RODRIGUEZ v. OPENDOOR

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

SANDRA RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

OPENDOOR PROPERTY C, LLC, et al., Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-1051
FILED 09-22-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2025-031262
The Honorable Michael D. Gordon, Judge (Ret.)

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Sandra Rodriguez, Gilbert
Plaintiff/Appellant

Wood Smith Henning & Berman, LLP, Phoenix
By Iulia A. Taranu
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Angela K. Paton delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

RODRIGUEZ v. OPENDOOR, et al.
Decision of the Court

P A T O N, Judge:

¶1 Sandra Rodriguez appeals the superior court’s order
awarding attorneys’ fees and costs to Opendoor Property C, LLC,
Opendoor Brokerage, LLC, Opendoor Property Trust I, Opendoor Labs,
Inc., Carrie Wheeler, Megan Meyer Toolson, and Dianna Wood
(collectively, “Opendoor”), and the denial of her motion to vacate that
judgment. Rodriguez also challenges the superior court’s earlier order
compelling mediation (“alternative dispute resolution”) (“ADR”). For the
following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In June 2023, Rodriguez purchased a home from Opendoor
Property C, LLC. Section 7(c) of the purchase agreement (“Contract”)
required the parties to mediate “any dispute or claim arising out of or
relating to” the Contract. If mediation did not resolve the dispute, the
Contract required binding arbitration but permitted either party to opt out
of arbitration within 30 days after mediation concluded and to proceed in
court. The parties agreed to share mediation costs “equally.”

¶3 Section 7(d) identified matters excluded from ADR, including
certain small-claims, foreclosure, forcible-entry-and-detainer, mechanic’s-
lien, and probate proceedings. It separately provided that filing a judicial
action to enable the recording of an attachment, receivership, injunction, or
other provisional remedy would not waive a party’s obligation to submit
the underlying claim to ADR or breach their duty to mediate or, if
unsuccessful, arbitrate.

¶4 In March 2024, Rodriguez sued Opendoor Property C
concerning the home purchase (“first case”). Opendoor Property C moved
to dismiss and compel mediation based on Section 7 of the Contract (“ADR
provision”). Rodriguez responded, among other things, that because her
requested relief exceeded $12 million, this case was properly filed in the
superior court. The superior court found the parties bound by the ADR
provision, dismissed the action, and directed them to first participate in
ADR as required by the Contract. Rodriguez appealed, and this Court
dismissed that appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Rodriguez v. OpenDoor
Prop. C, LLC, No. 2 CA-CV 2024-0356 (Ariz. App. Apr. 25, 2025) (dec. order).

¶5 In September 2025, Rodriguez filed this action against
Opendoor, again asserting claims arising from the home purchase. Her
complaint included an exhibit list but did not include the listed exhibits.

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Rodriguez simultaneously moved for emergency and injunctive relief,
seeking to prevent foreclosure while the action remained pending and to
prevent Opendoor from enforcing the Contract’s ADR provision. The
superior court found Rodriguez had not shown adequate grounds for
equitable relief without notice and set a return hearing. After the return
hearing, the court denied immediate injunctive relief but scheduled an
evidentiary hearing.

¶6 Opendoor then moved to compel ADR under the Contract
and dismiss the complaint. In that motion, Opendoor also put Rodriguez
on notice of its intent to seek attorneys’ fees and costs related to enforcing
the ADR provision. Rodriguez opposed the motion, arguing that her claims
were not subject to compulsory arbitration and that Opendoor waived ADR
through its conduct in the parties’ first case. After Opendoor replied,
Rodriguez filed an unauthorized sur-reply, which the superior court did
not consider.

¶7 In October 2025, the superior court granted Opendoor’s
motion to compel, dismissed all of Rodriguez’s claims without prejudice,
and vacated the scheduled evidentiary hearing (“dismissal order”). The
court ordered the parties to “mediate and, if mediation is unsuccessful,
arbitrate their dispute” in accordance with the Contract. As relevant here,
Rodriguez then moved to stay the proceedings and for reconsideration of
the October order. The superior court denied those motions.

¶8 Rodriguez filed notices of appeal from several of the superior
court’s rulings (“first appeal”). After the court dismissed Rodriguez’s
claims, she emailed the superior court’s judicial assistant materials she
claimed she had previously delivered to the court in support of her
complaint and emergency motion but that did not appear on the docket.
The court directed the clerk to file Rodriguez’s email and attachments but
explained that emails to chambers “are not a substitute for proper filings”
and that the materials did not affect its previous rulings. The court also
instructed Rodriguez to communicate with its chambers about routine
matters only and to serve all defendants.

¶9 Rodriguez continued filing motions in the superior court.
Opendoor moved for its attorneys’ fees and costs under the Contract,
Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) Sections 12-341.01, and 12-349 for
enforcing the ADR provision. Rodriguez opposed the motion and also filed
a “notice of withdrawal from mediation, arbitration opt out, [and]
jurisdictional divestiture.” Opendoor replied to her motion in which she
opposed the fee award. Rodriguez then filed a “supplemental motion to

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strike or deny [Opendoor’s] attorney-fee and cost filings as void and
unlawful,” a motion to stay enforcement of the fee award pending appeal
(which the court had not yet awarded), and another notice of appeal,
consolidating her prior appeals (“second appeal”). We dismissed
Rodriguez’s first appeal.

¶10 The superior court awarded Opendoor $7,000 in attorneys’
fees and $281.50 in costs under the Contract and Section 12-341.01; it
declined to award fees under Section 12-349. The court also addressed its
statement (in a prior minute entry) that it lacked jurisdiction because of
Rodriguez’s appeals. It explained that the statement was erroneous
because Rodriguez’s notices of appeal were premature and nullities. As a
result, the notices of appeal did not divest the superior court of jurisdiction,
and it could thus enter final judgment. In considering Opendoor’s request
under Section 12-341.01, the court found Rodriguez had not demonstrated
“extreme hardship.” See Associated Indem. Corp. v. Warner, 143 Ariz. 567, 570
(1985). The court denied Rodriguez’s supplemental motion to strike or
deny the fee request and her motion to stay. It then entered final judgment
under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 54(c) for Opendoor, finding
no further matters remained pending.

¶11 Rodriguez then moved to vacate the final judgment,
asserting, among other things, the court lacked jurisdiction to enter it, she
was entitled to a financial-ability hearing, and the court misapplied the
Contract. Before the court ruled on that motion, Rodriguez timely appealed
the final judgment. After Opendoor responded, the court denied
Rodriguez’s motion to vacate, and she timely amended her notice of appeal
to encompass that ruling. Because the order denying the motion to vacate
was unsigned, we revested jurisdiction in the superior court to enter a
signed order, which the court subsequently did.

¶12 We have jurisdiction under Section 12-2101(A)(1) and (2), and
we review the intermediate rulings properly before us under Section 12-
2102(A).

DISCUSSION

I. Rodriguez’s deficient briefing limits our appellate review.

¶13 As a preliminary matter, Rodriguez’s briefing does not
comply with the Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure (“ARCAP”).
Her briefs do not follow the organization or naming conventions required
by ARCAP 13(a). Her “Table[s] of Authorities” do not identify the pages
on which the cited authorities appear. See ARCAP 13(a)(2). And she uses

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those tables of authorities to state the legal proposition each authority
stands for and to explain its relevance to her case. Rodriguez’s table of
authorities in her opening brief includes more than 2,300 words of
substantive argument that she did not include in her word count. See
ARCAP 4(b)(9), 14; cf. State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 298 (1995). Rodriguez
certified her opening brief contained 12,683 words—within ARCAP 14’s
14,000-word limit. ARCAP 14(a)(1). But including the substantive analyses
in her table of authorities puts her well over the permitted word limit and
she did not seek leave to file an opening brief exceeding the word count.
See ARCAP 3(a), 14(a)(1).

¶14 Rodriguez’s opening brief also lacks an introduction, and her
statement of facts is largely argument. See ARCAP 13(a)(3), (5). Rodriguez
generally does not support her factual assertions and arguments with
citations to the record as ARCAP requires. See ARCAP 13(a)(4), (5), (7).
Instead, she cites materials in her unpaginated, 414-page appendix without
identifying where those materials appear in the appellate record. See
ARCAP 13.1(c), (d)(1).

¶15 Her argument sections (including the arguments in her
statement of facts) are similarly deficient. See ARCAP 13(a)(7). Her
arguments are conclusory and lack supporting reasons. See ARCAP
13(a)(7)(A). She does not identify the applicable standard of review for each
issue. See ARCAP 13(a)(7)(B). Nor does she adequately identify where she
raised issues in the superior court or where the court ruled on them. See id.

¶16 Although most of the case citations in her opening brief are
correct and properly formatted, many do not support the propositions for
which she cites them, are not relevant, and do not include pincites. See
ARCAP 13 (a)(7), (f). Her reply brief compounds these deficiencies by
largely identifying authorities only by case name. ARCAP 13(f).

¶17 Because of these deficiencies, we could consider her
arguments waived. Ramos v. Nichols, 252 Ariz. 519, 522, ¶ 8 (App. 2022)
(arguments “not supported by adequate explanation, citations to the
record, or authority” are waived on appeal); Ritchie v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288,
305, ¶ 62 (App. 2009) (failure to comply with ARCAP 13 “can constitute
abandonment and waiver” of claims). Despite Rodriguez’s status as a self-
represented litigant, we hold her to the same standard as attorneys. Flynn
v. Campbell, 243 Ariz. 76, 83, ¶ 24 (2017). But waiver is discretionary, and
we opt to address Rodriguez’s arguments to the extent we can discern
them. See Delmastro & Eells v. Taco Bell Corp., 228 Ariz. 134, 137, ¶ 7 n.2
(App. 2011).

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II. Rodriguez has not shown the superior court erred by enforcing
the Contract’s ADR provision.

a. The superior court properly required the parties to proceed
through ADR.

¶18 The Contract requires the parties to mediate disputes arising
from it and, if unsuccessful, potentially proceed to arbitration. We review
de novo the superior court’s interpretation of the Contract and its decision
to compel ADR. See Sun Valley Ranch 308 Ltd. P’ship ex rel. Englewood Props.,
Inc. v. Robson, 231 Ariz. 287, 291, ¶ 9 (App. 2012); Dunn v. FastMed Urgent
Care PC, 245 Ariz. 35, 38, ¶ 10 (App. 2018); see also Macias v. Maricopoly, LLC,
1 CA-CV 23-0624, 2024 WL 2831842, at *3, ¶¶ 14-17 (Ariz. App. June 4, 2024)
(applying de novo review to a contract requiring mediation and, if
unsuccessful, arbitration). Because ADR agreements are contractual,
ordinary principles of contract interpretation govern. See Chang v. Siu, 234
Ariz. 442, 447, ¶ 19 (App. 2014); Sun Valley Ranch, 231 Ariz. at 291, ¶ 9.
“[W]e construe contracts to give effect to the parties’ intent, applying the
plain contractual language when it is unambiguous.” Standard Constr. Co.
Inc. v. State, 249 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 5 (App. 2020).

¶19 We first identify Rodriguez’s arguments that are properly
before us regarding the superior court’s order compelling ADR. In her
complaint and opposition to Opendoor’s motion to compel ADR,
Rodriguez argued the ADR provision was unenforceable because she did
not assent to it, it was hidden in the Contract and thus unconscionable, her
claims were not subject to compulsory arbitration, and Opendoor had
waived ADR through its conduct in the parties’ first case. After Opendoor
replied, Rodriguez raised additional theories in an unauthorized sur-reply,
which the court did not consider. Rodriguez does not renew on appeal any
of those arguments she timely raised before the court compelled ADR.
Instead, she renews arguments she first raised only after the court
compelled ADR, including post-ruling motions and her motion for
reconsideration.

¶20 Generally, a party must timely present an argument to the
superior court to preserve it for appeal. Cont’l Lighting & Contracting, Inc.
v. Premier Grading & Utils., LLC, 227 Ariz. 382, 386, ¶ 12 (App. 2011). That
requirement gives the opposing party an opportunity to respond and the
superior court an opportunity to address the issue on its merits. Id.;
Airfreight Express Ltd. v. Evergreen Air Ctr., Inc., 215 Ariz. 103, 109, ¶ 17 (App.
2007). An argument first presented after the court rules, when it could have
been presented earlier (and thus timely), ordinarily is waived. See Evans

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Withycombe, Inc. v. W. Innovations, Inc., 215 Ariz. 237, 240, ¶ 15 (App. 2006);
RT Auto. Ctr., Inc. v. Westlake Servs. LLC, 253 Ariz. 91, 95, ¶ 12 (App. 2022)
(“We typically do not consider matters raised for the first time in a motion
for reconsideration unless the facts . . . were not available when the court
entered the challenged ruling.”). We therefore will address Rodriguez’s
timely-presented challenges and consider later-made arguments—meaning
arguments made after the court compelled ADR—only as necessary to
review the rulings in which she raises them.

¶21 Rodriguez argues Section 7(d) excludes her claims from ADR
because she sought injunctive relief, and the Contract’s “express terms”
preserve her right to “seek judicial intervention for immediate and
irreparable harm.” Not so. Rodriguez’s claims arose from Opendoor’s sale
of the property, and she sought, among other relief, to enjoin any
foreclosure and Opendoor’s use of what she characterized as
“unconscionable arbitration clauses.” Section 7(d), however, excludes only
five categories of disputes “arising out of or relating to th[e] Contract” from
ADR: certain small-claims, foreclosure or other proceedings to enforce
specified property instruments, forcible-entry-and-detainer, mechanic’s-
lien, and probate matters. It contains no exclusion for claims alleging
“immediate and irreparable harm.” Est. of Tovrea v. Nolan, 173 Ariz. 568,
573 (App. 1992) (“[T]he statement of one exception implicitly denies the
existence of other unstated exceptions.”).

¶22 To the extent Rodriguez contends her request to enjoin
foreclosure falls within the Contract’s exclusion for “judicial or nonjudicial
foreclosure or other action or proceeding to enforce a deed of trust,
mortgage, or agreement for sale,” the Contract’s plain language forecloses
that argument. Rodriguez asked the court to prevent Opendoor and its
“successors, agents, and assigns” from “initiating or continuing foreclosure
proceedings . . . until final resolution of th[e] case.” Merits aside, her claim
was not a foreclosure or enforcement action. She sought the opposite—to
prevent foreclosure. Her request for injunctive relief thus did not place her
claims within one of Section 7(d)’s exclusions.

¶23 Nor does Section 7(d)’s reference to an “injunction” support
Rodriguez’s interpretation. It provides that:

[T]he filing of a judicial action to enable the recording of a
notice of pending action (“lis pendens”), or order of
attachment, receivership, injunction, or other provisional
remedies shall not constitute a waiver of the obligation to

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submit the claim to ADR, nor shall such action constitute a
breach of the duty to mediate or arbitrate.

The provision does not exclude claims seeking injunctive or other
provisional relief from ADR. Rather, it provides that filing a judicial action
to enable the recording of such order does not waive “the obligation to
submit the claim to ADR” or breach “the duty to mediate or arbitrate.”
Rodriguez’s request for an injunction therefore did not remove her
substantive claims from ADR. By its terms, Section 7(d) presupposes that
the underlying claim remains subject to ADR.

¶24 Rodriguez next argues, for the first time on appeal, that
federal and state law required the superior court to stay, rather than
dismiss, the case. Because she did not make this argument below, we
consider it waived. See Odom v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 216 Ariz. 530, 535,
¶ 18 (App. 2007) (“[A]rguments raised for the first time on appeal are
untimely and deemed waived.”). It also fails on the merits. The Contract
requires mediation before arbitration. And if mediation fails, either party
has the right to opt out of arbitration within 30 days and “resort to court
action.” Thus, when the court dismissed the case and directed the parties
to mediate, arbitration was neither ordered nor inevitable.

¶25 Arizona’s Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (“RUAA”)
governs any potential arbitration under the Contract. See A.R.S. § 12-
3003(A)(1). Under the RUAA, “[i]f the court orders arbitration,” it “shall
stay any judicial proceeding that involves a claim subject to the arbitration.”
A.R.S. § 12-3007(G). But the court ordered mediation, not arbitration. Per
the parties’ contract, arbitration would follow only if mediation failed and
neither party timely opted out. Section 12-3007(G)’s mandatory-stay
provision therefore had not been triggered. Rodriguez’s reliance on the
Federal Arbitration Act, case law interpreting it, and non-governing
statutes do not establish otherwise.

¶26 Rodriguez further argues the Contract’s ADR provision could
be enforced only by Opendoor Property C, not the other defendants who
were non-signatories to the Contract. But she did not present that theory
to the superior court before it compelled mediation; she first raised it in her
post-judgment motion to vacate the attorneys’ fees award.1 Rodriguez did

1 Although Rodriguez did not cite Rule 60(b), we construe her motion
according to the relief sought and treat it as a motion under Rule 60(b). See
Rodriquez v. Williams, 104 Ariz. 280, 283 (1969) (looking “to substance rather
than to form” in determining intended effect of pleading).

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not raise this argument before the court entered the dismissal order and
therefore did not preserve it for our review. See Evans Withycombe, 215 Ariz.
at 240, ¶ 15.

¶27 Nor could she use Rule 60(b) to obtain substantive review of
the dismissal order. That order was intermediate. See Rourk v. State, 170
Ariz. 6, 13 (App. 1991) (“An ‘intermediate order’ is one made between
commencement of the action and final judgment, which is not separately
appealable.”). Rule 60(b), by contrast, provides relief from “a final
judgment, order, or proceeding.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 60(b); see Sw. Barricades,
L.L.C. v. Traffic Mgmt., INC., 240 Ariz. 139, 141, ¶ 11 (App. 2016). The later
entry of final judgment did not transform Rule 60(b) into a vehicle for
challenging the substantive correctness of the earlier dismissal order.
See Welch v. McClure, 123 Ariz. 161, 165 (1979) (Rule 60(b) motion “is not a
device for weighing evidence or reviewing legal errors”); see also Hirsch v.
Nat’l Van Lines, Inc., 136 Ariz. 304, 311 (1983) (“The scope of an appeal from
a denial of a Rule 60 motion is restricted to the questions raised by the
motion to set aside and does not extend to a review of whether the
[superior] court was substantively correct in entering the judgment from
which relief was sought.”). We therefore do not consider Rodriguez’s
newly raised interpretation of the Contract.

b. Rodriguez has not shown Opendoor waived ADR.

¶28 Rodriguez also argues Opendoor waived ADR. Before the
superior court ordered ADR and dismissed the case, Rodriguez argued
Opendoor waived ADR through its conduct in the parties’ first case. She
does not develop that theory on appeal, see ARCAP 13(a)(7), and we thus
do not consider it. See Ramos, 252 Ariz. at 522, ¶ 8.

¶29 Rodriguez instead relies on Opendoor’s conduct after the
court ordered ADR, including its continued litigation, request for attorneys’
fees, and alleged failure to initiate or meaningfully participate in mediation.
That conduct could not establish error in compelling ADR because it had
not yet occurred.

¶30 She did, however, present some of that later conduct to the
superior court. In her “notice of withdrawal from mediation, arbitration
opt out, [and] jurisdictional divestiture,” Rodriguez argued Opendoor’s
post-dismissal conduct waived ADR, relieved her of any further ADR
obligation, and permitted her to opt out of arbitration and return to court.
While that request remained pending, the superior court entered final
judgment and found that “no further matters remain pending.” The court

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thus implicitly denied Rodriguez’s requested relief. State v. Hill, 174 Ariz.
313, 323 (1993) (“A motion that is not ruled on is deemed denied by
operation of law.”).

¶31 Rodriguez has not shown error in that denial. The Contract
permits either party to opt out of arbitration within 30 days after mediation
concludes. Mediation had not occurred when Rodriguez purported to opt
out, so her contractual right to do so was not triggered. When the superior
court later addressed Rodriguez’s opt-out notice, it observed that mediation
had not yet occurred and that the contractual opt-out provision applied
only after mediation concluded. To the extent Rodriguez asks us to
independently decide whether Opendoor’s post-dismissal conduct
independently waived ADR, we decline to do so. See State v. Schackart, 190
Ariz. 238, 247 (1997) (appellate court “does not act as a fact-finder”).

III. Rodriguez has not shown the superior court erred in denying
her injunctive relief.

¶32 As explained above, Section 7(d) did not exempt Rodriguez’s
claims from ADR merely because she sought injunctive relief. Rather, it
provides that filing an action to enable the recording of an injunction or
other provisional remedies “shall not constitute a waiver of the obligation
to submit the claim to ADR,” or “breach of the duty to mediate or arbitrate.”
Thus, Section 7(d) preserves the ADR obligation notwithstanding an action
enabling the filing of an injunction; it does not create an additional category
of claims excluded from ADR.

¶33 We review the denial of injunctive relief for an abuse of
discretion. TP Racing, L.L.L.P. v. Simms, 232 Ariz. 489, 492, ¶ 8 (App. 2013).
A court abuses its discretion when it applies an incorrect legal standard,
makes a material factual finding unsupported by the record, or reaches a
conclusion unsupported by the facts or law. Id.; Fann v. State, 251 Ariz. 425,
432, ¶ 15 (2021). A party seeking a preliminary injunction must show (1) a
strong likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the possibility of irreparable
harm not remediable by damages, (3) a balance of hardships favoring the
party, and (4) that public policy favors the injunction. Shoen v. Shoen, 167
Ariz. 58, 63 (App. 1990).

¶34 The superior court initially denied Rodriguez’s request for a
temporary restraining order because she had not established “adequate
grounds to grant equitable relief without notice.” At the same time, it set a
return hearing. After the return hearing, the court denied immediate
injunctive relief and scheduled an evidentiary hearing. Before that hearing

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occurred, however, the court compelled the parties to mediate, dismissed
Rodriguez’s claims, and vacated the evidentiary hearing.

¶35 Rodriguez does not challenge the superior court’s initial
denial of a temporary restraining order. She instead argues the court erred
in later denying immediate injunctive relief because it failed to consider
“141 pages” of evidence. But those materials were not part of the record
when the court ruled. Although Rodriguez’s complaint identified
supporting exhibits, she did not file the exhibits themselves. She provided
them only after the court dismissed the action, when she emailed them to
the court’s judicial assistant and asked that they be added to the record. The
court then directed the clerk to file the email and attachments but explained
they were “not a substitute for proper filings,” and that “the responsibility
falls on [Rodriguez].” The court could not have erred by failing to consider
materials that were not before it when it ruled. Nor do we credit
Rodriguez’s vague assertion that the superior court did not consider them.
The court expressly said that it had “reviewed the October 21 Email and the
attached exhibits,” but determined they did “not affect the Court’s previous
rulings.”

¶36 Rodriguez further argues the superior court misapplied Rule
65 in denying immediate injunctive relief. But the record contains no
transcript of the hearing at which the court made that ruling. ARCAP
11(c)(1)(B) requires the appellate record to include transcripts necessary to
address the issues raised on appeal. When a necessary transcript is missing,
we presume it supports the superior court’s ruling. Kline v. Kline, 221 Ariz.
564, 572, ¶ 33 (App. 2009). Without a transcript, we cannot determine the
basis for the court’s ruling or whether it applied an incorrect legal standard.
We therefore presume the proceedings at the return hearing support the
denial of immediate injunctive relief. Nothing in the record supports
Rodriguez’s claim that the superior court erred in denying her immediate
injunctive relief.

IV. The superior court did not err in awarding Opendoor its
reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

¶37 Rodriguez next challenges the superior court’s award of
$7,000 in attorneys’ fees and $281.50 in costs to Opendoor. The court
awarded fees under the Contract and, independently, Section 12-341.01.
Rodriguez does not challenge the applicability of the Contract’s attorneys’
fees provision or Opendoor’s entitlement to fees under that provision. Nor
does she challenge the amount or reasonableness of the award. She instead

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argues her indigency precluded an award and that the court was required
to hold a hearing on her ability to pay.

¶38 We enforce a contractual attorneys’ fees provision according
to its terms. McDowell Mountain Ranch Cmty. Ass’n v. Simons, 216 Ariz. 266,
269, ¶ 14 (App. 2007). The Contract provides that “[t]he prevailing party in
any dispute or claim between Buyer and Seller arising out of or relating to
this Contract shall be awarded their reasonable attorney fees and costs.”
Because Rodriguez does not challenge Opendoor’s entitlement to fees
under that provision, and we discern no error in the court’s award of
attorneys’ fees under it, we need not address the court’s alternative basis
for awarding fees under Section 12-341.01.

¶39 The waiver of court fees and costs Rodriguez received did not
preclude the contractual fee award. Section 12-302 governs the deferral or
waiver of specified court fees and costs. Those include filing, service,
transcript, and appellate fees—they do not include an opposing party’s
attorneys’ fees. A.R.S. § 12-302(H). We will not “write a term into the
statute that the legislature did not include.” AAA Cab Serv., Inc. v. Indus.
Comm’n of Ariz., 213 Ariz. 342, 344, ¶ 6 (App. 2006). Rodriguez’s eligibility
for a waiver of court fees and costs did not preclude an award of Opendoor’s
attorneys’ fees under the Contract.

¶40 We likewise reject Rodriguez’s argument that the superior
court did not consider her financial circumstances. Rodriguez asserted
financial hardship in opposing Opendoor’s fee request. In considering
Opendoor’s alternative request under Section 12-341.01, the court expressly
considered that assertion and found Rodriguez had not demonstrated
“extreme hardship.” See Associated Indem. Corp., 143 Ariz. at 570
(identifying whether an award would cause “extreme hardship” as a factor
relevant to a discretionary fee award under § 12-341.01). That the court
ultimately awarded fees does not establish that it failed to consider
Rodriguez’s financial circumstances—particularly when the record
indicates that it did.

¶41 Rodriguez also argues the superior court was required to
conduct an evidentiary hearing on her ability to pay before awarding fees.
She did not request such a hearing before the court entered final judgment.
And she first asserted a right to one in her post-judgment motion to vacate.
We therefore do not consider that untimely challenge to the fee award.
Generally, an argument first made after the challenged ruling when the
merits have already been decided does not preserve the issue for appellate
review. See Evans Withycombe, 215 Ariz. at 240, ¶ 15.

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V. The superior court did not err in denying Rodriguez’s post-
judgment motion to vacate.

¶42 After the superior court entered the fee award under Rule
54(c), Rodriguez moved to vacate it, arguing, as relevant here, that the
judgment was void because the court lacked jurisdiction to enter it. We
review the denial of Rule 60(b) relief for an abuse of discretion but review
de novo whether a judgment is void under Rule 60(b)(4). City of Phoenix v.
Geyler, 144 Ariz. 323, 328 (1985); Laveen Meadows Homeowners Ass’n v. Mejia,
249 Ariz. 81, 84, ¶ 10 (App. 2020). “Only errors that undermine jurisdiction
render a judgment void for purposes of [Rule 60(b)(4)].” Laveen Meadows
Homeowners Ass’n, 249 Ariz. at 84, ¶ 10. A judgment is void when the court
entering it lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties, or over
“the particular judgment or order entered.” Sycamore Hills Ests.
Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Zablotny, 250 Ariz. 479, 482, ¶ 7 (App.
2021) (citation omitted).

¶43 Rodriguez argues the final judgment was void because her
then-pending notices of appeal deprived the superior court of jurisdiction
to enter it. She reasons that jurisdiction transferred to this Court when she
filed her notices and did not return until she was “served with that
dismissal” notice. We disagree.

¶44 A valid notice of appeal generally divests the superior court
of jurisdiction over matters connected with the appeal. See Sw. Gas Corp. v.
Irwin, 229 Ariz. 198, 201, ¶ 8 (App. 2012). Except in a narrow circumstance
(not present here), a notice filed before entry of a final judgment is
ineffective and a nullity. Craig v. Craig, 227 Ariz. 105, 107, ¶ 13 (2011). When
the notice of appeal is “clearly premature” and thus a “nullity,” “the trial
court does not lose jurisdiction of the case.” In re Marriage of Johnson &
Gravino, 231 Ariz. 228, 232, ¶ 11 (App. 2012).

¶45 Rodriguez’s notices associated with her first and second
appeals were premature. When she filed them, Opendoor’s request for
attorneys’ fees remained unresolved and the superior court had not entered
a final judgment. The dismissal order contained no Rule 54(b) or Rule 54(c)
language. And the earlier denial of immediate injunctive relief was
unsigned and therefore did not independently invoke our appellate
jurisdiction. Klebba v. Carpenter, 213 Ariz. 91, 93, ¶ 9 (2006) (“[W]here no
signed order has ever been entered, the notice of appeal is simply
ineffective to confer jurisdiction on an appellate court.”). Resolving the fee
request required the court to determine entitlement and amount—
substantive matters that were not merely “ministerial tasks.” See Smith v.

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Decision of the Court

Ariz. Citizens Clean Elections Comm’n, 212 Ariz. 407, 415, ¶ 38 (2006)
(discussing Barassi v. Matison, 130 Ariz. 418 (1981)). The notices therefore
did not divest the superior court of jurisdiction. See Craig, 227 Ariz. at 107,
¶ 13; Johnson & Gravino, 231 Ariz. at 232-33, ¶¶ 11, 14.

¶46 Our dismissal of Rodriguez’s first appeal confirmed that her
notices were premature because there was no final judgment. Although her
second appeal remained pending when the superior court entered final
judgment, it suffered from the same defect: Rodriguez filed it before entry
of final judgment while Opendoor’s fee request remained unresolved. The
superior court could therefore determine that the second appeal was also
premature and did not prevent it from resolving Opendoor’s fee request
and entering final judgment. Johnson & Gravino, 231 Ariz. at 232, ¶ 9 (after
a notice of appeal is filed, the superior court “may determine its own
jurisdiction if the issue of jurisdiction is clear”). Thus, Rodriguez’s pre-fee
award notices did not divest the superior court of jurisdiction. In any event,
by the time the superior court entered final judgment, this Court had
dismissed Rodriguez’s first appeal and clarified that her notices were
premature and nullities.

¶47 Nor did jurisdiction depend on when Rodriguez personally
received notice of our dismissals in her premature appeals, as she contends.
Rodriguez does not develop this argument or cite supporting authority,
and we have found none. But see Baumann v. Tuton, 180 Ariz. 370, 372 (App.
1994) (“[D]ismissal of an appeal for lack of jurisdiction terminates the
appellate proceedings and leaves the matter still pending before the lower
court.”).

¶48 Rodriguez also challenges Opendoor’s alleged recording of
the fee award as a lien against her property. Rodriguez first raised the lien
issue in the superior court after she filed the governing notice of appeal.
Her subsequent filings did not bring that later-arising issue within the
scope of this appeal. We therefore have no ruling properly before us
addressing the lien and do not consider its propriety. See Desert Palm
Surgical Grp., P.L.C. v. Petta, 236 Ariz. 568, 576, ¶ 15 (App. 2015) (our
jurisdiction extends only to matters identified in a timely notice of appeal);
see also In re Marriage of Thorn, 235 Ariz. 216, 218, ¶ 5 (App. 2014); ARCAP
8(d).

VI. Rodriguez’s remaining arguments do not establish reversible
error.

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Decision of the Court

¶49 Rodriguez characterizes various aspects of the proceedings as
violations of due process, structural and cumulative error, and a denial of
access to the courts. We understand her argument to be that she lacked
notice and an opportunity to respond, the superior court disregarded her
filings and evidence, and the dismissal left her without a meaningful forum
to pursue her claims. None establish error, let alone reversible error.

a. Rodriguez was not denied due process.

¶50 We review constitutional claims de novo. Savord v. Morton, 235 Ariz. 256, 260, ¶ 16 (App. 2014). Due process requires notice and an
opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.” Gonzales v. Ariz. State Bd. of Nursing, 255 Ariz. 132, 136, ¶ 12 (App.
2023) (citation omitted).

¶51 Rodriguez argues that service deficiencies and
communications between Opendoor and the court deprived her of a
meaningful opportunity to respond before dismissal. The record shows
otherwise. Rodriguez responded to every one of Opendoor’s motions or
filings. At no point was she denied the opportunity to respond. Thus, even
if we assumed error, Rodriguez cannot show prejudice. See Volk v. Brame, 235 Ariz. 462, 470, ¶ 26 (App. 2014).

¶52 Nor did due process require the superior court to conduct an
evidentiary hearing before the court compelled ADR. A court may decide
a motion without oral argument, Ariz. R. Civ. P. 7.1(d), and due process
does not invariably require an evidentiary hearing before a court rules. See
RT Auto. Ctr., 253 Ariz. at 95, ¶ 14. Rodriguez received notice of Opendoor’s
request to compel ADR and opposed it. Due process required no more.

¶53 Rodriguez similarly invokes due process based on an
allegedly “incomplete record” and the court’s asserted failure to
“meaningfully accommodate” her indigency. We have already addressed
the “141 pages” of evidence that Rodriguez claims the court failed to
consider, despite the court’s express acknowledgment that it considered
such evidence. Supra ¶ 35. She identifies no other evidence properly before
the superior court that it failed to consider, nor does she develop what
additional process the United States and Arizona Constitutions required.
See ARCAP 13(a)(7).

b. The dismissal did not deprive Rodriguez of a forum.

¶54 Rodriguez next argues the dismissal deprived her of a
“meaningful forum” and “meaningful access to relief” because neither

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RODRIGUEZ v. OPENDOOR, et al.
Decision of the Court

litigation nor ADR followed. But the dismissal did not adjudicate the merits
of her claims or foreclose resolution; it directed the parties to mediate—as
required by their Contract. The Contract requires mediation and, if
mediation does not resolve the dispute, provides the procedures that
follow, including either party’s right to opt out of arbitration and return to
court. That mediation ultimately has not yet occurred does not establish
error in the earlier dismissal based on circumstances that arose afterwards.

c. Rodriguez has not established structural or cumulative
error.

¶55 Rodriguez characterizes the dismissal, alleged service and
communication deficiencies, and the combined effect of the proceedings as
“structural” and “cumulative” error. But the authorities she cites address
structural error in criminal cases, and she identifies no authority extending
that doctrine to these civil proceedings. Clem v. Pinal County, 261 Ariz. 103,
108, ¶ 20 (App. 2025), review granted in part (May 5, 2026) (we have “found
no case law . . . extending structural error beyond the criminal context” in
Arizona). Similarly, her claim for “cumulative” error fails because the
cumulative error doctrine applies only in criminal cases. See State v. Pandeli, 242 Ariz. 175, 191, ¶ 69 (2017) (Arizona formally recognizes cumulative
error only in the prosecutorial-misconduct context).

¶56 Finally, Rodriguez makes additional assertions of gross
negligence, abuse of discretion, denial of access to relief, and other
procedural improprieties throughout her briefs. To the extent those
assertions rest on the rulings and conduct addressed above, they fail for the
reasons stated. To the extent they are intended to raise distinct claims of
error, Rodriguez does not sufficiently develop them with supporting legal
authority, record citations, and identification of the challenged ruling to
permit appellate review. See ARCAP 13(a)(7)(A); Ramos, 252 Ariz. at 522, ¶
8.

VII. We deny Rodriguez’s request for sanctions.

¶57 Rodriguez requests sanctions against Opendoor and its
counsel, relying on ARCAP 25, Section 12-349, and Rule 11. She alleges,
among other things, that counsel engaged in improper communications
with the court, misrepresented the receipt of filings, sought to accelerate
dismissal before the scheduled evidentiary hearings, and pursued
enforcement of the judgment while her appeals were pending.

¶58 Rodriguez has not established sanctions are warranted under
any authority she invokes. She does not develop an argument showing that

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Decision of the Court

Opendoor’s counsel engaged in conduct falling within Section 12-349. Nor
has she shown that Opendoor pursued a frivolous appeal or motion, acted
solely for delay, or committed an unreasonable violation of ARCAP
warranting sanctions. See A.R.S. § 12-349; ARCAP 25. We therefore deny
her request. As the prevailing party, we grant Opendoor its taxable costs
on appeal upon compliance with ARCAP 21(b).

CONCLUSION

¶59 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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