Mallidi v. Valero

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

RAGHUVEERA MALLIDI, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

ROBERTO VALERO, Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0917
FILED 09-22-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2023-018335
The Honorable Christopher Whitten, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Manthra Legal Counsel, LLC, Cashion
By Sai N. Manthra
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant

Dyet & Hill, P.L.L.C., Gilbert
By Shane P. Dyet, Andres Chagolla III
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

MALLIDI v. VALERO
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge D. Andrew Gaona delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined.

G A O N A, Judge:

¶1 Raghuveera Mallidi appeals the superior court’s orders
granting Roberto Valero’s motion to dismiss for insufficient service of
process and denying Mallidi’s motion to vacate the resulting judgment
under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 60(b). Because Mallidi
didn’t make reasonably diligent efforts to personally serve Valero, we
affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In November 2021, Mallidi was part of a car accident
involving Valero and another driver. One day before the two-year statute
of limitations expired, Mallidi’s counsel filed a complaint alleging Valero’s
negligence caused the accident.

¶3 Mallidi’s counsel failed to serve Valero within Rule 4(i)’s 90-
day deadline, and the superior court issued a notice of intent to dismiss for
lack of service. Mallidi sought and received multiple extensions, with the
latest service deadline set for May 20, 2024.

¶4 Mallidi’s counsel retained a licensed process sever to attempt
service on Valero in February 2024. The process server’s first attempt was
on February 10, 2024, at the residence address Valero provided law
enforcement after the accident. The process server spoke with a resident
who said Valero didn’t live there. The resident provided a phone number
for Valero and explained that he only spoke Spanish.

¶5 Two days later, in a message translated into Spanish by
Google Translate, the process server texted that phone number to request a
meeting with Valero to provide him with legal documents. The process
server received no response.

¶6 On February 14, 2024, Mallidi’s counsel asked the process
server to perform a “skip trace”; they did so and found eight possible
addresses for Valero. The process server then recommended that they

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attempt service at an address on South 46th Street in Phoenix. Mallidi’s
counsel authorized the company to proceed on the same day.

¶7 Five days later, the process server arranged for an
independent contractor to attempt service at the South 46th Street address,
but a clerical error resulted in the contractor attempting service at an
address on South 46th Place, where the resident explained they didn’t know
Valero.

¶8 The process server told Mallidi’s counsel about this second
unsuccessful attempt and filed affidavits of non-service with the superior
court.

¶9 Mallidi’s counsel then published the summons and notice of
the lawsuit in the Arizona Business Gazette on four days in May and June
2024. Two months after the last publication, the superior court granted
Mallidi’s after-the-fact motion for leave to serve Valero by publication
under Rule 4.1(l).

¶10 Almost eight months later, Valero moved to dismiss the
action for insufficient service of process. After oral argument, the superior
court granted the motion after finding Mallidi (1) didn’t try to serve Valero
with reasonable diligence and (2) didn’t comply with Rule 4.1(l)’s
requirements for service by publication.

¶11 Mallidi moved for reconsideration and to vacate the
judgment of dismissal under Rule 60(b). The superior court denied both
post-judgment motions.

¶12 Mallidi timely appealed and we have jurisdiction under
A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶13 Mallidi’s opening brief raises nine issues, but we can distill
them into just three—whether the superior court: (1) erred in finding
Mallidi’s efforts to serve Valero weren’t sufficiently diligent; (2) abused its
discretion in denying reconsideration and Rule 60(b) relief; and (3) abused
its discretion by refusing to grant an extension of time for service under
Rule 4(i). We address and reject each restated argument in turn.

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I. The Superior Court Didn’t Err in Dismissing Mallidi’s Complaint
for Insufficient Service of Process.

¶14 Proper service under Rule 4 implicates personal jurisdiction
and is thus a legal question we review de novo. Ruffino v. Lokosky, 245 Ariz.
165, 168 ¶ 9 (App. 2018); see Duckstein v. Wolf, 230 Ariz. 227, 233 ¶ 19 (App.
2012) (same). But when, as here, the superior court makes factual findings
associated with service of process, we defer to those findings and won’t set
them aside unless they are clearly erroneous. Ruffino, 245 Ariz. at 168 ¶ 9;
Huskie v. Ames Bros. Motor & Supply Co., 139 Ariz. 396, 401 (App. 1984).

¶15 Rule 4.1(l) allows service by publication only if (1) “the
serving party, despite reasonably diligent efforts, has been unable to
ascertain the person’s current address,” or (2) “the person to be served has
intentionally avoided service of process,” and (3) “service by publication is
the best means practicable in the circumstances for providing the person
with notice.” See also Rule 4.1(k)(3) (“A party may serve by publication only
if the requirements of Rule 4.1(l) . . . are met.”). If the serving party knows
the person’s address, the serving party must also mail the summons and
complaint to the person “on or before the date of first publication.” Rule
4.1(l)(3).

¶16 Before a court allows service by publication, the serving party
must make diligent efforts to effect personal service. Ruffino, 245 Ariz. at
169 ¶ 11; Sprang v. Petersen Lumber, Inc., 165 Ariz. 257, 261 (App. 1990). A
finding of due diligence before service by publication is a fundamental
“prerequisite to the jurisdiction of the court.” Preston v. Denkins, 94 Ariz.
214, 222 (1963). And a “diligent effort” requires “pointed measures,” like
“an examination of telephone company records, utility company records,
and records maintained by the county treasurer, county recorder, or similar
record keepers” to find the defendant’s address. Sprang, 165 Ariz. at 261.

¶17 The superior court found that Mallidi’s counsel failed to make
reasonably diligent efforts before proceeding to serve notice by publication,
stressing that there were just two attempts at physical service and one text
message sent in the ten months after the complaint’s filing. The superior
court noted that Mallidi’s counsel ignored his own process server’s
recommendation to try another address and never mailed the summons to
that recommended address or any other addresses the skip trace revealed.

¶18 Mallidi’s main contention on appeal is that the superior
court’s determination was based on factual inaccuracies. He disputes that
he ignored the process server’s recommendation. Mallidi says he

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“[d]isplay[ed] exemplary diligence” by authorizing the process server to
proceed with the recommended address on the same day his counsel
received it. He also claims it was the process server’s error that led to the
service attempt at the wrong address, and points us to two declarations,
submitted after the superior court’s dismissal, in which the process server
attests to Mallidi’s recounting of the timeline and the clerical error.

¶19 These arguments are irrelevant. The superior court dismissed
the complaint based on the relevant information it had when it made that
decision: the pleadings, one affidavit of non-service showing an
unsuccessful attempt at the address Valero gave after the accident, and one
affidavit showing an unsuccessful attempt at the erroneous address. At oral
argument, Mallidi’s counsel conceded that “the only two places that [the
process server] tried to serve are what’s on the record.”

¶20 What’s more, the affidavit of non-service at the mistaken
address was signed and dated February 22, 2024, and the affidavit of non-
service that provided the results of the skip trace and recommended service
addresses was signed and dated February 26, 2024. Though Mallidi’s
counsel attests, and the post-dismissal declarations seem to support, that
these aren’t the actual dates of the process server’s attempts and
recommendations, the superior court didn’t know this when deciding the
motion to dismiss.

¶21 Mallidi’s counsel also failed to make these points pre-
dismissal. During oral argument, Mallidi’s counsel could’ve explained the
clerical error and cleared up any confusion about whether he followed the
process server’s recommendation when the court asked several times why
service wasn’t attempted at the recommended address. Mallidi’s counsel
couldn’t provide any answers. When the superior court asked Mallidi’s
counsel where in the record it shows he asked the process server to attempt
service at the recommended address, Mallidi’s counsel stated: “We don’t
have that in the record,” and it was the first time he was hearing about this
issue. But these weren’t trick questions; the failure to attempt service at the
recommended address was at the heart of Valero’s motion to dismiss.

¶22 Mallidi’s counsel didn’t submit the declarations on which
Mallidi’s arguments hinge until after the court granted the motion to
dismiss. Our review is limited to the record before the superior court when
it ruled on the motion being reviewed. GM Dev. Corp. v. Cmty. Am. Mortg.
Corp., 165 Ariz. 1, 4 (App. 1990). That limitation follows from the nature of
appellate review. We review only the ruling properly before us, see Arizona
Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure (“ARCAP”) 8, based on the record before

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the superior court when it ruled, GM Dev. Corp., 165 Ariz. at 4. We can’t
consider post-dismissal submissions. Based on that record, the superior
court’s finding that Mallidi failed to make sufficiently reasonable and
diligent efforts to serve Valero is not clearly erroneous.

II. The Post-Dismissal Record Doesn’t Warrant Reconsideration or
Rule 60 Relief.

¶23 We review the superior court’s denial of Mallidi’s motion for
reconsideration for abuse of discretion. Worldwide Jet Charter, Inc. v.
Christian, 255 Ariz. 67, 70 ¶ 10 (App. 2023); Tilley v. Delci, 220 Ariz. 233, 238
¶ 16 (App. 2009). The same standard applies to our review of the superior
court’s denial of Mallidi’s Rule 60(b) motion. City of Phoenix v. Geyler, 144
Ariz. 323, 328 (1985). “Abuse of discretion” is discretion “manifestly
unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable
reasons.” Tilley, 220 Ariz. at 238 ¶ 16. We conclude the superior court didn’t
abuse its discretion when it denied Mallidi’s post-judgment motions.

¶24 To start, the superior court wasn’t required to accept and
examine evidence presented to it for the first time in connection with
Mallidi’s motion for reconsideration. Tilley, 220 Ariz. at 238 ¶ 17; see also Phil
W. Morris Co. v. Schwartz, 138 Ariz. 90, 94 (App. 1983) (calling it the “better
policy” to disallow affidavits submitted after the superior court’s decision
on a motion for summary judgment when they do not include newly
discovered material and could have been produced earlier through
reasonable diligence). Because Mallidi’s motion for reconsideration turned
on newly presented evidence, the superior court didn’t abuse its discretion
when it denied that motion.

¶25 As for Rule 60(b)(1), that rule provides that a court may
relieve a party from a final judgment for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect. We will affirm the superior court’s ruling on a Rule 60(b)
motion unless “undisputed facts and circumstances require a contrary
ruling.” Geyler, 144 Ariz. at 330. “The scope of an appeal from a denial of a
Rule 60 motion is restricted to the questions raised by the motion to set aside
and does not extend to a review of whether the [superior court] was
substantively correct” in its original judgment. Hirsch v. Nat’l Van Lines, Inc.,
136 Ariz. 304, 311 (1985).

¶26 Mallidi’s arguments for vacating the superior court’s
dismissal derive from the post-dismissal declarations and can be summed
up in one sentence: the superior court mistakenly thought Mallidi ignored
the process server’s recommendation to try the address on South 46th Street

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when in reality, Mallidi authorized the server to proceed on that
recommendation. Mallidi declares this a “palpable judicial mistake”
warranting relief under Rule 60(b)(1). We aren’t persuaded.

¶27 Rule 60(b)(1) doesn’t authorize vacating a judgment when
correcting the alleged mistake wouldn’t change the result. The potential
misunderstanding that Mallidi identifies doesn’t change the fact that
Mallidi’s counsel relied on only two physical service attempts and one text
message before proceeding to attempt service by publication. These
undisputed facts were independent grounds for the superior court’s
determination that Mallidi hadn’t shown reasonable diligence to locate and
serve Valero and had failed to meet Rule 4.1(l)’s requirements before
proceeding to service by publication. We agree with the superior court that
the misunderstandings identified by Mallidi aren’t outcome determinative
and nothing in the record shows the superior court abused its discretion in
declining to vacate its dismissal.

III. The Superior Court Didn’t Abuse its Discretion in Declining to
Grant Mallidi an Extension.

¶28 Rule 4(i) requires service within 90 days after a plaintiff files
a complaint. If the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure of service, the
court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period. Absent a
showing of good cause, the court has the discretion to grant an extension.
Sholem v. Gass in & for Cnty. of Maricopa, 248 Ariz. 281, 286 ¶ 18 (2020). “Thus,
Rule 4(i) provides a mandatory extension based on good cause and a
discretionary extension without a showing of good cause.” Id. Mallidi
disputes the superior court’s determination that his request for extra time,
which he says he made during oral argument on the motion to dismiss, was
untimely. Mallidi never formally moved for an extension of service under
Rule 4(i), and he doesn’t appear to claim he has shown good cause, which
would obligate the superior court to extend the time for service under Rule
4(i). Rather, Mallidi argues the superior court had to grant an extension sua
sponte.

¶29 The record shows Mallidi raised the potential extension only
three times: during oral argument, briefly in his motion for reconsideration,
and on appeal. At oral argument, Mallidi’s counsel suggested that “given
an opportunity…[he] could go back and try to serve it at the [recommended
address].” The superior court deemed the request (if it was a request and
not just an observation) untimely, emphasizing the time Mallidi’s counsel
had before oral argument to determine why the process server didn’t
attempt service at the recommended address.

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¶30 Mallidi’s motion for reconsideration also told the superior
court that: “Plaintiff is now prepared to submit a motion for default or a
motion to extend service.” But an expressed willingness to move to extend
the time for service under Rule 4(i) is definitionally not a motion itself.

¶31 At any rate, Mallidi says the superior court abused its
discretion by dismissing the case without considering the factors discussed
in Sholem. That case lists several factors courts can consider when
determining whether to grant a discretionary extension, including whether:
(1) the applicable statute of limitations bars the plaintiff from re-filing the
action; (2) the defendant evaded service; and (3) the defendant would be
prejudiced if the court grants the extension. Sholem, 248 Ariz. at 290 ¶ 42.
According to Mallidi, Sholem requires a court to weigh these factors
“regardless of whether the plaintiff places each factor on the record in a
formal motion.” But Sholem says no such thing. Instead, it emphasizes these
are “discretionary factors” that a court “may consider.” Id. Sholem also
states that this discretion “is not limitless,” “must be based on facts
contained in the record,” and, while “plaintiffs need not show good cause…
they must still show some cause as to why the Court should not dismiss
their case.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

¶32 The superior court can’t abuse its discretion in declining to
grant a request that was never made. Even if there had been a formal
request, however, nothing in the record shows the superior court was
required to expressly weigh these considerations and extend the time for
service.

¶33 First, the fact that dismissal was fatal because the statute of
limitations had run isn’t, by itself, reason to extend the time for service.
Adequate service of process is a jurisdictional prerequisite we can’t
overlook because its failure extinguishes a claim.

¶34 Second, the record doesn’t show Valero deliberately evaded
Mallidi’s attempts at service despite Mallidi’s contrary claim. Mallidi
alleges Valero provided an incorrect address to law enforcement at the time
of the accident and “went completely silent” after the process server sent a
text message to Valero’s phone number. This, Mallidi contends, amounts to
evasion and Mallidi shouldn’t be penalized “for failing to execute perfect
personal service upon an untraceable, evading foreign national.” There’s no
basis, however, for labeling Valero as “evasive” simply because Mallidi
couldn’t locate him after just two attempts and just one text message,
especially when Mallidi didn’t follow up after the text message and ignored
other potential addresses for service.

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¶35 Our cases require much more before a court can find a
defendant “evasive” for purposes of service by publication. See, e.g., Ruffino,
245 Ariz. at 169–70 (defendant couldn’t be called evasive based solely on
two unsuccessful service attempts); Walker v. Dallas, 146 Ariz. 440, 444
(1985) (“[S]ervice by publication is constitutionally sufficient where the
defendant willfully leaves the state to evade service of process.”); Barlage v.
Valentine, 210 Ariz. 270, 273–74 ¶¶ 9–11 (App. 2005) (two unsuccessful
attempts at service by certified mail weren’t enough to constitute evasion
of service); but see Rouzaud v. Marek, 166 Ariz. 375, 381 (App. 1990) (party
was evading service by hiding in a foreign country). And nothing in the
record suggests Valero met these standards.

¶36 Lastly, we disagree with Mallidi’s contention that Valero’s
“actual notice” of the litigation through his insurer and his counsel
“fulfill[s] the core mandate of due process.” “The purpose of process is to
give the [defendant] actual notice of the action filed against him and an
opportunity to respond,” thereby vesting the superior court with
jurisdiction to resolve the matter. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rapton, 140 Ariz.
60, 62 (App. 1984). The reverse isn’t true—mere notice of an action doesn’t
automatically cure deficiencies in service of process or a failure to comply
with Rule 4.1’s procedural requirements. “If service is not achieved
according to the requirements of the applicable procedural rule, it is
technically defective.” Kline v. Kline, 221 Ariz. 564, 570 ¶ 21 (App. 2009).

¶37 Mallidi’s reply brief backtracks on this argument a bit,
restating it to say that “[a]ctual notice does not cure defective service . . .
[b]ut . . . is directly relevant to . . . whether [Valero] suffered prejudice from
any alleged service deficiency.” The argument’s framing, however, can’t
overcome the lack of evidence that Valero possessed sufficient notice
through his insurer and counsel to overcome the fundamental requirements
of effective service and prerequisites for service by publication under Rule
4.1(l). See Smith v. Smith, 117 Ariz. 249, 253 (App. 1977) (“Where service of
process does not comply with statutory requirements, the court does not
obtain jurisdiction[.] Knowledge by defendant as to [a] pending lawsuit will
not operate to cure a defect in service.”) (citations omitted).

¶38 In sum, even considering Sholem’s discretionary factors, the
superior court did not abuse its discretion in declining to extend Mallidi’s
time to serve Valero.

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CONCLUSION

¶39 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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