Joseph v. Obradovic

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

ADLENE JOSEPH, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

NIKOLA OBRADOVIC, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0892 FC
FILED 07-22-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2024-001412
The Honorable Melissa Zabor, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Bishop, Del Vecchio & Beeks Law Office, P.C., Phoenix
By Daniel P. Beeks
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

Nikola Obradovic, Mesa
Respondent/Appellee
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Andrew J. Becke delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge James B. Morse Jr. and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.

B E C K E, Judge:

¶1 Adelene Joseph (“Mother”) appeals from the superior court’s
dissolution decree ending her marriage to Nikola Obradovic (“Father”) and
the court’s denial of her motions to alter or amend and for clarification.
Specifically, Mother takes issue with the court’s award of spousal
maintenance and child support to Father. For the following reasons, we
affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother and Father were married in 2020 and share one minor
child. Mother petitioned for divorce in March 2024. The superior court
entered temporary orders in August 2024, awarding Mother and Father
joint legal decision-making authority and ordering Mother to pay $395 per
month in child support and pay Father $1,500 per month in spousal
maintenance.

¶3 The parties entered into an Arizona Rule of Family Law
Procedure (“Rule”) 69 agreement resolving some financial issues, which
was later approved by the court. The case proceeded to trial in June 2025 on
the remaining issues.

¶4 At trial, Mother and Father testified and several exhibits from
each party were admitted into evidence. In August 2025, the court entered
the decree of dissolution. As relevant here, the court found Father was
eligible for spousal maintenance and awarded him $1,900 per month for 24
months.1 Mother was awarded the marital home as her sole and separate
property and $316 per month in child support. Based on the division of
property and debt, the court ordered Mother pay Father an equalization
payment of $37,251.60. Finally, the court denied both parties’ requests for
attorneys’ fees.

1 The decree erroneously stated 24 years, but as discussed infra ¶¶ 5, 27 the

superior court later corrected that clerical error.

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¶5 Both parties filed motions for clarification. Father also filed a
motion for reconsideration, and Mother filed a motion to alter or amend.
The court resolved all of the motions in a single order. The court found it
had used an incorrect insurance payment to calculate child support;
determined that Father, not Mother, was entitled to child support; and
required Mother to pay $109 per month in child support. In addition, the
court found it had incorrectly assigned uninsured medical costs and
ordered Mother pay 59% of those costs and Father pay 41% of those costs.
The court also corrected the duration of spousal maintenance from 24 years
to 24 months, stating it “erred in selecting the ‘years’ button rather than the
‘months’ button in issuing” the order. The court denied all other relief.

¶6 Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Article
6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and -
2101(A)(2).

DISCUSSION

I. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Awarding
Father Spousal Maintenance.

¶7 Mother argues the superior court erred in finding Father was
eligible for spousal maintenance under A.R.S. § 25-319(A). Mother also
takes issue with the amount and duration of the spousal maintenance
award. We review a superior court’s spousal maintenance award for an
abuse of discretion, and will affirm if supported by reasonable evidence.
Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 348, ¶ 14 (App. 1998).

A. Eligibility determination

¶8 Mother contends the court’s findings under A.R.S. § 25-
319(A)(1) were erroneous because it did not consider the equalization
payment to Father in the decree. Mother also takes issue with the court’s
finding under A.R.S. § 25-319(A)(2) that Father was unable to be self-
sufficient when Father’s monthly income was $16,000 and his monthly
reasonable expenses were only $4,800.

¶9 When considering a request for spousal maintenance, the
court must first determine whether the requesting spouse is eligible for any
award. In re Marriage of Cotter, 245 Ariz. 82, 85, ¶ 7 (App. 2018); see A.R.S. §
25-319(A). Eligibility for maintenance is established if the requesting spouse
shows that he or she meets one of the following conditions:

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1. Lacks sufficient property, including property apportioned
to the spouse, to provide for that spouse’s reasonable needs.

2. Lacks earning ability in the labor market that is adequate to
be self-sufficient.

3. Is the parent of a child whose age or condition is such that
the parent should not be required to seek employment
outside the home.

4. Has made a significant financial or other contribution to the
education, training, vocational skills, career or earning ability
of the other spouse or has significantly reduced that spouse’s
income or career opportunities for the benefit of the other
spouse.

5. Had a marriage of long duration and is of an age that may
preclude the possibility of gaining employment adequate to
be self-sufficient.

A.R.S. § 25-319(A)(1)-(5).

¶10 As applied here, the superior court considered these inquiries
and determined Father was eligible because he: (1) lacked sufficient
property as he left the marital home with a mattress and a chair and was
unable to meet his monthly expenses without working two full-time jobs,
and (2) was unable to be self-sufficient without working two full-time jobs
and was limited by both employment options in the tech industry in
Arizona and his immigration status.

¶11 We defer to the superior court’s assessment of witness
credibility and do not reweigh the evidence. Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 52,
¶ 16 (App. 2009). Reasonable evidence supports the court’s finding that
Father lacked sufficient property to provide for his reasonable needs.

¶12 “[S]ufficient property is of such value that the spouse would
be unlikely to exhaust it in his or her lifetime.” Cotter, 245 Ariz. at 85–86, ¶
9. And while it is true the superior court must consider “property
apportioned to the spouse” (i.e. the $37,251.60 equalization payment by
Mother to Father), the record does not support Mother’s contention that the
court disregarded that payment. The court’s ruling on the equalization
payment is set forth in the decree that analyzed Father’s eligibility for
maintenance. And “[t]here is no requirement that specific findings be made
in the decree with regard to A.R.S. § 25-319.” Higgins v. Higgins, 154 Ariz.

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87, 88 (App. 1987); accord Cotter, 245 Ariz. at 87, ¶ 12. We may assume the
superior court employed the correct reasoning if the record would support
its ultimate conclusion, as it does here. Cotter, 245 Ariz. at 87, ¶ 12.

¶13 Even with the $37,251.60 equalization payment, the record
supports the conclusion that Father’s property was not sufficient to support
him. Father testified he lives in a studio apartment and has $11,000 in credit
card debt. He also testified that when he left the marital home, he took only
a mattress and a chair, and has since purchased a single bed for the child.
Mother fails to show the superior court abused its discretion in finding
Father eligible for spousal maintenance under A.R.S. § 25-319(A)(1). Given
that conclusion, we need not address Mother’s argument that the superior
court erred in finding Father eligible for spousal maintenance under A.R.S.
§ 25-319(A)(2).

B. Amount and duration

¶14 Mother contends the amount and duration of the spousal
maintenance award should be vacated and recalculated.

¶15 Once the court finds the requesting spouse eligible for spousal
maintenance, it then determines the amount and duration of the award.
A.R.S. § 25-319(B); Cotter, 245 Ariz. at 85, ¶ 7. It may award spousal
maintenance pursuant to Arizona’s Spousal Maintenance Guidelines
(“Guidelines”) “only for a period of time and in an amount necessary to
enable the receiving spouse to become self-sufficient.” A.R.S. § 25-319(B).

¶16 When calculating spousal maintenance, the court determines
the parties’ “Actual Income,” identifies expenditures, and calculates a
spousal maintenance award range. See A.R.S. § 25-319 app. Guidelines § I.D.
(2023). After considering and balancing all relevant statutory factors, the
court can award an amount within the amount range or, upon making
additional findings of fact and conclusions of law, deviate from the range.
See Rainwater v. Rainwater, 177 Ariz. 500, 502 (App. 1993) (“[T]he trial court
need not apply every factor listed . . . some factors will not apply.”);
Guidelines § I.D. (2023).

¶17 Mother argues the superior court should have considered
Father’s income from both of his jobs as his “Actual Income” when applying
the Guidelines. The court found, and the record supports, Father worked
two jobs at the time of trial, making $90,000 at one job and $75,400 at his
second job. But the court also found Father did not work two jobs during
the marriage, and so both incomes would not be included in his “Actual
Income” for spousal maintenance purposes. Instead, the court determined

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Father’s “Actual Income” to be $90,000 per year, or $7,500 per month, based
on the higher-paying of his two jobs.

¶18 Father began working the second job in December 2023, three
months before Mother filed her petition for dissolution. Mother argues it
was therefore “regularly earned by the marital community.” We disagree.
Although Section III.A.3 of the Guidelines instructs the court to “include
overtime or extraordinary work regimen income regularly earned by the
marital community,” the superior court did not abuse its discretion by
failing to include the income from the second job.

¶19 Father testified that he began working the second job after his
separation from Mother in order to afford his studio apartment, and pay his
credit card debt, and various other bills after departure from the marital
home. On these facts, Mother has not shown that the court abused its
discretion in determining Father’s second job did not constitute income
“regularly earned by the marital community.”

¶20 Mother claims the superior court used “Attributed Income”
instead of “Actual Income” because its order states “Per the Spousal
Maintenance Guidelines, Father shall not be attributed to earn both
incomes.” Mother provides no support for her assertion other than the
court’s use of the word “attributed” in its order. The spousal maintenance
worksheet clearly shows that the court did not find any “Attributed
Income.” It only found Father’s “Actual Income” to total $90,000 per year
or $7,500 per month. Mother fails to show error.

¶21 Finally, Mother argues the duration of spousal
maintenance—24 months—exceeds the time Father needs to become self-
sufficient because his reasonable expenses are $4,800 per month and he
earns $16,000 per month. However, as discussed supra ¶¶ 18–20, the
superior court did not abuse its discretion in finding Father’s “Actual
Income” for spousal maintenance was $7,500 per month.

¶22 The superior court also has “substantial discretion” to choose
the duration of spousal maintenance. Rainwater, 177 Ariz. at 502. Here, the
court chose a duration within the standard range for a marriage lasting four
years—between six to 36 months of spousal maintenance. See Guidelines §
V.B.2 (2023). The court found 24 months sufficient after weighing and
considering the following relevant factors:

1. The standard of living established during the marriage;

2. The marriage length;

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3. The age, employment history, earning ability, and physical
and emotional condition of the spouse seeking maintenance;

4. The ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought
to meet that spouse’s needs while meeting those of the spouse
seeking maintenance;

5. The spouse’s comparative financial resources, including
their comparative earning abilities in the labor market;

...

9. The financial resources of the party seeking maintenance,
including marital property apportioned to that spouse, and
that spouse’s ability to meet that spouse’s own needs
independently.

Guidelines § V.C. (2023).

¶23 The court found: (1) “the parties were upper middle class
during the marriage, earning approximately $280,000 a year,” (2) the
marriage lasted about four years, (3) “Father [was] young, healthy, and able
to work, (4) Mother could “meet Father’s financial needs,” (5) Mother made
“significantly more than Father and [would] continue to do so,” and (9)
“Father’s financial resources [were] minimal.” The record supports these
findings.

¶24 Mother fails to show the superior court abused its discretion
in awarding Father $1,900 per month in spousal maintenance for 24 months.

II. The Superior Court Applied the Correct Arizona Spousal
Maintenance Guidelines.

¶25 Mother argues the superior court was required to recalculate
spousal maintenance under the 2025 Guidelines when it issued a minute
entry denying the parties post-trial motions and “modifying” the spousal
maintenance award.

¶26 Our supreme court issued an administrative order in May
2025 mandating statewide use of the 2025 Guidelines for “all spousal
maintenance orders, whether original orders or modification of previous
orders, entered on or after September 1, 2025. . . .” Administrative Order
2025-101. Here, the superior court entered the decree August 8, 2025, before
the effective date of the 2025 Guidelines.

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¶27 The minute entry filed October 7, 2025 was neither an original
order nor a modification of a previous spousal maintenance order. The
court ruled on the parties’ numerous post-trial motions and denied all
affirmative relief sought concerning spousal maintenance, except to correct
an error so that spousal maintenance was awarded for 24 months, not 24
years. This correction is not sufficient to require recalculation under the 2025
Guidelines.

¶28 Furthermore, neither party filed a modification petition as
required by A.R.S. § 25-327(A), nor did the superior court make any of the
relevant findings for a spousal maintenance award under A.R.S. § 25-319(B)
in the October 7, 2025 order. The August 2025 decree is the operative
spousal maintenance award because it includes the findings that would be
relevant to any future modification petition. Mother has shown no error.

III. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Calculating
Child Support.

¶29 Mother finally argues that because the spousal maintenance
award was error, the child support order should be vacated and
recalculated. However, because we affirm the spousal maintenance award,
we need not order a recalculation of child support. In the alternative,
Mother argues the superior court abused its discretion in not considering
both of Father’s incomes when calculating child support. We review a
superior court’s child support award for an abuse of discretion. Cummings
v. Cummings, 182 Ariz. 383, 385 (App. 1994).

¶30 Mother cites to a memorandum decision, In re Beasterfield v.
Del Bosque, 1 CA-CV 25-0046 FC, 2025 WL 3720254 (Ariz. App. Dec. 23,
2025) (mem. decision), for the proposition that a superior court abuses its
discretion when it fails to consider income actually earned by a parent.
There, we vacated a child support order and remanded to reconsider the
award based on mother’s actual income. Beasterfield, 1 CA-CV 25-0046 FC,
at *5, ¶ 33.

¶31 Beasterfield is not controlling, merely persuasive. See Ariz. R.
Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1)(C). And even if it were binding, it is distinguishable. The
superior court in Beasterfield did not attribute any income to mother despite
her having a seasonal, part-time job. 1 CA-CV 25-0046 FC, *2–3, ¶¶ 15–16.
Here, the superior court attributed income to Father for his first full-time
job, but it declined to attribute income from his second full-time job. The
court was within its discretion to do so: “[t]he court generally does not
include more income than earned through full-time employment.” A.R.S. §

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25-320 app. (“Child Support Guidelines”) § II.A.3.a. Mother fails to show
error.

CONCLUSION

¶32 We affirm. Both parties request their reasonable attorneys’
fees on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-324. We decline their requests in our
discretion. Father, as the successful party, is entitled to his taxable costs
upon compliance with ARCAP 21. See A.R.S. § 12-341.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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