state/solano v. Zamora Felix
Opinion text
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
In re the Matter of:
STATE OF ARIZONA, ex rel. D.E.S., (DENNISE SOLANO),
Petitioners/Appellants,
v.
MARCELINO ZAMORA FELIX, JR., Respondent/Appellee.
No. 1 CA-CV 25-0851 FC
FILED 07-10-2026
Appeal from the Superior Court in Yuma County
No. S1400DO201800147
The Honorable Levi Gunderson, Judge Pro Tem.
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Dennise Solano, Yuma
Petitioner/Appellant
STATE/SOLANO v. ZAMORA FELIX
Decision of the Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Andrew J. Becke and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.
M O R S E, Judge:
¶1 Dennise Solano ("Mother") appeals the court's denial of her
motion to modify parenting time and motion for reconsideration. We
affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 Mother and Marcelino Zamora Felix Jr. ("Father") have one
child in common ("Child"), born in 2017. In 2018, the court ordered joint
legal decision-making with Mother having final legal decision-making
authority if the parties cannot agree. The court also ordered
"essentially-equal parenting time" with a one-week-on, one-week-off
schedule and Father to pay child support. In December 2019, the court
eliminated Father's child-support obligation.
¶3 In July 2024, the court granted Father an ex parte order of
protection against Mother, and, after a contested hearing, the court affirmed
the order.
¶4 Mother filed a petition to modify parenting time in October
2024 and amended that petition in April 2025. Mother alleged that Child
had to sleep on the floor at Father's house, Father did not reliably
administer Child's medication, and Father failed to meet Child's hygienic
needs. Mother also alleged that Father regularly left Child in Father's wife's
care, despite Mother previously obtaining an order of protection against
Father's wife arising from a later-dismissed disorderly-conduct charge.
Mother contended that Child had unexplained bruises after being in
Father's custody and feared staying with Father. Mother requested the
court modify the parenting-time plan by granting her "first right of refusal,"
limiting Father's parenting time to alternate weekends from 9:00 a.m. to 7:00
p.m., and adjust Father's child-support obligation in its discretion. Father
responded arguing that Mother's claims were fabricated and requested the
court award him sole legal decision-making authority and majority
parenting time based on Mother's disruptions.
2
STATE/SOLANO v. ZAMORA FELIX
Decision of the Court
¶5 In August 2025, with Father's approval, the court modified
the protective order against Mother to allow the parties to "communicate
via electronic means . . . regarding [Child] only."
¶6 In September 2025, after a contested evidentiary hearing, the
court found no change in circumstances to justify a change in parenting
time or legal decision-making. The court affirmed the original
parenting-time plan and legal decision-making order, only removing a
provision that guaranteed the parties an hour of electronic communication
per day with Child while in the physical care of the other parent. The court
found that Mother had committed domestic violence against Father, but she
successfully rebutted the presumption against joint legal decision-making.
¶7 Mother moved for reconsideration citing the rule for a motion
to alter or amend a judgment. See Ariz. R. Fam. L. P. 35.1, 83. Mother
argued the court misinterpreted the evidence, erred in finding Father was
more likely to allow Child meaningful and consistent contact with the other
parent, and failed to consider Father's repeated failures to facilitate Child's
mental-health needs. The court denied the motion under both rules.
¶8 Mother timely appealed and we have jurisdiction pursuant to
A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1).
DISCUSSION
¶9 Father did not file an answering brief. If an appellant raises a
debatable issue, an appellee's failure to respond is generally treated as a
confession of reversible error, see Savord v. Morton, 235 Ariz. 256, 259, ¶ 9
(App. 2014), unless the case involves a child's best interests, see Hays v.
Gama, 205 Ariz. 99, 102, ¶ 18 (2003); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 4 Ariz. App. 83, 85
(1966). An issue is not debatable if the record resolves the question raised.
See, e.g., Air E., Inc. v. Wheatley, 14 Ariz. App. 290, 294 (1971); Honsey v.
Honsey, 126 Ariz. 336, 337 (App. 1980). Because Mother does not raise any
debatable issues, and the best interests of a child are at issue, we do not
apply implied confession of error.
¶10 We review the court's decision on a petition to modify
parenting time for an abuse of discretion. Engstrom v. McCarthy, 243 Ariz.
469, 471, ¶ 4 (App. 2018). We view the record in the light most favorable to
sustaining the court's rulings, and we will affirm "if there is any reasonable
supporting evidence." Garlan v. Garlan, 249 Ariz. 278, 280–81, ¶ 4 (App.
2020).
3
STATE/SOLANO v. ZAMORA FELIX
Decision of the Court
¶11 There is no transcript of the hearing. Mother must ensure the
record on appeal contains the transcripts necessary for this Court to
consider the issues. See ARCAP 11(c)(1); State ex rel. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v.
Burton, 205 Ariz. 27, 30, ¶ 16 (App. 2003). When such transcripts are not
included, "we assume the missing portions of the record would support the
trial court's findings and conclusions." Burton, 205 Ariz. at 30, ¶ 16.
¶12 Mother argues the court abused its discretion by misreporting
the record and erroneously faulted her for the parties' communication and
co-parenting issues despite her evidence to the contrary. The court found
"Father is more likely than Mother to allow [Child] frequent, meaningful,
and continuing contact with the other parent." The court also found very
poor communication between the parties and that, while both parties were
at fault, Mother bore more of the blame. Given this conflicting evidence,
we defer to the court's determination of the weight to give such evidence
and presume the missing record would support the court's findings. See
Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 347–48, ¶ 13 (App. 1998); ARCAP 11(c);
Burton, 205 Ariz. at 30 ¶ 16.
¶13 Second, Mother argues the court failed to analyze Child's
mental-health needs meaningfully in its best-interests analysis. The court
found that Child had been diagnosed with mental-health issues and was
currently prescribed three medications. The court concluded Mother was
more likely than Father to ensure that Child's mental-health needs were met
and maintained her final legal decision-making authority, adding a
provision ordering both parents "to ensure that [Child] takes his prescribed
medication." The court did make a best-interest finding about Child's
mental-health needs and Mother does not show how the court erred in its
analysis.
¶14 Third, Mother argues that the court ignored evidence of
Father's failure to provide medical care, maintain Child's hygiene, and
coordinate appointments. The court explicitly found Mother was more
likely than Father to help Child receive proper care with regards to his
mental and physical health, including ensuring he takes his prescribed
medication and attends his various appointments. And without the
transcript, we presume the evidence and arguments at the hearing would
support the court's findings, Burton, 205 Ariz. at 30, ¶ 16, and "[w]e presume
that after admitting . . . evidence, the trial court considered it," Able Distrib.
Co., Inc. v. James Lampe, Gen. Contractor, 160 Ariz. 399, 409 (App. 1989).
¶15 Last, Mother argues the court failed to consider Child's safety
and stability regarding Mother's dismissed no-contact order against
4
STATE/SOLANO v. ZAMORA FELIX
Decision of the Court
Father's wife, Child's unexplained bruises, and Child's apprehension about
staying with Father. Again, we presume the court considered the evidence
and the missing record would support the court's findings. See Burton, 205
Ariz. at 30, ¶ 16; Able Distrib. Co., Inc., 160 Ariz. at 409 (App. 1989). Mother
points to no error.
¶16 Mother also contends that, based on the original (but later
dismissed) no-contact order against Father's wife, Child's bruising, and
Child's expressions of fear, the court had to perform an analysis under
A.R.S. § 25-403.03 but failed to do so. At the time the court entered its order,
A.R.S. § 25-403.03 provided that "joint legal decision-making shall not be
awarded if the court makes a finding of the existence of significant domestic
violence . . . ." In fact, the court performed this analysis. The court found
"[b]ecause an order of protection was upheld against Mother, following a
contested hearing . . . Mother has committed domestic violence against
Father, pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-403[.03](D)(3)." The court then considered
the factors in A.R.S. § 25-403.03(E) and found "that Mother had rebutted the
presumption that an award of joint legal decision-making is contrary to
[Child]'s best interests," and awarding Mother parenting time would not
endanger Child's development. However, the court found that it was in
Child's best interest to eliminate electronic communication between the
parties about Child because "the parties communicate so poorly with each
other . . . ." We presume the record supports this finding and Mother points
to no other error. See Burton, 205 Ariz. at 30, ¶ 16.
¶17 Father, as the successful party, is entitled to recover costs
upon compliance with ARCAP 21. See A.R.S. § 12-341.
CONCLUSION
¶18 We affirm.
MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR
5