Varela v. Hauser

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

MANUEL F. VARELA, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

KERRI LYNN HAUSER, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0912 FC
FILED 09-17-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
No. S1300DO202400577
The Honorable Linda Wallace, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Manuel F. Varela, Cottonwood
Petitioner/Appellee

Kerri Lynn Hauser, Peoria
Respondent/Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Daniel J. Kiley delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding
Judge Andrew M. Jacobs and Judge Veronika Fabian joined.

VARELA v. HAUSER
Decision of the Court

K I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Kerri Hauser (“Wife”) appeals from certain provisions of the
decree (the “Decree”) that dissolved her marriage to Manuel Varela
(“Husband”). For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Husband and Wife married in November 2019 and had no
children in common. Wife was unemployed during the pendency of the
marriage, while Husband worked on a part-time basis as a mechanic for a
business owned by Wife’s adult son Mitchell Ferguson. Husband also
received income from his military pension and Social Security benefits.

¶3 During the marriage, Husband and Wife lived in a house in
Cottonwood that Husband owned before the marriage. Their community
assets included joint bank accounts, a 2003 Dodge Ram that Husband
primarily used, and a 2019 Honda CRV that Wife primarily used. As
Husband later testified (and Wife did not deny), Wife managed the couple’s
finances during the marriage.

¶4 About twenty years before the marriage, Husband acquired
another property on 15th Street in Cottonwood (the “15th Street property”).
In 2022, Husband sold the 15th Street property and deposited the sales
proceeds, which exceeded $250,000, into one of the couple’s joint checking
accounts.

¶5 In March 2024, Wife asked Ferguson for a $5,000 loan.
Surprised by his mother’s request, Ferguson mentioned it to Husband.
Husband then accessed online account information and discovered that
“hundreds of thousands of dollars” had been “withdrawn” from the joint
accounts and “spent at casinos.” He also found transactions on several
accounts which, he suspected, reflected expenses Wife incurred while
having an extramarital affair.

¶6 Husband petitioned for dissolution of the marriage, asking,
inter alia, that the superior court take Wife’s waste of community assets into
account when allocating property and debt. In response, Wife denied
wasting community assets and further requested an award of spousal
maintenance.

¶7 Husband, Wife, and Wife’s son Ferguson all testified at the
dissolution trial in July 2025. Husband also presented monthly statements

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from the parties’ bank and credit card accounts reflecting, among other
things, over sixty cash withdrawals at various casinos in amounts ranging
from $500 to $2,000. A bank statement for the month ending January 2023,
for example, reflects that over $15,000 was withdrawn at casinos that
month, including four withdrawals totaling over $4,000 at Casino Arizona
in Scottsdale in a single day. The bank and credit card statements also
reflect expenses for cruises and other travel, which Husband cited as further
evidence of Wife’s waste of marital assets. Ferguson also testified about a
text message he received from Wife in which she admitted to “gambling
stupidity.” Husband presented a spreadsheet of the bank withdrawals
evidencing Wife’s alleged marital waste. Over Wife’s objection, the court
admitted the spreadsheet for demonstrative purposes as Exhibit 13.

¶8 In his testimony, Husband asserted that Wife went on two
cruises without him and took other “trips” and “vacations” as well. The
expenses relating to two cruises, a trip to Legoland, and other travel were
listed on Exhibit 13. On cross-examination, however, Husband admitted
that Wife went on both cruises with his knowledge and in the company of
other family members. Neither Husband nor Wife testified about the
Legoland expenses.

¶9 Each party’s affidavit of financial information (“AFI”) was
admitted at trial. On his AFI, Husband did not list any earnings from his
part-time job at Ferguson’s company. On the contrary, his AFI identifies his
pension and Social Security benefits as his only sources of income. In the
space on the AFI form marked “Name and address of current employer,”
Husband wrote, “NOT APPLICABLE.” When Wife asked Husband on
cross-examination why he omitted his employment income from his AFI,
Husband answered, “I don’t know.”

¶10 On further questioning, Husband testified that he worked for
Ferguson on a part-time basis earning “$200 per day.” He described his
work schedule as “sporadic,” stating that he worked “two, three days a
week[,] . . . sometimes four.” Ferguson testified that Husband worked “one
to two days a week” for his company and was paid “$200 a day.”

¶11 Wife testified that she sought spousal maintenance because,
although she was “working [her] hiney off,” she did not “have the means
to support [herself] right now.” She also testified that she had a job that paid
$17 per hour, that her monthly rent was approximately $1,300, and that the
loan on her 2019 Honda CRV had been paid off.

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¶12 After the parties submitted written closing statements, the
court took the matter under advisement, issuing the Decree shortly
thereafter. The Decree reflects the court’s finding, after reviewing the
factors set forth in A.R.S. § 25-319, that Wife was eligible for an award of
spousal maintenance because she “lacks sufficient property to provide for
her reasonable needs.” The court further determined that, under the
Spousal Maintenance Guidelines, Wife would be entitled to spousal
maintenance of between $772.62 to $1,012.06 per month. Finding deviation
from the guidelines appropriate, however, the court denied Wife’s request
for spousal maintenance, citing, in part, “Husband’s inability to meet his
[own] needs.” Husband’s “ability to pay spousal maintenance is limited,”
the court found, because “Wife wasted community resources during the
marriage in the amount of $155,636.70.”

¶13 The court allocated responsibility for credit card and other
community debts, and allocated community property between, and
confirmed sole and separate property to, the parties. Although the court
found that the marital residence was Husband’s separate property, the
court also determined that the marital community was entitled to an
equitable lien of $9,554.94 because community funds had been used for
improvements such as new appliances and upgraded windows.

¶14 The court also found that Wife had wasted community funds
in the amount of $155,636.70 by gambling and paying expenses relating to
an extramarital affair. After considering the value of the assets and debts
allocated between the parties and Wife’s waste of community funds, the
court found that Husband was entitled to an equalization payment of
$86,130.49. But finding that “Wife does not have many resources from
which to pay an equalization payment,” the court “equitably reduced” the
equalization payment by more than two-thirds, to $28,000.

¶15 Wife filed a motion of reconsideration and a motion for relief
from judgment, then filed a notice of appeal. We stayed the appeal pending
the resolution of Wife’s post-Decree motions. The court denied both
motions, and Wife filed a new, timely notice of appeal. We have jurisdiction
under A.R.S. §§ 12-2101(A) and 12-120.21(A).

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DISCUSSION

¶16 Wife challenges various provisions of the Decree.1 In
evaluating her challenges, we do not reweigh the evidence on appeal. Clark
v. Kreamer, 243 Ariz. 272, 276, ¶ 14 (App. 2017) (citation omitted). Instead,
we view the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to upholding
the superior court’s ruling, which we will affirm if the evidence reasonably
supports it. Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 348, ¶ 14 (App. 1998).

A. Spousal Maintenance

¶17 Wife challenges the superior court’s denial of her request for
spousal maintenance. We review the superior court's ruling on a request for
spousal maintenance for an abuse of discretion. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. at 348,
¶ 14.

¶18 In support of her challenge, Wife argues, first, that the Decree
“contains no findings addressing [W]ife’s eligibility” for maintenance. She
further complains that the Decree “fails to weigh the relevant [statutory]
factors, such as the duration of the marriage, the marital standard of living,
and [H]usband’s ability to pay.”

¶19 A review of the Decree refutes Wife’s assertions. The Decree
reflects the superior court’s finding that Wife was “eligible for spousal
maintenance under A.R.S. § 25-319(A)(1)” because she “lack[ed] sufficient
property to provide for her reasonable needs.” And contrary to Wife’s
assertions, the court made express findings about the duration of the
parties’ marriage (“four years”), the marital standard of living (“modest”),
and Husband’s ability to pay spousal maintenance (“limited,” in part
because “Wife wasted community resources during the marriage”).

1 In his answering brief, Husband simply sets forth some of the court’s

findings in the Decree and states that he will not pursue recovery of the
$28,000 equalization payment to which the Decree entitles him. In her reply
brief, Wife asserts that the answering brief’s failure to address the merits of
the opening brief’s arguments entitles her to vacatur of the challenged
provisions of the Decree. In support of her position, she cites Savord v.
Morton, 235 Ariz. 256 (App. 2014), in which this Court held that “[w]hen
debatable issues exist and an appellee fails to file an answering brief, we
may consider such failure a confession of reversible error.” Id. at 259, ¶ 9.
Savord does not apply here, however, because Husband did, in fact, file an
answering brief and, more importantly, because Wife’s opening brief raises
no meritorious or even colorable claims.

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¶20 Wife next argues that the superior court erred by “imput[ing]
an annual income of $37,000 [sic] to [her] without any evidentiary support.”
The spousal maintenance worksheet reflects that the court found that Wife
earned $2,946.67 per month, or $35,360.00 per year. Evidence in the record
supports this determination. Wife testified that she is employed at a rate of
$17 an hour. The same figure appears in her AFI and in a letter from her
employer that she offered as an exhibit at trial. Assuming a 40-hour work
week, Wife’s employment earnings would be $35,360.00 per year. The court
did not err in relying on evidence that Wife presented to determine her
income for spousal maintenance purposes.

¶21 Finally, Wife argues that the superior court erred by
overlooking Husband’s employment earnings when determining his
income. She contends that although Husband admitted at trial that he earns
employment income, the court improperly relied on his “admittedly false”
AFI, which reflects no employment earnings. According to Wife, the court
denied her request for spousal maintenance based on “an unsupported and
unreliable financial record.”

¶22 The premise of Wife’s argument is that when determining
Husband’s income for spousal maintenance purposes, the superior court
considered only the $4,571.58 in monthly benefits income listed on his AFI.
The record refutes this assertion. The spousal maintenance worksheet
included in the Decree reflects a finding that Husband’s monthly income
was $6,507.00. This figure makes sense only if the court considered
Husband’s earnings from both his employment income and his monthly
benefits.

¶23 Wife contends that the superior court underestimated
Husband’s employment income, asserting that Husband “testified” that he
works “at least 3 days but up to 5 days per week.” The trial transcript shows
that Husband did not say this. He testified that he worked “two,” “three,”
and “some times four” days a week. Ferguson testified that Husband
worked “one to two days a week.” Nothing in the record supports Wife’s
assertion that the evidence at trial showed that Husband worked “at least
3” and as much as “5 days per week.”

¶24 Wife complains that the superior court improperly
“sustain[ed] objections” to questions she posed to Husband on cross-
examination, thereby “prevent[ing]” her from exposing “his undisclosed
income.” Again, the trial transcript refutes this assertion. Although the
court sustained an objection to one question asked by Wife on the basis that
it was “argumentative,” the court overruled other objections made by

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Husband’s counsel, thus permitting Wife to elicit Husband’s admission that
he earned income that was not reflected in his AFI.

¶25 The Decree makes clear the superior court calculated each
party’s income based on record evidence, determined that Wife was
entitled to spousal maintenance, and declined to award it. In denying
Wife’s request for spousal maintenance, the court considered not only
Husband’s age and ability to meet his own needs, but also Wife’s
dissipation of marital assets. These were appropriate factors for the court to
consider in determining whether to award spousal maintenance. A.R.S.
§ 25-319(B)(4), (5), (11) (providing that relevant considerations include
“[t]he ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet that
spouse's needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance[,]”
“[t]he comparative financial resources of the spouses, including their
comparative earning abilities in the labor market[,]” and “[e]xcessive or
abnormal expenditures, destruction, concealment or fraudulent disposition
of community, joint tenancy and other property held in common.”).

¶26 The record supports the superior court’s decision to deny
Wife’s request for spousal maintenance despite her eligibility for such an
award. Wife is entitled to no relief.

B. Marital Waste

¶27 Wife argues that the superior court erred in finding that she
wasted community funds and then taking her waste of funds into account
when dividing marital property.

¶28 The superior court is statutorily authorized to consider a
spouse’s destruction of joint property when apportioning community
property. A.R.S. § 25-318(C); Helland v. Helland, 236 Ariz. 197, 201, ¶ 17
(App. 2014). When the court determines that one spouse has wasted or
dissipated marital assets, “it may apportion the community property in a
manner designed to compensate the other spouse for the waste.” Helland,
236 Ariz. at 201, ¶ 17. The spouse alleging waste must make a prima
facie showing to support his or her claim; upon such a showing, the burden
shifts to the other spouse to demonstrate the absence of waste. Id.

¶29 Wife argues, first, that the superior court exceeded its
jurisdiction by finding that she committed waste because, she contends, the
court “had already classified” the funds she removed from the parties’ joint
accounts “as [H]usband’s separate property.” Citing Weaver v. Weaver, 131
Ariz. 586 (1982), for the proposition that a spouse’s separate property
cannot be the subject of a waste claim, Wife argues that “[o]nce the court

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characterized the funds as Husband’s separate property, it lost jurisdiction
to impose any financial obligation based on those funds.” See Weaver, 131
Ariz. at 586, 587 (reversing money judgment granted in dissolution
proceeding based on “damage” that one spouse caused “to the separate
property of the other spouse”; although governing statutes permit courts to
“consider[] destruction of property in dividing the community, joint
tenancy or other commonly held assets[,] . . . no such provision is made for
separate property”).

¶30 The premise of Wife’s argument — that the superior court
found that the money she wasted was Husband’s separate property — is
incorrect. The Decree reflects the court’s finding that Husband “purchased
[the 15th Street property] well before the marriage.” The court also found,
however, that he deposited the sale proceeds “into the parties’ joint bank
account.” “When commingling occurs, the entire fund becomes community
property unless the separate property can be explicitly traced.” Kim v. Pak, 258 Ariz. 594, 597, ¶ 9 (App. 2023) (citation modified). Here, the court made
no finding that the proceeds from the sale of the 15th Street property
remained Husband’s separate property after he deposited them into the
joint account, nor did either party present any evidence on that issue. Whitt
v. Meza, 257 Ariz. 176, 181, ¶ 15 (App. 2024) (party asserting that funds are
separate “has the burden of [proof] with clear and satisfactory evidence”).
Because the court made no finding, and the record does not establish, that
the funds Wife removed from the joint account were Husband’s separate
property, we reject Wife’s argument that the court’s finding of marital
waste runs afoul of Weaver.

¶31 Wife challenges the “factual predicate” for the waste
determination. According to Wife, “Husband’s primary claim was that
[W]ife took two cruises without his knowledge,” and that this allegation
“collapse[d]” when Husband admitted on cross-examination that she went
on the cruises with other family members and with Husband’s knowledge.
Likewise, Wife contends, the court found that she committed waste by
taking a trip to Legoland when Husband presented no evidence to support
such a finding.

¶32 The record refutes Wife’s contentions about the superior
court’s factual findings in support of its waste determination. The Decree
reflects the court’s express finding that “Wife’s expenses for travel that were
unrelated to [her] affair,” including the cost of the “cruises” and the
“Legoland trip[],” did “not constitute waste.”

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VARELA v. HAUSER
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¶33 Wife next challenges the evidentiary basis for the superior
court’s determination that Wife wasted assets of over $150,000. According
to Wife, the spreadsheet that was admitted as Exhibit 13 was “the sole
substantive basis for” the court’s determination of the amount of the funds
she wasted. Wife maintains the court erred in relying on Exhibit 13 because
the spreadsheet was admitted only for demonstrative purposes, and
“[d]emonstrative aids are not evidence and [so] cannot support factual
findings.”

¶34 Again, the record refutes Wife’s assertion that the court relied
solely on Exhibit 13 in calculating the amount of community funds she
wasted. Substantive evidence in the record supporting the court’s
calculation of waste includes, for example, bank statements reflecting over
sixty separate withdrawals at casinos totaling tens of thousands of dollars.

¶35 In support of her challenge to the superior court’s
determination of the amount of funds wasted, Wife relies on inapposite,
and even non-existent, legal authority. In her opening brief, for example,
Wife cites a purported case entitled “In re Marriage of Balsige” for the
proposition that “[a] trial court abuses its discretion when it bases its
findings on such unadmitted materials.” Our research has uncovered no
such case in Arizona (or, for that matter, in any other jurisdiction). The
reporter citation listed in Wife’s opening brief refers to a different case, Elgin
v. Great-West Life Assur. Co., 163 Ariz. 176 (App. 1989), which does not
address the proposition that Wife attributes to the non-existent “Balsige”
case. See Elgin, 163 Ariz. at 180-81 (addressing whether retroactive effect
should be given to prior case’s holding that federal statute governing
improper handling of claims under employee benefit plans preempted state
tort and contract law).

¶36 Wife cites other cases for propositions those cases do not
support. She cites State v. McCray, 218 Ariz. 252, 256, ¶ 12 (2008) and State
v. Martin, 225 Ariz. 162, 166, ¶ 14 (App. 2010), for example, for the
proposition that “[d]emonstrative aids are not evidence and cannot support
factual findings.” Neither case supports that proposition. McCray, 218 Ariz.
at 256, ¶ 12 (rejecting defendant’s challenge to admission of DNA evidence
based on purportedly inadequate authentication); Martin, 225 Ariz. at 166,
¶ 14 (stating that a showing of prejudice is required to secure relief under
fundamental error review in a criminal case). Indeed, neither case even
mentions demonstrative aids. See generally McCray; Martin.

¶37 An appellant has an obligation “to make a bona fide and
reasonably intelligent effort to comply with” applicable court rules. Ramos

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v. Nichols, 252 Ariz. 519, 522, ¶ 8 (App. 2022) (citation modified). The fact
that Wife is self-represented does not relieve her of this responsibility. Flynn
v. Campbell, 243 Ariz. 76, 83, ¶ 24 (2017) (observing that unrepresented
litigants are expected to comply with procedural rules and are held to the
same standard as an attorney). An appellant’s failure to make the requisite
effort to comply with rules will be deemed to have “waive[d] issues and
arguments not supported by adequate explanation, citations to the record
or authority.” Ramos, 252 Ariz. at 522, ¶ 8.

¶38 Moreover, “[m]isrepresenting the law to the court constitutes
bad faith conduct in litigation,” Matter of Estate of Acciavatti, No. 1 CA-CV
25-0606, 2026 WL 2041963 at *4, ¶ 23 (Ariz. App. July 15, 2026) (opinion),
and a citation to non-existent authority constitutes a misrepresentation of
the law. Id. at *3-4, ¶¶ 17-18; see also Barari v. Burgess, No. 1 CA-CV 25-0815
FC, 2026 WL 1847041, at *1, ¶ 6 (Ariz. App. June 26, 2026) (mem. decision)
(holding that litigant’s citation to “a case that simply does not exist”
constitutes a “misrepresentation[] of the law”). By citing non-existent
authority and misrepresenting case law, Wife has failed to make the
requisite “bona fide and reasonably intelligent effort to comply with the
law.” Ramos, 252 Ariz. at 522, ¶ 8 (citation modified).

¶39 As a sanction, this Court holds that Wife has forfeited her
challenge to the court’s determination of Husband’s waste claim. See
Acciavatti, 2026 WL 2041963 at *4-5, ¶¶ 18, 23, 27 (“[C]iting a hallucinated
case in a legal filing is sanctionable conduct.”) see also Ngaruiya v. Gill, No.
1 CA-CV 25-1021, 2026 WL 1738822 at *2, ¶ 10 (Ariz. App. June 16, 2026)
(mem. decision) (“[L]aw won’t work if we let lawyers and pro se litigants
make things up without penalty.”).

C. Remaining Claims

¶40 Finally, Wife argues that the court erred by failing to
“address[] [her] uncontroverted testimony about her substantial
community contributions to [H]usband’s separate property, [H]usband’s
concealment of community funds, or the significant economic disparity
between the parties.” The record does not support these assertions. The
Decree reflects, for example, that the court accepted Wife’s testimony about
the use of community funds to pay for improvements to the marital
residence; the court determined that the community was entitled to an
equitable lien of $9,554.94, and considered this figure in calculating the
amount of the equalization payment. Wife’s reference to “Husband’s
concealment of community funds” is unexplained and supported by no
record citation, and so Wife has waived any claim on that point. See

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MacMillan v. Schwartz, 226 Ariz. 584, 591, ¶ 33 (App. 2011) (holding that
“[m]erely mentioning an argument in an appellate opening brief is
insufficient,” and therefore appellant waived argument that was not
supported by argument or authority). And, as discussed above, the court
made findings about the parties’ respective financial positions that are
supported by the record, see supra ¶¶ 18-26. Wife’s evident disagreement
with the court’s findings, without more, entitles her to no relief. See Hurd v.
Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 52, ¶ 16 (App. 2009) (“Even though conflicting evidence
may exist, we affirm the trial court’s ruling if substantial evidence supports
it.”).

CONCLUSION

¶41 We affirm. Husband is entitled to recover costs under A.R.S.
§ 25-324 upon his compliance with ARCAP 21.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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