Habicht v. Peterson

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

ADRIAN HABICHT, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

SAMANTHALYNN PETERSON, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-1040 FC
FILED 08-13-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2023-093094
The Honorable Jacki Ireland, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART

COUNSEL

Adrian Habicht, Surprise
Petitioner/Appellee

Samanthalynn Peterson, Maricopa
Respondent/Appellant

HABICHT v. PETERSON
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Veronika Fabian delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs and Judge Daniel J. Kiley joined.

F A B I A N, Judge:

¶1 Samanthalynn Peterson (“Mother”) appeals the order
modifying legal decision-making authority and child support and the
award of attorney fees to Adrian Charles Habicht (“Father”). We affirm the
legal decision-making and child support orders. However, because we lack
jurisdiction over the attorney fees judgment, that portion of the appeal is
dismissed.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 The parties were never married and had three children
together. In 2017, the superior court adopted the parties’ agreement to share
joint legal decision-making authority, with Mother as the primary
residential parent and Father having unsupervised parenting time one
weekend a month and supervised parenting time twice per month at his
discretion. Father was ordered to pay $400 a month in child support. In
2020, they agreed to modify this order to give Father three unsupervised
weekend overnights each month.

¶3 In June 2023, Father petitioned to modify the existing orders
to have the children live primarily with him, give him final decision-
making authority, and order Mother to pay child support. He alleged,
among other things, that: 1) the children had significant unexcused
absences from school, 2) Mother was often not home, leaving her two older
children from a prior relationship to care for the parties’ children, and 3)
Mother excluded Father from decision-making.

¶4 The court held a final two-hour evidentiary hearing in
October 2025 with over two months’ notice to the parties. After all evidence
had been presented, Mother asked the court to continue the hearing so that
she could hire an attorney to help her. The court denied the request.

¶5 The superior court awarded joint legal decision-making
authority with Father having final decision-making authority in the event
he and Mother were unable to agree. The court named Father primary

2

HABICHT v. PETERSON
Decision of the Court

residential parent and awarded Mother parenting time every other
weekend. After finding that Mother could earn $20 per hour and work full-
time, the court ordered her to pay child support of $622 per month. The
court also awarded attorney fees and costs (collectively “attorney fees”) to
Father in an amount to be determined after he filed a fee application and
affidavit. Although the court had not determined the amount of attorney
fees, the order included language under Arizona Rule of Family Law
Procedure 78(b) certifying it as final and appealable. Mother timely
appealed. Later, the court entered an order awarding Father $6,750.70 in
attorney fees over Mother’s objection. That order did not contain Rule 78(c)
language.

DISCUSSION

I. We Lack Jurisdiction over the Attorney Fees Award.

¶6 We have “an independent duty to examine whether
jurisdiction exists over matters on appeal.” Hernandez v. Athey, 256 Ariz.
530, 532 ¶ 3 (App. 2023). The superior court issued a signed order resolving
legal decision-making authority, parenting time, and child support. It
granted Father’s request for attorney fees but did not determine the specific
amount. Nonetheless, the court found that no just reason for delay existed
and directed entry of a final judgment, citing Rule 78(b). Although the Rule
78(b) certification made the legal decision-making, parenting time, and
child support orders appealable, it did not allow Mother to appeal from the
order finding Father entitled to an award of attorney fees in the absence of
a determination of the amount. See id. at 533 ¶¶ 7, 9.

¶7 An award of attorney fees is a single claim. Id. at ¶¶ 7-8. “Until
the court makes the entitlement and awards an amount, the court cannot
certify any portion of the attorney fees claim under Rule 78(b).” Id. at ¶ 8.
The award of attorney fees cannot be appealed until the entire claim is
resolved. Id. at ¶ 9. The court entered an order awarding the amount of
attorney fees three months after it decided that Father was entitled to an
award. But Mother did not amend her notice of appeal to include the order.
Nor was it appealable as it did not include Rule 78(c) language. See Larrea
v. Chand, 261 Ariz. 93, 98 ¶ 17 (App. 2025) (“The fee and cost awards did not
become appealable until the court issued the Family Rule 78(c) judgment,
which settled the amounts.”). Thus, we lack jurisdiction over the attorney
fees award but have jurisdiction over the other issues decided in the order
issued on October 23, 2025. See A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(2). Nothing in this
decision precludes Mother from timely appealing the award of attorney
fees once a final judgment is entered with respect to those fees.

3

HABICHT v. PETERSON
Decision of the Court

II. The Court Properly Denied Mother’s Request for a Continuance.

¶8 The superior court set a two-hour evidentiary hearing and
gave the parties more than two months’ notice. After the close of evidence
at that hearing, Mother asked the court to continue the hearing so she could
hire an attorney to address the “volume and complexity of evidence
presented.” The superior court denied the request, finding the case had
been pending for over two years. Mother argues this was an abuse of
discretion and denied her due process.

¶9 As an initial matter, although Mother asked for a continuance,
she was technically seeking an adjournment of the proceedings. Regardless,
the standard of review is the same. “A trial court has broad discretion over
the management of its docket,” including whether to grant extension
requests. Findlay v. Lewis, 172 Ariz. 343, 346 (1992). We review all such
matters for an abuse of discretion. See Aries v. Palmer Johnson, Inc., 153 Ariz.
250, 256 (App. 1987).

¶10 Father petitioned to modify in June 2023 and by the time of
the hearing, the case had been pending more than two years. Mother also
knew the hearing date and its two-hour limit for more than two months. In
that time, she did not move to continue, did not ask for a longer hearing,
and did not tell the court she was trying to retain counsel. Nor does she
claim Father made any untimely disclosures or identify anything that
surfaced at the hearing that she could not have anticipated from Father’s
petition. Finally, given that Mother claimed financial hardship, it seems
unlikely that she could have retained counsel. See In re Maricopa Cnty. No.
MH2003-000240, 206 Ariz. 367, 369–70 ¶ 10 (App. 2003) (holding that trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s request for
continuance to retain private counsel, in part because she “had no funds
with which to hire private counsel, undercutting the proffered reason for
the continuance”). On these facts, the superior court did not err in denying
Mother’s request.

¶11 Mother also contends the denial was unfair because the
superior court granted Father’s multiple requests for continuances. Father
did move four times to continue the hearing while he waited on records
from the children’s school, their medical providers, and the Department of
Child Safety. But Father’s last request came over six months before the
October 2025 hearing and each of his requests explained what he was
waiting for and why he could not obtain it sooner. Mother asked for her
continuance after the evidence had been presented and pointed to no

4

HABICHT v. PETERSON
Decision of the Court

evidence she needed more time to obtain and present. Treating the requests
differently was not an abuse of discretion.

¶12 Mother’s due process claim fails as well. Whether the superior
court afforded Mother due process is a question of law we review de novo.
See Backstrand v. Backstrand, 250 Ariz. 339, 346 ¶ 28 (App. 2020). “Due
process entitles a party to notice and an opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, as well as a chance to offer
evidence and confront adverse witnesses.” Cruz v. Garcia, 240 Ariz. 233, 236
¶ 11 (App. 2016) (citation modified). Mother claims the denial of more time
to prepare impacted her ability to present and challenge evidence. But she
knew from Father’s petition that the case would turn on conditions in her
home, the children’s unexcused absences, her handling of Father’s access to
school and medical records, and child support. She appeared, testified, had
the opportunity to present evidence, and the opportunity to question
Father. See Volk v. Brame, 235 Ariz. 462, 468 ¶ 21 (App. 2014) (a court denies
due process when it “allows no time to hear testimony” or when the time
available “does not allow for meaningful direct testimony and efficient but
adequate cross-examination”). In short, she was not denied a meaningful
opportunity to be heard, confront Father, or present evidence. See id. at
¶¶ 20-21.

¶13 Finally, although Mother argues the superior court had to
make written findings explaining the denial, Rule 34 requires no written
findings. When the family law rules require a court to explain itself in
writing they say so. See, e.g., Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 17(c) (written findings
required to seal or redact a record); A.R.S. § 25-320 app. (“Guidelines”)
§ IX.B.3 (written findings required to deviate from a child support award).
The superior court did not abuse its discretion, and Mother was not denied
due process.

III. The Record Supports the Income Attributed to Mother in the Child
Support Order.

¶14 In determining child support, the superior court attributed a
full-time income to Mother. Mother argues the court abused its discretion
in attributing more than her actual part-time income. We review child
support awards for abuse of discretion and defer to the court’s factual
findings absent clear error, but review de novo its conclusions of law and
interpretation of the Arizona Child Support Guidelines. Sherman v.
Sherman, 241 Ariz. 110, 112-13 ¶ 9 (App. 2016).

5

HABICHT v. PETERSON
Decision of the Court

¶15 Courts presume a parent can work full-time absent evidence
to the contrary. A.R.S. § 25-320(N). When a parent is unemployed or
working below their full earning potential, the superior court may attribute
income up to the parent’s full earning capacity, “if the parent’s earnings are
reduced voluntarily and not for reasonable cause.” Little v. Little, 193 Ariz.
518, 521 ¶ 6 (1999). Courts may look at earning capacity and work
experience in deciding a parent’s income for purposes of child support. See
Taliaferro v. Taliaferro, 188 Ariz. 333, 337 (App. 1996).

¶16 Mother testified that she historically earned $20 an hour. She
claimed she could not work full-time because she had to drive some of the
children to and from school and stay home with them after school. But the
court’s award of primary custody to Father means that Mother need not
limit her work hours to coincide with the children’s school hours. Thus, the
court properly attributed a full-time income to Mother.

¶17 Finally, Mother contends the court did not consider several
factors listed in the Guidelines before attributing her full-time employment
income. See Guidelines § II.A.4.d. We do not consider this issue because
Mother raises it for the first time on appeal. See Englert v. Carondelet Health
Network, 199 Ariz. 21, 26 ¶ 13 (App. 2000). The court did not err in
attributing full-time income to Mother.

IV. Costs on Appeal

¶18 Father requests an award of costs on appeal under A.R.S.
§ 25-324(A). Alternatively, he asks us to impose sanctions, if appropriate
under Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure (“ARCAP”) 25. Sanctions
are not warranted here, and, after considering the parties’ financial
resources and the reasonableness of their positions, we deny his request for
costs under A.R.S. § 25-324(A). However, as the prevailing party, Father is
entitled to recover his costs under A.R.S. § 12-341 upon compliance with
ARCAP 21.

6

HABICHT v. PETERSON
Decision of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶19 We lack jurisdiction over the appeal from the attorney fees
award, but affirm the legal decision-making authority, parenting time, and
child support orders.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

7