the
judgment on three grounds: the judgment was void, his default was
excusable neglect and extraordinary circumstances justified relief. See Ariz.
R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), (4), (6).1

¶9 We review the excusable-neglect and extraordinary-
circumstances arguments for an abuse of discretion, Gonzalez v. Nguyen, 243
Ariz. 531, 533, ¶ 8 (2018), and we affirm unless undisputed facts require a
different result, City of Phx. v. Geyler, 144 Ariz. 323, 330 (1985). We review
the void-judgment argument de novo. Sycamore Hills Ests. Homeowners
Ass’n v. Zablotny, 250 Ariz. 479, 482, ¶ 6 (App. 2021).

I. Void Judgment.

¶10 Stewart argues the judgment is void and should be set aside
because the Bank did not serve his former attorney George Paul (“Paul”)
and gave him untimely notice, which meant the superior court lacked
jurisdiction. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4). Service of process is required for a
court to obtain jurisdiction over a party, and a judgment entered without
jurisdiction is void. Ruffino v. Lokosky, 245 Ariz. 165, 168, ¶ 10 (App. 2018).

¶11 We are not persuaded. The superior court acquired personal
jurisdiction over Stewart the moment he accepted his first distribution from
the Trust. A.R.S. § 14-10202(B) (“By accepting a distribution from [the]
trust, the recipient submits personally to the jurisdiction of the courts of this
state regarding any matter involving the trust.”).

¶12 Besides that, Stewart’s former attorney no longer represented
him. Paul appeared for Stewart in 2011, left his firm in 2013 and never
represented Stewart again. Nobody ever filed a substitution or a
withdrawal. That gap in representation does not revive a relationship that
ended over a decade earlier. Given that, Arizona law required only that the
Bank mail the petition and hearing notice to Stewart’s last known address

1 Stewart also argues the accounting was inaccurate and the Bank
should not have been relieved of its trustee duties. He never appealed that
order, so those arguments are not before us. Laveen Meadows Homeowners
Ass’n v. Mejia, 249 Ariz. 81, 83, ¶ 6 (App. 2020) (“The scope of an appeal
from a denial of a Rule 60 motion is restricted to the questions raised by the
motion to set aside and does not extend to a review of whether the trial
court was substantively correct in entering the judgment from which relief
was sought.” (citation omitted)).

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STEWART v. ARIZONA BANK, et al.
Decision of the Court

more than fourteen days before the hearing. See A.R.S. §§ 14-1401(A)(1),
-10109(A). The Bank did so. Service was proper. See Ariz. R. Civ. P.
5(c)(2)(C).

¶13 Stewart separately argues the same notice failures violate due
process. Due process requires notice “reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action
and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v.
Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). He argues notice
should have gone to his former attorney instead of him, he personally
received the papers only after the hearing and the letter he received listed
the wrong date.

¶14 We are not persuaded. First, former attorney Paul had not
represented Stewart since 2013. Supra ¶ 12. The Bank emailed Paul and got
no answer. And in 2023, Stewart himself asked the Bank to send his
statements directly to him instead of to Paul. Stewart never explains how
notice to a lawyer who no longer represented him would have reached him
more reliably than notice sent to the address he provided. The Bank
provided reasonable notice. Second, due process does not require receipt
of actual notice, only notice reasonably calculated to reach the interested
party—the same standard that made service proper. Supra ¶¶ 12–13. Third,
although one letter misstated the hearing date, the notice the Bank sent with
the petition stated the correct date.

II. Excusable Neglect.

¶15 Stewart argues in the alternative that his default was the
result of excusable neglect. To set aside a judgment on that ground, a
movant must show mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect;
prompt action in seeking relief; and a meritorious defense. Ariz. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(1); Addison v. Cienega, Ltd., 146 Ariz. 322, 323 (App. 1985); Daou v.
Harris, 139 Ariz. 353, 358–59 (1984). Neglect is excusable when it is the kind
of mistake a reasonably prudent person might make under the same
circumstances. Geyler, 144 Ariz. at 331.

¶16 This argument fails because Stewart cannot show he
promptly sought relief. He received the petition two weeks after the
hearing but waited five more months to seek relief. He does not explain
that delay. We do not presume an unexplained delay is prompt action, and
the superior court properly denied relief on that basis alone. United Imps.
& Exps., Inc. v. Superior Court, 134 Ariz. 43, 46 (1982), abrogated on other
grounds by Gonzalez, 243 Ariz. at 534, ¶ 13.

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STEWART v. ARIZONA BANK, et al.
Decision of the Court

¶17 Even if Stewart had acted promptly, his neglect was not
excusable. He only restates his notice argument: that the Bank failed to
make sure he received the petition before the hearing. As explained above,
however, the Bank had no such duty. Supra ¶ 14; see also A.R.S. §§ 14-
1401(A)(1), -10109(A); Columbia Grp., Inc. v. Jackson, 151 Ariz. 76, 78–79
(1986). That leaves only Stewart’s own inaction, and it was not excusable.
A beneficiary who fails to check mail sent to the address he provided has
shown only “mere carelessness” or “unexplained neglect,” neither of which
qualifies as excusable neglect. Daou, 139 Ariz. at 359; Richas v. Superior
Court, 133 Ariz. 512, 515 (1982). We find no abuse of discretion.

III. Extraordinary Hardship or Injustice.

¶18 Stewart likewise argues that improper notice and service
justify relief as extraordinary circumstances. Rule 60(b)(6) authorizes a
court to set aside a judgment for “any other reason justifying relief.” Ariz.
R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). A movant seeking that relief must show extraordinary
circumstances of hardship or injustice and a reason distinct from the
grounds covered by the rule’s other five clauses. Hilgeman v. Am. Mortg.
Sec., Inc., 196 Ariz. 215, 220, ¶ 15 (App. 2000). Stewart’s argument fails
because he only parrots the arguments rejected above. We find no abuse of
discretion.

CONCLUSION

¶19 We affirm. The Bank seeks its attorney fees under A.R.S.
§ 14-11004. We grant that request in our discretion. As the prevailing party,
the Bank is also entitled to its taxable costs upon compliance with ARCAP
21.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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