TORRES v. REEVES

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

ZOE TORRES, et al.,
Plaintiffs/Appellees,

v.

COLLIN REEVES,
Defendant/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0759
FILED 07-31-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2019-015647
The Honorable Scott A. Blaney, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP, Phoenix
By Susan M. Freeman, Yalda Godusi Arellano
Co-Counsel for Defendant/Appellant

Weinberg, Wheeler, Hudgins, Gunn & Dial, LLC, Phoenix
By William Drury, Brian R. Booker, Annelise Dominguez
Co-Counsel for Defendant/Appellant

Gammage & Burnham, P.L.C., Phoenix
By Cameron C. Artigue, Kevin G. Brown
Co-Counsel for All Plaintiffs/Appellees

TORRES, et al. v. REEVES
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The Slavicek Law Firm, Phoenix
By Brett L. Slavicek, James E. Fucetola
Co-Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Zoe Torres

The Palumbo Law Firm, Phoenix
By Scott I. Palumbo
Co-Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Christopher & Shannon Dillard

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Andrew J. Becke delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

B E C K E, Judge:

¶1 Defendant Collin Reeves (“Reeves”) appeals a jury verdict in
favor of Zoe Torres, Christopher Dillard, and Shannon Dillard (collectively
“Plaintiffs”) for the wrongful deaths of their children, Jesel Morales (Zoe’s
child) and Audrianne Dillard (Christopher and Shannon’s child). Reeves
also appeals the superior court’s denial of his motion for new trial or
remittitur. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Around 6:30 p.m. on October 5, 2018, 20-year-old Audrianne
was driving a Ford Focus westbound on McKellips Road with her
boyfriend, 23-year-old Jesel, in the passenger seat and their dog in the back
seat of the car. At the same time, Reeves was driving his Ford F-250
eastbound on McKellips Road after drinking six beers in 90 minutes at a
work event. Lori Gleeson was also driving eastbound on McKellips Road.
Reeves cut her off and sped past her at what Gleeson estimated was at least
sixty-two miles per hour. The speed limit on that stretch of roadway was
fifty miles per hour.

¶3 Before Reeves entered the Alma School Road intersection, the
traffic light turned from yellow to red. Gleeson then saw Reeves “jump on
the gas” and run the red light. At that exact moment, Audrianne made a left

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turn southbound onto Alma School Road and Reeves struck her car, killing
Audrianne, Jesel, and their dog.

¶4 Gleeson called 911 and reported the collision. When police
officers arrived, Reeves was about fifty yards from the crash, appearing
disheveled with his zipper down and “some sort of liquid on his shirt and
pants.” Reeves initially said his son urinated in a cup earlier that morning,
but later admitted to lying and that he believed he urinated on himself.
Reeves also stated that, in the past, he would urinate in a cup or bottle in
his car when he did not want to stop driving. Reeves showed all six clues
of impairment during the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. Reeves
consented to a portable breath test, which revealed his blood alcohol
concentration (“BAC”) to be 0.145, well over the legal limit. After
transporting Reeves to the police station, Reeves voluntarily provided two
blood samples separated by one hour. Reeves’s BAC was 0.129 and 0.107
two and three hours after the crash, respectively.

¶5 In December 2019, Plaintiffs brought this case against Reeves,
Reeves’s employer, and the venue where he consumed the alcohol. Claims
against the latter two were resolved by stipulation and they were dismissed
as parties before trial. Reeves answered, denying any negligence and
asserting several affirmative defenses, including lack of causation and
comparative fault. This civil case was stayed pending Reeves’s criminal
prosecution. In 2021, Reeves pled guilty to felony endangerment and was
placed on supervised probation for three years, including a requirement
that he serve 12 months in jail. After learning Reeves was driving under the
influence of alcohol at the time of the accident, Plaintiffs sought and
obtained leave to amend their complaint to add a claim for punitive
damages.

¶6 Trial was held in August 2024. Plaintiffs called several
witnesses, including Sergeant Stuart Williams (the criminal case’s lead
investigator and accident reconstructionist), several police officers who
responded to the crash, the victims’ family members, Gleeson, and Reeves.
Reeves called accident reconstructionist Dr. Joseph Peles as his only
witness.

¶7 At the end of a four-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in
favor of the three Plaintiffs, awarding them $30 million in damages each: $8
million in compensatory damages and $22 million in punitive damages.
The jury found Audrianne 12% at fault and Reeves 88% at fault. After
apportioning comparative fault, the court entered a judgment awarding
each plaintiff $26.4 million, consisting of $7.04 million in compensatory

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damages and $19.36 million in punitive damages. The total judgment was
$79.2 million. As the prevailing parties, Plaintiffs were also awarded
$14,531.04 in taxable costs per A.R.S. § 12-332.

¶8 Reeves filed a timely motion for new trial or remittitur,
arguing: (1) the fault apportionment was against the weight of the evidence;
(2) Plaintiffs’ did not establish Reeves’s outrageous conduct caused their
injuries; (3) Plaintiffs’ counsel’s statements during closing arguments
improperly influenced the verdict; (4) the verdict was grossly
disproportionate to Reeves’s income; (5) Plaintiffs’ grief did not entitle them
to $8 million in compensatory damages; (6) the verdict was excessive in
comparison to analogous Arizona verdicts; (7) the punitive damages
awarded violated due process; and (8) the verdict should have been offset
by advance payments by Reeves in the amount of $1.2 million.

¶9 After oral argument, the court agreed Reeves was entitled to
a $1.2 million credit for payments already made on his behalf but otherwise
denied his motion. Reeves timely appealed and we have jurisdiction under
Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-2101(A)(1),
-120.21(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶10 Reeves argues the superior court erred in denying his motion
for new trial or remittitur. We review the denial of a motion for new trial
for an abuse of discretion. Jaynes v. McConnell, 238 Ariz. 211, 215–16, ¶ 13
(App. 2015). The superior court is afforded wide discretion in deciding a
motion for new trial. See City of Glendale v. Bradshaw, 114 Ariz. 236, 237–38
(1977). In ruling, the superior court must “pass on the weight of the
evidence to determine if substantial justice has not been done between the
parties.” Walsh v. Advanced Cardiac Specialists Chartered, 229 Ariz. 193, 197, ¶
15 (2012) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Smith v. Moroney, 79 Ariz.
35, 38 (1955)). “The court ‘may not simply substitute its judgment for the
jury’s.’” Ahmad v. State, 245 Ariz. 573, 576, ¶ 5 (App. 2018) (quoting Soto v.
Sacco, 242 Ariz. 474, 477, ¶ 7 (2017)). “Remittitur is proper only when the
court ‘is firmly convinced’ that the verdict ‘reflects an exaggerated
measurement of damages’ and ‘is contrary to the weight of the evidence.’”
Id. (quoting Soto, 242 Ariz. at 478, ¶¶ 8-9).

I. Reeves Waived His Sufficiency of Evidence Arguments.

¶11 In his opening and reply briefs, Reeves argued the evidence
did not support a finding by clear and convincing evidence that he acted
with an “evil mind,” a required showing for a punitive damages award.

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Reeves also argued that, even if the evidence did support the finding, it did
not establish his outrageous conduct was the proximate cause of Plaintiffs’
injuries. At oral argument, however, Reeves withdrew these arguments,
conceding that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could
conclude that Reeves acted with an “evil mind” and that his actions caused
Plaintiffs’ damages. In light of that concession, we treat these arguments as
waived. See In re Leon G., 204 Ariz. 15, 17, ¶ 2 n.1 (2002) (Arizona appellate
courts generally “will not examine waived or moot questions.”).

II. The Punitive Damages Awards Were Not Unconstitutionally
Excessive.

¶12 Reeves argues that under due process principles, the punitive
damages award was excessively high. The Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution provides that “[n]o State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The
Due Process Clause “imposes a substantive limit on the size of punitive
damages awards.” Sec. Title Agency, Inc. v. Pope, 219 Ariz. 480, 501, ¶ 93
(App. 2008) (quoting Hilgeman v. Am. Mortg. Sec., Inc., 196 Ariz. 215, 222, ¶
26 (App. 2000)).

¶13 We review de novo a due process challenge to a punitive
damage award. See Nardelli v. Metro. Grp. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 230 Ariz. 592,
609, ¶ 83 (App. 2012). “The role of gatekeeper over punitive damages
verdicts is one of the most challenging that has been placed upon appellate
judges in civil cases.” Pope, 219 Ariz. at 504, ¶ 107 (cleaned up) (quoting
Inter Med. Supplies, Ltd. v. EBI Med. Sys., Inc., 181 F.3d 446, 450 (3d Cir.
1999)).

¶14 When reviewing punitive damages awards, we consider the
“Gore guideposts”: “(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s
conduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by
the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference
between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties
authorized or imposed in comparable cases.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003) (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559, 575 (1996)). Because there are no sufficiently analogous civil
penalties for wrongful death resulting from a car crash, the third guidepost
is inapplicable. Cf. Pope, 219 Ariz. at 501, ¶ 94 n.19 (quoting Cont’l Trend
Res., Inc. v. OXY USA Inc., 101 F.3d 634, 641 (10th Cir. 1996)) (noting that

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common law torts are often not comparable with statutory penalties and
declining to analyze the third guidepost in an aiding and abetting action).

A. Degree of reprehensibility

¶15 When determining the reprehensibility of a defendant’s
conduct, we look at whether:

the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the
tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless
disregard of the health or safety of others; the target of the
conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved
repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm
was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or
mere accident.

State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419. Compensatory damages are presumed to make
a plaintiff whole, so punitive damages should only be awarded if the
defendant’s culpability “is so reprehensible as to warrant the imposition of
further sanctions to achieve punishment or deterrence.” Id.

¶16 Three reprehensibility factors are present here: physical harm,
reckless disregard, and repeated actions.

¶17 Conduct that causes physical harm as opposed to economic
harm weighs in favor of reprehensibility. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 576. The harm
here is the most extreme example of physical harm: the deaths of two young
people.

¶18 Reckless disregard is also present. “Within the
reprehensibility scale suggested by Gore, however, ‘acts of violence or
threats of bodily harm . . . [are] the most reprehensible, followed by acts
taken in reckless disregard for others’ health or safety, affirmative acts of
trickery and deceit, and finally, acts of omission and mere negligence.”
Hudgins v. Sw. Airlines, Co., 221 Ariz. 472, 490, ¶ 52 (App. 2009) (alteration
in original) (quoting Florez v. Delbovo, 939 F. Supp. 1341, 1348–49 (N.D. Ill.
1996)). Reeves’s testimony at trial supports that his conduct evinced a
reckless disregard for the health or safety of others. He testified that he
knew that driving drunk the night of the crash “created a substantial risk
of harm or death to others.” He continued to drink and drive even after
being educated on the dangers of doing so. He also acknowledged that he
“intentionally disregarded the danger [he was] well aware of.” Reeves’s
testimony that he knew that drinking and driving was dangerous, yet

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continued to do it anyway, choosing to put others at risk of death,
demonstrates reprehensible conduct.

¶19 Repeated actions are more supportive of reprehensibility than
isolated incidents. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 576–77. Contrary to Reeves’s
assertion, repeated actions do not need to have involved the same plaintiffs
each time. See Nardelli, 230 Ariz. at 610, ¶ 89 (quoting Hawkins v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 152 Ariz. 490, 502 (1987)) (noting that repeated actions may occur when
an insurer makes arbitrary decisions as an “established company policy”).
Reeves testified that he drank and drove “every month for more than a
decade leading up to the crash.” He did this even after being educated on
the dangers of drinking and driving. Reeves’s engagement in repetitive
drunk driving is reprehensible.

¶20 Considering the evidence and these factors,1 Reeves’s conduct
is at the higher end of the reprehensibility scale.

B. Disparity between harm suffered and punitive damages

¶21 A punitive damages award must be reasonable when
compared to the compensatory damages award. Smith v. Olsen, 257 Ariz.
518, 532, ¶ 53 (App. 2024) (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 580–81). “When
compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only
equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due
process guarantee.” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425 (emphasis added). The ratio
here is 2.75:1. See A.R.S. § 12-2505 (comparative negligence reduces the full
damages award). But substantial compensatory damages do not impose a
1:1 ratio cap, particularly where the compensatory damages are for
personal injury resulting in death.

¶22 Whether the ratio between punitive and compensatory
damages is reasonable is “highly fact-specific.” Smith, 257 Ariz. at 532, ¶ 53
(citing State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425). There “is no bright-line rule” for the
calculation of punitive damages, though “a high ratio is only appropriate
in situations where the defendant acted egregiously, or the damages are
difficult to calculate.” Id. But an award exceeding a single-digit ratio will
likely not satisfy due process. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425.

¶23 A 1:1 ratio is not the constitutional limit when large
compensatory damages are awarded. See, e.g., Ondrisek v. Hoffman, 698 F.3d

1 The remaining factors are not applicable. Financial vulnerability is
relevant only to financial harm. Reeves’s conduct was neither “trickery or
deceit” nor accidental.

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1020, 1024, 1029–31 (8th Cir. 2012) (approving a 4:1 ratio in an action for
battery, outrage, and conspiracy where compensatory damages were $3
million to both plaintiffs); Goddard v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Or., 179 P.3d 645,
654, 667, 670 (Or. 2008) (approving a 4:1 ratio in a failure to settle action
based on a wrongful death verdict where the compensatory damages were
$863,274); Fontaine v. Philip Morris USA Inc, 277 N.E.3d 585, 591, 606 (Mass.
2026) (affirming a 7:1 ratio in a wrongful death action when the
compensatory damages to four plaintiffs totaled more than $8 million);
Mansfield v. Horner, 443 S.W.3d 627, 645–46 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) (affirming
an 11:1 ratio in a wrongful death action where the compensatory damages
were $8.65 million); Raglund v. DiGiuro, 352 S.W.3d 908, 921, 924 (Ky. Ct.
App. 2010) (approving a 9:1 ratio in a wrongful death action when the
compensatory damages were more than $3.3 million); Eden Elec., Ltd. v.
Amana Co., 370 F.3d 824, 826, 829–29 (8th Cir. 2004) (affirming a ratio of
more than 4.5:1 in a fraud action where the compensatory damages were
$2.1 million); Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc., 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d, 638, 645, 684–87
(Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (approving a ratio of more than 9:1 in a tobacco
personal injury action where the compensatory damages were over $5.5
million); Aleo v. SLB Toys USA, Inc., 995 N.E.2d 740, 745, 756–59 (Mass. 2013)
(affirming a ratio of nearly 7:1 in a wrongful death, negligence, and breach
of the implied warranty of merchantability action where the compensatory
damages were more than $2.6 million); Jolley v. Energen Res. Corp., 198 P.3d
376, 379 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008) (affirming a 6.76:1 ratio in a wrongful death
action where the compensatory damages were more than $2.95 million);
Planned Parenthood of Colombia/Willamette Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists,
422 F.3d 949, 951, 962–63 (9th Cir. 2005) (approving a 9:1 ratio in a Freedom
of Access to Clinic Entrances Act action where “[m]ost of the compensatory
awards are substantial”); see also Kunasek v. Johnson, 1 CA-CV 20-0061, 2022
WL 4377299, at *11, ¶ 53, *12, ¶ 60 (Ariz. App. Sept. 22, 2022) (mem.
decision) (affirming a 3:1 ratio in an aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary
duty case where the compensatory damages were $2.625 million).

¶24 In Smith, we considered ratios of 2.67:1 on an intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim and 3:1 in assault and trespass claims.
257 Ariz. at 532, ¶ 55. Smith involved a dispute between neighbors over a
shared easement. Id. at 323, ¶¶ 3–4. The defendant had altercations with
third parties, harassed the plaintiff’s daughter, and interfered with the
plaintiff’s property rights, among other offensive behaviors. Id. at 325, ¶¶
15–18. We held that, while the conduct was repetitive and intentional, it was
not “the most extreme instance” of intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Id. at 532, ¶ 56. We determined “some award of punitive damages
[was] justified” but reduced the ratio to 1:1. Id.

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¶25 Unlike in Smith, Reeves’s conduct represents the most
extreme drunk driving conduct—a car crash resulting in the deaths of two
people. Reeves acted egregiously in choosing to drink and drive after
receiving education on the dangers of doing so. He recklessly disregarded
the danger his drinking and driving posed to others—and with full
knowledge of the possible consequences—regularly repeated that behavior
for over a decade until the crash occurred. After considering the facts in this
case, the strong showing of reprehensibility, and the ratios upheld in
similar cases, we find that the 2.75:1 ratio here is supported.

C. Applying the Gore Guideposts

¶26 After considering the reprehensibility of Reeves’s conduct
and the disparity between punitive damages and comparative damages in
consideration of the specific facts of this case, the 2.75:1 ratio between
punitive and compensatory damages here is constitutional.

III. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Determining the Jury’s
Damages Award Was Not Excessive.

¶27 Reeves argues the information he presented on verdicts in
comparable cases was sufficient to grant his motion for new trial or
remittitur. But comparable verdicts are “only marginally relevant and the
[superior] court should not treat other damage awards as conclusive” in
considering a motion for new trial. Soto, 242 Ariz. at 482, ¶ 22.

¶28 The Arizona Constitution prohibits laws “limiting the
amount of damages to be recovered for causing the death or injury of any
person.” Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 31. Thus, the law leaves the measure of
damages “to a jury’s good sense and unbiased judgment.” Meyer v. Ricklick, 99 Ariz. 355, 358 (1965). The jury’s award “should not be disturbed unless
the award is the result of passion or prejudice.” Hawkins, 152 Ariz. at 501.
Whether the award was the result of passion or prejudice depends on
“whether the verdict is ‘so manifestly unfair, unreasonable and outrageous
as to shock the conscience of the court.’” Id. (quoting Acheson v. Shafter, 107
Ariz. 576, 579 (1971)). “The amount of the award alone is not sufficient
evidence to prove the jury acted with passion or prejudice.” Id.

¶29 In his motion for new trial or remittitur, Reeves provided the
court with information regarding other wrongful death verdicts and
settlements in Arizona for decedents aged 18-30. He also provided
information about verdicts in wrongful death cases involving intoxicated
drivers. Plaintiffs responded with different information regarding twelve
Arizona verdicts in wrongful death cases where juries had awarded

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damages similar to, or higher than, those awarded here. In denying the
motion for new trial, the superior court noted that Reeves’s arguments
regarding the other verdicts were “unpersuasive” and rejected his
“argument that Plaintiffs did not suffer enough grief to justify $8 million”
verdicts as “diminish[ing] the jury’s unique and critical role of subjectively
valuing the Plaintiffs’ grief.” The court’s ruling properly applied Soto, 242
Ariz. 474, Walsh, 229 Ariz. 193, and Ahmad, 245 Ariz. 573.

¶30 Reeves argues that the disparity between the damages
awarded here and those in the cases he presented to the superior court
shows that the award was the result of passion or prejudice. But “[t]he
amount of the award alone is not sufficient evidence to prove the jury acted
with passion or prejudice.” Hawkins, 152 Ariz. at 501. Instead, “[t]he
appropriate test of passion or prejudice is whether the verdict is ‘so
manifestly unfair, unreasonable and outrageous as to shock the conscience
of the court.’” Id. (citing cases). The record does not show that the jury acted
with passion or prejudice.

¶31 At trial, family members of Audrianne and Jesel provided
heartbreaking testimony about their losses. How to compensate such a loss
is not easily calculated, and based on the gravity of the harm here, Reeves
has not shown that the jury’s verdict was “so manifestly unfair,
unreasonable and outrageous as to shock the conscience of the court.” Id.
Accordingly, Reeves has not shown that the court abused its discretion in
denying the motion for new trial when it considered and found information
about comparable verdicts, which are of marginal relevance, unpersuasive.

IV. Reeves Waived His Arguments Concerning Alleged Misconduct
During Closing Argument.

¶32 Reeves next argues a new trial was warranted because
Plaintiffs’ attorney’s comments attacking Dr. Peles’s professional integrity
and arguments about causation and damages in his closing argument
improperly influenced the jury, leading to an “extraordinarily excessive
verdict.”

¶33 Reeves did not object at trial to any of the comments he now
alleges were improper. He did not request a curative instruction or move
for mistrial. Reeves “withheld the opportunity for corrective action” from
the superior court and took his chance with the jury’s verdict, only raising
this argument in his motion for new trial. See Copeland v. City of Yuma, 160
Ariz. 307, 310 (App. 1989). He has, therefore, waived these arguments and
we will not consider them on appeal. See State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 460,

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¶153 (2004) (stating failure to object to a comment in closing argument
waives that argument on appeal); accord Ariz. R. Evid. 103(a).

V. The Superior Court Was Not Required to Consider Untimely and
Undisclosed Evidence of Reeves’s Net Worth.

¶34 Reeves argues the superior court erred when it refused to
reduce the punitive award in light of Reeves’s net worth.

¶35 Under Arizona law, plaintiffs are not required to present
evidence of a defendant’s wealth to recover punitive damages. Rustin v.
Cook, 143 Ariz. 486, 491 (App. 1984). While a defendant’s financial position
is relevant, it is not required to recover punitive damages. See Hawkins, 152
Ariz. at 497–98 (“One category of relevant evidence is the defendant’s
financial position . . . . These factors are presented only as guidelines to the
character of evidence that is relevant to assessing punitive damages and
should be viewed as neither exhaustive nor exclusive.”).

¶36 In his motion for new trial, Reeves attached an exhibit
detailing his net worth. However, Reeves had not disclosed information
about his finances, including his net worth, before trial. And at trial,
Reeves’s counsel admitted the same and explicitly withdrew any poverty
defense.

¶37 Reeves contends the superior court was required to consider
his untimely evidence due to its “gatekeeper” obligations, citing Arellano v.
Primerica Life Ins. Co., Co., 235 Ariz. 371 (App. 2014). However, Arellano
states this court on appeal acts as a “gatekeeper” over punitive damages
verdicts and, “[a]s such, we review a punitive damages award de novo.”
235 Ariz. at 378, ¶ 34. We have done so here, see supra ¶¶ 12-26, and found
the punitive damage award to be constitutional and not a violation of due
process.

¶38 Reeves also cites to Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415
(1994) and claims the U.S. Supreme Court held a “trial court erred in
deferring to trial evidence alone” in its review of a punitive damage award.
This is incorrect. In Honda Motor Co., the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed an
Oregon constitutional provision that prohibited judicial review of the
amount of punitive damages awarded by a jury unless the court could
conclude there was no evidence to support the verdict. 512 U.S. at 418. The
Court held this provision violated due process. Id. at 432. Arizona does not
have a constitutional provision prohibiting judicial review of punitive
damage awards, nor did the superior court here refuse to review the

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punitive damage award. It merely declined to consider Reeves’s untimely
evidence of net worth.

¶39 Reeves fails to cite any Arizona authority that would compel
such consideration. Instead, Reeves cites an Alabama Supreme Court case
that held a trial court erred in not reducing punitive damages when
evidence was presented in a post-judgment hearing necessitating a
reduction, even though that evidence was not presented to the jury. Wilson
v. Dukona Corp., N.V., 547 So. 2d 70, 74 (Ala. 1989). However, how Alabama
courts handle judicial review of punitive damage awards is not relevant to
our analysis under Arizona law. Neither is Reeves’s citation to Pac. Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 22 (1991), which held that Alabama’s review
and reduction procedure satisfied due process requirements.

¶40 Reeves further argues that, under the Arizona Supreme
Court’s ruling in Hawkins, 152 Ariz. at 501, punitive damages awards that
“financially kill” defendants cannot stand. But in Hawkins, financial
evidence had been properly and timely presented. Reeves fails to show the
superior court abused its discretion by not considering his untimely
evidence of net worth in its review of the punitive damages award entered
against him. Reeves could have disclosed and presented evidence of his
limited financial resources, but he failed to do so.

CONCLUSION

¶41 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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