Moore v. Moore

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In Re the Matter of:

CONNOR R. MOORE, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

TAWNI MOORE, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0974 FC
FILED 09-02-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2024-051820
The Honorable Colleen E. O’Donnell-Smith, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Castle Law, LLC, Mesa
By Ian D. Haney
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

Colburn Hintze Maletta, PLLC, Phoenix
By Henry Alzate
Counsel for Respondent/Appellee

MOORE v. MOORE
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Angela K. Paton joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Connor Moore (“Father”) appeals the superior court’s decree
dissolving his marriage with Tawni Moore (“Mother”) and the order
denying portions of his post-decree motion. For the following reasons, we
affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The parties married in 2023 and have one minor child (born
in 2023). Father petitioned for divorce in August 2024. In January 2025, the
parties agreed to joint legal decision-making, no spousal maintenance, and
partial division of community property. The agreement listed numerous
items of tangible personal property (“Property”), some of which were still
in Father’s possession. The parties did not resolve parenting time, child
support, the division of Property “not specifically discussed [t]herein,” and
attorneys’ fees. The superior court adopted the partial agreement under
Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure (“Rule”) 69.

¶3 Mother’s pretrial statement included an exhibit listing many
Property items, asserting the court should award them to her and order
Father to provide the Property to her within 30 days of the decree. At trial,
Father testified about possession of various Property items and parenting
time. Mother testified about the same issues, along with Father’s alleged
domestic violence. Father claimed he had returned all Property to Mother
other than the bed frame and mattress. Mother’s Exhibit R40, identical to
Exhibit A filed with her pretrial statement, was admitted without objection.
Exhibit R40, which we refer to in the remainder of this decision, set forth
the list of Property items, including Mother’s engagement ring. Mother
testified that none of those items had been returned to her. The exhibit
included several items listed in the Rule 69 agreement, but most of the

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Property listed in the exhibit, including the engagement ring, was not part
of the agreement.1

¶4 Father requested equal parenting time. Mother disagreed,
explaining she did not want him to have the child for “a long period of time
where he gets overwhelmed or frustrated.” Mother also testified about
Father’s violent behavior, explaining he would “hold [her] down,” “throw[]
[her] on the floor,” “s[i]t on top of [her],” and if she left “the house, he’[d]
slap . . . [her].”

¶5 In the dissolution decree, the court ordered Father to “turn
over” to Mother the Property listed in Exhibit R40, which included her
engagement ring, within 30 days. For any items Father claimed he no
longer had possession, the court ordered him to “pay Mother the financial
equivalent of those items.”

¶6 Under A.R.S. § 25-403.03, the court determined Father
committed domestic violence against Mother, but the domestic violence
was not “significant,” and thus Father rebutted the presumption that
awarding him parenting time would be contrary to the child’s best interests.
See A.R.S. § 25-403.03(D).

¶7 The court ordered parenting time in two phases. In the first
phase, Father was to “exercise parenting time every Tuesday from 9 a.m. to
Wednesday at 9 a.m., and every other weekend from 9 a.m. on Saturday to
9 a.m. on Monday.” In the second phase, “Father shall have parenting time
every Tuesday from 9 a.m. to Thursday at 9 a.m., and every other weekend
from 9 a.m. on Saturday to 9 a.m. on Monday” with the parties maintaining
their current weekend rotation. The court declined to award attorneys’ fees
or costs to either party.

¶8 Father moved to alter or amend the decree: (1) asserting the
parenting schedule failed to maximize his time with the child and was not
in the child’s best interests because Mother had mental health issues; (2)
claiming for the first time that Mother had committed domestic violence;
and (3) challenging the court’s finding that Mother’s testimony about the
Property items was credible. The court denied Father’s motion on each
issue raised but amended its findings to clarify that Mother had not
engaged in acts of domestic violence against Father.

1 The parties use the terms engagement ring and wedding ring
interchangeably. For ease of reference, we refer to it as the “engagement
ring.” Father does not dispute that the ring is Mother’s separate property.

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¶9 Father asked the court to modify the Rule 78(c) language in
the decree to retain jurisdiction for purposes of deciding the value of
Mother’s Property. After briefing, the court confirmed a dispute existed
about the value of the Property and designated the decree as final under
Rule 78(b) because there was no just reason for delay.

¶10 Father timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under
A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1), (2).

DISCUSSION

I. Division of Property

¶11 We review the superior court’s distribution of marital
property for an abuse of discretion. Saba v. Khoury, 253 Ariz. 587, 590, ¶ 7
(2022). When conflicting evidence exists, we defer to the court’s ability to
assess the credibility of each witness and the weight assigned to competing
evidence. Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 347, ¶ 13 (App. 1998). We do
not reweigh evidence on appeal. Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 52, ¶ 16 (App.
2009). Given that neither party requested findings of fact and conclusions
of law under Rule 82, “our standard of review presumes the superior court
found every fact necessary to support its decision.” See Ariz. R. Fam. Law
P. 82(a)(1); Whitt v. Meza, 257 Ariz. 176, 180, ¶ 8 (App. 2024).

A. Property List

¶12 Father argues the court erred in awarding Mother the
Property listed in Exhibit R40, asserting the court needed to determine an
acquisition date for each item and classify it as separate or community. Yet
Father identifies no point in the record where he raised those issues in the
superior court. Instead, as noted by Mother, Father’s position at trial was
that he had returned all the items to Mother other than a mattress and a bed
frame. Nothing in the record shows that Father asked the court to classify
any of the numerous Property items as community or separate nor does the
record indicate he argued the items were not Mother’s. Thus, he has
waived any contention that the court erred by failing to sua sponte classify
each of the Exhibit R40 items or to determine the dates of acquisition. See
ARCAP 13(a)(7); Sobol v. Marsh, 212 Ariz. 301, 303, ¶ 7 (App. 2006) (“As a
general rule, a party cannot argue on appeal legal issues and arguments
that have not been specifically presented to the trial court.”); Englert v.
Carondelet Health Network, 199 Ariz. 21, 26, ¶ 13 (App. 2000) (“[W]e generally
do not consider issues, even constitutional issues, raised for the first time
on appeal.”).

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B. Engagement Ring

¶13 Father argues the record does not support the superior court’s
finding that Mother’s engagement ring is in his possession, and thus the
court erred in ordering him to pay her the financial equivalent of the value
of the ring. As an initial matter, the court did not make a specific finding
that Father has the ring. Instead, the court explained that it found
“Mother’s testimony that she left the marital residence with very few items
to be credible . . . .[and] Father’s testimony that he has returned all
[P]roperty to Mother to not be credible.”

¶14 The court received conflicting evidence about who possesses
the engagement ring. At trial, Father acknowledged that he had the ring in
June 2024, but he presented photos showing Mother wearing the ring the
following month. When asked at trial, “[d]o you have the [engagement]
ring,” Father said no. He also stated that he believed that Mother has the
ring, but when asked, “[i]f you find the [engagement] ring, are you going
to return [it]?”, Father responded, “Yes.” In contrast, Mother testified that
she left the marital home “[f]or the final time . . . [on] Saturday, August 3”
with only a diaper bag and a small suitcase, and when Mother’s counsel
asked whether Mother had received her engagement ring, Mother stated “I
have not.” Mother also explained that Father told her there is an insurance
policy for the ring.

¶15 The court resolved these evidentiary conflicts when it found
Mother more credible than Father. Because we do not re-evaluate the
credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence on appeal, Father has not
shown the court erred in ordering him to pay Mother the replacement value
of the ring. See Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. at 347, ¶ 13 (“We will defer to the trial
court’s determination of witnesses’ credibility and the weight to give
conflicting evidence.”).

¶16 Father also contends the court erred by considering Mother’s
counsel’s statements in making its decision, arguing those statements were
not supported by the record. To be sure, the statements made by Mother’s
counsel near the end of the trial are not evidence. See Aksamit v. Krahn, 224
Ariz. 68, 71, ¶ 12 (App. 2010) (“[T]he argument and positions taken by the
attorney do not themselves constitute evidence.”). Even so, Father did not
object to the relatively brief statements that Mother’s counsel offered in
response to the court’s questions.

¶17 Regardless, Father fails to acknowledge the central point of
the court’s ruling: the court did not consider his testimony credible

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concerning possession of the items listed in Exhibit R40. The engagement
ring is part of that list, which means the court was not persuaded by
Father’s denial of possession. The court received evidence from which it
could reasonably infer that Father had not returned any of the items listed
in Exhibit R40, including the ring. Thus, Father has not shown that the
court’s ruling was affected by counsel’s statements or that the court abused
its discretion in finding he is responsible for either giving Mother the ring
or compensating her for its value. See Meister v. Meister, 252 Ariz. 391, 396,
¶ 14 (App. 2021) (“We construe all reasonable inferences in favor of
sustaining the court’s decision.”).

¶18 Father suggests the court’s engagement ring analysis is
erroneous because near the end of trial, the court stated, “I have no idea
who has the ring.” Father fails to provide proper context for that comment,
which was made during the court’s extended explanation about why it
made sense that Wife had not received the items listed in Exhibit R40,
noting in part her inability to retrieve her Property because she was locked
out of the house. When Father’s counsel stated there were photos proving
his client had returned the items, the court replied that it had not seen any
such photos and Father’s counsel did not disagree. Moreover, the court
clarified that it was taking the matter under advisement and would issue a
written ruling. Finally, to the extent Father questions the court’s analysis
based on lack of findings, because there was no Rule 82 request filed by
either party, we presume the court found the facts necessary to support its
decision relating to possession of the items listed in Exhibit R40. See Whitt,
257 Ariz. at 180, ¶¶ 7–8.

II. Parenting Plan

¶19 Father raises several challenges to the court’s parenting plan.
We review parenting time orders for an abuse of discretion. DeLuna v.
Petitto, 247 Ariz. 420, 423, ¶ 9 (App. 2019). In our review, we defer to the
court’s findings of fact unless those findings are clearly erroneous.
Engstrom v. McCarthy, 243 Ariz. 469, 471, ¶ 4 (App. 2018).

¶20 Father argues the court erred by finding Mother did not
commit domestic violence, and thus concluding the presumption against
awarding legal decision-making to the parent who has committed domestic
violence does not apply. See A.R.S. § 25-403.03(D). Contrary to Father’s
assertion, in denying Father’s motion to alter or amend, the court analyzed
the necessary statutory factors, see A.R.S. § 25-403.03(C), and rejected
Father’s claim that Mother committed domestic violence. We will not
reweigh the evidence on appeal. Hurd, 223 Ariz. at 52, ¶ 16.

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¶21 Father further contends the court failed to make findings
under A.R.S. § 25-403.03(E). But that statute applies only “[t]o determine if
the parent has rebutted the presumption,” § 25-403.03(E), “that an award of
sole or joint legal decision-making to the parent who committed the act of
domestic violence is contrary to the child’s best interests,” § 25-403.03(D).
Because the court analyzed the required statutory factors and determined
Mother did not commit domestic violence, she was not required to rebut
the presumption.

¶22 Father contends Mother’s deposition testimony contradicts
the court’s finding that Mother did not commit domestic violence. As
noted, Father failed to claim domestic violence in his pretrial statement;
instead, he raised the issue for the first time in his motion to alter or amend,
relying on Mother’s deposition testimony, which was admitted as an
exhibit at trial.

¶23 During her deposition, Mother testified that “[t]here was one
jug of water that I . . . did throw at [Father] . . . which was in retaliation to
him approaching me in an aggressive manner.” And when asked whether
that action “could be construed as an act of domestic violence,” Mother
conceded that it “[p]ossibly could.” Mother also noted that when she was
pregnant, she “asked [Father] to . . . let go of [her] when [they] were in an
argument,” and she “had kind of pushed him away.”

¶24 In its order denying Father’s motion, the court acknowledged
Mother’s deposition testimony, but concluded Father was being aggressive
toward her, and that she responded to protect herself. Because that
testimony supports the court’s finding that Mother did not commit
domestic violence, Father has not shown the court’s denial of the motion to
alter or amend was an abuse of discretion. See Smith v. Smith, 253 Ariz. 43,
48, ¶ 22 (App. 2022) (quoting O’Hair v. O’Hair, 109 Ariz. 236, 240 (1973))
(“[T]he duty of a reviewing court begins and ends with the inquiry whether
the [superior court] had before it evidence which might reasonably support
its action viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining the findings[.]”).
Moreover, Father’s failure to present any evidence at trial on this issue,
either through his own testimony or on cross-examination, supports our
conclusion that the court did not err in applying § 25-403.03(D).

¶25 Father further argues the court erred by failing to consider
Mother’s mental health under A.R.S. § 25-403(A)(5), which requires
consideration of the mental health of all individuals involved when making
a best-interests finding. During Mother’s deposition, she testified that she
was never “formally diagnosed” with a mental health condition. Mother

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also explained that she sought therapy in August 2024. Mother
acknowledged that she was prescribed mental health medication when she
was younger, but she could not remember the last time she had taken it. In
the decree, the court determined “[t]here was no evidence presented that
either party . . . has any . . . mental health issues,” and later denied Father’s
request to amend that finding.

¶26 Mother’s testimony supports the court’s finding that neither
party has any “mental health issues.” Simply because Mother sought
counseling and had been prescribed medication for her mental health when
she was younger does not mean the court had to find she has a current
mental health issue affecting the court’s best-interests analysis. Because the
record supports the court’s findings, Father has not shown the court abused
its discretion. See Smith, 253 Ariz. at 45, ¶ 9.

III. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

¶27 Both parties request attorneys’ fees and costs under A.R.S.
§ 25-324, which authorizes a fee award after consideration of the parties’
financial resources and the reasonableness of their positions. In our
discretion, we award Mother a portion of her reasonable attorneys’ fees
incurred on appeal, plus taxable costs, subject to her compliance with
ARCAP 21.

CONCLUSION

¶28 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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