Hawkins v. Hawkins

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

DARRELL LAMAR HAWKINS, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

EMILY JEAN HAWKINS, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0750 FC

FILED 08-21-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2023-094729
The Honorable Keith A. Miller, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART

COUNSEL

McWhorter Law Firm, Gilbert
By Heath H. McWhorter
Counsel for Appellant

Al Arpad, Esq., Phoenix
By Alexander R. Arpad
Counsel for Appellee

HAWKINS v. HAWKINS
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Andrew J. Becke delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge Veronika Fabian joined.

B E C K E, Judge:

¶1 Darrell Lamar Hawkins (“Husband”) appeals the superior
court’s dissolution decree and order amending the decree. For the following
reasons, we affirm in part and vacate and remand in part.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Husband was married to Emily Jean Hawkins (“Wife”) for
eight years before petitioning for divorce in November 2023. They share
one minor child, born December 2019. Husband works as a bankruptcy
attorney earning $35,000 monthly and Mother works as a dental hygienist
instructor earning $7,222 monthly.

¶3 Mother and Father moved for temporary orders. Mother
sought temporary spousal maintenance while Father requested joint legal
decision-making and proposed a parenting schedule. Following an
evidentiary hearing, the superior court awarded Mother temporary spousal
maintenance of $4,000 for nine months followed by $2,000 for another nine
months, ordered Father to pay $95 each month in child support, granted
joint legal decision-making, and adopted Father’s parenting time schedule.
Neither party provided a transcript of this hearing.

¶4 At the trial in April 2024, the parties agreed on some issues
but still disputed legal decision-making, parenting time, the division of
assets, spousal maintenance, child support, and attorneys’ fees. Neither
party requested findings of facts or conclusions of law before trial under
Arizona Rule of Family Paw Procedure (“Rule”) 82(a). The superior court
heard testimony from both parties, their valuation experts, and Mother’s
sister. As relevant here, the court issued its dissolution decree amending
the existing parenting schedule to adopt some of Mother’s proposed
changes, ordering Father to pay $1,076 monthly in child support to Mother,
and denying Mother’s spousal maintenance claim. The court also awarded
Father a Tesla valued at $10, all of his 2023 tax refund, and a Vantage
self-directed IRA (“IRA”) valued at $1.3 million. Father was also ordered to

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pay an equalization payment of $31,500. Last, the court found neither party
acted unreasonably but awarded Mother a portion of her attorneys’ fees
based on financial disparity. See A.R.S. § 25-324(B).

¶5 Both parties moved to alter or amend the decree. Father asked
the court to reconsider the parenting time schedule, the temporary spousal
maintenance and child support, the value of the Tesla, the split of the tax
refund and retirement accounts, and to divide assets omitted from the
decree. He also argued Mother should not be awarded attorneys’ fees
because she acted unreasonably during the proceedings and had similar
assets following the division of the marital estate. Mother asked the court
to divide several life insurance policies and financial accounts not
addressed in the decree.

¶6 The superior court affirmed its decision on parenting time,
temporary spousal maintenance and child support, the Tesla valuation, the
tax refund division, the IRA, and attorneys’ fees. The court divided the
omitted life insurance policies and other assets, ordering Father to pay an
additional $65,162 as an equalization payment. The court did not explain
how the equalization payment amount was calculated. Father timely
appealed. We have jurisdiction. A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶7 Father argues the superior court erred by (1) setting the
parenting time schedule, (2) not crediting him for overpaid temporary
spousal maintenance, (3) undercharging him for child support, (4) failing
to correctly value and divide assets, and (5) awarding attorneys’ fees to
Mother. We address each issue in turn.

I. The Court Did Not Err in Setting the Parenting Time Schedule.

¶8 We review the superior court’s orders regarding parenting
time for an abuse of discretion. Nold v. Nold, 232 Ariz. 270, 273, ¶ 11
(App. 2013). When parents disagree on a parenting time schedule, the court
is tasked with deciding a schedule based on the child’s best interests,
including specific statutory factors enumerated in § 25-403(A). A.R.S.
§§ 25-403.02(D), -403(A). It must make “specific findings on the record
about all relevant factors and the reasons for which the decision is in the best
interests of the child,” § 25-403(B) (emphasis added), and adopt a parenting
plan that maximizes a parent’s respective parenting time consistent with a
child’s best interests, § 25-403.02(B). Parenting-time orders which lack
requisite statutory findings and fail to set forth the superior court’s
consideration of those factors are deficient as a matter of law and constitute

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an abuse of discretion. Christopher K. v. Markaa S., 233 Ariz. 297, 301, ¶ 18
(App. 2013).

¶9 Although Father argues the court’s § 25-403 findings were
scarce, the superior court considered the relevant § 25-403 factors and found
its parenting time schedule “is practical and also maximizes each parent’s
parenting time to the extent it is in the child’s best interests.” Neither party
disputed the superior court’s findings that the child was too young to
express his wishes on parenting time, that neither party had mental or
physical health problems, and that there was no history of or false reporting
of domestic violence or child abuse. See A.R.S. § 25-403(A)(4), (5), (8), (11).
The court made findings on the third factor—the child’s adjustment to
home, school, and community—which was the only factor disputed at trial.
The court is only required to make findings on relevant factors. See A.R.S.
§ 25-403(B).

¶10 Father argues the child had become accustomed to the
temporary orders’ parenting plan. That argument ignores, however, that
the superior court is not handcuffed to its temporary orders because the
orders do “not prejudice the rights of the parties . . . at subsequent hearings
in the proceedings” and automatically “[t]erminate[] when the final decree
is entered.” A.R.S. § 25-316(D). We discern no abuse of discretion.

II. The Court Was Not Required to Retroactively Modify Temporary
Spousal Maintenance.

¶11 Father next argues that because Mother was not entitled to
spousal maintenance in the final decree, the court should have retroactively
modified the temporary spousal maintenance. We review the court’s
decision whether to modify temporary support for an abuse of discretion.
Maximov v. Maximov, 220 Ariz. 299, 300, ¶ 2 (App. 2009). The court abuses
its discretion when the record viewed most favorably to affirming is
“devoid of competent evidence to support the decision.” Little v. Little, 193 Ariz. 518, 520, ¶ 5 (1999) (internal quotations omitted).

¶12 In a dissolution proceeding, the superior court may issue an
order for temporary spousal maintenance but such an order “[d]oes not
prejudice the rights of the parties or of any child that are to be adjudicated
at subsequent hearings in the proceedings[,]” and may be revoked or
modified any time before entry of the final decree if there is a showing that
there has been a substantial and continuing change of circumstances. A.R.S.
§§ 25-316(A)(2), (D)(1)–(2), -327; Maximov, 220 Ariz. at 301, ¶ 7 (stating the
family court retains its authority to modify temporary support). “The

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burden of proving changed circumstances is on the party seeking
modification.” Scott v. Scott, 121 Ariz. 492, 494 (1979).

¶13 Here, the superior court awarded temporary spousal
maintenance but denied additional spousal maintenance in the final
dissolution decree and affirmed both decisions following Father’s motion
to amend. Father did not allege during trial or in his motion to amend that
there was a substantial or continuing change of circumstances that justifies
retroactive modification. Therefore, Father has not met his burden. See id.

¶14 Instead, Father presumes the denial of spousal maintenance
in the final decree automatically modified the temporary orders. Neither
the final decree nor the order denying Father’s motion to amend contain
any language to support that theory. Nor has Father provided any case law
or statutory authority to support that presumption.

¶15 Additionally, Father did not provide a transcript of the
temporary orders hearing. We therefore presume the superior court found
every fact necessary to support its award of temporary maintenance. See
ARCAP 11(c); Baker v. Baker, 183 Ariz. 70, 73 (App. 1995) (holding we may
assume the court’s findings are supported by the record when the parties
fail to provide the relevant transcripts).

¶16 Even so, the court’s orders are supported by the record. Prior
to the petition for dissolution, Mother had left her job while pregnant and
then started working part time. Around the time of the petition, Mother had
moved to full time. However, shortly thereafter, Father was given exclusive
possession of the house in the temporary orders. The court reasonably
could have found Mother was unable to support herself and needed
maintenance to transition to self-reliance. See A.R.S. § 25-319(A)(1). Father
fails to show the superior court erred.

III. The Court Was Not Required to Retroactively Modify Temporary
Child Support.

¶17 Father next argues the temporary child support should be
retroactively modified to reflect the monthly child support amount in the
final dissolution decree. We review a child support order for an abuse of
discretion. Cummings v. Cummings, 182 Ariz. 383, 385 (App. 1994).

¶18 Here, the superior court ordered Father to pay $95 in monthly
child support to Mother following temporary orders and $1,076 monthly
following the final dissolution decree. That difference is attributable to a
$15,000 increase in Father’s monthly income and the elimination of

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Mother’s temporary spousal maintenance, which was included as income
in the child support worksheet. Both orders were consistent with the
superior court’s financial findings at those times. We discern no abuse of
discretion.

IV. The Court Erred in Valuing and Dividing Assets.

¶19 Father challenges the superior court’s valuation and division
of assets. Because neither party requested findings under Rule 82(a), we
may presume the court “found every fact necessary to support the
judgment” and will affirm if any reasonable construction of the evidence
justifies the decision. Neal v. Neal, 116 Ariz. 590, 592 (1977).

A. Valuation of Assets

¶20 Father claims the court abused its discretion because the
evidence does not support the court’s valuation of the Tesla or the IRA. We
review the superior court’s valuation of assets and liabilities for an abuse of
discretion. Walsh v. Walsh, 230 Ariz. 486, 490, ¶ 9 (App. 2012). “A court
abuses its discretion if it commits an error of law . . . or the record fails to
provide substantial evidence to support the [superior] court’s finding[s].”
Id. (internal quotations omitted).

¶21 Here, the superior court valued the Tesla at $10 and the IRA
at $1.3 million. That was error. The only evidence in the record shows the
Tesla had a value of negative $879.63, as more was owed on it than it was
worth. Father testified the value of the IRA at the termination of the
community estate was $1,292,188 and the court expressly adopted his
expert’s identical calculation of the IRA’s value. But that calculation was
$7,812 less than the court’s valuation in the decree, contrary to the evidence
presented. Neither the valuation of the Telsa nor the valuation of the IRA is
supported by the record. For that reason, the court erred.

B. Division of Assets

¶22 Father asks us to review the superior court’s division of assets
and corresponding equalization payment. We review de novo the court’s
characterization of assets or debts as community or separate, but we review
the court’s division of those assets and debts for an abuse of discretion.
Hammett v. Hammett, 247 Ariz. 556, 559, ¶ 13 (App. 2019). In a dissolution,
the superior court must “assign each spouse’s sole and separate property to
such spouse” and divide the community property and debt equitably.
A.R.S. §§ 25-213, -318(A).

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¶23 Here, the superior court found equal distribution of the
marital estate was appropriate, awarded each party assets, and ordered
Father to pay two equalization payments.

¶24 Father argues the superior court erred in calculating the
equalization payment by awarding him the entirety of the 2023 tax refund
because the community is entitled to a portion based on income earned
before the petition for dissolution. We agree. Income earned during the
marriage is presumptively community property and a tax refund is
overpaid money returned by the taxing authority. A.R.S. § 25-211(A); Tax
Refund, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Part of the 2023 refund was
based on Father’s income earned before the petition terminated the marital
community in November 2023. See A.R.S. § 25-211(A)(2). Despite our
presumptions, see Neal, 116 Ariz. at 592, there is no evidence in the record
that would support awarding Father the entirety of the tax refund because,
as he concedes, at least some portion of the refund is community property.
See Carriker v. Carriker, 151 Ariz. 296, 298 (App. 1986) (noting the equal
division of tax refunds is consistent with A.R.S. § 25-318(A)). Therefore, the
court erred.

¶25 Father also argues the superior court failed to apportion the
life insurance policies as separate or community and failed to explain how
it calculated the equalization payment. The record contains evidence to
support the superior court’s division and equalization payment and we
may assume the court found every fact necessary to support its judgment
because neither party requested findings under Rule 82(a). See Neal, 116
Ariz. at 592. The court’s division and equalization calculation is consistent
with Mother’s expert report admitted during trial. To the extent Father
argues the court failed to apportion his Northwestern Mutual account
x4594 as wholly separate, the court implicitly disagreed by adopting the
expert report which valued the account at $54,660, $27,554 of which was
community property.

¶26 We therefore vacate the superior court’s division of property
orders as to the Tesla, IRA, and 2023 tax refund but otherwise affirm. We
also note the superior court’s decree did not assign or divide a forthcoming
burglary insurance payout. Although neither party raised this issue in their
post-trial motions, because we are remanding for additional findings
regarding other assets, as a matter of judicial economy, the court should
address this payout on remand.

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V. The Court Did Not Err in Awarding Attorneys’ Fees.

¶27 Father argues the superior court erred in awarding Mother a
portion of her attorneys’ fees under § 25-324, which authorizes an award of
attorneys’ fees after considering both parties’ financial resources and the
reasonableness of their positions throughout the proceedings. We review
an award of attorneys’ fees for an abuse of discretion. Myrick v. Maloney, 235 Ariz. 491, 494, ¶ 6 (App. 2014).

¶28 Here, the superior court found both parties acted reasonably
but awarded Mother her attorneys’ fees based on financial disparity. See
Magee v. Magee, 206 Ariz. 589, 591, ¶ 8 n.1 (App. 2004) (“[A]n applicant need
not show both a financial disparity and an unreasonable opponent in order
to qualify for consideration for an award.”). We decline Father’s request for
us to reweigh the statutory factors and substitute our judgment for that of
the superior court in its fee award. See Ferrill v. Ferrill, 253 Ariz. 393, 399,
¶ 25 (App. 2022) (holding the balancing of the factors pertinent to an
attorneys’ fees award is left to the superior court’s discretion).

CONCLUSION

¶29 We affirm the superior court’s decree and the order amending
the decree as to the parenting time schedule, temporary spousal
maintenance, temporary child support, and attorneys’ fees.

¶30 We vacate the court’s division of property and remand for the
court to make new findings as to the Tesla and IRA’s values, apportion the
2023 tax refund between community and separate property, and
correspondingly adjust its equalization payment.

¶31 Both parties request their reasonable attorneys’ fees on appeal
pursuant to §§ 25-324, -415. We decline those requests in our discretion.
Father, as the successful party, is entitled to his taxable costs upon
compliance with ARCAP 21. See A.R.S. § 12-341.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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