KB RANCH v. ECKARD

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

KB RANCH, LLC, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

TROY ECKARD, et al., Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0825
FILED 07-27-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
No. S1300CV202500079
The Honorable Kristyne Marie Schaaf-Olson, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Rose Law Group PC, Scottsdale
By Shelton L. Freeman, Austin Moylan
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant

Gammage & Burnham PLC, Phoenix
By Christopher L. Hering, Daniella F. Lertzman
Co-Counsel for Defendants/Appellees

Law Office of Barry Olsen PLLC, Yuma
By Barry L. Olsen
Co-Counsel for Defendants/Appellees

KB RANCH v. ECKARD, et al.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Anni Hill Foster delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge David B. Gass 1and Judge D. Andrew Gaona joined.

F O S T E R, Judge:

¶1 Plaintiff KB Ranch, LLC (“KB Ranch”) holds three easements
across property owned by Defendants Troy and Claire Eckard, Trustees of
the Troy and Claire Eckard Revocable Trust dated June 26, 2007. Jan Sterling
owns KB Ranch, and through that entity sought a declaratory judgment
enforcing its access to those easements. The superior court denied KB
Ranch’s request, finding that it did not prove that the Eckards unreasonably
interfered with or obstructed access to the easements and KB Ranch’s
property. KB Ranch appeals that decision. This Court affirms.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 The parties own neighboring rural properties that were once
a single parcel.

¶3 In 1998, A Bar V Cattle & Commerce Corporation (“A Bar V”)
owned the combined property and operated a cattle ranch on the land. A
Bar V conveyed a portion of the cattle ranch to its owner’s daughter, Laurie
Boaz, and her husband to construct a home (the “Dominant Property”).
Because the only access to the Dominant Property from public roadways
was across the remaining cattle ranch (the “Servient Property”), A Bar V
granted three easements to the Dominant Property to establish permanent
legal access to it from public roadways.

1 Judge David B. Gass was a sitting member of this court when the matter

was assigned to this panel of the court. He retired effective June 30, 2026. In
accordance with the authority granted by Article VI, Section 3, of the
Arizona Constitution, and under A.R.S. § 12-145, the Chief Justice of the
Arizona Supreme Court has designated Judge David B. Gass as a judge pro
tempore in the Court of Appeals for the purpose of participating in the
resolution of cases assigned to this panel during his term in office and for
the duration of Administrative Order 2026-87.

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KB RANCH v. ECKARD, et al.
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¶4 Easement 1 begins at the Dominant Property and runs west
until it intersects with Peavine Road (formerly Old Road North) and then
runs southwest until it exits at the Servient Property’s southwest corner.
The Deed states that Easement 1 “shall be fifty (50) feet in width along an
irregular centerline to be designated by Grantees [the Boazes].” The Boazes
designated the centerline of Easement 1 by constructing a roadway
approximately 10 feet wide running from the Dominant Property to
intersect Peavine Road as it ran southwesterly to the southern boundary of
the Servient Property. That road was in place when the Deed was recorded.

¶5 Easement 2 begins where Easement 1 intersects Peavine Road
and runs northeast before turning west and then north until it exits the
Servient Property at either the western boundary “or at Grantor’s option[,]”
the northwest corner. The Deed states that Easement 2 “shall be fifty (50)
feet in width,” “along an irregular centerline to be designated by Grantor,”
and could be moved at grantor’s election and expense. The grantor
designated the centerline of Easement 2 by constructing a roadway
approximately ten feet wide along the path described in the easement and
exiting the Servient Property’s western boundary.

¶6 Easement 3 begins where Easement 2 turns west and runs
northeast across the Servient Property until it terminates at that property’s
northeastern corner. The Deed states that Easement 3 “shall be fifty (50) feet
in width” “along an irregular centerline to be designated by Grantor” and
gives the grantor the option to move the easement at its expense. There was
testimony that Easement 3 follows an old railroad track.

¶7 The easements—shown on the map below—were not
surveyed because the roadways were already in place, and the easements
were to be 50 feet wide, centered on the existing roads, to account for the
rural terrain. There is no evidence that the roadways have been moved since
they were originally constructed.

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Decision of the Court

¶8 In 2007, A Bar V sold the Servient Property to the Boazes, who
continued cattle ranching operations.

¶9 In 2018, Jan Sterling, through her entity KB Ranch, purchased
the Dominant Property, including the easements attached to the land.
Sterling relies exclusively on the easements for access to the Dominant
Property, and primarily uses Easement 1.

¶10 From 2018 to 2023, Sterling used the easements without
interruption by the Servient Property’s cattle ranch operations. Because the
cattle roamed the ranch and got water from a trough at the ranch house,
they did not congregate on the easements.

¶11 In 2023, the Eckards purchased the Servient Property and
implemented different ranching practices, including fencing off areas of the
Servient Property to control the movement of the cattle, so they could rotate
them between pastures. As part of these changes, the Eckards installed
fencing along the edge of the roadway in Easements 1 and 2. At places, the
fencing is approximately 12 feet from the centerline of the roadway and
therefore within the boundaries of the easements. In addition, the Eckards
placed temporary watering troughs within the boundaries of the
easements. This temporary placement of the water troughs lasted
approximately three months while a generator for a ground water pump

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KB RANCH v. ECKARD, et al.
Decision of the Court

was replaced. Eventually, the Eckards moved the water troughs adjacent to
the roadway at the intersection of Easements 1 and 2.

¶12 KB Ranch filed this action alleging the Eckards interfered with
its easement rights and asked the superior court to declare its rights under
the Deed. Sterling testified that the Eckards’ fencing and water trough
placement caused cattle to congregate in the easements, frequently blocking
them entirely and making Sterling’s access to her property difficult or
impossible. KB Ranch also asked the court to order the Eckards to show
cause as to why they should not relocate all fence lines and the water trough
outside the easements.

¶13 At an evidentiary hearing, the Eckards did not deny the
location of a fence within Easements 1 and 2 but disputed that the water
trough was within the easements. The Eckards maintained that KB Ranch
did not need the full 50-foot easement width and their conduct did not
unreasonably interfere with Sterling’s use of the easements.

¶14 After considering the evidence, the superior court found that
the Eckards’ placement of a fence and water trough on Easement 1 did not
interfere or impede Sterling’s access. The court ruled that KB Ranch failed
to establish that any of the Eckards’ improvements unreasonably interfered
with or obstructed access to the Dominant Property. The court therefore
denied KB Ranch’s request for an order requiring the Eckards to remove
the improvements situated within the easements. The court found the
Eckards prevailed and awarded them attorneys’ fees and costs.

¶15 KB Ranch timely appealed. This Court has jurisdiction under
A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶16 KB Ranch argues the superior court erred by applying a
reasonableness standard to allow obstructions within the easements,
contrary to Squaw Peak Cmty. Covenant Church of Phx. v. Anozira Dev., Inc.,
149 Ariz. 409, 412 (App. 1986).2 This Court reviews questions of law—

2 KB Ranch also claimed the Eckards interfered with the easements by
allowing their sprinklers to wet the roadway, failing to remove manure
from the roadways, feeding cattle in the easements and encouraging cattle
to congregate in the easements. On appeal, KB Ranch does not argue that
the superior court erred by denying its request for relief with respect to

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Decision of the Court

including the interpretation of an easement—de novo. Id. And it defers to
the superior court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous. Shooter v.
Farmer, 235 Ariz. 199, 200, ¶ 4 (2014).

I. The Eckards’ Use of the Easements.

¶17 “Unless barred by the terms of the easement, the servient
estate owner ‘is entitled to make any use of the servient estate that does not
unreasonably interfere with enjoyment of the servitude.’” Hunt v.
Richardson, 216 Ariz. 114, 121, ¶ 21 (App. 2007) (quoting Restatement
(Third) of Property: Servitudes (“Restatement”) § 4.9 cmt. c (2000)). Thus,
the first inquiry is whether the terms of the Deed bar the improvement. Id.
at 121, ¶ 22. As the superior court found, nothing in the Deed prohibits the
Eckards from locating improvements within the easements. Powell v.
Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556–57, ¶¶ 13–14 (2006) (following Restatement
§ 4.1(1), cmt. a, which interprets servitudes according to the parties’ intent
as shown by the instrument’s language and the circumstances of its
creation).

¶18 KB Ranch argues that even though the Deed does not
expressly prohibit improvements within the easements, any obstruction
within the easements’ bounds is unlawful because the Deed grants
easements of a defined size (50-feet wide). It relies on Squaw Peak. That case,
however, prohibits only permanent improvements that limit access to an
express easement. Squaw Peak, 149 Ariz. at 414.3

¶19 In Squaw Peak, a church owned an easement “40 feet in width”
over neighboring property. Id. at 411. It constructed a 28-foot-wide paved
roadway in the middle of the easement, leaving 5-foot and 7-foot unpaved
strips on either side of the roadway. Id. The neighboring property owner

these improvements or behaviors; therefore, this Court does not address
those issues.

3 This Court rejects the Eckards’ suggestion that the Arizona Supreme Court

overruled Squaw Peak in Powell and Arizona courts must now apply only
Restatement § 4.9 to easement disputes. The court’s ruling in Powell
concerned interpretation of restrictive covenants (a form of servitude) and
it adopted the approach in Restatement § 4.1 rather than a rule of strict
construction. Powell, 211 Ariz. at 556–57, ¶¶ 12–14. It did not address Squaw
Peak and nothing in its holding undermines Squaw Peak’s continued
validity. See Hunt, 216 Ariz. at 121, ¶ 22 (discussing Squaw Peak in its
analysis of whether gate interfered with ingress/egress easement).

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KB RANCH v. ECKARD, et al.
Decision of the Court

sought to install curbs perpendicular to the paved roadway on the 7-foot
strip of easement. Id. The 6-inch tall curbs would prevent traffic from using
7 feet of the easement. Id. In denying the church’s request to enjoin
construction of the curbs, the superior court found that the curbs would not
unreasonably interfere with the church’s right of ingress and egress. Id. at
411–12.

¶20 On appeal, this Court held that because the easement was
unambiguously 40-feet wide, the superior court had to determine whether
the permanent curbs would obstruct access of any part of the easement, not
just whether they impeded reasonable ingress and egress. Id. at 413–14.
Noting multiple times that the proposed curbs were to be “permanently”
located on the easement, this Court reversed the superior court’s denial of
the church’s request for an injunction and ruled “as a matter of law that
permanent curbing running perpendicular across an easement is an
obstruction of that easement.” Id. at 414.

¶21 KB Ranch insists that the holding of Squaw Peak is not limited
to “permanent” improvements but prohibits the servient landowner’s
occupation of “any part of a defined easement.” Careful reading of Squaw
Peak, though, reveals the language KB Ranch cites: “permanent
obstructions” in “any part” of the easement. Id. at 413 (quoting Hoff v. Scott,
453 So.2d 224, 225–26 (Fla. App. 1984)).

¶22 This Court in Squaw Peak prohibited only permanent—not
temporary—improvements within an easement, and this Court declines to
extend that rule to temporary items. See also Metro. Water Dist. of Salt Lake &
Sandy v. Sorf, 542 P.3d 87, 95–96, ¶¶ 34–35 (Utah App. 2023) (discussing
cases that have adopted the “bright-line” exception to the rule of mutual
reasonableness by classifying as unreasonable any “permanent structure”
within the boundaries of negotiated easements); Johnson v. Highway 101
Invs., LLC, 319 P.3d 485, 487 (Idaho 2014) (identifying cases that recognize
an exception “to the general rule of reasonableness” as “a permanent
structure is per se unreasonable if it diminishes an easement with definite
location and dimensions”); Aladdin Petroleum Corp. v. Gold Crown Props.,
Inc., 561 P.2d 818, 825 (Kan. 1977) (“Construction of carports or other
permanent obstructions over a portion of an easement for passage of a
definite width wrongfully impairs and interferes with the privilege of
passage which the owner of the definite easement holds.”).

¶23 KB Ranch points to a Wyoming Supreme Court decision,
Lamb v. Wyo. Game and Fish Comm’n, 985 P.2d 433 (Wyo. 1999), which
affirmed an order directing servient landowners to remove not only

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permanent structures, but also “other objects” from within the bounds of
defined easements granted to the public for fishing access. Id. at 436, 438.
The Wyoming Supreme Court did not, however, adopt a rule barring
placement of any object—no matter how temporary—within a defined
easement. See id. And even if it had, this Court would decline to follow such
an approach in light of Squaw Peak’s permanency language.

¶24 Accordingly, when an easement does not preclude a servient
landowner from erecting improvements, temporary improvements are not
automatically barred, even when the bounds of the easement are expressly
defined. See Hunt, 216 Ariz. at 121, ¶ 23. Instead, the superior “court must
consider and balance the parties’ interests.” Id. (citing Restatement § 4.9,
Reporter’s Note). This balancing is typically a question of fact dependent
on the circumstances of the particular case. Id.

¶25 Restatement § 4.9 cmt. c states:

If an improvement is temporary and easily removed, it is
generally not unreasonable. The more expensive the
improvement or the more difficult its removal is likely to be,
the more likely is the conclusion that the improvement is an
unreasonable interference with the easement . . . .

Restatement § 4.9 cmt. c. Thus, a court may consider the nature of the
improvement and whether it may hinder future development of the
easement when deciding the reasonableness of an improvement. Indeed,
the Restatement illustrates an example with similar facts to those in this
case:

O, the owner of Blackacre, conveyed to A, the owner of
Whiteacre, a 60-foot-wide easement for a road to provide
access to Whiteacre. There is currently a narrow dirt lane
within the easement area. A has no current plans to improve
the road, but plans to do so when Whiteacre is eventually
subdivided. O is using the area up to the lane for pasture and
has erected a temporary fence along the lane to keep the
livestock from straying. In the absence of other facts or
circumstances, O is entitled to maintain the fence within the
easement area because the fence will be relatively easy to
remove when A wants to widen the road.

Restatement § 4.9 cmt. c, illus. 5.

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KB RANCH v. ECKARD, et al.
Decision of the Court

¶26 Here, the two contested improvements are the water trough
and the fence. Both are removeable improvements. Because the Deed does
not prohibit placement of improvements in the easements and the Eckards’
improvements are removable, the superior court appropriately considered
and balanced the parties’ interests to determine whether the water trough
and fence unreasonably interfered with KB Ranch’s enjoyment of the
easements. Hunt, 216 Ariz. at 121, ¶ 21; Restatement § 4.9, Reporter’s Note
(“When the parties have not spelled out the details of their arrangements,
it is assumed that they intended a mutual accommodation of their interests.
An interpretation that balances their interests is proper[.]”).4 Based on the
evidence presented, the record supports the superior court’s finding that
the water trough and fence do not unreasonably interfere with or impede
KB Ranch’s use and enjoyment of the easements.

II. KB Ranch’s Easements.

¶27 In affirming the superior court’s ruling, this Court must
address the Eckards’ suggestion in their answering brief that the superior
court limited the easements to 10-foot-wide roadways.

¶28 “An easement is a right to use the land of another for a specific
purpose.” Scalia v. Green, 229 Ariz. 100, 102, ¶ 7 (App. 2011); Restatement
§ 1.2 (“An easement creates a nonpossessory right to enter and use land in
the possession of another and obligates the possessor not to interfere with
the uses authorized by the easement.”). All residual use rights remain in the
servient landowner. Restatement § 4.9 cmt. c. An express grant of an
easement defines the grantee’s rights, and Arizona courts will interpret it
to give effect to the parties’ intention. See Powell, 211 Ariz. at 557, ¶ 14;
Restatement § 4.1(1) (“A servitude should be interpreted to give effect to
the intention of the parties ascertained from the language used in the
instrument, or the circumstances surrounding creation of the servitude, and
to carry out the purpose for which it was created.”).

¶29 The Eckards contend the Deed’s failure to describe the
location of the easements by reference to metes and bounds, angles,

4 The superior court found that the water trough is adjacent to, not within,

the easements, a finding supported by the evidence. Nevertheless, because
actions that make it more difficult to use an easement may constitute an
unreasonable interference with the easement, the parties’ interests must be
balanced to determine whether they interfered with access and use of the
easements. Restatement § 4.9 cmt. c.

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Decision of the Court

distances or fixed landmarks renders the Deed insufficiently specific and
definite for a court to enforce according to its terms. Therefore, and even
though there is no dispute that the Deed states the easements are 50-feet
wide, the Eckards argue the superior court was allowed to apply a
“necessary and reasonable under the circumstances” rule to determine the
bounds of the easements. They claim the court did so and found that KB
Ranch is entitled to only a 10-foot roadway to access the Dominant
Property.

¶30 The superior court’s ruling does not support the Eckards’
position, nor does the law. See Squaw Peak, 149 Ariz. at 412 (court’s will
enforce an unambiguous easement according to its terms). The court’s order
did no more than determine that KB Ranch did not establish that the
Eckards’ improvements infringed on access to the easements or the
Dominant Property. In denying KB Ranch’s request for a declaratory
judgment, the superior court did not limit the defined 50-foot easement to
the 10-foot-wide roadway. See id. (stating that if the language creating an
easement is ambiguous, a “reasonably convenient and suitable way across
the servient land is presumed”). Although the court made factual findings
that the 10-foot-wide roadways are sufficient for KB Ranch to access the
Dominant Property, such findings were in support of the superior court’s
determination that KB Ranch did not meet its burden of proof.

III. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs.

¶31 Both parties request an award of attorneys’ fees and costs on
appeal, citing A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and -341.01. Because KB Ranch did not
prevail on appeal, this Court denies its request.

¶32 Because the Eckards prevailed, this Court awards their
reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal upon compliance with
Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21. A.R.S. §§ 12-341.01, - 342.

CONCLUSION

¶33 This Court affirms.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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