Patil v. Patil

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

TEJAS MADHUKAR PATIL, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

DHANASHRI PITAMBAR PATIL, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0964 FC
FILED 08-04-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2023-002147
The Honorable Harla Davidson, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART

APPEARANCES

Dhanashri Pitambar Patil, Tucson
Respondent/Appellant

Tejas Madhukar Patil, Sun City
Petitioner/Appellee

PATIL v. PATIL
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the Court’s decision, in
which Judge Anni Hill Foster, and Vice Chief Judge David D. Weinzweig
joined.

W I L L I A M S, Judge:

¶1 Dhanashri Patil (“Mother”) appeals the decree of dissolution
(“Decree”) dissolving her marriage to Tejas Patil (“Father”). For the
following reasons, we affirm in part, and vacate and remand in part.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In 2019, Mother and Father married in India, but soon moved
to Arizona. In 2021, the parties purchased a home. At the time of purchase,
Mother signed a disclaimer deed designating the home as Father’s sole and
separate property.

¶3 In 2022, their child (“Child”) was born. In 2023, Father
petitioned for dissolution of the marriage. A few months later, the parties
reconciled and Father moved the superior court to dismiss his petition. The
court obliged. But several weeks later, Father moved to reinstate his
petition, which the court granted.

¶4 During the pendency of the divorce, Mother obtained ex parte
an order of protection (“OOP”) against Father designating both her and
Child as protected persons. After a joint hearing on the OOP and Father’s
motion for temporary orders, the superior court dismissed the OOP, issued
temporary orders regarding legal decision-making and parenting time, and
ordered Father to pay child support. The court awarded Mother temporary
exclusive use of the marital home.

¶5 Following settlement negotiations, the parties reached an
Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure (“Rule”) 69 agreement on some
issues but failed to reach agreement on others. The superior court held a
trial on the contested issues and entered the Decree.

¶6 In the Decree, and relevant to this appeal, the superior court:
(1) found the disclaimer deed Mother signed was valid and that the marital
home was Father’s sole and separate property (subject to a community lien);

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(2) awarded Mother one half of the community lien on the marital home;
(3) ordered Mother to reimburse Father for post-petition payments related
to the marital home; (4) credited Father with an offset of $39,432 toward the
amount he owed Mother for her portion of the community lien on the
marital home; (5) awarded joint legal decision-making authority and equal
parenting time; (6) ordered Father to pay child support; (7) awarded Mother
her jewelry (including the pieces held by Father’s family in India); (8)
ordered each party to pay 50% of the community’s credit card debts; (9)
ordered Mother to reimburse Father for post-petition payments for health
insurance; and (10) denied Mother’s request for attorneys’ fees.

¶7 Both parties moved to alter or amend the Decree, which the
court denied. Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Article
6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶8 Mother challenges several of the superior court’s rulings
related to the marital home. She also contests the court’s orders on health
insurance, child support, and credit card debt. Finally, Mother contends
Father has not complied with the superior court’s order to return her
jewelry, and that the court erred in denying her request for attorneys’ fees.
We address each issue in turn.1

I. The Marital Home

A. The Disclaimer Deed is Valid.

¶9 Mother contends she signed the disclaimer deed
involuntarily because of Father’s undue influence, fraud, and coercion.

¶10 At the temporary orders hearing, Father testified that a notary
explained the disclaimer deed to Mother before she signed it. Father
admitted he knew that Mother wanted to be on the title, that she believed
the marital home would be jointly owned, and that he told her the
disclaimer deed was only for the convenience of the lender. He also testified
that the home was purchased with community funds, contradicting the

1 For the first time on appeal, Mother asks this court to designate Mother as

the primary residential parent for school attendance purposes. As a general
rule, we do not address arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See In
re MH 2008-002659, 224 Ariz. 25, 27, ¶ 9 (App. 2010).

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deed’s express terms that the marital home was “purchased with [Father’s]
separate funds.”

¶11 Months later, at trial, Mother testified that when the home
was purchased, Father directed her to sign several documents that had been
previously marked for her signature. She stated, “I started signing, and –
and I signed whole – the entire document.” She testified that Father had
never discussed using a disclaimer deed before that day. And she believed
everything she signed was “as per [their] agreement to be 50-50 owner[s] of
the house.” She stated that after she signed the documents, the notary asked
if she knew what she just signed because she had “waiv[ed] away all [her]
rights on the house.” Mother stated she never intended to waive her
ownership interest in the home and that Father “reassured” her the
disclaimer deed was “only a formality” to get “a lower interest rate on the
loan” but that Mother would still be “50 percent owner of the house.”

¶12 But Mother also testified she first “learned that something
[wa]s wrong” two years later when talking to someone at an unrelated
event who explained to Mother that she signed something “which made
[her] transfer [her] ownership of the house to Father.”

¶13 The superior court summarized Mother’s argument as
claiming “the disclaimer deed was not executed in good faith, and that
[Father] forced or tricked her into signing” it. But the court did not find
Mother credible and concluded the disclaimer deed was valid.

¶14 Property acquired during marriage is presumed to be
community property. A.R.S. § 25-211(A). The spouse seeking to rebut that
presumption must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
property is separate. Brebaugh v. Deane, 211 Ariz. 95, 98, ¶ 6 (App. 2005)
(citation modified). A signed disclaimer deed provides such proof, absent
fraud or mistake, regardless of which spouse’s funds paid for the property.
Bell-Kilbourn v. Bell-Kilbourn, 216 Ariz. 521, 523–24, ¶¶ 7, 9–11 (App. 2007).

¶15 Here, both parties testified that Father told Mother the use of
the disclaimer deed was related to the mortgage. But this alone does not
establish that Father obtained Mother’s signature by fraud. Mother
provided conflicting statements as to when she discovered something was
amiss and that she had given up her interest in the home—first stating the
notary told her she had waived her rights after she signed the disclaimer
deed—but also testifying she first learned there was an issue much later
during an interaction with someone at an unrelated event. We defer to the
superior court’s findings on witness credibility and the weight given to

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conflicting evidence. See Lehn v. Al-Thanayyan, 246 Ariz. 277, 284, ¶ 20 (App.
2019). And because Mother failed to establish fraud by clear and convincing
evidence, see Bell-Kilbourn, 216 Ariz. at 524, ¶ 11, we affirm the court’s
conclusion that the disclaimer deed is valid.

B. Post-Petition Housing Expenses Were Miscalculated.

¶16 Mother challenges the court’s order that she reimburse Father
$35,800 for his post-petition payments related to the home.

¶17 We review the superior court’s property division for an abuse
of discretion, In re Marriage of McCulloch and Parker, 257 Ariz. 195, 199, ¶ 9
(App. 2024), and will affirm if reasonably supported by the evidence,
Andrews v. Andrews, 252 Ariz. 415, 419, ¶ 18 (App. 2021). “An order for
exclusive use of a residence does not preclude a family court from ordering
reimbursement for a party’s exclusion from a marital or separate home.”
Marriage of McCulloch, 257 Ariz. at 204, ¶ 33.

¶18 Father reported marital housing expenses totaling $25,754
between service of the petition and the entry of temporary orders. During
that time, Father stayed with a friend and Mother lived in the home. And
while the OOP was in force, Father was barred from visiting the home. The
temporary orders also gave Mother exclusive use of the home. Father
reported additional expenses of $45,845 following entry of the temporary
orders through the time Mother began to pay all of the home’s expenses
under the parties’ Rule 69 agreement in March 2025. Thus, the record
supports the superior court’s finding that “it is equitable to credit [Father’s]
post-petition payments of the marital residence.”

¶19 However, the superior court’s worksheet attributed Father’s
post-petition expenses through June 2025. But Father conceded Mother
began making full payments under the Rule 69 agreement in March 2025
and agreed that any expenses after that should be excluded. He also
testified that Mother had already paid half of what she owed.
Consequently, the evidence does not support the court ordering Mother to
pay Father $35,800. We vacate that portion of the Decree relating to the post-
petition housing expenses and remand for corrected findings and orders
going only so far back as when the petition for dissolution was reinstated
in October 2023.

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II. The Superior Court Miscalculated the Amount It Could Order
Mother to Reimburse Father for Health Insurance Costs.

¶20 Mother contests the Decree’s directive that she reimburse
Father for his payments for her health insurance. She asserts she paid for
her own health insurance beginning in January 2024. For his part, Father
contends he was obligated to maintain insurance coverage for Mother and
Child under the preliminary injunction and, in any event, that the court’s
order for Mother to reimburse him $3,632 for health care costs “falls within
the court’s broad discretion in allocating financial obligations between the
parties.” See Bobrow v. Bobrow, 241 Ariz. 592, 596, ¶ 19 (App. 2017).

¶21 We review an order for reimbursement of post-petition
expenses for an abuse of discretion. See Hefner v. Hefner, 248 Ariz. 54, 61,
¶¶ 22–23 (App. 2019). Berg v. Berg, 1 CA-CV 21-0320 FC, 2022 WL 1498136,
at *4, ¶ 20 (Ariz. App. May 12, 2022) (mem. decision) (“[C]ourts must
consider the post-petition payment of community expenses but retain
discretion to account for such payments in an equitable overall property
allocation.”). We will affirm the superior court’s ruling “if the evidence
reasonably supports it.” Andrews, 252 Ariz. at 419, ¶ 18.

¶22 Once the superior court reinstated Father’s original petition
for dissolution in October 2023, it follows that the preliminary injunction
was also reinstated. See A.R.S. § 25-315. Father was obligated to continue
Mother’s health insurance coverage. A.R.S. § 25-315(A)(1)(c). Father
testified that he did. And though Mother testified she obtained separate
health insurance coverage, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in
finding it “equitable” to credit Father for his post-petition payments for
Mother’s insurance coverage.

¶23 We note, however, that the superior court mistakenly credited
Father “from the date of service [of the petition] to December 2024.” Father
is only entitled to reimbursement from October 2023 (the date of
reinstatement of the petition for dissolution) through December 2024. We,
therefore, vacate that portion of the Decree and remand for the court to
enter orders consistent with this timeline.

III. The Superior Court Should Have Awarded Past Child Support.

¶24 Mother challenges the superior court’s denial of her request
for past child support predating the award of temporary child support. She
also asks this court to recalculate the court’s final child support award. In
doing so, Mother maintains she exercised sole custody following the
parties’ separation in early 2023. And while the court’s temporary orders

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directed Father to pay child support beginning February 1, 2024, Mother
requested past child support beginning on April 12, 2023, the date of service
of the petition for dissolution. The court declined to do so and then denied
Mother’s Rule 83 motion to alter or amend the Decree.

¶25 “Child support awards are within the discretion of the trial
court.” Simpson v. Simpson, 224 Ariz. 224, 225, ¶ 4 (App. 2010). We will
affirm a child support order if “competent evidence” supports the court’s
exercise of its discretion. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 215 Ariz. 35, 37, ¶ 8 (App. 2007).
We construe the evidence in the light most favorable to affirming the ruling.
Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 52, ¶¶ 16, 19 (App. 2009).

¶26 The superior court declined to award Mother past child
support. But the uncontroverted evidence shows that Mother alone
exercised parenting time with Child from October 2023 (the month Father’s
petition for dissolution was reinstated) until February 2024 when the OOP
that prevented Father from seeing Child was dismissed. The court should
have awarded Mother past child support for those months. We remand for
the court to do so.

¶27 Mother also asks us to consider additional evidence (when
considering the superior court’s final award of child support) that was not
part of the trial record. She provided additional evidence of childcare costs
with her Rule 83 motion but those were not offered into evidence at trial.
Mother also asks us to consider Father’s tax returns in making our own
child support calculation. But the court expressly noted in the Decree
“[n]either party provided tax filings to the Court.” Though Father’s tax
returns from 2022–2024 and W-2s from 2023–2024 were disclosed and
marked as exhibits, neither party offered them for admission.

¶28 Our review is limited to the record before the superior court
at the time of trial. Bowser v. Nguyen, 249 Ariz. 454, 457, ¶ 14 (App. 2020).
Available evidence that a party failed to introduce at trial cannot serve as a
proper basis for a Rule 83 motion. Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 83(a)(1)(A) (noting
that a Rule 83 motion generally considers only “admitted evidence”),
(a)(1)(E) (limiting the “newly discovered evidence” ground for altering or
amending a ruling to evidence in existence at the time of trial that could not
have been discovered with reasonable diligence).

IV. The Superior Court Appropriately Assigned the Credit Card Debt.

¶29 Mother next challenges the superior court’s order that the
community’s credit card debt be paid equally by each party. She argues that

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the expenses on the credit card were incurred solely by Father for his “meals
and travel” after he left Mother and Child in India following a trip there.

¶30 “Because debt incurred during marriage is presumed to be
community in nature, the spouse contesting this characterization must
establish by clear and convincing evidence that the debt is actually a
separate obligation.” In re Marriage of Flower, 223 Ariz. 531, 537, ¶ 24 (App.
2010).

¶31 The superior court admitted into evidence the pertinent credit
card statement during Father’s testimony. All the relevant charges occurred
before the court reinstated Father’s petition for dissolution in October 2023,
and in fact, predated his original filing date of April 10, 2023. Mother
testified that “all those [credit card] transactions were used only for Father’s
expenses.” But this allegation alone does not establish, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the expenses were Father’s separate obligation.
They are presumed to have benefited the community. Mother’s argument
fails.

V. The Superior Court’s Order Regarding Dependent Child Tax
Benefits Was Not Error.

¶32 Mother challenges the superior court’s order allocating which
party may claim the annual dependent child tax benefit. The Decree
provides that Father may claim the benefit in 2025, 2026, and 2027, and that
Mother may claim the benefit in 2028 and 2029. The Decree notes that Father
may not claim the benefit unless he has paid all the required child support
for the year.

¶33 Mother asserts the parties agreed during settlement
discussions for Mother to claim Child on her tax return during odd years,
with Father claiming Child on even years. But the parties’ Rule 69
agreement, which was read into the record at the beginning of trial, did not
address tax benefits. After reviewing the agreement, the superior court
asked if anything was left out of the agreement, and neither party sought to
add tax benefits.

¶34 Father testified Mother claimed Child on her tax return for
three years: 2022, 2023, and 2024. Mother explained that Father
unexpectedly directed her to file separately in 2022. Despite difficulty, she
did so, claiming Child as a dependent. She claimed Child in 2023 because
she had sole physical custody for most of the year. She claimed the benefit
in 2024 because the temporary orders stated that Father could only claim

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the benefit if he was current on his child support obligations. Because he
did not meet that obligation, Mother claimed the benefit again in 2024.

¶35 Arizona’s Child Support Guidelines direct the superior court
to allocate the federal and state tax benefits between parents “in proportion
to the Combined Child Support Income of both parents.” A.R.S. § 25-320
app. (“Guidelines”) § XI.B.1.a. The Guidelines provide that the court may
condition claiming the tax benefit upon a parent’s payment of their child
support obligation by December 31. Guidelines § XI.C.1. We review child
support orders for an abuse of discretion. Hamblen v. Hamblen, 203 Ariz. 342,
344, ¶ 6 (App. 2002).

¶36 The Decree complies with the Guidelines. The superior court
calculated that Father is responsible for 58.82% of Child’s support and
Mother is responsible for 41.18%. The court awarded three years of tax
benefits to Father and two years of tax benefits to Mother, in accordance
with the above percentages and as directed by the Guidelines. Further, the
court conditioned Father claiming the benefit upon his payment of child
support. Mother has shown no error.

VI. Father’s Failure to Return Mother’s Jewelry is an Issue for the
Superior Court.

¶37 Mother claims Father has not complied with the Decree
directing that he return her jewelry (including that held by his family in
India). Mother requests a monetary award of $61,690 if Father does not
return her jewelry. She also asks that we review evidence disclosed, but
never admitted at trial, that can demonstrate Father’s unwillingness to
return her jewelry. See Gersten v. Gersten, 223 Ariz. 99, 103, ¶ 10 (App. 2009)
(explaining that pretrial submissions have no evidentiary value unless
admitted in evidence (citing In re Marriage of Kells, 182 Ariz. 480, 493 (App.
1995))). Because Mother’s request was raised for the first time on appeal,
we need not address it. See Alulddin v. Alfartousi, 255 Ariz. 436, 442, ¶ 20
(App. 2023).

¶38 We note, however, if a party fails to comply with a court order
to convey property awarded in a dissolution decree, the superior court may
enforce “its decree[] through enforcement actions.” In re Marriage of Rojas,
255 Ariz. 277, 282, ¶ 9 (App. 2023); Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 92(a)(1) (“The court
may use civil contempt sanctions under this rule only for compelling
compliance with a court order or for compensating a party for losses
because of a contemnor’s failure to comply with a court order.”).

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VII. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Denying Mother Attorneys’
Fees.

¶39 Lastly, Mother requests we revisit the court’s refusal to award
her attorneys’ fees and costs under A.R.S. § 25-324. Though the superior
court found Father has greater financial resources than Mother, the court
also appropriately considered the reasonableness of each party’s positions
before denying Mother’s request. On this record, Mother has shown no
error.

CONCLUSION

¶40 We vacate the superior court’s order and calculation of post-
petition expenses for the marital home, as well as the court’s order denying
Mother’s request for past child support. We remand on those two issues for
the court to address them as directed in this decision. In all other respects,
we affirm the Decree.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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