Rose v. Estrada

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

ATHENA ROSE, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL ESTRADA, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0982 FC
FILED 08-13-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
No. S1300DO202400714
The Honorable Tina R. Ainley, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Athena Rose
Petitioner/Appellant

Michael Estrada, Prescott Valley
Respondent/Appellee

ROSE v. ESTRADA
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Veronika Fabian delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Michael S. Catlett joined.

F A B I A N, Judge:

¶1 Athena Rose (“Mother”) appeals from the superior court’s
order denying her request to relocate the child she shares with Michael
Estrada (“Father”) and awarding joint legal decision-making and equal
parenting time. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and vacate in
part.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 The parties divorced in Arkansas in 2023 but their decree did
not make provisions for the parties’ minor child. In 2024, Mother filed a
petition for legal separation in Yavapai County Superior Court, and the
petition was later converted to a petition to establish legal decision-making,
parenting time, and child support. In July 2025, the court entered a
temporary order granting Mother sole decision-making and parenting
time. Shortly thereafter, Mother provided notice she intended to relocate
out of Arizona with the child. Father then filed a petition to prevent the
relocation.

¶3 The superior court consolidated both petitions for trial. After
trial, the court entered a final order denying Mother’s relocation request
and awarding joint legal decision-making and substantially equal
parenting time.

¶4 Mother timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant
to Article VI, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S.
§§ 12-120.21(A) and 2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶5 Father did not file an answering brief. Ordinarily, when a civil
appeal raises debatable issues and the appellee fails to file an answering
brief without good cause, we assume such failure to be a confession of error.
Tiller v. Tiller, 98 Ariz. 156, 157 (1965); Stover v. Kesmar, 84 Ariz. 387, 388
(1958). However, because this case involves the best interests of a minor

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child, we will not assume a confession of error here. See Hoffman v. Hoffman, 4 Ariz. App. 83, 85 (1966).

¶6 We review a superior court’s order concerning custody and
relocation for an abuse of discretion and construe statutes de novo. Murray
v. Murray, 239 Ariz. 174, 176 ¶ 5 (App. 2016). Viewing the evidence “in the
light most favorable to the superior court’s order,” we “will affirm the
judgment if reasonable evidence supports it.” Boyle v. Boyle, 231 Ariz. 63, 65
¶ 8 (App. 2012).

¶7 In her opening brief, Mother argues that the superior court
erred by:

1) not applying Arizona law in continuing the matter without
findings,

2) improperly weighing the evidence of domestic violence,

3) awarding equal legal decision-making and parenting time
despite a differing prior parenting plan,

4) failing to order psychological and substance abuse
evaluations,

5) improperly excluding evidence,

6) mischaracterizing evidence,

7) attributing the child’s bruising to her ,

8) relying on unsupported factual findings,

9) relying on evidence not admitted at trial,

10) ordering her to disclose contact information,

11) failing to consider her evidence,

12) denying relocation,

13) improperly weighing the child’s relationship to her
and the child’s siblings,

14) adding Father’s last name to the child’s name,

15) deviating from the Arizona Child Support Guidelines,

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16) failing to rule on Mother’s contempt and enforcement
motions,

17) granting Father medical decision-making despite
Mother’s evidence,

18) depriving Mother of a fair and neutral adjudication
through selective fact-finding and mischaracterization of
the evidence, and

19) adopting positions contrary to the evidence resulting
in cumulative prejudice.

I. We Will Not Reweigh the Evidence.

¶8 With respect to issues 2, 8, 11, 12, 13, 17, 18, and 19,
Mother complains that the superior court improperly weighed,
analyzed, and characterized the evidence in Father’s favor. Because
“the family court is in the best position to judge the credibility of
witnesses and resolve conflicting evidence,” “appellate courts
generally defer to the findings of the family court.” Vincent v. Nelson, 238 Ariz. 150, 155 ¶ 18 (App. 2015). Thus, we will not reweigh the
evidence presented on these issues to the superior court. See Gutierrez
v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 347 ¶ 13 (App. 1998).

II. Many of Mother’s Arguments Do Not Comply with Rule of
Civil Appellate Procedure 13.

¶9 With respect to issues 1, 4, 5, and 10, Mother’s arguments do
not comply with Rule 13, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P., and are therefore waived.
See Ritchie v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288, 305 ¶ 62 (App. 2009). “Opening briefs
must present and address significant arguments, supported by authority
that set forth the appellant’s position on the issue in question.” Id. An
opening brief must include, among other things, arguments supported by
“citations of legal authorities and appropriate references to the portions of
the record on which the appellant relies,” as well as “the applicable
standard of appellate review with citation to supporting legal authority.”
Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(a)(5), (7)(A)-(B).

¶10 Mother argues the court erred by initially not ruling it had
jurisdiction over the petition while Father was withholding the child in
December of 2024 and instead resetting the hearing to January of 2025 to
give Father’s counsel 30 days to research the jurisdiction issue (Issue 1).
Although the court subsequently decided it did have jurisdiction, Mother

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does not provide any legal authority showing that the superior court’s
decision to provide Father’s counsel with the opportunity to research that
issue was in error. Similarly, Mother argues the court erred in not
ordering Father to undergo psychological evaluation and drug testing
(Issue 4), but she fails to support her argument with authority.

¶11 Mother also argues the court improperly excluded
declarations from school staff allegedly documenting Father’s
harassing and threatening conduct (Issue 5). The court excluded the
declarations after Father objected that he could not cross-examine the
declarant. On appeal, Mother argues the evidence was relevant but
does not explain why it was error to exclude the evidence on due
process or hearsay grounds.

¶12 Mother contends the court erred by ordering the parties
exchange contact information despite an existing order of protection
(Issue 10). However, Mother does not cite to the record for the order
of protection or explain why the order would preclude the exchange
of contact information. Nor does she identify where she made this
argument before the superior court. Finally, she does not support her
argument with legal authority.

¶13 Consequently, Mother has waived these arguments. See
Ritchie, 221 Ariz. at 305 ¶ 62; see also Melissa W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 238
Ariz. 115, 117-18 ¶ 9 (App. 2015) (party may waive argument on appeal by
failing to cite relevant legal authority as required by Rule 13). It is also not
the policy of this Court to decide cases “with no research assistance or
analytical input from the parties.” Childress Buick Co. v. O’Connell, 198 Ariz.
454, 459 ¶ 29 (App. 2000). Therefore, it is important that Mother provide us
with relevant authority upon which to decide the issues. We are mindful
that Mother is representing herself in this matter. However, we “hold
unrepresented litigants in Arizona to the same standards as attorneys.”
Flynn v. Campbell, 243 Ariz. 76, 83 ¶ 24 (2017).

III. Most of Mother’s Remaining Arguments Do Not Show Error.

¶14 Mother argues that the superior court did not address
Father’s withholding of the child in its order (Issue 3). However, the court’s
order did find that “Father kept the child from Mother through the month
of December,” and “Father also denied video calls and permitted few phone
calls during that time, which was not in the best interests of the child.”
Mother then argues that the court did not make the required express
findings under A.R.S. § 25-403(A) to justify equal parenting time.

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However, the court made findings on all statutory factors in
§ 25-403(A).

¶15 Mother further alleges that the court improperly failed to
adopt a prior parenting agreement without making findings that the
agreement, which gave Mother primary custody, was harmful to the
child or provided less stability. In a January 2025 evidentiary hearing,
Mother introduced the prior agreement, but the court did not adopt
that agreement because it did not provide for meaningful contact with
both parents and was therefore not in the child’s best interests. Mother
has shown no error in that determination. See A.R.S. § 25-403(A) (“The court
shall determine legal decision-making and parenting time . . . in accordance
with the best interests of the child.”).

¶16 Mother argues that the superior court’s finding that she
“would like nothing more than to eliminate or limit Father’s parenting
time” is unsupported by the record. However, before trial, Mother
sought full custody pursuant to a prior agreement, and at trial Father
testified that Mother had withheld the child from him in various ways.
The record supports this finding.

¶17 Mother argues that there is no evidence supporting the
finding that she withdrew a request to dismiss an order of protection
against Father because Father did not accommodate a transfer of
schools for the child (Issue 6). But this is only one of the circumstances
the superior court considered when weighing the domestic violence
or child abuse factor. The court made many other findings supporting
its determination—including that Mother had made unsubstantiated
allegations of aggressive and controlling behavior by Father, had
made unsubstantiated allegations of sexual abuse by Father, and that
the child had bruises and scratches from being disciplined by Mother.
Mother has not shown that the court erred.

¶18 Mother argues no competent evidence linked bruising on
the child to her (Issue 7). However, Father introduced evidence of
bruising and testified that it was due to Mother. Reasonable evidence exists
to support the superior court’s finding. See Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. at 347 ¶ 13.

¶19 Mother also argues the superior court erred in relying on an
unadmitted exhibit to state that the Department of Child Safety closed it s
investigation into Father (Issue 9). However, Father also testified that the
investigation had closed and Mother does not dispute this fact. The record
supports this finding.

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¶20 Mother argues the superior court erred in putting the child’s
last name as Rose-Estrada on its orders (Issue 14). The court decided to list
the last name as such after Father testified that was his wish in a temporary
orders hearing. Mother did not object, nor has she shown reversible error.

¶21 Mother also argues that the superior court erred by not ruling
on her motion to enforce temporary orders and her petition for contempt
(Issue 16). A party cannot petition to enforce temporary orders. See Ariz. R.
Fam. Law P. 91 (governing petitions to enforce judgments); Ariz. R. Fam.
Law P. 78(a)(1) (“A temporary order is not a judgment.”). Thus, there was
no error in the superior court not ruling on the motion to enforce the
temporary orders.

¶22 A party can petition for contempt pursuant to temporary
orders. See Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 92. However, contempt findings are not
reviewable on direct review, only by special action. Henderson v. Henderson, 241 Ariz. 580, 586–87 ¶ 16 (App. 2017). Because we lack jurisdiction over
Mother’s arguments regarding her petition for contempt, we accept special
action jurisdiction to address those arguments. See RPSA 11(e), 12(a).
Mother argues that the court erred by failing to rule on the petition and
does not demonstrate the court should have granted the petition on the
merits or would have erred in denying the petition. We find that the court’s
entry of final judgment effectively denied the pending petition. See Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Parr, 96 Ariz. 13, 15 (1964) (motions not ruled
upon “were therefore denied by operation of law”); Molever v. Roush, 152
Ariz. 367, 369 n.1 (App. 1986). Therefore, we accept special action
jurisdiction on this issue but deny relief.

¶23 Mother lastly argues that the above alleged errors
cumulatively prejudiced her and warrant remand (Issue 19). As she has
shown no error on those arguments, she has not demonstrated cumulative
error or prejudice.

IV. The Superior Court Erred in Deviating from the Arizona Child
Support Guidelines.

¶24 Mother argues that the superior court erred by deviating from
the Arizona Child Support Guidelines (Issue 15). The court determined
that the application of the Guidelines was inappropriate or unjust and
deviation was in the best interests of the child. On that basis, it deviated
Father’s calculated $42 of monthly child support to $0. However, the court
did not make findings of fact supporting either of those determinations as
required by A.R.S. § 25-320(D). See Nia v. Nia, 242 Ariz. 419, 424-25 ¶¶ 20-

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26 (App. 2017). Therefore, we vacate the child support order and remand
for the superior court to enter the required findings of fact.

CONCLUSION

¶25 The child support order is vacated, the remainder of the
superior court’s order over which we have jurisdiction is affirmed. We
accept jurisdiction over Mother’s argument regarding her petition for
contempt but deny relief. We remand for the superior court to enter an
appropriate child support order.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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