Munoz v. Juarez

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

SUSANA MUNOZ, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

IVAN JUAREZ, Respondent/Appellee.

MARGARITA TENA PARRA, Intervenor/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0882 FC
FILED 07-02-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FN2023-002022
The Honorable Lauren R. Guyton, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART

COUNSEL

Law Office of Clifford Levenson, Phoenix
By Clifford I. Levenson
Counsel for Intervenor/Appellant

Stanley David Murray Attorney at Law, Scottsdale
By Stanley David Murray
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

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Underwood Law Office, Phoenix
By Sonya E. Underwood
Counsel for Respondent/Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge D. Andrew Gaona delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge David B. Gass1 and Judge Anni Hill Foster joined.

G A O N A, Judge:

¶1 Margarita Tena Parra (“Parra”) intervened in her son and
daughter-in-law’s dissolution proceeding and appeals a portion of the
superior court’s dissolution decree that awarded them an Avondale home
(“Home”) as their community property. Parra argues the beneficiary deed
through which Ivan Juarez (“Husband”) and Susana Munoz (“Wife”)
acquired the house was ineffective under Arizona’s community property
and spousal-joinder statutes and that it thus belonged to her after her
husband, Benito Juarez (“Juarez”), died.

¶2 We disagree and affirm. Parra’s arguments turn on her
disagreements with the superior court’s factual findings about her claimed
ownership interest in the Home. Because substantial evidence supports
those findings, we don’t disturb them on appeal. We also dismiss
Husband’s challenge to the attorneys’ fee award against him for lack of
jurisdiction.

1 Judge David B. Gass was a sitting member of this court when the matter

was assigned to this panel of the court. He retired effective June 30, 2026. In
accordance with the authority granted by Article VI, Section 3, of the
Arizona Constitution, and under A.R.S. § 12-145, the Chief Justice of the
Arizona Supreme Court has designated Judge David B. Gass as a judge pro
tempore in the Court of Appeals for the purpose of participating in the
resolution of cases assigned to this panel during his term in office and for
the duration of Administrative Order 2026-87.

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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining
the superior court’s ruling. Goodell v. Goodell, 257 Ariz. 563, 567 ¶ 3 (App.
2024).

¶4 Husband and Wife began their relationship in 2000 and
married in 2015. Wife filed for divorce in 2023.

¶5 For more than two decades, Husband worked at a restaurant
using his father’s name (Benito Juarez) and social security number.
Husband shared a bank account with Juarez into which Husband
deposited2 his earnings. Wife likewise deposited her earnings into that
account. Juarez filed tax returns in his own name using income attributable
to Husband’s work, and deposited any resulting tax refunds into the joint
account.

¶6 In 2011, Juarez obtained financing and purchased the Home
in his name. Wife testified that Juarez secured the loan because Husband
and Wife couldn’t qualify for financing, but that Juarez used Husband’s
paystubs (which, as a reminder, were under Juarez’s identity) to obtain the
loan. Wife also testified that Husband and Wife supplied the funds to
acquire, maintain, and pay for the Home.

¶7 In February 2013, Juarez executed a beneficiary deed naming
Husband and Wife as beneficiaries of the Home. See A.R.S. § 33-405 (2006).
Wife testified Juarez executed the deed to protect her and Husband in case
Juarez died. Husband, on the other hand, testified he didn’t know about the
beneficiary deed until Juarez’s death.

¶8 Husband and Wife married in 2015. Four years later, the
remaining mortgage balance—about $80,000—was paid using funds from
the joint account. Juarez died in 2022. Husband and Wife acquired title
through the beneficiary deed and later recorded a deed conveying the
Home to themselves.

¶9 When Wife petitioned for divorce in 2023, she alleged the
Home was community property. Husband responded that Juarez owned
the Home, transferred it to the parties through the beneficiary deed, and

2 Because Husband worked under Juarez’s name and social security
number, Husband’s earnings were paid to Juarez.

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asserted Parra may have an equitable interest in the Home. Husband then
moved to join Parra as a party.

¶10 Parra intervened and asserted quiet-title and declaratory-
relief claims. Parra unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment on those
claims, with the superior court noting that the issues she raised would “be
addressed at trial.” The superior court then conducted a bench trial—the
central issue being who owned the Home.

¶11 As relevant here, Parra alleged Juarez bought the Home with
his funds in the joint account while married to Parra and that the beneficiary
deed was ineffective because Parra didn’t sign the deed or join in its
execution. According to Parra, the Home was her community property, the
beneficiary deed never conveyed the Home to Husband and Wife, Juarez
died intestate, and thus she was the Home’s sole owner. Wife disputed
those allegations, asserting that Husband and Wife supplied the funds used
to acquire and pay for the Home and that Juarez merely held title and
obtained financing on their behalf.

¶12 The court heard testimony from Parra, Husband, Wife, and
Husband’s uncle (who prepared the beneficiary deed at issue). Although
the court admitted several exhibits, it excluded the principal documentary
evidence offered to prove Parra and Juarez’s marriage: a document
purporting to be a marriage certificate. Wife objected to its admission on
authenticity grounds. The document contained multiple dates relating to
the marriage and its registration, and Husband couldn’t establish personal
knowledge sufficient to authenticate it. The court sustained Wife’s objection
and excluded it.

¶13 Following trial, the superior court rejected Parra’s ownership
claim and issued the dissolution decree. The court found Parra failed to
prove she was married to Juarez, and that Husband and Wife funded the
Home’s purchase. It found Husband didn’t claim Parra owned the Home
until the dissolution proceedings began and that Husband—not Parra—
initiated Parra’s involvement in the case. The court also found no credible
evidence that Parra “sought this action of her own will.” The court
ultimately concluded Husband and Wife owned the Home, ordered it sold,
and directed the net proceeds be divided equally between Husband and
Wife.

¶14 Parra timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S.
§ 12-2101(A)(1).

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DISCUSSION

¶15 On appeal, Parra contends the superior court erred in
determining Husband and Wife owned the Home because the beneficiary
deed was void under Arizona’s community property and spousal-joinder
statutes. Husband—who didn’t appeal—joins many of Parra’s arguments
and separately challenges the superior court’s award of attorneys’ fees to
Wife.

¶16 Parra doesn’t challenge the superior court’s characterization
of the Home as Husband’s and Wife’s community property. Nor does she
develop an argument that the court’s factual findings were clearly
erroneous. See ARCAP 13(a)(7)(A); In re Aubuchon, 233 Ariz. 62, 64–65 ¶ 6
(2013) (arguments that are “not supported by adequate explanation,
citations to the record, or authority” are considered waived). Instead, her
arguments simply assume facts contrary to those found by the superior
court.

¶17 Because we have an independent obligation to examine our
jurisdiction and that of the court below, Morgan v. Hays, 102 Ariz. 150, 152–
53 (1967), we start by briefly discussing Parra’s claims. Parra framed her
claims in intervention as requests for quiet-title and declaratory relief, and
we’ve previously held that “statutory remedies such as quiet title and
partition would not be appropriate for consideration in a dissolution
proceeding.” Thomas v. Thomas, 220 Ariz. 290, 294 ¶ 16 n.4 (App. 2009).
Thomas, however, didn’t involve claims of an intervening third party. But
whatever the proper procedural vehicle, the superior court had to
determine whether Parra had an interest in the Home before deciding
whether the Home was subject to division. The court resolved the
ownership claim against Parra and, having done so, divided the Home
between Husband and Wife. Because the court’s ruling rejected Parra’s
claim and ultimately resulted in the division of the Home in the dissolution
proceeding, we need not address the form of Parra’s claim.

¶18 At bottom, Parra’s appeal challenges the superior court’s
determination that she failed to establish an ownership interest in the
Home. We thus turn to that issue.

I. The Superior Court Didn’t Err in Rejecting Parra’s Ownership
Claim.

¶19 Although Parra frames her appeal as involving the
application of Arizona’s community property statutes—and thus a legal
question we review de novo, see Whit v. Meza, 257 Ariz. 176, 184 ¶ 27 (App.

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2024)—her arguments hinge on disagreements with the superior court’s
factual findings. Parra contends the beneficiary deed was invalid because
Juarez acquired the Home during his marriage to Parra and executed the
beneficiary deed without her participation or consent. See A.R.S. §§ 25-
211(A), -214(C), 33-452.

¶20 The superior court found that Parra failed to establish the
facts necessary to support that theory. We defer to that finding absent clear
error. Kim v. Pak, 258 Ariz. 594, 596–97 ¶ 7 (App. 2024). We also defer to the
superior court’s credibility determinations and resolution of conflicting
evidence and don’t reweigh the evidence on appeal. Id.; Gutierrez v.
Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 347 ¶ 13 (App. 1998).

¶21 Parra’s claim rested on a specific factual and legal theory. She
asserted Juarez acquired the Home during their marriage with funds
belonging to Juarez and Parra, thus creating a community property interest
protected by Arizona’s spousal-joinder statutes. See A.R.S. §§ 25-211(A),
-214(C), 33-452. As Parra’s theory went, because she didn’t sign the
beneficiary deed, it was ineffective and Husband and Wife acquired no
interest in the Home when Juarez died. And because Juarez died intestate,
Parra asserted she was the Home’s sole owner. See A.R.S. § 14-2102. But that
claim depended on Parra proving the ownership interest she claimed
through Juarez.

¶22 The central dispute at trial concerned who funded and owned
the Home. Parra’s claim depended on establishing three factual predicates:
(1) Parra and Juarez were married; (2) Juarez acquired the Home during the
marriage; and (3) Juarez bought and paid for the Home with funds
belonging to his marital community rather than funds belonging to
Husband or Wife. Only if Parra established those facts could she claim the
ownership interest she asserted through Juarez.

¶23 The superior court resolved these factual disputes against
Parra. As to the first factual predicate, the court found Parra failed to
establish she was married to Juarez. That finding alone undermined the
foundation of Parra’s ownership theory—her claim depended on proving
that the Home belonged to a marital community shared with Juarez. See
A.R.S. § 25-211(A).

¶24 We find nothing clearly erroneous about that finding. Parra
gave inconsistent testimony about the date of her marriage to Juarez, first
saying she married Juarez in 1976 but later that she wasn’t sure whether
that date was correct. Her pleadings, meanwhile, alleged she married

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Juarez in 1974. The court also excluded the only documentary evidence
offered to establish the marriage. See supra ¶ 12. And although Parra and
Husband testified Parra was married to Juarez, that testimony didn’t
require the court to find a valid marriage existed. See Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz.
48, 52 ¶ 16 (App. 2009) (“Even though conflicting evidence may exist, we
affirm the trial court’s ruling if substantial evidence supports it.”). The
superior court thus reasonably found Parra failed to establish she was
married to Juarez.

¶25 Because Parra was a party to the proceedings and failed to
establish the marital relationship on which her ownership theory
depended, her claim failed from the start and the superior court didn’t err
in rejecting her claimed ownership interest in the Home. We thus need not
address any of her (or Husband’s) additional arguments about the Home’s
ownership.

II. We Lack Jurisdiction to Consider Husband’s Challenge to the
Attorneys’ Fees Award.

¶26 Husband argues the superior court erred by finding his
conduct unreasonable and awarding Wife attorneys’ fees.

¶27 Our consideration of this argument implicates our
independent duty “to examine whether jurisdiction exists.” Matter of
Hernandez v. Athey, 256 Ariz. 530, 532 ¶ 3 (App. 2023) (citation omitted). Our
jurisdiction extends only to matters identified in a timely notice of appeal.
In re Marriage of Thorn, 235 Ariz. 216, 218 ¶ 5 (App. 2014). Although an
appellee may defend a judgment on any ground properly raised below
without filing a cross-appeal, we can’t enlarge the appellee’s rights or
reduce the appellant’s rights under a judgment absent a cross-appeal.
ARCAP 13(b)(2).

¶28 Husband’s argument seeks affirmative relief. If successful, it
would eliminate his obligation to pay Wife’s attorneys’ fees, thereby
enlarging his rights under the decree. See Engel v. Landman, 221 Ariz. 504,
510 ¶ 17 (App. 2009). Because Husband didn’t file a notice of appeal from
the decree, we lack jurisdiction to consider his challenge to the fee award.
See ARCAP 8(d).

CONCLUSION

¶29 We affirm the superior court’s decree in all respects properly
before us and dismiss Husband’s challenge to the attorneys’ fees award for
lack of jurisdiction.

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¶30 Wife requests her attorneys’ fees from Parra under A.R.S.
§ 25-324. Husband requests attorneys’ fees under Arizona Rule of Civil
Appellate Procedure 25, and A.R.S. §§ 12-349 and 25-324. We deny both fee
requests in exercise of our discretion. We award Wife her costs on appeal,
to be paid by Parra, upon compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate
Procedure 21(b). And based on our review of the record, we share in the
superior court’s considerable concern about Husband’s role in encouraging
Parra’s prosecution of her claims (and now this appeal).

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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