Opinion text
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
PREFERRED CHOICE RESTORATION LLC,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
MARIA DIMOVA,
Defendant/Appellant.
No. 1 CA-CV 25-0952
FILED 07-21-2026
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2025-010104
The Honorable Richard F. Albrecht, Judge Pro Tempore
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Maria Dimova, Tryavna, Bulgaria
Defendant/Appellant
PREFERRED v. DIMOVA
Decision of the Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Andrew J. Becke delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.
B E C K E, Judge:
¶1 Maria Dimova appeals a default judgment entered against
her. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 On March 13, 2025, Preferred Choice Restoration, LLC
(“Preferred Choice”) filed a complaint against Dimova, claiming she failed
to pay for restoration work it performed on her home. On June 16, Preferred
Choice moved to extend the service of process deadline after eight
unsuccessful attempts to personally serve Dimova. Preferred Choice’s
motion attached documents showing Dimova lived at the address where
service was attempted. Preferred Choice also moved to authorize an
alternate method of service.
¶3 The superior court granted Preferred Choice’s motions and
on June 20, Preferred Choice served Dimova by posting copies of the
summons and complaint at her address and by sending additional copies
by first-class mail and certified mail, postage prepaid to the address, all as
authorized by the superior court.
¶4 On July 16, Konstantine Vrazhilov moved to dismiss and
requested an interpreter “on behalf of” Dimova. Vrazhilov is neither an
attorney nor a party to this case. In his motion, Vrazhilov claimed Dimova
and her family spend their summers in Europe and that he collects her mail
and takes care of her dog during that time. Vrazhilov claimed that he
contacted the Clerk of the Superior Court of Maricopa County upon
noticing papers taped to Dimova’s front door, and the Clerk advised him
of the response deadlines, thus prompting his filing of the motion to
dismiss.
¶5 Vrazhilov’s motion claimed Preferred Choice could have
alerted Dimova by email of the pending action because Preferred Choice
had her email address. He also claimed Preferred Choice knew or should
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PREFERRED v. DIMOVA
Decision of the Court
have known Dimova spent her summers in Europe and did not speak
English. Although Preferred Choice had not yet sought entry of default or
default judgment, Vrazhilov asserted it was seeking a default judgment in
bad faith by “starting a ‘time to respond’ clock” by serving Dimova when
she was unlikely to be home.
¶6 On August 25, Preferred Choice filed an application and
declaration for default. On September 26, Preferred Choice filed a request
for default judgment without a hearing against Dimova for the principal
amount owed, interest, and attorneys’ fees and costs, totaling almost
$16,000. On October 1, the court entered the default judgment. On October
14, in an unsigned order, the court denied the motion to dismiss, stating
Vrazhilov could not represent Dimova. Dimova timely appealed and we
have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and
A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), -2101(A)(1).
DISCUSSION
¶7 Dimova argues the superior court erred by entering default
and a default judgment while her motion to dismiss was pending. Preferred
Choice did not file an answering brief. In cases that the Arizona Supreme
Court decided before this court existed, when no answering brief was filed,
that court developed a general approach that when a debatable issue is
raised on appeal, the court would “assume that the failure to file an
answering brief is a confession of reversible error on the part of the
appellee.” Tiller v. Tiller, 98 Ariz. 156, 157 (1965). As this court has noted
more recently, however, “the confession of error rule is not absolute and
can be waived in the discretion of this court.” Eversten v. Indus. Comm’n, 117
Ariz. 378, 383 (App. 1977).
¶8 We have previously noted that there is “no definitive test to
identify a debatable issue.” Williams v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 261 Ariz. 303,
315, ¶ 56 (App. 2025) (review granted in part Mar. 26, 2026). Our supreme
court has found a debatable issue where there was “at least grave doubt”
about an order being appealed. Adkins v. Adkins, 39 Ariz. 530, 532 (1932).
We have found that an issue was not debatable when “the answer to the
questions is clear,” Honsey v. Honsey, 126 Ariz. 336, 337 (App. 1980), and
when the “[t]he record shows so clearly” the answer to the issue raised, Air
E., Inc. v. Wheatley, 14 Ariz. App. 290, 294 (1971). Since there is no debatable
issue here, we will not treat Preferred Choice’s failure to file an answering
brief as confession of error.
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PREFERRED v. DIMOVA
Decision of the Court
¶9 Rule 55(a)(1) allows an entry of default where a “party against
whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or
otherwise defend.” Dimova argues she filed a motion to dismiss before
Preferred Choice applied for entry of default. Not so. Vrazhilov, who is
neither an attorney nor a party to this case, purportedly filed a motion to
dismiss on Dimova’s behalf. Non-attorneys may not represent other parties
in court. See State v. 1810 E. Second Ave., 193 Ariz. 1, 2 n.1 (App. 1997)
(“Because he is not an attorney, he cannot represent his wife in court. . . .”);
see also Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 31.1(a)(1), 31.2 (providing, as applicable here, that
only active members in good standing of the State Bar of Arizona may
engage in the practice of law). Dimova either needed to represent herself or
hire an attorney to represent her. See Encinas v. Mangum, 203 Ariz. 357, 359,
¶ 10 (App. 2002) (holding that a party either needed to represent herself or
hire a lawyer, and not being able to afford a lawyer in a civil action did not
violate due process).
¶10 The motion to dismiss filed by Vrazhilov, a non-party and
non-attorney, was a nullity. See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court, 19 Ariz.
App. 210, 213 (1973) (“[T]he requirement . . . that a party who is not
represented by an attorney [must] sign his own pleading is not a mere
technicality but a matter of substance going to the sufficiency of the
pleading and the jurisdiction of the court.”); see also Michel v. United States,
519 F.3d 1267, 1271 (11th Cir. 2008) (“A party cannot be represented by a
nonlawyer, so a pleading signed by a nonlawyer on behalf of another is
null.”).
¶11 Dimova failed to properly file a responsive pleading or
otherwise defend at any point and so, default judgment was properly
entered.
CONCLUSION
¶12 We affirm.
MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR
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