Hancock v. Hancock

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

AUDREY L. HANCOCK, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

BRANDON J. HANCOCK, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0847 FC
FILED 08-28-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2021-094653
The Honorable Harla M. Davison, Judge, Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART

COUNSEL

San Tan Family Law, P.L.C., Queen Creek
By Spencer T. Hale, Matthew K. Palfreyman
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

Brandon J. Hancock, Gilbert
Respondent/Appellee

HANCOCK v. HANCOCK
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge D. Andrew Gaona joined.

F U R U Y A, Judge:

¶1 Audrey L. Hancock (“Mother”) appeals the superior court’s
order modifying legal decision-making, parenting time, and child support.
For the following reasons, we affirm in part and vacate and remand in part.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother and Brandon J. Hancock (“Father”) married in
October 2005 and have one adult child and three minor children—B.H.,
L.H., and K.H. The parties divorced in January 2022 and agreed to joint
legal decision-making. The court also ordered Father to pay child support.

¶3 In January 2025, Mother filed a Motion for Post-Decree
Temporary Order Without Notice and a Petition to Modify Legal Decision-
Making, Parenting Time and Child Support. Mother sought sole legal
decision-making and requested supervised parenting time for Father,
alleging he psychologically abused the children. Mother also filed an
Expedited Motion for Court to Interview Children of the Parties. The court
denied Mother’s temporary order motion and motion to interview on an
emergency basis. The next month, Father filed a Counter-Petition for Order
to Appear Re: Contempt and Enforcement of Parenting Time and Legal
Decision-Making Authority Orders.

¶4 The court set an evidentiary hearing to take place on August
11, 2025, to address Mother’s petition and Father’s counter-petition. Two
weeks before that hearing, Mother filed a Motion to Continue Trial because
she argued she needed time to find legal counsel and the court had not yet
addressed her motion to interview. She also asserted in her motion to
continue that “one hour is an insufficient amount of time” for the hearing.
The court entered a minute entry on August 6 denying the motion to
continue and the motion to interview. Later that day, Mother sent Father
sixteen exhibits she sought to admit at the hearing. Father then filed a
supplemental pre-trial statement, objecting to all of Mother’s exhibits as
untimely disclosed.

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¶5 At the evidentiary hearing on August 11, the court excluded
Mother’s exhibits as a sanction for her failure to comply with the rules of
disclosure but allowed her to testify about the contents of the exhibits. After
considering the evidence and the parties’ testimony, the court awarded
Father sole legal decision-making, ordered Mother to pay $570 per month
in child support, and found Mother in contempt for violating the court’s
previous parenting-time order. The court also imposed a parenting plan for
K.H. and L.H. but allowed B.H. to choose her own schedule.

¶6 One month later, Mother filed a Motion to Alter or Amend,
requesting a new trial because the court “was not able to weigh all of the
appropriate evidence” in its best-interests analysis. The court denied the
motion and Mother timely appealed. Father filed a Motion to Dismiss
Appeal, arguing Mother’s opening brief was untimely and failed to comply
with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure (“ARCAP”) 13. We denied
the motion to dismiss but permitted Father to re-raise his arguments in his
answering brief.

¶7 In November 2025, while Mother’s appeal was pending, she
filed a Petition to Modify Child Support. The court held a hearing in March
2026 and later ordered Father to pay $492 per month beginning on January
1, 2026.

¶8 We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9 of the
Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) Section 12-
2101(A)(2).

DISCUSSION

¶9 Mother contends the court erred by (1) excluding her
evidence as a sanction; (2) untimely ruling on and denying her motion
requesting that the court interview the minor children; (3) denying her
request for an expanded hearing; (4) misapplying A.R.S. Section 25-320, the
Arizona Child Support Guidelines (“Guidelines”); and (5) failing to
consider all evidence related to the parties’ incomes.

¶10 Father argues Mother’s brief does not comply with ARCAP
13 because she fails to cite the applicable standard of review and include
citations to the record. See ARCAP 13(a)(7)(B). Failure to comply with
ARCAP 13 generally results in waiver. Ramos v. Nichols, 252 Ariz. 519, 522
¶ 8 (App. 2022). But even if we assume Mother’s brief is deficient, we
decline to apply waiver here because the children’s best interests are at
issue. See Fadlon v. Cleverly, 262 Ariz. 127, 134 ¶ 17 n.2 (App. 2026) (citing

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cases), rev. denied (Aug. 7, 2026). We address each of Mother’s arguments in
turn.

I. Violation of the Disclosure Rules

A. Timely Disclosure

¶11 Mother argues the court erred in summarily excluding her
evidence as a sanction for her violation of disclosure rules because one
exhibit was timely disclosed.

¶12 We review the court’s ruling to exclude evidence as a sanction
for abuse of discretion. Fadlon, 262 Ariz. at 138 ¶ 41. “In reviewing for an
abuse of discretion, the question is not whether the judges of this court
would have made an original like ruling, but whether a judicial mind, in
view of the law and circumstances, could have made the ruling without
exceeding the bounds of reason.” Marquez v. Ortega, 231 Ariz. 437, 441 ¶ 14
(App. 2013) (citation modified). We will affirm unless the court made an
error of law or its decision is unsupported by the record. DeLuna v. Petitto, 247 Ariz. 420, 423 ¶ 9 (App. 2019).

¶13 Parties must serve their initial disclosures “not later than 40
days after the filing of the first responsive pleading to a petition.” Ariz. R.
Fam. Law P. (“ARFLP”) 49(b)(1). Evidence discovered after this deadline
must be disclosed no more than 30 days after discovery. ARFLP 49(b)(2)(B).
But if new evidence is discovered less than 30 days before the hearing, it
must be disclosed “reasonably in advance of the hearing.” Id.

¶14 Here, Mother first disclosed her list of exhibits in her pre-trial
statement on July 28, 2025, approximately two weeks before the hearing.
But she did not send Father the actual exhibits—which varied from those
listed in her pre-trial statement—until August 6, five days before the
hearing. Mother concedes that her disclosure of most exhibits was
delinquent. She argues, however, that because one exhibit was not
discoverable until July 22, and she disclosed that one exhibit within 30 days
of discovery, her disclosure of at least that exhibit was timely.

¶15 But Mother’s argument is flawed because it fails to
acknowledge the requirement that disclosure occur “reasonably in
advance” when the evidence is discovered less than 30 days before the
hearing. See id. July 22 was 20 days before the August 11 hearing. Mother
does not cite supporting evidence in the record or argue why five days
before trial is “reasonably in advance,” such that her disclosure was timely.
Thus, we discern no abuse of discretion and affirm the court’s finding that

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Mother violated ARFLP 49 by untimely disclosing her evidence, including
the one exhibit that was not discoverable until July 22.

B. Prejudice

¶16 Mother also argues the court erred because “Father was not
unfairly prejudiced by the untimely disclosure.” A party who is prejudiced
by the opposing party’s untimely disclosure may seek sanctions under
ARFLP 65. ARFLP 49(b)(3). Mother contends Father was not prejudiced
because he “knew the evidence existed since he either helped to create the
evidence or was present during the creation of the evidence.” Mother also
contends the court excluded her evidence “without regard to Father’s
failure to show prejudice.”

¶17 Mother’s argument is unsupported by the record. In his
supplemental pre-trial statement, Father alleged prejudice in that Mother’s
exhibits were so voluminous he lacked sufficient time to review them or
confirm their authenticity. He also noted there was “little to no context”
provided and the exhibits “offer[ed] limited clarity or meaningful insight.”
Further, at the hearing, the court acknowledged Father’s assertion of
prejudice and found it to be sufficient. Thus, because the record supports
the court’s finding of prejudice, we discern no abuse of discretion.

C. Best-Interests Analysis

¶18 Mother further argues the court’s sanction violated Hays v.
Gama, 205 Ariz. 99 (2003) and Kelly v. Kelly, 252 Ariz. 371 (App. 2021). Father
argues these authorities are distinguishable and this case is more like
Johnson v. Provoyeur, 245 Ariz. 239 (App. 2018), so the court’s sanction
should be affirmed.

¶19 The superior court has broad discretion when imposing
sanctions for disclosure violations. Fadlon, 262 Ariz. at 138 ¶ 45. But “[i]n
family court cases, the court must nevertheless ensure it remains able to
consider all factors relevant to the best interests of the children.” Id. In Hays
and Kelly, the superior court reversed a court’s evidence-excluding
sanctions because they “effectively preclude[d] potentially significant
information from being considered in the custody determination.” Hays,
205 Ariz. at 103–04 ¶¶ 22–23; Kelly, 252 Ariz. at 375 ¶ 19 (“The superior
court cannot sanction a parent in a way that prevents the court from
considering admissible, potentially significant information about the
child’s best interests.”) (citation modified). But in Johnson, we affirmed a
sanction excluding evidence because other evidence “gave the court

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sufficient information” to conduct its best-interests analysis. 245 Ariz. at 244
¶¶ 16–17.

¶20 Mother argues the court could not conduct a proper best-
interests analysis without her excluded evidence. She argues that like Hays
and Kelly, her evidence was significant and the court failed to review the
exhibits and determine whether the information they contained “could
realistically be obtained from additional sources.” More specifically, she
contends the court lacked “information regarding Father’s abuse or the
children’s desires to not return to their Father’s home.”

¶21 But we cannot examine Mother’s exhibits because she made
no offer of proof to preserve their review and they are absent from the
record. It is an appellant’s responsibility to ensure “the record on appeal
contains all . . . documents necessary for us to consider the issues raised on
appeal.” Baker v. Baker, 183 Ariz. 70, 73 (App. 1995). When such evidence is
absent from the record, we assume it “would support the court’s findings
and conclusions.” Id. Thus, we assume the information contained in the
missing exhibits could realistically be obtained from other sources,
supporting the court’s sanction.

¶22 Further, the relevant question is not whether the court
weighed every piece of potentially relevant evidence in its best-interests
analysis. Rather, the question on review is whether the court considered the
best-interests factors under A.R.S. Section 25-403 and made findings
supported by the record. See Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 51 ¶ 11 (“In a
contested custody case, the court must make specific findings on the record
regarding all relevant factors and the reasons for which the decision is in
the best interests of the children.”) (citation modified).

¶23 Here, the court listed the best-interests factors in its order,
made findings for each factor, and cited the parties’ testimony to support
its findings. Also, contrary to Mother’s assertion, the court did receive
evidence of Father’s alleged abuse and the children’s desires. Mother
testified Father’s “emotional and psychological manipulation . . .
transfer[ed] onto [the] kids” and the children “are afraid of [Father] in
different ways.” She also testified that the children want “to be with
[Father] but not . . . 50/50.” Thus, in light of the missing exhibits and the
state of the record, we affirm the court’s sanction.

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II. Motion to Interview

A. Timely Ruling

¶24 Mother contends the court committed reversible error by
untimely ruling on her motion to interview. Rule 91(e) of the Arizona Rules
of the Supreme Court states that the superior court must rule on matters
within sixty days of submission, as required by Article 6, Section 21 of the
Arizona Constitution. But this rule is “only directory and not mandatory.”
In re Appleton’s Estate, 15 Ariz. App. 490, 493 (1971). As a result, the remedy
for a pending matter that is more than 60 days old is a mandate for the court
to enter a ruling. See Western Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. Diamond Lazy K Guest
Ranch, Inc., 18 Ariz. App. 256, 261 (1972) (noting remedy is for parties to
“make a record in the trial court . . . urging compliance with the rule”); see
also Fish v. Life Time Fitness, Inc., 1 CA-CV 16-0496, 2018 WL 2016495, at *4
¶ 19 (Ariz. App. May 1, 2018) (concluding party’s failure to cite authority
showing untimeliness “gives rise to a remedy that would assist her on the
merits of the appeal” so the remedy is ordering court to rule on pending
motion) (mem. decision). Here, the court denied Mother’s motion to
interview on August 6, 2025, so no further remedy is warranted.

¶25 Mother also argues the court should have ruled within a
reasonable amount of time, citing Zancanaro v. Cross, 85 Ariz. 394 (1959). But
Zancanaro applied a reasonableness standard to the question of contract
performance, 85 Ariz. at 398, and is thus irrelevant to the issue of timely
judicial rulings. Mother further contends the court’s untimely ruling
violated her substantial rights, but she fails to develop this argument, thus
waiving it. See In re Aubuchon, 233 Ariz. 62, 64–65 ¶ 6 (2013) (considering
arguments that lack adequate explanation as waived). Therefore, Mother’s
argument regarding the timeliness of the court’s ruling is unavailing.

B. Denial of the Motion

¶26 Mother argues in the alternative that even if the court timely
ruled on her motion, it nevertheless erred in denying the motion because it
could not fully evaluate the children’s best interests without interviewing
them.

¶27 We review the court’s decision on a motion to interview
children for an abuse of discretion. See A.R.S. § 25-405(A) (“The court may
interview the child in chambers to ascertain the child’s wishes as to the
child’s custodian and as to parenting time”) (emphasis added); see also
ARFLP 12(a) (“[T]he court may conduct an in camera interview with a minor

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child . . . .”) (emphasis added). We also review the court’s best-interests
analysis for an abuse of discretion. DeLuna, 247 Ariz. at 423 ¶ 9.

¶28 When deciding legal-decision making and parenting time, the
court must consider the children’s best interests using factors listed in
A.R.S. Section 25-403. Id. at 423 ¶ 11. One such factor is “the wishes of the
child as to legal decision-making and parenting time.” A.R.S.
§ 25-403(A)(4).

¶29 Mother argues the court’s refusal to interview the children
prevented the court from considering the children’s wishes. But the court
received and considered evidence regarding the children’s wishes through
the parties’ testimony. Mother testified the children “want to be with
[Father] but not . . . 50/50.” Father testified that in January 2025, only L.H.
was following the parenting-time schedule and the other two children had
left his home. The court acknowledged both parties’ testimony in its order
before establishing parenting time. Thus, the record supports the court’s
best-interests analysis. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Mother’s motion to interview.

III. Expanded Hearing

¶30 Mother further argues the court erred by denying her request
for an expanded hearing because presenting evidence on her petition to
modify and defending against Father’s counter-petition in one hour was
“an unrealistic task.”

¶31 We review the court’s management of its docket for abuse of
discretion. Findlay v. Lewis, 172 Ariz. 343, 346 (1992); see also ARFLP 77(c)(1)
(“The court may impose reasonable time limits appropriate to the
proceedings.”). We will not “substitute [our] judgment for that of the trial
court in the day-to-day management of cases.” Findlay, 172 Ariz. at 346.

¶32 In April 2025, four months before the hearing, the court
entered a minute entry that included instructions on how to request
additional trial time. The instructions state the requesting party must file a
motion “stating good cause to extend the time” and “an estimate of time
and subject matter of the expected testimony for each witness.” Mother
filed a motion to continue on July 28, 2025 and included a single line that
read, “One hour is an insufficient amount of time for this trial.” Mother’s
motion did not follow the court’s instructions, so the court was well within
its discretion to deny Mother’s request for additional time.

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¶33 Mother also argues the court’s decision was error because she
“did not have sufficient time to present her evidence which included ten
video recordings.” But Mother’s exhibits were excluded at the beginning of
the hearing, so this argument is unavailing. Thus, we affirm the court’s
denial of Mother’s request for an expanded hearing.

IV. Child Support

¶34 Mother raises two issues regarding the court’s child support
order. Father argues these issues are moot because the court modified the
child support order in March 2026. While Mother no longer has a current
child support obligation due to the modification, the court’s 2026 order was
not retroactive and went into effect first on January 1, 2026. Thus, any error
in the court’s August 2025 child support order would have impacted
Mother’s liability for child support until December 31, 2025. So, the prior
order is not moot.

A. Application of the Guidelines

¶35 Mother contends the court misapplied Section V(F) of the
Guidelines and thus miscalculated child support. We review child support
orders for an abuse of discretion “but review de novo the court’s
conclusions of law and interpretation of the Arizona Child Support
Guidelines[.]” Sherman v. Sherman, 241 Ariz. 110, 112–113 ¶ 9 (App. 2016).

¶36 Section V(F) of the Guidelines addresses how to calculate
child support in two separate scenarios involving multiple children with
different parenting plans. The first scenario requires the court to use two
child support worksheets and applies when “each parent exercises more
than half of the parenting time with at least 1 child[.]” Guidelines § V.F. The
court calculates “the child support owed based on which parent has the
most parenting time with the child” and then finds the difference between
the two parents to determine who has a remaining child support obligation.
Id. (providing a calculation example). The second scenario requires only
one child support worksheet and applies when “one parent does not have
more than half of the parenting time with any of the children[.]” Id. To
determine a parent’s total annual amount of parenting time under either
scenario, the court should look to “a court order, a parenting plan, . . . the
parents’ expectation, or . . . historical practice.” Id. § V.C.

¶37 Mother argues the court should have applied the two-
worksheet scenario because Father exercises more than half of the parenting
time with L.H. and K.H. and she exercises more than half of the parenting

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time with B.H. We agree and note the court did indeed use two child
support worksheets, a decision the record supports.

¶38 The court’s parenting-time order shows Mother gets
parenting time with L.H. and K.H. every other weekend and every
Wednesday. This gives Father more than half of the parenting time with
K.H. and L.H. But for B.H., the court did not impose a parenting-time
schedule. As such, the Guidelines point the court to the parents’
expectations or historical practice to determine whether either parent
exercises more than half of the parenting time. Id. Here, we rely on Father’s
testimony and exhibits since the court found Mother’s testimony not
credible. Father testified that B.H. began living exclusively with Mother on
January 20, 2025 and was unsure “if [he] could convince her to come back.”
Because this testimony shows Mother had been exercising more than half
of the parenting time with B.H. since January 2025, the court appropriately
applied the two-worksheet scenario. See id. § V.F.

¶39 But upon review of the two worksheets, we cannot determine
how the court concluded that Mother owed $570 per month. In its first
worksheet, the court calculated Mother’s presumptive child support
obligation for L.H. and K.H. as $701.12 and Father’s presumptive obligation
as $1,283.14. Then, in the second worksheet, the calculations show Mother’s
presumptive obligation for B.H. was $628.71 and Father’s was $891.49. The
court’s final calculation shows Mother’s child support obligation is $701
while Father’s is $131, leaving Mother with a child support obligation of
$570. It is unclear how the court’s final calculations of $701 and $131 derive
from the preceding calculations, and there are no supporting findings
enabling us to adequately review the child support order. Thus, we vacate
and remand the child support order to be recalculated using two
worksheets with supporting findings. See City of Phoenix v. Geyler, 144 Ariz.
323, 330 (1985) (concluding “we are not disposed to assume that the trial
court exercised its discretion” when court fails to explain its decision and
none are apparent from the record); see also Emeofa v. Emeofa, 1 CA-CV
24-0805, 2025 WL 3140192, at *3 ¶ 17 (Nov. 10, 2025) (remanding after
discerning no reason for court’s inconsistent treatment of certain property
allocations) (mem. decision).

B. Mother’s Income

¶40 Mother further argues the court erred by attributing a higher
income to her, despite evidence to the contrary. Mother’s Affidavit of
Financial Information, which was admitted at the hearing as one of Father’s
exhibits, shows Mother makes $20 an hour with a $200 commission or

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bonus per paycheck. Father testified Mother makes $25 an hour after
considering two certifications she received. In its order, the court attributed
an income of $25 an hour to Mother after noting “a negative inference shall
apply to Mother’s income due to her lack of participation in the discovery
process.”

¶41 Mother contends the court ignored her Affidavit of Financial
Information and relied on Father’s unsubstantiated testimony. But the
court’s imputation of a higher income was based on Mother’s failure to
follow the disclosure rules. As previously discussed, the record supports
the court’s finding that Mother failed to comply with such rules, supra
¶¶ 13–15, and thus the court’s negative inference and its imputation of a
higher income is supported by the record.

¶42 But because we vacate and remand the child support order,
inasmuch as the court is required to recalculate the parties’ incomes, the
court may exercise its discretion to reevaluate based on the evidence
presented as of August 11, 2025, or it may consider further testimony and
evidence to determine the parties’ incomes for the relevant period. See supra
¶ 34.

V. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs on Appeal

¶43 Both parties request an award of attorneys’ fees and costs
pursuant to A.R.S. Section 25-324. Because Father is a self-represented
litigant, he is not entitled to attorneys’ fees. Munger Chadwick, P.L.C. v.
Farwest Dev. and Const. of the Sw., LLC, 235 Ariz. 125, 126 ¶ 5 (App. 2014).
Further, having considered the reasonableness of the parties’ positions and
their financial resources, we also deny Mother’s request for attorneys’ fees
in exercise of our discretion.

¶44 But we cannot determine costs on appeal at this time. A.R.S.
Section 12-342(A) lays out which party will recover costs on appeal if the
appealing party is the one against whom judgment was entered by the
superior court:

[I]f the judgment of the appellate court is against [appellant],
but for a lesser amount, [the appellant] shall recover costs in
the appellate court, but shall be adjudged to pay costs in the
court below. If the judgment of the appellate court is against
[the appellant] for the same or a greater amount than in the
court below, the adverse party shall recover costs in both
courts.

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¶45 Because we vacate and remand in part for the superior court
to recalculate child support, we cannot conclude how the judgment against
Mother will compare to the superior court’s judgment after remand. Thus,
after recalculating child support, we defer to the superior court to
determine costs of this appeal.

CONCLUSION

¶46 We affirm the legal decision-making and parenting-time
orders but vacate and remand the child support order for recalculation and
appropriate findings. We also defer to the superior court to award the costs
of this appeal.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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