AZ HOLBROOK v. VAN HO

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

ARIZONA HOLBROOK HOSPITALITY GROUP LLC,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

VINCENT VAN HO, et al.,
Defendants/Appellants.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0755
FILED 07-30-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2023-012931
The Honorable Jason Easterday, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Spencer Fane LLP, Phoenix
By Eric D. Gere, Dina G. Aouad
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee

Udall Law Firm, LLP, Tucson
By Thomas P. Burke, II, Bret Shaw, Maile Lei Belongie
Counsel for Defendants/Appellants

AZ HOLBROOK v. VAN HO et al.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Andrew J. Becke and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

T H U M M A, Judge:

¶1 Defendants Vincent Van Ho and the Law Office of Vincent
Van Ho (collectively, Van Ho) appeal from an order denying a motion to
set aside a default judgment entered in favor of plaintiff Arizona Holbrook
Hospitality Group LLC (AHHG). Because there was no error, the order is
affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In August 2023, AHHG filed this legal malpractice action
against Van Ho arising out of legal services in connection with a real estate
transaction for Arizona real estate. AHHG is an Arizona entity with its
principal place of business in Arizona. Vincent Van Ho is an attorney
licensed and lives in California. The Law Office of Vincent Van Ho also is
located in California.

¶3 After attempts to personally serve Van Ho failed, the court
granted AHHG’s motion for alternative service. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.1(k)(1)
(2026).1 AHHG then served Van Ho by alternative means, including by
publication in California and Arizona, by email, and by first class mail, all
as authorized by the court.

¶4 When Van Ho failed to plead or otherwise defend, AHHG
filed an application for entry of default. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 55(a). When Van
Ho did not respond to that application, the default became effective. Id.
AHHG then moved for entry of default judgment. When Van Ho did not
respond, the court held a hearing on the motion. Van Ho did not appear at
that hearing. As a result, in June 2024, the court entered default judgment
against Van Ho, awarding AHHG $600,000. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 55(b).

1 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.

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¶5 In February 2025, AHHG domesticated the judgment in
California. In March 2025, Van Ho filed a motion in this Arizona case to set
aside the judgment. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 60. Van Ho argued Arizona lacked
personal jurisdiction, meaning the judgment was void, and also that “the
judgment should be set aside for equitable purposes.” See Ariz. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(4), (6). AHHG’s opposition, supported by a sworn declaration of its
managing member, countered that Arizona had personal jurisdiction over
Van Ho and that equitable considerations did not support relief.

¶6 After full briefing and oral argument, the superior court
denied Van Ho’s motion. Concluding that AHHG properly showed
Arizona had personal jurisdiction over Van Ho, the court rejected the
argument that the judgment was void. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4). The court
also concluded that Van Ho failed to show the judgment should be set aside
on equitable grounds. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).

¶7 This court has jurisdiction over Van Ho’s timely appeal from
that denial pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and
Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(2).2

DISCUSSION

I. Van Ho Has Not Shown the Superior Court Erred in Denying the
Rule 60(b) Motion.

A. Standard of Review.

¶8 A ruling on a Rule 60(b) motion generally is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. See City of Phoenix v. Geyler, 144 Ariz. 323, 328-29 (1985).
Similarly, the denial of a motion to set aside entry of a default judgment is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp. v. Osterkamp, 172
Ariz. 191, 194 (App. 1992). However, whether a judgment is void, including
where personal jurisdiction is lacking, is reviewed de novo. See Duckstein v.
Wolf, 230 Ariz. 227, 233 ¶ 19 (App. 2012) (personal jurisdiction); Laveen
Meadows Homeowners Ass’n v. Mejia, 249 Ariz. 81, 84 ¶ 10 (App. 2020) (Rule
60(b)(4) motion). “The scope of an appeal from a denial of a Rule 60 motion
is restricted to the questions raised by the motion to set aside and does not
extend to a review of whether the trial court was substantively correct in

2 Although a default judgment generally is not appealable, the appeal here

is proper given it raises whether personal jurisdiction is proper. See Kline v.
Kline, 221 Ariz. 564, 568 ¶ 11 (App. 2009) (citing Hirsch v. Nat’l Van Lines,
Inc., 136 Ariz. 304, 311 (1983)).

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entering the judgment from which relief was sought.” Hirsch v. Nat’l Van
Lines, Inc., 136 Ariz. 304, 311 (1983).

B. The Superior Court Properly Concluded It Had Personal
Jurisdiction Over Van Ho, Meaning the Judgment Was Not
Void.

¶9 Arizona may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant
to the maximum extent permitted by due process. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a);
accord Beverage v. Pullman & Comley, LLC, 232 Ariz. 414, 417 ¶ 8 (App. 2013).
Arizona may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Van Ho if the
record shows: (1) purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting
business in Arizona by Van Ho; (2) AHHG’s claim “arises out of or relates
to” Van Ho’s contacts with Arizona (sometimes referred to as the required
“nexus”) and (3) “the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable.” Williams v.
Lakeview Co., 199 Ariz. 1, 3 ¶ 7 (2000) (citation omitted). AHHG had the
burden to show Arizona could exercise personal jurisdiction over Van Ho.
Smith & Wesson Corp. v. The Wuster, 243 Ariz. 355, 358 ¶ 13 (App. 2017).

¶10 In denying Van Ho’s motion to set aside the judgment as void,
the superior court found that the complaint and its judicially admitted facts,
along with the declaration of AHHG’s managing member, sufficiently
showed Arizona properly could exercise specific personal jurisdiction over
Van Ho. The court specifically noted that (1) Van Ho’s conduct
purposefully targeted Arizona in representing AHHG in the Arizona real
estate transaction; (2) there was a nexus between the legal services Van Ho
provided and AHHG’s legal malpractice claim and (3) Van Ho’s legal
services were inadequate. The court further found that exercise of its
jurisdiction over Van Ho was reasonable.

¶11 Van Ho argues the court erred because the complaint’s
allegations, deemed admitted by the entry of default, fail to establish
personal jurisdiction. Citing Beverage, Van Ho claims that AHHG’s “home
state” is not enough to subject an out-of-state law firm to jurisdiction in
Arizona, and that the other allegations do not establish purposeful contacts
with Arizona by Van Ho.

¶12 In Beverage, however, this court reversed the superior court’s
dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding Arizona properly could
exercise specific jurisdiction over out-of-state lawyers who “performed all
their legal research and drafted [an opinion] letter” in another state for a tax
shelter promoted by an Arizona firm, where the client was an Arizona
resident. 232 Ariz. at 416 ¶¶ 1-2, 419-20 ¶¶ 21-23. In doing so, Beverage noted

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Decision of the Court

the lawyers in that case had communicated with individuals in Arizona,
drafted a document directed to Arizona and provided services intended to
be used in Arizona. Id. at 419-20 ¶¶ 21-23.

¶13 Here, factual allegations in the complaint (deemed admitted
by the entry of default) show, among other things, that: (1) AHHG is an
Arizona limited liability company located in Arizona; (2) that the real
property that is the subject of AHHG’s claims is located in Arizona; (3) Van
Ho agreed to provide legal services to AHHG relating to the sale of the
Arizona real properly; (4) Van Ho advised AHHG to sign a deed of release
and full reconveyance that was recorded with the Navajo County, Arizona,
Recorder; (5) Van Ho “failed to provide adequate representation and legal
services” to AHHG in connection with the deed of release and full
reconveyance and (6) these actions and inactions by Van Ho damaged
AHHG “in that it no longer possesses security for the obligation due and
owing by” the purchaser of the Arizona real property. These well-pled facts
set forth in the complaint are deemed admitted by Van Ho, see Smith &
Wesson, 243 Ariz. at 358 ¶ 14, and are sufficient to support a finding of
personal jurisdiction, see Beverage, 232 Ariz. at 420 ¶ 23 (concluding similar
“contacts, considered in context and in their totality, constitute conduct
purposefully targeting Arizona, sufficient to support exercise of
jurisdiction”).

¶14 Van Ho asserts it “had no contacts with Arizona,” and that
Arizona thus lacks jurisdiction. Jurisdictional contacts with Arizona must
arise out of a defendant’s purposeful contacts, Plan. Grp. of Scottsdale, L.L.C.
v. Lake Mathews Min. Props., Ltd., 226 Ariz. 262, 266 ¶ 16 (2011), which are
analyzed in their totality, id. at 269 ¶ 29 (citing Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 485-86 (1985)). Van Ho’s primary argument is that
AHHG’s managing member (a California resident) was the client, not
AHHG, and that no legal representation was undertaken in Arizona.

¶15 Van Ho’s assertion fails because both the allegations in
AHHG’s complaint (which are deemed admitted) and supporting evidence
it offered (through the AHHG managing member’s declaration) show Van
Ho had contacts sufficient for Arizona to properly exercise personal
jurisdiction. As summarized above, the complaint alleged Van Ho
represented AHHG in connection with the Arizona real estate transaction.
The declaration by AHHG’s managing member also states AHHG retained
Van Ho to provide legal services relating to the sale of Arizona real
property and that Van Ho negligently performed those legal services. Van
Ho, the declaration adds, provided a variety of legal services to AHHG
through the duration of the transaction, “including communicating and

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coordinating with the Arizona-based title company used in the
transaction.” The invoices from Van Ho attached to the declaration show
substantial communications on behalf of AHHG in Arizona, including
correspondence regarding damage and repairs to the Arizona property,
disclosures on inspection reports, communication with the property
manager, contacts with the Arizona Corporation Commission and the State
of Arizona’s Corporation Division regarding certification. Although Van
Ho may have been in California while performing these legal services, these
services specifically involved, and specifically targeted, Arizona

¶16 The required nexus sufficient to establish jurisdiction exists
when a plaintiff’s claim results from alleged injuries that arise out of the
defendant’s activities in Arizona. Williams, 199 Ariz. at 4 ¶ 11 (citing cases).
Here, AHHG’s allegations, deemed admitted by the entry of default, are
that it was injured by Van Ho’s legal malpractice in representing AHHG in
the transaction involving Arizona real estate. Van Ho’s alleged malpractice
is the direct cause of the injury AHHG claims it suffered in Arizona. This
nexus is not merely the “effect of a damage-causing event,” Cohen v.
Barnard, Vogler & Co., 199 Ariz. 16, 18 ¶ 10 (App. 2000) (citation omitted),
but rather an injury directly suffered because of Van Ho’s actions arising
out of Arizona activities.

¶17 Because the record shows purposeful availment in Arizona by
Van Ho, and the requisite nexus, jurisdiction is presumed reasonable.
Williams, 199 Ariz. at 3 ¶ 7; see also Beverage, 232 Ariz. at 420 ¶ 27
(“Generally, the existence of sufficient contacts between the defendant and
the forum state giving rise to the suit will justify exercise of jurisdiction.”).
Accordingly, Van Ho was required to “present a compelling case that the
presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction
unreasonable.” Beverage, 232 Ariz. at 420 ¶ 27 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S.
at 477). Concluding Van Ho failed to make such a showing, the superior
court found the exercise of jurisdiction was reasonable because AHHG “is
an Arizona company, and the complaint alleged legal malpractice
concerning an Arizona real estate transaction.”

¶18 Van Ho argues that jurisdiction in Arizona was unreasonable
because the law firm did not “function as counsel to AHHG” in the real
estate transaction. But the admitted allegations of the complaint are to the
contrary, showing Van Ho represented AHHG. Van Ho has not overcome
the presumption that exercising jurisdiction was reasonable, and that
defending an action alleging legal malpractice in Arizona courts was not

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unexpected.3 Accordingly, Van Ho has shown no error in the superior court
denying relief under Rule 60(b)(4).

C. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Rejecting the Equitable Circumstances Arguments.

¶19 A party seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) must show: (1)
extraordinary circumstances of hardship or injustice justifying relief and (2)
a reason for setting aside the judgment other than those listed in Rule 60(b).
See Hilgeman v. Am. Mortg. Sec., Inc., 196 Ariz. 215, 220 ¶ 15 (App. 2000). The
superior court addressed the merits of Van Ho’s Rule 60(b)(6) arguments
after concluding they were timely, Rule 60(c)(1), but concluded “the
equitable circumstances do not outweigh the public policy favoring
finality.” Van Ho has shown no abuse of discretion in that ruling.

¶20 Van Ho argues “the circumstances surrounding service weigh
heavily in favor of setting aside the judgment.” But Van Ho does not
meaningfully dispute AHHG’s argument that Van Ho was aware of the
litigation through extensive email communication, yet chose not to respond
until after the judgment was domesticated in California. Moreover,
although spending significant time discussing service of process in superior
court, Van Ho did not argue that AHHG did not properly effectuate service.
Instead, Van Ho conceded, before the superior court and during oral
argument before this court, “that Plaintiff followed the procedure approved
by the Court” to effectuate service. Having waived any challenge to service
of process, Cont’l Lighting & Contracting, Inc. v. Premier Grading & Utils., LLC,
227 Ariz. 382, 386 ¶ 12 (App. 2011), Van Ho has not shown how the superior
court was required to find that the “circumstances surrounding service”
required relief under Rule 60(b)(6), cf. Hilgeman, 196 Ariz. at 221 ¶ 20 (noting
any argument regarding service should be raised under Rule 60(b)(4), “a
separate and mutually exclusive basis for setting aside a judgment”).

¶21 Van Ho makes four additional arguments for equitable relief,
none of which show error under Rule 60(b)(6). First, Van Ho argues that
AHHG “strategically delayed” in domesticating the judgment until after

3 Van Ho argues an arbitration provision in a contract between Van Ho and

AHHG’s managing member meant Arizona lacked jurisdiction. AHHG,
however, was not a party to that contract and, accordingly, was not bound
by the arbitration provision. Duenas v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 236 Ariz.
130, 139 ¶ 26 (App. 2014) (“‘In general, a party is bound to arbitrate only
those disputes which it has contractually agreed to arbitrate,’ and is not
bound to arbitrate disputes it has not specifically agreed to arbitrate.”).

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the six-month deadline to seek relief under Rule 60(b)(1)-(3). Van Ho,
however, offered no evidence to support that argument, and the superior
court was not required to credit it without supporting evidence. Second, Van
Ho claims substantial defenses, pointing to a claimed lack of personal
jurisdiction and the arbitration clause. But, as discussed above, Arizona has
personal jurisdiction over Van Ho and the arbitration clause does not apply.
Third, Van Ho alleges a meritorious defense to AHHG’s claims. In superior
court, however, Van Ho did not establish or elaborate on any “meritorious
defenses,” instead summarily claiming “significant jurisdictional issues”
and that AHHG “gam[ed] the system to get its default judgment.” As
discussed above, reliance on those claimed defenses fails. Finally, Van Ho
argues that, collectively, diligence in seeking relief “once they received
actual notice,” coupled with AHHG benefitting “from a procedural posture
it created by” alternative service, “securing a large monetary award
without meaningful participation from the opposing party” and delaying
in seeking to domesticate the judgment in California, means “the overall
equities weigh decisively toward vacating the judgment.” But Van Ho has
not shown that the superior court was required, in exercising its discretion,
to accept these arguments and grant relief under Rule 60(b)(6). See Geyler,
144 Ariz. at 328-29.

CONCLUSION

¶22 The superior court’s denial of Van Ho’s Rule 60(b) motion is
affirmed. Van Ho’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal under
A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and -341.01 is denied. AHHG seeks its attorneys’ fees and
costs on appeal under A.R.S. §§ 12-349 and -341.01. AHHG’s request for
attorneys’ fees and costs under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 is granted, contingent
upon its compliance with ARCAP 21. Exercising the court’s discretion,
AHHG’s request for fees, expenses and damages under A.R.S. § 12-349 is
denied.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JT

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