Opinion text
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
WRI SUMMIT REIT LP, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellees,
v.
STEFANIE A. KUERSCHNER, Defendant/Appellant.
No. 1 CA-CV 25-0854
FILED 08-10-2026
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2024-002481
The Honorable Mary Collins Cronin, Judge Pro Tempore
DISMISSED
COUNSEL
Fletcher Barnes Law PLC, Tempe
By Timothy H. Barnes, Sheryl L. Andrew
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee WRI
Frazer, Ryan, Goldberg, Phoenix
By Scott Erickson, Philip B. Whitaker
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellees James T. Kuerschner, et al.
Stefanie Kuerschner, Carefree
Defendant/Appellant
WRI SUMMIT, et al. v. KUERSCHNER
Decision of the Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Judge D. Andrew Gaona joined.
P E R K I N S, Judge:
¶1 Stefanie Kuerschner appeals from superior court judgments
awarding WRI Summit REIT, LP (“Summit”) unpaid rent under a
commercial lease, and sanctioning her for issuing improper subpoenas. We
dismiss her appeal because Stefanie has repeatedly violated our rules by
omitting references to the record and inaccurately citing legal authorities.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 In May 2019, Summit executed a lease, agreeing to rent a unit
in a Scottsdale shopping center to Summit Aesthetics, LLC, (“Aesthetics”).
Stefanie agreed to “absolutely and unconditionally guarantee[] the full
performance” of Aesthetics under the lease.
¶3 In February 2024, Summit filed a forcible detainer action
against Aesthetics and Stefanie in superior court, seeking $96,535.75 for
“unpaid monthly rent, common area maintenance, taxes, late fees, interest
and other charges.” Summit later amended its complaint to remove
Aesthetics after it filed for bankruptcy, and sought to recover the unpaid
rent from Stefanie alone.
¶4 Before this case began, Stefanie was involved in litigation
with the estate of her deceased husband (“the probate case”). See In re Est.
of Kuerschner, 1 CA-CV 25-0108 PB, 2025 WL 2780806 (Ariz. App. Sept. 30
2025) (mem. decision). In February 2025, the probate court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining Stefanie from filing subpoenas
“directly or indirectly” relating to the probate case without prior
permission from the court because Stefanie had “willful[ly] violat[ed] prior
rulings” denying her third party subpoena authority.
¶5 In July 2025, Stefanie served subpoenas, in this case, on James
Kuerschner (“the personal representative”) of the estate and two of his
banks. The subpoenas, among other things, directed the personal
representative and the banks to produce financial documents dating back
12 years.
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Decision of the Court
¶6 The personal representative warned Stefanie three times that
he would move for sanctions if she did not withdraw the subpoenas. She
did not, and the personal representative moved the court in this case to
quash the subpoenas and sought sanctions under Arizona Revised Statutes
Section 12-349(A)(4) (engaging in abuse of discovery), requesting his
attorney fees and double damages up to $5,000. The court granted the
personal representative’s motions to quash the subpoenas and sanctioned
Stefanie, ordering her to pay the personal representative’s attorney fees, his
costs, and an additional $5,000.
¶7 The case eventually proceeded to trial “regarding damages
pertaining to unpaid rents” on July 25, 2025. On July 18, the deadline to
submit exhibits for trial, Stefanie requested an extension to submit her
exhibits, which the court denied. Stefanie submitted her exhibits three days
later. The court precluded the exhibits from trial because Stefanie had
received multiple warnings about the deadline and because allowing the
untimely exhibits would be unfair to opposing counsel.
¶8 Stefanie represented herself at the July 25 bench trial. The
court ultimately found that Summit was entitled to a judgment of
$146,029.45 for the past due rent and its reasonable attorney fees and costs.
The court entered final judgments awarding Summit $146,000 for unpaid
rent and $44,193.69 in attorney fees and costs, and awarding the personal
representative $7,871 in attorney fees and $5,000 in additional sanctions.
Stefanie filed a notice of appeal from those judgments on September 29,
2025, and an amended notice of appeal on October 2, 2025. We have
jurisdiction over Stefanie’s appeal from those judgments. See A.R.S. § 12-
2101(A)(1).
¶9 Stefanie moved the superior court to stay the execution of the
unpaid rent judgment during her appeal without requiring her to post a
supersedeas bond. After a hearing, the court set a $190,193 supersedeas
bond—the total amount of the judgment. Stefanie filed several motions
asking the court to reconsider the bond amount, which the court denied.
DISCUSSION
¶10 Stefanie argues on appeal that the court erred by
(1) precluding her trial exhibits, (2) sanctioning her, (3) and setting the
amount of the supersedeas bond.
¶11 Our appellate rules require opening briefs to include a
statement of facts “relevant to the issues presented for review with
appropriate references to the record.” ARCAP 13(a)(5). The opening brief
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Decision of the Court
must also include citations to the legal authorities on which it relies.
ARCAP 13(a)(7). Self-represented litigants must “comply with [all] relevant
rules of procedural and substantive law,” State v. Gomez, 231 Ariz. 219, 223,
¶ 15 (2012), and are not afforded any special leniency, Ramos v. Nichols, 252
Ariz. 519, 522, ¶ 8 (App. 2022) (we hold unrepresented litigants “to the same
standards as attorneys”). If a party violates our procedural rules, we “may
impose sanctions that are appropriate in the circumstances of the case, and
to discourage similar conduct in the future.” ARCAP 25. Such “sanctions
may include contempt, dismissal, or withholding or imposing costs or
attorneys’ fees.” Id.
¶12 Stefanie’s opening brief does not include a single citation to
the record. Her opening brief also consistently misquotes cases and cites
cases for propositions either not mentioned or directly contradicted by the
case. And one case she cites appears not to exist. We highlight these
examples:
• On page 27, the brief quotes State ex rel. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Burton, 205 Ariz. 27, 30, ¶ 14 (App. 2003) as saying that an appellate court
will find an abuse of discretion if a ruling was “manifestly
unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable
reasons.” But Burton contains none of that language.
• On page 28, the brief quotes Bennett v. Baxter Grp., Inc., 223 Ariz.
414, 418, ¶ 10 (App. 2010) as saying: “We review de novo whether
the trial court complied with the procedural requirements of
§ 12-350.” But that paragraph in Bennett does not mention Section
12-350 and nowhere does it say that we review the trial court’s
compliance with Section 12-350 de novo.
• On page 46, the brief quotes the following language: “Rulings
which prevent a party from presenting evidence strike at the heart
of due process,” citing “Brown v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 194 Ariz.
85, 91 ¶ 30 (1999).” But Brown was an Arizona Court of Appeals
decision from 1998, not an Arizona Supreme Court decision from
1999. See Brown v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 194 Ariz. 85 (App. 1998).
And more importantly, that case did not mention due process at all.
• On page 48, the brief cites Cruz v. Superior Court (Ramirez), 172 Ariz.
462, 464 (App. 1992). We cannot locate a case with this name in the
Arizona appellate courts.
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• On page 58, the brief asserts that the court in Takieh v. O’Meara, 252
Ariz. 51 (App. 2021) reversed a fee sanction because the trial court
“failed to make explicit findings” under Section 12-350, holding
that such failure is reversible error per se. But Takieh did not
contain the quoted language, and it affirmed the trial court’s fee
sanction—the opposite of what the brief asserted.
These citation errors are consistent with the misuse of generative AI.
¶13 Stefanie failed to comply with ARCAP 13 by failing to cite the
record and by submitting inaccurate and misleading legal citations. We
may dismiss her appeal on that basis. See ARCAP 25; Matter of Est. of
Acciavatti, 1 CA-CV 25-0606 PB, 2026 WL 2041963, at *2 , ¶¶ 8–10 (Ariz. App.
July 15, 2026) (dismissing appeal when the opening brief provided “no
citations to the record” and contained “inaccurate and false [legal]
citations” as a result of appellant’s reliance on generative AI). But, we
generally prefer to resolve cases on their merits, see DeLong v. Merrill, 233
Ariz. 163, 166, ¶ 9 (App. 2013), so we will look further into “the
circumstances of [this] case,” to determine whether to dismiss the appeal,
ARCAP 25.
¶14 Stefanie was on notice of ARCAP 13’s requirements when she
filed her opening brief in this appeal. This Court’s September 2025 decision
in her probate case informed Stefanie that her “opening brief is . . . devoid
of the record citations required by ARCAP 13(a)(7)(A), and her case
citations are often inaccurate.” Kuerschner, 1 CA-CV 25-0108 PB, at *5, ¶ 29.
The panel in that case opted to address the substance of her arguments, but
noted that it could “hold that the deficiencies in Stefanie’s opening brief
effect a waiver of her right to appellate review of her claims.” Id. at ¶ 31.
Yet, three months later, in December 2025, she made the same mistakes
when she filed her opening brief in this appeal.
¶15 Stefanie received additional warnings about violating
ARCAP 13 before she filed her reply brief in this appeal. In January 2026,
we issued an order in this case which warned Stefanie about potential
sanctions should she continue to file pleadings relying on “miscited,
misrepresented, or nonexistent legal authorities.” In March 2026, this Court
issued another decision in her probate case, and dismissed that appeal
because of Stefanie’s “repeated and unrepentant violations” of ARCAP 13.
Kuerschner v. Kuerschner, 1 CA-CV 25-0491 PB, 2026 WL 619894, at *2, ¶ 13
(Ariz. App. Mar. 5, 2026) (mem. decision). Yet, Stefanie’s reply brief—filed
over a month later—once again failed to cite to the record and included
multiple inaccurate legal citations. We highlight the following:
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• On page 32, she cites “Starr Pass Resort Developments, LLC v.
Harrington, 237 Ariz. 537 (App. 2015).” But the actual reporter
number and date in that case is 245 Ariz. 495 (App. 2018).
• On page 34, she incorrectly asserts that Arizona Rule of Evidence
201 requires judicial notice to have been “sought for a proper and
limited purpose.”
• On page 35, she cites “Hertz v. Coy, 213 Ariz. 264 (App. 2006).” The
correct citation is Hertz v. Coy, 1 CA-CV 12-0608, 2014 WL 3610893
(Ariz. App. July 22, 2014) (mem. decision). Representing Hertz as a
published opinion, when it is an unpublished memorandum
decision that cannot be cited, even for persuasive value, is
particularly problematic. See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1)(C)
(memorandum decisions issued before January 1, 2015, may not be
cited for persuasive value).
¶16 Dismissal of Stefanie’s appeal is warranted under ARCAP 25
because she continued to violate ARCAP 13 despite receiving repeated
warnings about its requirements and of the consequences for failing to
comply. See Acciavatti, 1 CA-CV 25-0606 PB, at *2, ¶ 10.
¶17 We note that Stefanie filed a motion on July 16 titled
“Corrective Motion to Rely on Verified Authorities,” notifying this Court
that her opening brief contained incorrect case descriptions and sought to
withdraw those case descriptions. We appreciate her candor and always
encourage litigants to correct mistakes in their briefs. But Stefanie filed this
motion several months after the briefing was completed in this case. This is
too little, too late. We therefore deny her motion.
¶18 Summit requests its attorney fees and costs incurred on
appeal under the guaranty agreement that Stefanie and Summit entered. In
that agreement, Stefanie “agree[d] to indemnify and hold harmless
[Summit] from all loss, damage, cost, and expense (including without
limitation costs of court and attorneys’ fees incurred by [Summit]) in the
event of a default by [Aesthetics] under [the lease].” Accordingly, we award
Summit its reasonable attorney fees and taxable costs on appeal upon
compliance with ARCAP 21.
¶19 The personal representative requests attorney fees on appeal
under Section 12-349(A)(1)–(3) and ARCAP 25. We may impose sanctions
on a “party for a violation of these Rules” and such “[s]anctions may
include . . . costs or attorneys’ fees.” ARCAP 25. As we have explained,
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Decision of the Court
Stefanie violated ARCAP 13 because she failed to cite the record and made
many inaccurate and misleading legal citations. Therefore, we award the
personal representative his reasonable attorney fees and taxable costs on
appeal upon compliance with ARCAP 21.
CONCLUSION
¶20 We dismiss the appeal under ARCAP 25.
MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR
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