Opinion text
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
ANH T. NGUYEN, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants,
v.
HIEU NGUYEN, et al., Defendants/Appellees.
No. 1 CA-CV 25-0995
FILED 07-09-2026
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2025-001809
The Honorable Joseph C. Kreamer, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Law Offices of Kimberly A. Eckert, Tempe
By Kimberly A. Eckert
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants
AZ Legacy Law Group, PLLC, Tempe
By Luan Mai
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
NGUYEN, et al. v. NGUYEN, et al.
Decision of the Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Andrew J. Becke delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge James B. Morse Jr. and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.
B E C K E, Judge:
¶1 Plaintiffs Anh Nguyen and Quy Hoang appeal the dismissal
of their fraud, conversion, negligent misrepresentation, and unjust
enrichment claims against Defendants Hieu Nguyen, Hongyen Le, and
Nam Nguyen. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 Nam1 wanted to purchase a home (the “Property”) in 1997 but
could not qualify for the mortgage. His son, Hieu, obtained financing on
Nam’s behalf to allow him to purchase the Property, and Nam gave him
$5,000 for the down payment. The Property was titled in Hieu’s name, but
Nam paid all mortgage payments and paid for the taxes, insurance, and
maintenance on the Property. In 2011, Nam made an oral agreement with
Anh and Quy, his daughter and son-in-law, respectively, to convey the
Property to them upon his death in exchange for $95,000. Hieu then
quitclaimed the Property to Anh and Quy to hold for Nam until he died.
¶3 In 2022, Nam filed a quiet title action, alleging that Anh and
Quy paid $40,000 towards the $95,000 and then stopped making payments.
Anh and Quy disputed this, countering that they paid between $66,625.90
and $106,625.90 to purchase the Property from Hieu and his wife Hongyen.
¶4 After a bench trial, the court found for Nam, quieting title in
his favor in a decision that included a number of factual findings. The court
found that the Property was originally titled in Hieu’s name, but that Hieu
held it in trust for Nam. Nam, the court found, was “the true owner of the
Property.” Nam had been paying the taxes, homeowners insurance,
utilities, and repairs for the Property. Because Hieu never had rights to the
property, his quitclaiming the property to Anh and Quy did not convey any
1 Because several of the parties share the same last name, we refer to the
parties by their first names.
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NGUYEN, et al. v. NGUYEN, et al.
Decision of the Court
rights to them. See Sprang v. Petersen Lumber, Inc., 165 Ariz. 257, 263 (App.
1990) (“A quitclaim deed conveys no greater rights to the property than
those possessed by the grantor.”).
¶5 The court found that Anh and Quy had not paid any money
for the Property, nor did Hieu and Hongyen have an agreement with Anh
and Quy to purchase the Property. Even if the $40,000 was paid, Nam had
repaid $55,000 to Anh and Quy, fully reimbursing them for the $40,000
payment.
¶6 The superior court also found that Hieu and Hongyen did not
know that Anh and Quy had an agreement with Nam to purchase the
Property. Hieu and Hongyen did not understand the quitclaim deed
because it was written in English, no one explained a quitclaim deed’s
purpose, and they never intended to deprive Nam of the Property. The
court also found evidence of deception by Anh and Quy to get Hieu to sign
the quitclaim deed. The quitclaim deed was prepared and notarized by Anh
and Quy’s tax preparer, who did not witness Hieu or Hongyen sign the
deed. Instead of what the quitclaim deed purported to do, Nam intended
to leave the Property to his children, Hieu and Anh.
¶7 In 2025, Anh and Quy brought this lawsuit against Hieu,
Hongyen, and Nam. The complaint alleged conversion, fraud, and
negligent misrepresentation claims against Hieu and Hongyen, and unjust
enrichment against Hieu, Hongyen, and Nam, all arising from the same
transactions at issue in the 2022 quiet title lawsuit. The complaint alleged
that Anh and Quy paid $66,625.90 to Hieu and Hongyen for them to
transfer ownership of the property. It also alleged Anh and Quy were
misled into giving Hieu and Hongyen money for title to a property that
they did not own. Finally, Anh and Quy claimed that they had been paying
taxes, utilities, insurance, and for upkeep on the Property.
¶8 Hieu, Hongyen, and Nam moved to dismiss, arguing issue
and claim preclusion based on the factual findings made in the 2022 quiet
title action and the resulting judgment. The superior court dismissed the
claims of fraud, conversion, negligent misrepresentation, and unjust
enrichment based on those factual findings. It found that issue preclusion2
applied because whether Anh and Quy had paid money for the property
was already decided in the quiet title case. Specifically, the superior court
2 The superior court used the term “collateral estoppel.” “Issue preclusion,”
used here, is the more modern term for “collateral estoppel” and they are
synonymous. See Howell v. Hodap, 221 Ariz. 543, 546, ¶ 17 n.7 (App. 2009).
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NGUYEN, et al. v. NGUYEN, et al.
Decision of the Court
listed these factual findings from the 2022 quiet title verdict as barring the
2025 claims from being relitigated:
Hieu Nguyen and Hongyen Le were the record owners of the
Solar Drive property but at all relevant times they held the
property in trust for its true owner Nam Nguyen;
Hieu Nguyen and Hongyen Le did not make an agreement
with Anh Nguyen and Quy Hoang for the sale of the Solar
Drive property;
Hieu Nguyen and Hongyen Le first learned after Nam
Nguyen sued Anh Nguyen and Quy Hoang to quiet title to
the Solar Drive property that An[h] and Quy were claiming
to have paid Hieu and Hongyen money for the purchase of
the property;
Anh Nguyen and Quy Hoang failed to prove that they paid
Hieu Nguyen $66,625 for the Solar Drive property, and Quy’s
testimony to that effect was not credible;
the evidence, including Nam Nguyen’s testimony and
documentary evidence that Nam introduced, showed that
Nam – not Anh Nguyen and Quy Hoang – paid for the
homeowners’ insurance, utilities, and maintenance at the
Solar Drive property since 2011; and
the evidence concerning the quitclaim deed, including the
testimony of Hieu Nguyen and Hongyen Le that they did not
understand what the deed meant because it was written in
English, “evidence of deception” relating to the preparation
and notarization of the deed, and Nam’s testimony that he
intended to leave the property to both Hieu and Anh,
rebutted the presumption of validity of the deed.
¶9 Anh and Quy moved to reconsider the dismissal, arguing that
issue preclusion did not apply. The court denied the motion. Anh and Quy
timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).
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NGUYEN, et al. v. NGUYEN, et al.
Decision of the Court
DISCUSSION
¶10 We review the superior court’s grant of a motion to dismiss
and whether issue preclusion applies de novo. Coleman v. City of Mesa, 230
Ariz. 352, 355–56, ¶¶ 7–8 (2012) (motion to dismiss); Banner Univ. Med. Ctr.
Tucson Campus, LLC v. Gordon, 252 Ariz. 264, 266, ¶ 8 (2022) (issue
preclusion). We must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true
when assessing a motion to dismiss. Coleman, 230 Ariz. at 361, ¶ 36. Because
issue preclusion is an affirmative defense, “the facts to establish the defense
must appear in the complaint.” Shepherd v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 250 Ariz.
511, 514, ¶ 16 (2021).
¶11 To successfully assert issue preclusion as an affirmative
defense, a party must show that:
(1) the issue at stake is the same in both proceedings; (2) the
issue was actually litigated and determined in a valid and
final judgment issued by a tribunal with competent
jurisdiction; (3) the opposing party had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue and actually did so; and (4)
the issue was essential to the judgment.
Legacy Found. Action Fund v. Citizens Clean Elections Comm’n, 254 Ariz. 485,
492, ¶ 24 (2023). Because Hieu, Hongyen, and Nam assert issue preclusion
“defensively”—i.e., “to prevent a plaintiff from asserting a claim the
plaintiff previously litigated unsuccessfully against another party”—there
is no requirement that the same parties appear in both lawsuits. Campbell v.
SZL Props., Ltd., 204 Ariz. 221, 233, ¶ 10 (App. 2003).
¶12 Anh and Quy contend that the first element is not met because
the issues in the two cases are different—in the quiet title case the issue was
the ownership of the Property, and in this case the issue is whether Anh
and Quy were misled into giving Hieu, Hongyen, and Nam money for the
Property. However, the factual issue is whether Anh and Quy paid money
for the Property, which was at stake in both proceedings. See Crosby-Garbotz
v. Fell, 246 Ariz. 54, 60, ¶ 25 (2019) (finding issue preclusion when a factual
issue was adjudicated in a previous proceeding). While the claims differ,
the factual issue is the same. Thus, the first element is met.
¶13 Anh and Quy argue that the quiet title verdict did not find
that they never paid any money to Hieu or Hongyen, only that they did not
pay them money for the Property. Therefore, they contend that their claims
that they were misled into giving Hieu and Hongyen money for things
other than the Property are not precluded. But a motion to dismiss is
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Decision of the Court
decided on the allegations of the complaint, and the complaint alleged that
they paid Hieu and Hongyen money for the Property. See Coleman, 230 Ariz.
at 356, ¶¶ 8–9. The complaint also alleged that they paid insurance, taxes,
utilities, and maintenance on the Property. The quiet title verdict and
resulting judgment conclusively determined that Nam paid for the
insurance, utilities, and repairs on the Property, showing that findings on
this issue were made.
¶14 The verdict determined that Anh and Quy did not pay any
money to Hieu and Hongyen for the Property. It also found Hieu and
Hongyen did not make an agreement to sell the Property to Anh and Quy.
Because the quiet title verdict found that there was no payment for the
Property, nor was there an agreement for its purchase, the issues of whether
a payment was made and whether Anh and Quy were misled were decided.
The second element is satisfied.
¶15 Anh and Quy also argue that the third element is not met
because the factual findings in the quiet title verdict do not show that they
litigated the issue. “When an issue is properly raised by the pleadings or
otherwise, and is submitted for determination, and is determined, the issue
is actually litigated.” Chaney Bldg. Co. v. City of Tucson, 148 Ariz. 571, 573
(1986). Anh and Quy first alleged that they purchased the Property from
Hieu and Hongyen in their responses to requests for admissions. The quiet
title verdict made factual findings on the testimony Anh and Quy provided
on this payment, and made a final determination that a payment for the
Property was not made. The issue was therefore actually litigated during
the quiet title case, and the third element is met.
¶16 As to the fourth element, Anh and Quy argue that whether
they gave money to Hieu, Hongyen, and Nam under false pretenses was
not essential to the quiet title judgment. But an action for quiet title
determines “adverse claims in order to clear the title of disputed property.”
Cook v. Town of Pinetop-Lakeside, 232 Ariz. 173, 176, ¶ 13 (App. 2013); see also
A.R.S. § 12-1101(A). Whether someone paid money in exchange for
property ownership is essential to deciding their adverse claim.
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Decision of the Court
¶17 Therefore, all four elements of issue preclusion are met, and
the superior court did not err in granting the motion to dismiss on that
ground.3
CONCLUSION
¶18 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. Anh and Quy request
attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. § 12-341, as do Hieu, Hongyen, and Nam.
Because A.R.S. § 12-341 authorizes the award of costs, but not attorneys’
fees, we deny those requests. As the prevailing party, Hieu, Hongyen, and
Nam are entitled to taxable costs upon compliance with ARCAP 21.
MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR
3 Because we find that issue preclusion was a sufficient basis to grant the
motion to dismiss, we do not need to address the parties’ arguments
regarding claim preclusion.
7