SHUMATE v. DAVIS/BROADBENT

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

MARK SHUMATE, Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

RICHARD DAVIS, et al., Defendants/Appellees,

CRAIG BROADBENT, Appellant,

PAGE MORRIS, Third Party Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0984
FILED 08-25-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2019-003338
The Honorable Erik Thorson, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Mark Shumate, Fort Lauderdale, Florida
Plaintiff/Appellee

Richard Davis, Beverly Hills, California
Defendants/Appellees

Craig Broadbent, Phoenix
Appellant

Rose Law Group PC, Flagstaff
By Olen V. Lenets
Counsel for Third Party Defendant/Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge D. Andrew Gaona delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined.

G A O N A, Judge:

¶1 Craig W. Broadbent appeals the award of attorneys’ fees and
costs imposed against him as a sanction under A.R.S. § 12-349(A)(1). The
superior court sanctioned Broadbent for continuing to pursue, on his
clients’ behalf, a civil conspiracy claim against Page Morris premised on
unjust enrichment. Broadbent did so despite Morris repeatedly explaining
that unjust enrichment isn’t a tort and thus could not serve as the
underlying tort necessary to maintain a civil conspiracy claim.

¶2 Broadbent contends there is no final judgment against him
and asks us to dismiss his appeal, direct the superior court to recognize that
no judgment exists against him, and prohibit further filings concerning him.
Alternatively, he challenges the sanctions award on several grounds,
including the superior court’s authority to sanction him and the factual and
legal bases for the award. Because the final judgment permits our review of
the judgment against Broadbent and the superior court didn’t err in
imposing reasonable sanctions against a lawyer who prosecuted a frivolous
claim, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3 Mark Shumate and Richard Davis formed RAD Asset LLC
(“RAD A”) to lease property in Scottsdale for short-term vacation rentals.
Shumate and Davis were RAD A’s partners, and Davis served as its
manager. Davis also managed RAD Ventures, LLC, which entered into an
operating agreement with Shumate and RAD A. One Marquis, LLC, whose
managing member was Davis, handled RAD A’s marketing. Shumate later

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proposed hiring Page Morris as a RAD A employee. Although Davis
opposed the proposal, he didn’t prevent Shumate from hiring Morris.

¶4 Shumate and Davis eventually had a falling out, leading
Shumate to sue Davis, One Marquis, and RAD Ventures (“Davis”).
Represented by Broadbent, Davis counterclaimed against Shumate and
filed a third-party complaint against Morris. As is relevant here, Davis
asserted unjust-enrichment, aiding-and-abetting, and civil-conspiracy
claims against Shumate and Morris, and intentional interference with
business expectancy against Morris.

¶5 Morris, then representing herself, moved to dismiss the third-
party complaint. The superior court dismissed the civil conspiracy claim
because civil conspiracy isn’t an independent cause of action but denied
dismissal of the unjust-enrichment, aiding-and-abetting, and intentional-
interference-with-business-expectancy claims. The court granted Davis
leave to amend the conspiracy claim to identify an underlying tort. Davis
amended the claim to allege “Civil Conspiracy to Commit Unjust
Enrichment.” Shortly after, Shumate’s counsel appeared on Morris’ behalf.

¶6 Morris and Shumate again moved to dismiss. They argued,
among other things, that unjust enrichment is a quasi-contract remedy
rather than a tort and thus couldn’t supply the tort underlying Davis’
conspiracy claim. Davis opposed the motion, maintaining that “[t]he tort of
unjust enrichment” could support the claim. Morris and Shumate replied
that Davis cited no authority treating unjust enrichment as a tort. The court
denied the motion because Morris and Shumate didn’t attach the good faith
consultation certification required by Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1.

¶7 While the motion to dismiss was pending, Davis moved for
partial summary judgment against Shumate. The superior court denied the
motion. The parties later exchanged offers of judgment. Morris then moved
for summary judgment on Davis’ remaining claims against her, arguing
(again) that unjust enrichment isn’t a recognized tort in Arizona, meaning
Davis failed to state a claim for civil conspiracy.

¶8 The superior court granted Morris summary judgment,
agreeing that unjust enrichment is an equitable remedy rather than a tort.
It concluded no reasonable juror could find Morris was unjustly enriched.
The court also rejected Davis’ aiding-and-abetting theories because unjust
enrichment isn’t a tort and Morris couldn’t aid and abet her own
interference. And because civil conspiracy requires an underlying tort that
the alleged conspirators agreed to commit, the court concluded Davis’

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claim for civil conspiracy to commit unjust enrichment failed as a matter of
law.

¶9 Morris then moved for sanctions against Davis and Broadbent
under A.R.S. § 12-349 and the court’s inherent authority. She argued that
Davis pursued groundless claims against her, continued litigating those
claims despite notice of their deficiencies, and unnecessarily expanded the
proceedings. After Morris moved for sanctions, the superior court
scheduled a trial-setting conference and ordered the parties to meet and
confer beforehand because the sanctions motion would be addressed at the
conference. Broadbent withdrew as Davis’ counsel a few days later. At the
conference, Davis had new counsel and another attorney from Broadbent’s
firm attended. Davis and his new counsel responded to the sanctions
motion and provided Broadbent a copy. Morris then moved for entry of
judgment against Broadbent because he didn’t timely respond and replied
in support of her sanctions as to Davis. Broadbent received copies of both.
Broadbent then responded to Morris’ proposed judgment.

¶10 The superior court granted the motion in part (“sanctions
order”), because the conspiracy to commit unjust enrichment claim was
brought without substantial justification, and awarded reasonable
attorneys’ fees and costs against Davis and Broadbent. Though the
sanctions order specified that sanctions were appropriate under § 12-
349(A)(2), the court later corrected itself and clarified that it imposed
sanctions under § 12-349(A)(1). Morris applied for a total of $53,937.43 in
attorneys’ fees and costs. Broadbent moved for additional time to file a
motion for reconsideration of the sanctions ruling and to respond to Morris’
fee application. The court denied reconsideration but gave Broadbent 10
days after that ruling to respond to the fee application. Davis challenged
the amount of fees; Broadbent didn’t. In October 2022, the superior court
awarded Morris $18,647.50 in attorneys’ fees and $5,457.93 in costs
(“October order”), determining that only those fees associated with the
claim for conspiracy to commit unjust enrichment were reasonable.

¶11 Morris lodged a proposed judgment, and in November 2022
the superior court purported to enter judgment against Broadbent for the
sanctions award (“November order”). But the November order didn’t
contain Rule 54(b) language. In May 2024, the court entered judgment
resolving Morris’ claims against Davis, awarding the same fees and costs
against Davis and Broadbent jointly and severally.

¶12 Davis and Shumate went to trial in July 2025. Broadbent filed
a notice of appeal before entry of a final judgment, and we dismissed that

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appeal. The superior court then entered a final judgment under Rule 54(c)
in October 2025. Broadbent timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

¶13 Broadbent identifies 13 issues for our review, but nearly all
overlap or restate the same arguments. Broadbent mainly argues that (1) no
final, enforceable judgment exists against him and we lack appellate
jurisdiction; (2) the superior court lacked authority to sanction him and
erred in awarding sanctions; and (3) the resulting fee award was improper
in amount and scope.

¶14 Before addressing Broadbent’s arguments, we note
significant deficiencies in his opening brief under Arizona Rule of Civil
Appellate Procedure (“ARCAP”) 13(a)(7). Broadbent makes many
arguments unsupported by authority (or relevant authority), have no basis
in the law, and lack record citations. He also provides little developed legal
analysis, relying instead on conclusory assertions. See id. Those deficiencies
would permit us to deem many of Broadbent’s arguments waived. See
Ramos v. Nichols, 252 Ariz. 519, 522 ¶ 8 (App. 2022) (arguments “not
supported by adequate explanation, citations to the record, or authority”
are waived on appeal) (citation omitted); Ritchie v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288,
305 ¶ 62 (App. 2009) (failure to comply with ARCAP 13 “can constitute
abandonment and waiver” of claims). But in our discretion, we address
arguments that permit meaningful review.

¶15 Morris didn’t file an answering brief. “When debatable issues
exist and an appellee fails to file an answering brief, we may consider such
failure a confession of reversible error.” Savord v. Morton, 235 Ariz. 256, 259
¶ 9 (App. 2014). But because Broadbent’s opening brief doesn’t present any
debatable issues, we don’t treat Morris’ silence as a confession of error.

I. There is a Final Enforceable Judgment Against Broadbent.

¶16 Broadbent first argues that there’s no final judgment against
him and thus asks us to dismiss the appeal he filed. He reasons that the
November order lacked Rule 54(b) language and the post-trial Rule 54(c)
final judgment didn’t name him. He separately argues the superior court
improperly allowed proceedings concerning the sanctions order without
formally serving him. Broadbent is wrong on both fronts.

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a. We have jurisdiction to review intermediate rulings like the
November order after the entry of a final judgment.

¶17 Our appellate jurisdiction is statutory. Madrid v. Avalon Care
Ctr.-Chandler, L.L.C., 236 Ariz. 221, 223 ¶ 3 (App. 2014); see Ariz. Const. art.
6 § 9. Relevant here, A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1) authorizes appeals from final
judgments and Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 54 describes two
types of final judgments under that statute. Brumett v. MGA Home
Healthcare, L.L.C., 240 Ariz. 420, 425 ¶ 1 (App. 2016). Rule 54(b) permits
entry of a final judgment as to “fewer than all[] claims or parties,” when the
court expressly determines “there is no just reason for delay” and directs
entry of judgment. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Rule 54(c), in contrast, applies
when the court resolves all claims against all parties and requires the
judgment to state that “no further matters remain pending.” Ariz. R. Civ.
P. 54(c); see Brumett, 240 Ariz. at 425 ¶ 1.

¶18 Broadbent is correct that the November order wasn’t
independently appealable when entered. It lacked Rule 54(b) language, and
other claims remained pending. See Rourk v. State, 170 Ariz. 6, 13 (App.
1991) (“An ‘intermediate order’ is one made between commencement of the
action and final judgment, which is not separately appealable.”). But an
intermediate ruling like the November order is appealable upon entry of
final judgment. See A.R.S. § 12-2102(A) (on appeal from final judgment we
review “any intermediate orders involving the merits of the action and
necessarily affecting the judgment, and all orders and rulings assigned as
error”).

¶19 Section 12-2102(A) determines the matter. After the superior
court resolved all claims in the litigation, it entered a Rule 54(c) final
judgment in October 2025 stating that “[n]o further matters remain
pending.” That judgment terminated the action. The November order thus
became reviewable as an intermediate ruling upon entry of that final
judgment. See A.R.S. § 12-2102(A). Because Broadbent timely appealed after
the Rule 54(c) judgment’s entry, we have jurisdiction under § 12-2101(A)(1).

¶20 Broadbent protests because the Rule 54(c) judgment didn’t
name him. Relying on Madrid v. Avalon Care Center-Chandler, L.L.C., he
argues the October 2025 judgment’s “no further matters remain pending”
language shows that the superior court excluded him from final judgment
and extinguished the November order. 236 Ariz. 221 (App. 2014). But
Madrid addresses whether a judgment is final; it doesn’t state, let alone
suggest, that a final judgment’s entry somehow vacates an earlier
interlocutory ruling not specifically identified in a Rule 54(c) judgment. Id.

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at 224 ¶ 11. The November order already determined Broadbent’s liability
for sanctions. The October 2025 judgment resolved the remaining claims
and made the November order reviewable—it didn’t erase it. Bottom line:
the October 2025 judgment is final as against Broadbent, and we have
jurisdiction to review it in this appeal he filed.

b. Broadbent’s due process claims fail because he had notice
of the sanctions proceedings and the final judgment’s entry.

¶21 Broadbent next argues the superior court improperly
permitted “post-judgment proceedings” concerning the sanctions ruling
without notice to him, thus depriving him of due process. Relying in part
on Rule 4, he contends the court couldn’t proceed against him without
formal service. We disagree. Because the November order lacked a Rule
54(b) certification, it remained interlocutory until entry of final judgment.
Its interlocutory status didn’t deprive the superior court of authority to
determine the amount of the sanctions award or otherwise continue
proceedings in the still-pending action.

¶22 Due process requires that an attorney facing sanctions receive
notice and an opportunity to be heard. Precision Components, Inc. v. Harrison,
Harper, Christian & Dichter, P.C., 179 Ariz. 552, 555 (App. 1993). It doesn’t
require the formal service necessary to bring a new party into a civil action.
See id.; Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4. The relevant question is whether Broadbent had
adequate notice of the proposed sanctions and a meaningful opportunity to
contest them. See In re Radacosky, 183 Ariz. 531, 534 (App.
1995) (opportunity to challenge the court’s sanctions ruling through motion
for reconsideration is sufficient).

¶23 Broadbent received both. After Morris moved for sanctions,
the superior court scheduled a conference to address the sanctions motion.
Broadbent withdrew as Davis’ counsel shortly after, but another attorney
from his firm attended the conference—and not as counsel for Davis,
Morris, or Shumate. Davis’ new counsel later sent Broadbent the response
to the sanctions motion, and Broadbent received Morris’ reply. Broadbent
then responded to Morris’ proposed sanctions judgment. And after Morris
applied for attorneys’ fees and costs, Broadbent moved for reconsideration
and sought extra time to respond to Morris’ fee application. The superior
court gave him additional time, yet he didn’t respond.

¶24 Broadbent thus had notice of the sanctions proceedings and a
meaningful opportunity to be heard. Contrary to Broadbent’s contention

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that formal service was required, what occurred here satisfied the demands
of due process.

II. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Sanctioning Broadbent Under
A.R.S. § 12-349 for Pursuing a Frivolous Claim.

¶25 We now turn to the heart of Broadbent’s arguments: that the
superior court erred by sanctioning him under A.R.S. § 12-349 for pursuing
a legal theory unsupported by Arizona law.

¶26 We review the superior court’s interpretation and application
of § 12-349 de novo, but we defer to its findings of fact unless clearly
erroneous. Ariz. Republican Party v. Richer, 257 Ariz. 237, 242 ¶ 10 (2024). We
also view the evidence in the light “most favorable to sustaining the
award.” Takieh v. O’Meara, 252 Ariz. 51, 61 ¶ 39 (App. 2021) (citation
omitted).

¶27 In granting Morris’ motion for sanctions, the superior court
awarded attorneys’ fees and costs under § 12-349(A)(1) against Broadbent
and Davis. The court found the conspiracy to commit unjust enrichment
claim lacked substantial justification, but concluded Davis’ other claims
were “fairly debatable.” It also found no basis to conclude the claims were
made primarily to delay or harass and recognized that all parties
contributed to prolonging the litigation. Though Morris sought sanctions
on several grounds, the superior court ultimately concluded the conduct
was sanctionable only under § 12-349(A)(1).

a. The “conspiracy to commit unjust enrichment” claim lacked
substantial justification.

¶28 Section 12-349(A)(1) requires the court to award a party their
reasonable attorneys’ fees when an attorney or party brings, maintains, or
defends a claim “without substantial justification.” Richer, 257 Ariz. at 242,
249 ¶¶ 9, 41. A claim lacks substantial justification when it is objectively
“groundless” and “not made in good faith.” A.R.S. § 12-349(F). “A claim is
groundless ‘if the proponent can present no rational argument based upon
the evidence or law in support of that claim.’” Richer, 257 Ariz. at 243 ¶ 15
(citation omitted). But a claim isn’t groundless if it is “fairly debatable,”
even if it’s a “long shot.” Id. (citations omitted). A claim isn’t made in good
faith when the attorney or party knows, or should know, it’s groundless but
pursues it anyway. Id. at 248 ¶ 38. We assess good faith by “what a
professional, competent attorney would do in similar circumstances.” Id. at
249 ¶ 40 (citations omitted).

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¶29 The “conspiracy to commit unjust enrichment” claim was
groundless. Civil conspiracy requires two or more individuals to agree to
commit and actually commit “an underlying tort.” Wells Fargo Bank v.
Arizona Laborers, Teamsters & Cement Masons Local No. 395 Pension Tr. Fund,
201 Ariz. 474, 498 ¶ 99 (2002). Unjust enrichment isn’t a tort; it’s an equitable
remedy requiring no tortious conduct. See Wang Elec., Inc. v. Smoke Tree
Resort, LLC, 230 Ariz. 314, 318 ¶ 10 (App. 2012). Unjust enrichment thus
couldn’t supply the underlying tort necessary to support the civil
conspiracy claim.

¶30 Broadbent understates this defect by characterizing the claim
as a “long shot.” A claim may be “fairly debatable” when the issues aren’t
well litigated or clearly resolved by existing precedent, or when little
authority addresses the circumstances presented. See Durable Invs. LLC v.
Villarreal, 262 Ariz. 84, 90 ¶ 17 (App. 2026). That wasn’t the case here.
Arizona law has long required an underlying tort for civil conspiracy, see,
e.g., Baker ex rel. Hall Brake Supply, Inc. v. Stewart Title & Tr. of Phoenix, Inc.,
197 Ariz. 535, 545 ¶ 42 (App. 2000), and unjust enrichment has never been
a tort, see Wang Elec., Inc., 230 Ariz. at 318 ¶ 10 (unjust enrichment is a
flexible remedy “available when equity demands compensation for benefits
received, even though the party has committed no tort and is not
contractually obligated to the other”) (cleaned up). There was thus no
“fairly debatable” application of existing law to Broadbent’s claim. And
Broadbent never advocated for an extension or modification of that law or
otherwise identified any rational legal basis for departing from it. His claim
instead depended on treating unjust enrichment as a tort when settled law
established otherwise.

¶31 Broadbent tries to avoid this reality by arguing that his
complaint alleged a viable conspiracy claim because it separately alleged
intentional interference with business expectancy, which the superior court
found “fairly debatable.” But that isn’t the conspiracy claim Broadbent
pled. After Morris moved to dismiss the original conspiracy claim,
Broadbent amended his complaint and expressly pled “Civil Conspiracy to
Commit Unjust Enrichment.” The superior court didn’t err by evaluating
the claim Broadbent pled rather than piecing together a different conspiracy
theory from allegations elsewhere in the complaint.

¶32 The record also supports the superior court’s finding that
Broadbent didn’t make the claim in good faith. Morris and Shumate
repeatedly identified the claim’s legal defect. Their motion to dismiss
explained that Arizona doesn’t recognize civil conspiracy as an
independent cause of action and that unjust enrichment is a quasi-

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contractual remedy, not a tort. They also repeatedly explained (citing to
many cases) that unjust enrichment could not provide the underlying tort
necessary for the conspiracy claim—in their motion to dismiss, motion to
amend the scheduling order, multiple emails with Broadbent, at a meet-
and-confer, and motion for summary judgment and reply. They did exactly
what they should have when confronted with a claim lacking a legal basis.
Broadbent’s only real response was to double down on his view that unjust
enrichment was a tort, saying the motion to dismiss “argues . . . against any
logical understanding of civil conspiracy.”

¶33 Although the court denied the motion to dismiss (on
procedural grounds), Broadbent failed to correct the identified defect. And
when Morris moved for summary judgment, she again cited controlling law
and explained the problem with the conspiracy to commit unjust
enrichment claim. Broadbent thus had repeated notice of the claim’s legal
defect and opportunities to correct it but continued to pursue it. And he did
so without identifying authority supporting unjust enrichment as the
underlying tort. On this record, the superior court could find that a
competent attorney knew—or at least should’ve known—the claim was
groundless. Richer, 257 Ariz. at 248 ¶¶ 38, 40.

¶34 Broadbent seems to equate good faith with a lack of intent to
harass or delay, pointing to his settlement efforts and the superior court’s
finding that Davis didn’t bring the claims primarily for either purpose. But
the court didn’t sanction Broadbent under § 12-349(A)(3). It sanctioned him
under § 12-349(A)(1) for pursuing a claim without substantial justification.
Neither Broadbent’s settlement efforts nor the absence of an improper
purpose answer whether he continued to pursue a groundless claim. See
Richer, 257 Ariz. at 248 ¶ 38. And to the extent that Broadbent asks us to
reweigh the evidence bearing on that determination, we won’t. See Hurd v.
Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 52 ¶ 16 (App. 2009).

¶35 Broadbent also claims that this all was just “zealous
advocacy” on a client’s behalf. But our Supreme Court removed “zealous”
from Arizona’s Rules of Professional Conduct more than two decades ago
and instead directed lawyers to “act honorably” in pursuing their clients’
interests. Advocacy, zealous or otherwise, does not justify the continued
pursuit of a claim an attorney knows or should know is groundless. Richer,
257 Ariz. at 248 ¶ 38.

¶36 On this record, the superior court didn’t err in finding that
Broadbent continued to pursue the conspiracy claim without substantial

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justification. An award under § 12-349(A)(1) was thus mandatory. See
Richer, 257 Ariz. at 242 ¶ 9.

b. The superior court’s findings satisfied § 12-350.

¶37 Broadbent contends that the superior court’s findings in its
sanctions order lacked the specificity required by § 12-350. But he didn’t
directly raise this objection to the superior court. Ordinarily “the failure of
a party to object to the lack of findings of fact and conclusions of law in
making awards of attorneys’ fees under . . . § 12-349 precludes that party
from raising the absence of findings as error on appeal.” Trantor v.
Fredrikson, 179 Ariz. 299, 301 (1994). That’s because the “court and opposing
counsel should be afforded the opportunity to correct any asserted defects
before error may be raised on appeal.” Id. at 300. But because Broadbent’s
motion for reconsideration arguably preserved the issue, and because this
principle of law bears repeating, we address the merits of his claim.

¶38 Section 12-350 requires a court awarding fees under § 12-349
to “set forth the specific reasons for the award.” It also provides eight
factors which the court “may include . . . as relevant, in its consideration” in
determining whether to award such fees. A.R.S. § 12-350 (emphasis added);
see Bennett v. Baxter Grp., Inc., 223 Ariz. 414, 421 ¶ 28 (App. 2010)
(consideration of such factors is permissive). Section 12-349 thus doesn’t
require a particular form of findings or express discussion of every factor
under § 12-350; it requires only that the superior court make findings
“specific enough to allow an appellate court ‘to test the validity of the
judgment.’” Id. (quoting Phx. Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr., 188 Ariz. 237,
243 (App. 1997)).

¶39 The November order satisfied that requirement. It found
Davis continued to pursue the conspiracy to commit unjust enrichment
claim after receiving contrary authority and expressly distinguished his
limited access to relevant facts from his ability to determine the claim’s legal
basis. The court made express findings on the factors in § 12-350(1), (2), (3),
(4), (7), and (8), including Davis’ walk-away offer, before concluding that
sanctions were appropriate.

¶40 That aside, Broadbent’s arguments mischaracterize both § 12-
350 and the court’s findings. He says § 12-350 provides “a checklist of
factors the court must consider,” and argues the court failed to specify his
“efforts to seek a just and speedy end to litigation.” But again, the § 12-350
factors are permissive and “guide[] the court in making awards authorized
by § 12-349.” Donlann v. Macgurn, 203 Ariz. 380, 387 ¶ 36 n.11 (App. 2002).

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The superior court considered Broadbent’s efforts. It acknowledged Davis’
walk-away offer. And it found that Davis and Broadbent didn’t attempt to
dismiss claims, even after having authority to the contrary. Broadbent’s
interpretation of those circumstances doesn’t prove the court didn’t
sufficiently specify them, and we defer to the court’s findings because the
record supports them. Richer, 257 Ariz. at 242 ¶ 10.

c. Broadbent waived his challenges to the amount and scope
of the award.

¶41 Finally, Broadbent challenges the amount and allocation of
the award, arguing (1) Morris failed to establish the awarded fees were
reasonable, (2) some fees were unrelated to the conspiracy claim and thus
unlawful, and (3) fees incurred by Shumate were improperly awarded to
Morris. Broadbent made none of these arguments below. Although he
received notice of Morris’ fee application and an extension to respond, he
filed no objection or response to the requested fees. We thus don’t
consider these arguments first made on appeal. Scottsdale Princess P’ship v.
Maricopa Cnty., 185 Ariz. 368, 378 (App. 1995).

CONCLUSION

¶42 “[O]ur courts provide a means of resolving . . . conflicts when
issues are legitimately presented,” and shouldn’t sanction “parties and
their lawyers for bringing debatable, long-shot complaints.” Richer, 257
Ariz. at 251 ¶ 49. But as we explain above, the “conspiracy to commit unjust
enrichment” claim Broadbent prosecuted and forced Morris to defend
wasn’t “legitimately presented,” “debatable,” or a “long-shot.” Because this
is precisely the sort of case in which § 12-349(A)(1) sanctions are
appropriate, we affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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