Pike v. Vanderhyde

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

DONNA PIKE, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

JASON VANDERHYDE, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-1023 FC
FILED 10-15-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2016-002643
The Honorable Paula A. Williams, Judge

APPEAL DISMISSED

COUNSEL

Donna Pike, Goodyear
Petitioner/Appellant

PIKE v. VANDERHYDE
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Veronika Fabian and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

C A T L E T T, Judge:

¶1 Donna Pike (“Mother”) appeals from an order clarifying that
the superior court denied Jason Vanderhyde’s (“Father”) request for
attorney fees. Because Mother is not an aggrieved party, we dismiss this
appeal.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother and Father share two minor children. In 2016, Mother
petitioned to dissolve their marriage. In 2017, the superior court entered a
Decree of Dissolution of Marriage setting legal decision-making, parenting
time, and child support. The parties returned to court in 2020 and 2022 to
modify the Decree.

¶3 In 2024, Mother again tried to modify legal decision-making,
parenting time, and child support. Father asked the court to find Mother in
contempt and to award him attorney fees. In an order entered September
4 (“September 4 Order”), the superior court resolved the parties’ petitions.
In that Order, the court initially denied Father’s request for attorney fees,
but it then made this inconsistent statement in its final judgment language:
“The Court must decide the amount of attorney’s fees and costs to be
awarded but finds there is no just reason to delay making a final order.”

¶4 Based on that inconsistent language, Father asked the court to
clarify whether he should resubmit his request for attorney fees. Following
that ask, the court entered an order on September 29, 2025 (“September 29
Order”) acknowledging the inconsistency. But after that
acknowledgement, the court vacated the September 4 Order to the extent it
suggested Father’s attorney fee request remained pending, and the court
reiterated that Father was not entitled to attorney fees.

¶5 In an order entered November 3, 2025 (“November 3 Order”),
the court again addressed the inconsistency in its September 4 Order. The
court explained that the September 4 Order “den[ied] all requests for

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PIKE v. VANDERHYDE
Decision of the Court

attorney’s fees,” and the court again vacated its inconsistent statement
about attorney fees in the September 4 Order.

¶6 Mother timely appealed the November 3 Order.

JURISDICTION

¶7 Although neither party raised the issue, we must ensure we
have jurisdiction. Camasura v. Camasura, 238 Ariz. 179, 181 ¶ 5 (App. 2015).
For us to have jurisdiction, an appellant must be aggrieved; otherwise, we
must dismiss the appeal. ARCAP 1(d); Chambers v. United Farm Workers
Org. Comm., AFL-CIO, 25 Ariz. App. 104, 107 (1975). To be aggrieved, an
appellant must challenge an order denying her a personal or property right
or imposing a substantial burden on her. In re Gubser, 126 Ariz. 303, 306
(1980).

¶8 Mother challenges the November 3 Order, asserting that it
substantively altered the court’s prior attorney fee ruling. She contends the
court used Father’s clarification request to improperly “vacate and
reconsider” its ruling denying attorney fees.

¶9 But the November 3 Order did not alter the September 4
Order in any substantive way or grant Father attorney fees. Instead, the
superior court again said it “den[ied] all requests for attorney’s fees.” And
Mother has not appealed the court’s decision requiring the parties to bear
their own attorney fees. In fact, she asks us to order the superior court to
require all parties to bear their own fees. But the court already did so in its
November 3 Order (and in prior orders).

¶10 Contrary to Mother’s assertion, the November 3 Order did
not vacate that portion of the September 4 Order denying Father attorney
fees. The court vacated inconsistent language (mistakenly included) saying
that, despite already denying Father attorney fees, the court still had to
“decide the amount of attorney’s fees and costs to be awarded.” In neither
the September 29 Order nor the November 3 Order did the court
substantively change the September 4 Order denying Father attorney fees,
other than to remove the inconsistent language.

¶11 The November 3 Order merely corrected that part of the
September 4 Order suggesting Father might still obtain attorney fees. That
clarification benefited Mother—it made clear Father’s fee request was
denied. So the November 3 Order did not deny Mother any right or impose
any burden. Because Mother is not an aggrieved party, we lack jurisdiction.
See In re Gubser, 126 Ariz. at 306; Chambers, 25 Ariz. App. at 107.

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PIKE v. VANDERHYDE
Decision of the Court

ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

¶12 Mother requests attorney fees and costs on appeal. We
decline that request because Mother represents herself. See Munger
Chadwick, P.L.C. v. Farwest Dev. & Constr. of the Sw., LLC, 235 Ariz. 125, 126
¶ 5 (App. 2014). And because Mother does not prevail on appeal, we deny
her request for costs. See Doherty v. Leon, 249 Ariz. 515, 523 ¶ 24 (App. 2020).

CONCLUSION

¶13 Because the order Mother appeals caused her no harm, we
dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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