Gonzales v. Gonzales

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

JENNY GONZALES, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

RAYMOND GONZALES, III, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0856 FC
FILED 08-14-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2021-053018
The Honorable Julie Ann Mata, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART

COUNSEL

Jenny Quintero, Phoenix
Petitioner/Appellant

The Valley Law Group, LLC, Phoenix
By Katelyn R. Morgan
Counsel for Respondent/Appellee

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GONZALES v. GONZALES
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge D. Andrew Gaona joined. Judge Brian Y. Furuya dissented in
part.

P E R K I N S, Judge:

¶1 Jenny Quintero (“Mother”) appeals the superior court’s order
modifying legal decision-making authority, parenting time, and child
support. As explained below, we vacate the court’s significant domestic
violence finding and otherwise affirm the order.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Mother and Raymond Gonzales (“Father”) married in 2015
and have two minor children. The parties divorced in February 2024 and
were awarded joint legal decision-making with a parenting-time plan. In
July 2024, Mother petitioned to modify legal decision-making authority,
parenting time, and child support. Father filed a competing petition to
modify legal decision-making authority and parenting time, and to enforce
various other provisions of the parenting plan due to Mother’s repeated
non-compliance.

¶3 In August 2025, the court held a hearing addressing the
parties’ petitions. The court awarded Father sole legal decision-making
authority, finding Mother “committed one or more acts of significant
domestic violence against Father.” The court also found Mother required
supervised parenting time and ordered Mother to pay $770 per month for
child support. The court also awarded Father $16,839 in attorney fees and
costs, finding Mother “acted unreasonably in the litigation” by consistently
violating court orders.

¶4 Mother timely appealed and we have jurisdiction. Ariz.
Const., art. 6, § 9; A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(2).

DISCUSSION

¶5 Mother argues the court (1) improperly applied the
best-interests factors under Arizona Revised Statutes Section 25-403,
(2) erroneously awarded Father sole legal decision-making authority,

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GONZALES v. GONZALES
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(3) erroneously ordered supervised parenting time, (4) miscalculated child
support, and (5) erroneously awarded Father attorney fees.

¶6 To begin, we note Mother failed to comply with Arizona Rule
of Civil Appellate Procedure (“ARCAP”) 13 because she did not include
record citations in her opening brief. ARCAP 13(a)(7) (requiring
“appropriate references to the portions of the record on which the appellant
relies”). We may consider an argument waived if it is “not supported by
adequate explanation, citations to the record, or authority.” Ramos v.
Nichols, 252 Ariz. 519, 522, ¶ 8 (App. 2022) (cleaned up). But the children’s
best interests are at issue, and so we decline to treat Mother’s arguments as
waived. Solorzano v. Jensen, 250 Ariz. 348, 350, ¶ 8 (App. 2020) (“We
typically decline to find waiver [when] a child’s best interests are at issue.”).

I. Best Interests Factors

¶7 We review legal decision-making authority and
parenting-time orders for abuse of discretion. DeLuna v. Petitto, 247 Ariz.
420, 423, ¶ 9 (App. 2019). A court abuses its discretion when it “commits an
error of law in reaching a discretionary decision or when the record does
not support the court’s decision.” Id. We accept the court’s explicit and
implicit factual findings unless clearly erroneous, Hoobler v. Hoobler, 254
Ariz. 130, 141, ¶ 26 (App. 2022), and will not reweigh evidence or determine
credibility on appeal, Vanwormer v. Lopez, 259 Ariz. 87, 90, ¶ 9 (App. 2025).

¶8 When deciding legal decision-making authority and
parenting time, the court must consider the children’s best interests using
factors listed in Section 25-403. DeLuna, 247 Ariz. at 423, ¶ 11. In doing so,
the court must “make specific findings on the record about all relevant
factors and the reasons for which the decision is in the best interests of the
child.” A.R.S. § 25-403(B).

¶9 Mother argues the superior court failed to properly apply
these best-interests factors. She contends the court failed to “meaningfully
analyze” certain evidence, and made findings inconsistent with the record.
And Mother asserts that there is insufficient evidence to support the court’s
best-interests findings.

¶10 In its order, the court listed each factor, made explicit
findings, and cited the evidence it relied on. To the extent Mother asks us
to reweigh that evidence, we will not do so. We defer to the superior court’s
“determination of witnesses’ credibility and the weight to give conflicting
evidence.” Kim v. Pak, 258 Ariz. 594, 596–97, ¶ 7 (App. 2024). And because

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GONZALES v. GONZALES
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Mother failed to provide us the transcript of the hearing, we assume that it
supports the court’s findings. Baker v. Baker, 183 Ariz. 70, 73 (App. 1995).

¶11 The superior court did not abuse its discretion in applying the
best-interests factors in Section 25-403.

II. Significant Domestic Violence

¶12 One best-interests factor the court must consider is whether
domestic violence has occurred under Section 25-403.03. A.R.S.
§ 25-403(A)(8). If the court finds domestic violence occurred, it must then
determine whether the domestic violence was “significant.” DeLuna, 247
Ariz. at 423–24, ¶¶ 11, 15; A.R.S. § 25-403.03(A) (2014). A finding of
“significant” domestic violence precludes an award of joint legal
decision-making. A.R.S. § 25-403.03(A).

¶13 In reaching its initial domestic violence conclusion, the
superior court referenced Mother’s testimony, and her adult child’s
testimony. The court also noted that Father had an active order of protection
against Mother. Father petitioned for the order in December 2023 based, in
part, on an allegation that Mother hit him in the chest on March 31, 2023,
despite knowing he had a stent placed six months earlier in October 2022.
This conduct is not included in the Phoenix incident report from March 31,
2023. But the superior court upheld the order after a contested hearing,
which means that it concluded Father established by a preponderance of
the evidence that Mother had committed domestic violence or may commit
domestic violence in the future. Ariz. R. Prot. Ord. P. 38(g)(3).

¶14 Finally, the court’s initial domestic violence finding included
that “Mother has been arrested and charged with domestic violence.” But
the three exhibits the court then cited were: Exhibit 18 (a March 31, 2023
City of Phoenix incident report describing an altercation between Mother
and Melinda, Father’s new wife); Exhibit 26 (a letter to Melinda from the
Phoenix Victim Services Unit); and Exhibit 40 (an August 2024 Gilbert
police report describing a separate incident between Mother and Melinda).
Conduct between Mother and Melinda is not domestic violence. See A.R.S.
§ 13-3601 (domestic violence requires the existence of certain relationships,
which do not include this one). And none of these cited exhibits otherwise
identify a domestic violence offense. The court’s statement that Mother was
arrested and charged with domestic violence is thus factually and legally
incorrect.

¶15 In sum, the record contains evidence that the court could have
relied on when reaching its initial finding that some domestic violence
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occurred. But the court’s subsequent “significance” determination under
Section 25-403.03 cited only the existence of Father’s order of protection, the
parties’ competing allegations of domestic violence, and the denial of
Mother’s requested order of protection. The court did not explain what act
or acts it relied on in reaching its determination. While it did not have to do
so, the lack of explanation coupled with the court’s earlier error about
whether Mother was charged with a domestic violence offense, supra ¶ 14,
raises concerns.

¶16 Mother herself inhibited our review by failing to provide us
the hearing transcript. As previously noted, when the relevant transcript is
absent from the record, we typically assume it contains testimony that
“would support the court’s findings and conclusions.” Baker, 183 Ariz. at
73. But we hesitate to make such an assumption here when the court’s
findings are contradicted, at least in part, by evidence the court explicitly,
if erroneously, relied on in reaching its initial domestic violence finding. See
Engstrom v. McCarthy, 243 Ariz. 469, 474, ¶ 15 (App. 2018) (vacating the
superior court’s significant domestic violence finding when the court
“relied on many acts that do not statutorily constitute domestic violence,
and did not explain why Father’s actions amounted to ‘significant’
domestic violence” because this court could not “determine whether the
court would have reached the same conclusion had it considered only the
acts that legally constituted domestic violence.”).

¶17 As in Engstrom, the superior court erred here by finding the
existence of significant domestic violence. We vacate that finding and
remand the issue back to the superior court for further consideration.

III. Supervised Parenting Time

¶18 Mother contends the court erred in ordering her parenting
time be supervised because it failed to make the required statutory findings
and the record does not support its order.

¶19 Under Section 25-411(J), “the court shall not restrict a parent’s
parenting time rights unless it finds that the parenting time would
endanger seriously the child’s physical, mental, moral or emotional health.”
Upon making such a finding, the court may impose limited restrictions on
the exercise of parenting time, including ordering supervision. Cruz v.
Garcia, 240 Ariz. 233, 238, ¶ 18 (App. 2016).

¶20 Here, the court found that unsupervised parenting time
“would or could endanger seriously the children’s physical, mental, or
moral health or would significantly impair the children’s emotional
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GONZALES v. GONZALES
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development.” See A.R.S. § 25-411(J). The court also noted that Mother
required assistance during previous supervised visits because the children
would run away. And here we assume the missing transcript would
support the court’s finding under Section 25-411(J). Mother has not shown
the court abused its discretion.

IV. Child Support

¶21 Mother argues the court miscalculated child support by
improperly imputing full-time income to her. She also argues the court
erred by relying on unsupported and inconsistent evidence.

¶22 We review an award of child support for abuse of discretion.
Sherman v. Sherman, 241 Ariz. 110, 112, ¶ 9 (App. 2016). When determining
child support, the court uses the Arizona Child Support Guidelines
(“Guidelines”) to calculate “the gross income of both parents to
approximate the amount that would have been spent on the children had
the family remained intact.” Id. at 113, ¶ 10. When a parent voluntarily or
without reasonable cause reduces her income to below her full earning
capacity, the court may impute higher income to her. Little v. Little, 193 Ariz.
518, 521, ¶ 6 (1999).

¶23 Here, the court found Mother’s monthly income to be $4,082,
despite Mother claiming a monthly income of $2,039. Mother admits in her
briefing that she voluntarily reduced her work hours to care for the
children. But such a reduction in work hours is no longer justifiable given
that the children reside exclusively with Father. And while the court did
not make an explicit finding in its order addressing why it imputed a higher
income to Mother, we assume the missing transcript supports the court’s
implicit finding that imputing a higher income was warranted. Baker, 183
Ariz. at 73; Hoobler, 254 Ariz. at 141, ¶ 26. The superior court did not abuse
its discretion.

V. Attorney Fees

¶24 Mother argues the court’s award of attorney fees is
unsupported and punitive, and the court “failed to meaningfully evaluate
financial disparity.”

¶25 We review an award of attorney fees for abuse of discretion.
Mangan v. Mangan, 227 Ariz. 346, 352, ¶ 26 (App. 2011). The court awarded
fees under Section 25-324, which states that “after considering the financial
resources of both parties and the reasonableness of the positions each party

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GONZALES v. GONZALES
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has taken throughout the proceedings,” the court may order one party to
pay a reasonable amount of the other party’s fees and costs.

¶26 Here, the court first found there was no substantial disparity
of financial resources between Mother and Father. Mother asserts “the
record reflects that Father has substantially greater earning capacity and
financial resources,” but it is not our role to reweigh that evidence.
Vanwormer, 259 Ariz. at 90, ¶ 9. The court also considered the
reasonableness of Mother’s position, finding she “acted unreasonably in the
litigation” by “show[ing] a consistent and flagrant inability to follow Court
Orders,” leading to “substantial litigation costs.” Again, based on this
record, the superior court did not abuse its discretion.

VI. Attorney Fees and Costs on Appeal

¶27 Father requests his reasonable attorney fees and costs
incurred on appeal pursuant to Section 25-324. We have considered the
parties’ financial resources and the positions taken. We decline to award
attorney fees but grant Father’s request for costs, subject to his compliance
with ARCAP 21.

CONCLUSION

¶28 We vacate the court’s finding of the existence of significant
domestic violence and remand that issue to the superior court. We express
no opinion on what, if any, proceedings the court should hold on remand.
Should the court’s reconsideration of the Section 25-403.03 issue impact any
of its other findings, the court is of course free to revisit them. But we affirm
the remainder of the superior court’s September 3, 2025 order.

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GONZALES v. GONZALES
Furuya, J., Dissenting in Part

F U R U Y A, Judge, dissenting in part:

¶29 As noted above, we will affirm the superior court’s explicit
and implicit findings as long as they are not clearly erroneous. Hoobler, 254
Ariz. at 141 ¶ 26. We also assume that any items an appellant has failed to
include in the record, such as transcripts or other documents, that are
necessary to our review “would support the court’s findings and
conclusions.” Baker 183 Ariz. at 73.

¶30 True, the superior court referenced exhibits that document
violence between Mother and Father’s new wife, Melinda. And I agree that
such interactions do not support a finding of significant domestic violence.
Thus, the exhibits cited by the court do not appear to expressly support the
finding. But “[a] factual finding is clearly erroneous only when, considering
the totality of the evidence, the reviewing court ‘is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Valdez v. Delgado, 254
Ariz. 495, 499 ¶ 14 (App. 2019) (quoting State v. Burr, 126 Ariz. 338, 339
(1980)); cf. Matter of a Member of State Bar of Arizona, 259 Ariz. 369, 382 ¶ 37
(2025) (in a disciplinary proceeding, “[f]indings are clearly erroneous if they
are not supported by reasonable evidence.”) (quoting In re Alexander, 232
Ariz. 1, 5 ¶ 11 (2013)).

¶31 Here, the exhibits mentioned by the court are not all that the
record reveals about what happened during the interactions between
Mother and Melinda. For example, as the majority recounts, Father’s
application for an order of protection states that Mother hit Father in the
chest. That document indicates this act occurred during the same March 31,
2023 incident that resulted in Mother’s arrest for assaulting Melinda. The
same application records another incident occurring on March 17, 2023,
where Mother pushed both Melinda and Father. And while Mother’s acts of
violence against Melinda cannot qualify as domestic violence, her acts of
violence against Father do. See A.R.S. § 13-3601(A)(1) (“relationship
between the victim and the defendant is one of . . . former marriage”). I feel
this evidence is sufficient to support the court’s finding of significant
domestic violence. And further, where we do not have the transcripts of the
hearings recording Mother’s and Father’s testimony—which might have
shed more light on the court’s findings regarding significant domestic
violence—we must presume that such testimony would also support the
court’s findings. Baker 183 Ariz. at 73.

¶32 As I see it, at most, the court’s reference to the unhelpful
exhibits creates a possibility that it may have relied on some evidence that

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GONZALES v. GONZALES
Furuya, J., Dissenting in Part
did not, by itself, establish domestic violence. For me, the court’s citations
to this unhelpful evidence do not establish the “definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed,” Valdez, 254 Ariz. at 499 ¶ 14, that is
required to find reversible error. Instead, in examining the record as a
whole and considering the totality of the evidence, I cannot say that the
court’s finding of significant domestic violence was clearly erroneous—
particularly given our “duty to affirm where any reasonable view of the fact
and law might support the judgment of the family court.” Hoobler, 254 Ariz.
at 141 ¶ 26 (cleaned up).

¶33 Because I believe reasonable evidence in this record—
combined with the presumption created by Mother’s failure to provide
transcripts of the relevant hearings—supports the superior court’s finding
of significant domestic violence, I would affirm as to this issue as well.
Therefore, I respectfully dissent as to this issue only.

¶34 In all other respects, I concur with the majority decision and
join in its reasoning and results.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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