Hickle v. Barraza

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

KEVIN J. HICKLE, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

STEPHANIE BARRAZA, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-1066 FC
FILED 08-19-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2019-072153
The Honorable Jillian Francis, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Kevin J. Hickle, Phoenix
Petitioner/Appellant Pro Se

Stephanie Barraza, Phoenix
Respondent/Appellee Pro Se

HICKLE v. BARRAZA
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Anni Hill Foster delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams and Vice Chief Judge David D.
Weinzweig joined.

F O S T E R, Judge:

¶1 Kevin Hickle (“Father”) appeals the superior court’s order
modifying legal decision-making, parenting time and child support. For the
reasons below, this Court affirms.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Father and Stephanie Barraza (“Mother”) share three minor
children. Between 2020 and 2022, the superior court established paternity
for the children and entered orders for legal decision-making, parenting
time and child support. The final order provided for joint legal decision-
making, with Father having the final say. The court ordered Father as the
primary residential parent and granted Mother parenting time every other
weekend. Mother was ordered to pay Father child support.

¶3 Father petitioned to modify the orders in 2025. He alleged that
Mother’s boyfriend molested the children. He also claimed Mother’s
boyfriend threatened the children. Father asked the court to grant him sole
legal decision-making with no parenting time for Mother. He also
requested $600 in monthly child support. The court held a hearing on
temporary orders and maintained the status quo but ordered Mother’s
parenting time supervised to protect the children.

¶4 The superior court appointed a best interests attorney for the
children. Following the best interests attorney’s appointment and
interviews of the parties, she noted that, “[a] dependency petition may be
necessary” but that she was still investigating. The best interests attorney
recommended that Father undergo a psychological evaluation and that the
court order the children to receive counseling if the parents did not initiate
it.

¶5 Father completed the recommended psychological evaluation
and provided a copy to the best interests attorney. The evaluation

2

HICKLE v. BARRAZA
Decision of the Court

concluded that Father “does not qualify for a psychiatric diagnosis.” After
receiving the evaluation report, the best interests attorney determined a
dependency petition unnecessary.

¶6 Meanwhile, Father filed two motions. Father first moved to
compel a search warrant and forensic investigation of Mother’s residence.
He alleged for the first time that the children were enrolled members of the
Cherokee Nation. He also requested fingerprint dusting, cellular tower
data, location records and photographic documentation of Mother’s
residence. The court denied this motion for lack of service.

¶7 Father’s second motion requested that the superior court
allow him to submit newly discovered evidence—a flash drive. He alleged
that he “obtained audio recordings/video and documentation revealing []
disturbing behavior” by Mother. He claimed Mother should not have even
supervised visitation because she caused the children distress during the
visits. Father acknowledged that the disclosure period had closed and
sought to bring these facts as new evidence. The court denied this motion
because it was not clear that Father served Mother. The court refused to
accept exhibits outside an evidentiary hearing, and the court directed
Father to pick up the flash drive or it would be destroyed.

¶8 Following Father’s motions, the superior court held an
evidentiary hearing on the petition to modify. At the end of the evidentiary
hearing, the court temporarily granted Mother unsupervised parenting
time and reaffirmed joint legal decision-making but granted Mother final
say.

¶9 In its final order, the superior court modified legal decision-
making and parenting time. The court ordered: (1) joint legal decision-
making with Mother having final say; (2) Mother as the primary residential
parent with Father exercising his parenting time every other weekend and
(3) Father to pay $825 in monthly child support to Mother.

¶10 Father timely appealed and this Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶11 Father lists twenty-one issues in his opening brief. His
arguments fall into three categories: (1) the court violated his due process
rights; (2) the court erroneously suppressed and excluded evidence, denied
evidentiary hearings to consider his psychological evaluation and
determine the credibility of evidence and (3) the court, other agencies and

3

HICKLE v. BARRAZA
Decision of the Court

court staff associated with the case misapplied or ignored the Indian Child
Welfare Act (“ICWA”).

I. Father’s brief does not comply with ARCAP 13.

¶12 Father’s brief violates this Court’s procedural rules. He has
therefore waived review of his arguments on appeal under Arizona Rule of
Civil Appellate Procedure (“ARCAP”) 13. See ARCAP 13(a).

¶13 ARCAP 13 outlines the requirements for an opening brief. In
appealing a court’s order, an opening brief must contain “appropriate
references to the record” and “citations of legal authorities” that the
appellant relies on to assert the court erred. ARCAP 13(a)(7)(A). Failure to
comply with ARCAP 13 may constitute abandonment and waiver of
arguments or an appeal. State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 425, ¶ 101 n.9 (2004).

¶14 This Court recognizes that Father is self-represented. But a
self-represented party “is entitled to no more consideration from the
[C]ourt than a party represented by counsel, and is held to the same
standards expected of a lawyer.” Kelly v. NationsBanc Mortg. Corp., 199 Ariz.
284, 287, ¶ 16 (App. 2000) (citation omitted).

¶15 Father’s brief does not explain the “precise relief sought,”
ARCAP 13(a)(9), nor do his arguments reference “portions of the record on
which [he] relies,” ARCAP 13(a)(7)(A). Except for citing ICWA, a duty to
report abuse statute (A.R.S. § 13-3620) and a statute outlining the
investigatory functions of the Department of Child Safety (A.R.S. § 8-456),
Father cites no legal authority supporting his arguments. ARCAP
13(a)(7)(A). Simply asserting an issue or citing law without more is not
enough to develop one’s argument on appeal. See Ritchie v. Krasner, 221
Ariz. 288, 305, ¶ 62 (App. 2009). “It is not incumbent upon the court to
develop an argument for a party.” Ace Auto. Prods., Inc. v. Van Duyne, 156
Ariz. 140, 143 (App. 1987). Father’s lack of citation to the record further
dooms his arguments. What is more, Father asks this Court to reweigh the
superior court’s credibility findings, which this Court does not do. See Hurd
v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 52, ¶ 16 (App. 2009).

¶16 Father has abandoned his claims because he did not develop
his legal arguments or cite to the record. See Ritchie, 221 Ariz. at 305, ¶ 62
(“Opening briefs must present and address significant arguments,
supported by authority that set forth the appellant’s position on the issue
in question.”). But in this Court’s discretion, it may review a waived issue
based on an independent review of the record. See Adams v. Valley Nat’l Bank
of Ariz., 139 Ariz. 340, 342 (App. 1984) (though courts prefer to decide each

4

HICKLE v. BARRAZA
Decision of the Court

case upon its merits rather than dismissing on procedural grounds, “there
is a limit to which judicial leniency can be stretched”). To the extent this
Court can discern Father’s arguments, it will address them.

II. No debatable issues exist.

¶17 Notably, Mother did not file an answering brief. When an
appellee fails to file an answering brief and debatable issues exist, this Court
“may consider such failure a confession of reversible error.” Savord v.
Morton, 235 Ariz. 256, 259, ¶ 9 (App. 2014). But this Court need not do so.
Id. When the record clearly supports a court’s ruling, no debatable issues
exist. See, e.g., Air. E., Inc. v. Wheatley, 14 Ariz. App. 290, 294 (1971). Here,
the record clearly supports the superior court’s orders, so no debatable
issues exist and this Court addresses the merits. See Lopez v. Barraza, 150
Ariz. 291, 292 (App. 1986).

III. Father fails to show how the superior court erred.

A. Claims not raised below

¶18 Here, the superior court ordered Mother to have parenting
time and both parents to share joint legal decision-making. The court
provided due process to Father. It held an evidentiary hearing, received
exhibits and heard Father’s testimony.

¶19 Father argues that various government agencies ignored their
statutory duties, that the court discriminated against Father contrary to the
American’s with Disability Act, that the “Bureau of Indian Affairs”
representative breached duties and that the BIA retaliated against him.
Father waived these arguments because he raises them for the first time on
appeal. See In re Marriage of Hinkston, 133 Ariz. 592, 595 (App. 1982).

¶20 Father also failed to provide a transcript of the superior
court’s evidentiary hearing, which precludes meaningful review of his
argument on appeal. This Court can only determine error and whether
Father properly raised the issues on appeal below by reviewing the
transcript of the evidentiary hearing. ARCAP 11(a)(1), (b). Without a
transcript, this Court assumes the transcript supports the superior court’s
decision. State ex rel. Dep’t. of Econ. Sec. v. Burton, 205 Ariz. 27, 30, ¶ 16 (App.
2003). Thus, this Court presumes that the superior court properly applied
the law. See id.

5

HICKLE v. BARRAZA
Decision of the Court

B. ICWA does not apply

¶21 Finally, after asserting for the first time that the children hold
membership in the Cherokee Nation, Father contends on appeal that: (1)
the court failed to provide notice to the tribe when it began proceedings, (2)
various agencies including the Department of Economic Security and law
enforcement disregarded ICWA and (3) the court structurally erred and
violated Father’s due process rights when it failed to apply ICWA.

¶22 ICWA applies to “the removal of Indian children from their
families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes.” 25
U.S.C. § 1902 (emphases added); see Valerie M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 219
Ariz. 331, 334, ¶ 12 (2009) (recognizing that “Congress enacted ICWA [due
to] alarmingly high rates of removal of Indian children”). It does not apply
to custody disputes between parents, which are expressly excluded under
the definition of a “child custody proceeding” in 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1). A
“child custody proceeding” includes (1) “foster care placement[s],” (2)
“termination of parental rights,” (3) “preadoptive placement[s]” and (4)
“adoptive placement[s].” 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(i)–(iv).

¶23 Father’s arguments do not implicate ICWA. See 25 U.S.C.
§ 1903(1)(i)–(iv). Therefore, Father’s ICWA arguments do not apply here.

CONCLUSION

¶24 Affirmed.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

6