GONZALEZ v. FIDUCIARY
GONZALEZ v. FIDUCIARY, No. 1 CA-CV 25-0877 PB (Ariz. Ct. App. June 30, 2026).
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Musa v. C. K. Adrian, M. D. 130 Ariz. 311
- In Re the Guardianship and Conservatorship Of: Robert Sommer 241 Ariz. 308
- Dawson v. Withycombe 216 Ariz. 84
- Sandretto v. Payson Healthcare Management, Inc. 234 Ariz. 351
- 248 Ariz. 112 not in our corpus
- 257 Ariz. 237 not in our corpus
- Rogone v. Correia 236 Ariz. 43
- Munger Chadwick, P.L.C. v. Farwest Development & Construction of the Southwest, LLC 235 Ariz. 125
Opinion text
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
In the Matter of the Estate of:
AGUSTINA MORALES DE GONZALEZ, Deceased.1
__________________________________
GABRIELA GONZALEZ, Respondent/Appellant,
v.
FIDUCIARY SOLUTIONS, LLC, et al., Petitioners/Appellees.
__________________________________
No. 1 CA-CV 25-0877 PB
FILED 06-30-2026
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. PB2021-050018
The Honorable Vanessa N. Smith, Judge Pro Tempore
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Gabriela Gonzalez, Phoenix
Respondent/Appellant
1 For accuracy, it is ordered that the clerk of this court shall amend the
caption of this appeal as shown. It is further ordered that the amended
caption shall be used on all future documents filed in this matter.
Joy Garvey, PLLC, Scottsdale
By Joy A. Garvey
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Angela K. Paton delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Michael S. Catlett and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined.
P A T O N, Judge:
¶1 Gabriela Gonzalez appeals from the superior court’s order
approving the settlement agreement between the Estate of Agustina
Morales De Gonzalez (“Decedent”), by and through Fiduciary Solutions,
LLC (“Fiduciary Solutions”), and Leticia Gonzalez.2 For the following
reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 Decedent passed away in October 2020. In January 2021,
Leticia filed an application for informal probate of will and informal
appointment as personal representative (“PR”). Leticia alleged that she,
Jose Gonzalez Morales, Maria Gonzalez Morales, and Gabriela were the
Decedent’s children. Leticia filed Decedent’s last will and testament (the
“Will”), which devised all of Decedent’s personal and real property to
Leticia and nominated Leticia as the Estate’s PR. The Estate’s only real
property was a triplex (the “Property”). Leticia filed her letters of
appointment and her acceptance of appointment as PR.
¶3 Gabriela filed a petition contesting the Will’s validity, arguing
it was unnotarized and fraudulently signed. Leticia responded that two
witnesses observed Decedent sign the Will. Gabriela then amended her
petition to allege Decedent was incapacitated and unduly influenced.
Gabriela also filed separate petitions opposing Leticia’s appointment as PR
and requesting that she be appointed as PR. Leticia argued she was validly
appointed in the Will and therefore had priority appointment for PR. The
court later suspended Leticia’s appointment as PR but directed her to
2 Because Gabriela and Leticia Gonzalez share the same last name, we refer
to them by their first names for clarity and convenience. For consistency,
we refer to the other parties by their first names as well.
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Decision of the Court
continue paying the mortgage, general maintenance costs, etc., during the
pendency of the proceedings. Leticia and Gabriela later stipulated to the
appointment of a representative from Fiduciary Solutions as PR.
¶4 In March 2021, the court held a hearing on Gabriela’s petition
contesting the Will and her petition opposing Leticia as PR. The court noted
Maria was “the adopted daughter of the Decedent.” But in December 2021,
Gabriela moved to remove Maria as an heir, arguing she was never legally
adopted by the Decedent.
¶5 In April 2022, Leticia petitioned the court for attorneys’ fees
incurred from Gabriela’s numerous filings. Gabriela objected. The court
admonished Gabriela “as to the unauthorized practice of law and . . .
cautioned that non-lawyers may only represent and speak for themselves
in court proceedings.” It subsequently granted Leticia’s amended petition
for attorneys’ fees.
¶6 The court held a hearing regarding the Will’s validity and the
petition for adjudication of intestacy and formal PR appointment. The court
found the Will was fraudulent and Leticia procured it by undue influence,
and it was therefore invalid, but Decedent was not incapacitated. It later
issued another minute entry, correcting its fraud finding to say the Will was
“NOT fraudulent.”
¶7 Gabriela continued to file numerous pleadings, so in February
2023, the court designated her a vexatious litigant and ordered her not to
file any further pleadings without the court’s permission. Meanwhile,
Leticia filed a petition for unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and
injunctive relief in conjunction with two claims against the Estate totaling
over $900,000. In May 2023, the PR allowed $32,875.60 of the $974,564.89
Leticia claimed.
¶8 In September 2023, the court confirmed an agreement
between the heirs and the PR that Leticia would pay at least $5,500 to bring
the Property mortgage current and the monthly mortgage thereafter, to be
reimbursed by the Estate as an administrative cost upon its closure.
Gabriela then filed a petition alleging Leticia committed elder abuse,
financial exploitation, and psychological and emotional abuse towards
Decedent. The court found “the [p]etition was inappropriately filed for
numerous reasons,” reminding Gabriela of her vexatious litigant
designation. Leticia and the PR jointly moved for attorneys’ fees incurred
in responding to Gabriela’s petition, which the court granted.
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Decision of the Court
¶9 Leticia and the PR engaged in settlement negotiations (in
which Gabriela participated) regarding Leticia’s remaining claims against
the Estate and her petition for unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and
injunctive relief. Although they reached an agreement (the “Settlement
Agreement”) that Leticia would not pursue her denied claims against the
Estate, the parties were unable to reach a global settlement on all issues. In
April 2025, the PR petitioned for approval of settlement, distribution, and
closing of the Estate and the discharge of it as PR. The Settlement
Agreement provided that although Gabriela owed $1,504 to the Estate and
$15,906 to Leticia, they would not pursue the remaining $11,713.74 Gabriela
owed the Estate. The court disposed of Leticia’s petition for unjust
enrichment, constructive trust, and injunctive relief, found Maria was an
heir, and approved the Settlement Agreement.
¶10 Gabriela timely appealed the superior court’s order
approving the Settlement Agreement, dismissing Leticia’s petition for
unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and injunctive relief with prejudice,
and discharging the PR. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised
Statutes (“A.R.S.”) Section 12-2101(A)(9).
DISCUSSION
¶11 We note at the outset two jurisdictional flaws in Gabriela’s
appeal: (1) the notice of appeal challenges the superior court’s failure to rule
on two petitions and (2) the opening brief challenges an order not listed in
the notice of appeal. See Musa v. Adrian, 130 Ariz. 311, 312 (1981) (the Court
of Appeals has an independent duty to determine whether it has
jurisdiction).
¶12 First, Gabriela’s notice of appeal claims the court failed to rule
on her petition for elder abuse, financial exploitation, and psychological
and emotional abuse and her petition challenging Maria’s heirship. The
superior court dismissed the elder abuse petition on November 6, 2023,
noting Gabriela’s petition “was inappropriately filed for numerous
reasons” and reminding Gabriela of its previous finding that she “[was] a
vexatious litigant.” And the court ruled on the petition challenging
heirship on February 7, 2023, finding the petition was moot and denying
any requested relief. These rulings are not final judgments, and Gabriela
never requested the court to enter final judgment language under Arizona
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c). See In re Guardianship of Sommer, 241 Ariz.
308, 311, ¶ 11 (App. 2016) (“[O]rders are only appealable under [Section]
12-2101(A)(9) ‘when they are in the form of a final judgment or decree . . .
.’”) (citation omitted). Further, none of these rulings constitute
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“intermediate orders involving the merits of the action and necessarily
affecting the judgment.” A.R.S. § 12-2102(A). Thus, to the extent Gabriela
is appealing these two rulings, we do not have jurisdiction to consider
them.
¶13 We also note that Gabriela’s opening brief does not comply
with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure (“ARCAP”) 13(a)(4). An
appellant must include a statement of the case that “concisely state[s] the
nature of the case, the course of the proceedings, the disposition in the court
from which the appeal is taken, and the basis of the appellate court’s
jurisdiction.” ARCAP 13(a)(4). Gabriela’s statement of the case is not
concise. It also contains factual inaccuracies regarding the proceedings. For
example, Gabriela states the court failed to rule on the petition for elder
abuse, financial exploitation, and psychological and emotional abuse, and
the petition to challenge maternity action for heirship. But the court denied
both petitions after holding virtual hearings on each one.
¶14 Additionally, Gabriela’s statement of the facts contains
factual inaccuracies. For example, Gabriela states the PR reversed its
decision to disallow Leticia’s claim. But the PR did not reverse its decision.
Instead, it filed a notice of partial allowance and disallowance as to Leticia’s
claim 1, whereas the prior notice pertained to Leticia’s claim 2. As to claim
1, the PR allowed $32,875.60 of the $954,377.39 claimed. Further, Gabriela
states Leticia neglected to repair the roof and maintain the Property,
pursuant to the court’s August 2021 order that Leticia “maintain the
payments of mortgage, property taxes, homeowner’s insurance, utilities,
and general maintenance costs of the real property.” In support of her
statement, she cites the court’s minute entry approving an agreement
between the parties that Leticia will pay at least $5,500 to bring the Property
mortgage current and she would pay the monthly mortgage thereafter. But
Leticia testified she paid the mortgage while the litigation was pending, and
she only stopped paying it in 2023 after the court ordered her to because the
PR was taking over. The PR confirmed the same, noting Leticia paid
$50,059.29 towards the mortgage.
¶15 Gabriela’s reply brief also introduces new arguments that
were not raised in her opening brief, which we will not consider. See
Dawson v. Withycombe, 216 Ariz. 84, 111, ¶ 91 (App. 2007) (courts will not
consider issues or arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief). For
example, Gabriela argues the PR did not speak Spanish, so she could not
communicate with all the heirs, and that it was crucial that the PR be
bilingual. She also contends that the PR’s attorney “mislead [sic] [her]
about documents that she should have filed to defend her position” and
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Decision of the Court
that the PR “reversed the ruling of [the] [p]robate court to remove Maria
Dolores as heir[] of the [E]state.”
¶16 Nevertheless, to the extent Gabriela is arguing that the
superior court erred by approving the Settlement Agreement, we disagree.
We review the superior court’s approval of a settlement agreement for
abuse of discretion. Sandretto v. Payson Healthcare Mgmt., Inc., 234 Ariz. 351,
362, ¶ 48 (App. 2014). Section 14-3715(17) permits a PR to “[e]ffect[uate] a
fair and reasonable compromise with any debtor or obligor.”
¶17 Per the Settlement Agreement, Leticia would pay the PR
$52,875.85 for the Estate’s debts and distributions and receive the Property
as her sole and separate property after working with the mortgage lender
on the Property. Leticia would also release all claims against the Estate and
dismiss all pending petitions with prejudice. The PR testified that the
Property was valued at $380,000, and after deducting the mortgage
payments Leticia made, her allowed creditor claims, and her payment of
$52,000 for administrative fees and distributions to the heirs, the value of
her settlement was $168,799.14. Leticia testified she gave up substantial
amounts of her creditor’s claim to reach the Settlement Agreement.
¶18 Leticia had claims against the Estate totaling almost $975,000
and a pending petition for unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and
injunctive relief. The Estate only had two assets: the Property worth
$380,000, less about $100,000 remaining on the mortgage, and a bank
account worth $400. At the evidentiary hearing, the court heard testimony
that the PR weighed the cost of litigation, Leticia’s claims, the roughly
$50,000 she had paid towards the mortgage, and determined that the best
outcome for the Estate would be for Leticia to pay $53,000 to the PR in
exchange for the Property.
¶19 In approving the Settlement Agreement, the court stated that
based on the PR’s testimony, the Estate had no liquidity and therefore no
money to defend the pending litigation or Leticia’s petition for unjust
enrichment, constructive trust, and injunctive relief. In other words, as
Leticia notes, the Settlement Agreement reasonably prevented the Estate
from facing more exposure and litigation than it had the means to handle.
Maria also testified that she agreed the PR should enter the Settlement
Agreement with Leticia. Reasonable evidence supports the court’s finding
that the Settlement Agreement constituted a fair and reasonable
compromise, and we will not reweigh the evidence. See In re Ghostley, 248
Ariz. 112, 117, ¶ 21 (App. 2020) (“It is not our function to reweigh the facts
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Decision of the Court
. . . .”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The superior
court did not abuse its discretion in approving it.
¶20 As to Gabriela’s argument that the court erred in considering
Leticia’s petition for unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and injunctive
relief, we are unpersuaded. Gabriela contends the record does not support
Leticia’s petition, and, in any event, it was untimely. Leticia filed a petition
for unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and injunctive relief on April 21,
2023. Section 14-3801(B) requires known creditors to present their claim
“within four months after the published notice.” The notice was published
on December 23 and December 30, 2022, and January 6, 2023. And Leticia’s
claim was filed on April 21, 2023, within the four-month timeframe
prescribed by Section 14-3801(B). Gabriela believes it was published on
August 8, 2022, but that refers to the publication giving notice of a hearing
on a different petition. We find no error. Because the court disposed of this
petition with prejudice on September 25, 2025, when it approved the
Settlement Agreement, we do not reach Gabriela’s argument that the
petition was unsupported.
¶21 Gabriela also contends the superior court erred in imposing
“substantial sanctions of $15,906.00” on her when she filed her petition for
elder abuse, financial exploitation, and psychological and emotional abuse
towards Decedent. As part of the attorneys’ fees award, the court further
ordered Gabriela to pay $5,000 in punitive damages to Leticia under Section
12-349. Gabriela contends this was an “excessive [award of] punitive
damages.” “Review of an attorney fees award under [Section] 12-349
presents a mixed question of fact and law,” which we review de novo. Ariz.
Republican Party v. Richer, 257 Ariz. 237, 242, ¶ 10 (2024).
¶22 Under Section 12-349(A)(1), attorneys’ fees, including
“double damages of not to exceed five thousand dollars,” must be awarded
if a party “[b]rings or defends a claim without substantial justification.”
“[W]ithout substantial justification” is defined as the “claim or defense is
groundless and is not made in good faith.” A.R.S. § 12-349(F). A groundless
claim is one where “the proponent can present no rational argument based
upon the evidence or law in support of that claim.” Rogone v. Correia, 236
Ariz. 43, 50, ¶ 22 (App. 2014) (citation omitted). We review whether a claim
is groundless “through an objective lens, without regard to the [claimant’s]
subjective beliefs.” Ariz. Republican Party, 257 Ariz. at 243, ¶ 15.
¶23 In denying Gabriela’s petition for elder abuse, financial
exploitation, and psychological and emotional abuse, the court ordered that
if Leticia’s counsel requested attorneys’ fees, then Gabriela would be
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Decision of the Court
allowed to respond to that pleading only. Leticia and the PR jointly
requested attorneys’ fees for addressing and appearing for a hearing on
Gabriela’s petition. The court ordered Gabriela to pay $7,315 for Leticia’s
attorneys’ fees, $508.50 for the Estate’s attorneys’ fees, $256.50 for the
Estate’s fiduciary fees, and $739 for the Estate’s attorneys’ fees related to
drafting a reply to Gabriela’s response.
¶24 In awarding the joint request for attorneys’ fees, the court
found Gabriela’s conduct had been unreasonable and vexatious. At the
hearing on Gabriela’s petition, the court reminded her not to file documents
on behalf of anyone other than herself because the petition noted it was filed
on behalf of her and her brothers. Further, the court noted “the petition
[was] inappropriately filed for a multitude of reasons,” including that
Section 46-456 does not permit individuals outside a limited number of
people to file this type of petition without leave of the court. The court also
stated a finding of vulnerability must be found before that type of petition
could be filed and that the court had not lifted its vexatious litigant
designation from Gabriela, and she was therefore precluded from filing the
petition absent the court’s approval. On this record, we cannot say the court
erred in granting the joint motion for attorneys’ fees.
¶25 Gabriela requests attorneys’ fees on appeal, but “parties who
represent themselves in a legal action are not entitled to recover attorney[s’]
fees.” Munger Chadwick, P.L.C. v. Farwest Dev. & Constr. of the Sw., LLC, 235
Ariz. 125, 126, ¶ 5 (App. 2014). We do, however, grant Leticia’s request for
her reasonable attorneys’ fees under Sections 12-349(A)(1) and 14-1105. As
the prevailing party, she is entitled to recover her taxable costs upon
compliance with ARCAP 21(b).
CONCLUSION
¶26 We affirm.
MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR
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