Pulsipher v. Norris

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

BROOKE LEE PULSIPHER, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

EUGENE LYNN NORRIS, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 26-0001 FC
FILED 10-27-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2021-090743
The Honorable Robert Ian Brooks, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Davis Miles, PLLC, Tempe
By Spencer Schiefer
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

Stanley David Murray, Attorney at Law, Scottsdale
By Stanley David Murray
Counsel for Respondent/Appellee

PULSIPHER v. NORRIS
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge D. Andrew Gaona joined.

F U R U Y A, Judge:

¶1 Brooke Lee Pulsipher (“Mother”) appeals the superior court’s
order modifying child support. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother and Eugene Norris (“Father”) married in 2001 and
share five children, three of whom are minors. The parties divorced in 2021.

¶3 Mother and Father agreed to their initial child support
obligations in a consent decree, including a deviation from the presumptive
amount under the Arizona Child Support Guidelines, Arizona Revised
Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 25-320 app. (“Guidelines”). The consent decree
provided that the stipulated support amount would decrease by $240
whenever a child turned 19 years old. It also specified that Father’s spousal
maintenance obligation would decrease by half if Mother remarried.

¶4 In March 2023, Mother filed a Petition to Modify Child
Support, Simplified Process, because she had remarried and one child had
emancipated. In August 2023, Mother petitioned to move to Wyoming with
the children, which ultimately resulted in the parties’ temporary agreement
to the relocation.

¶5 Because of various continuances and other delays, the court
did not resolve Mother’s Petition to Modify Child Support until November
2025, when it issued a modified child support order. Considering many
competing circumstances, including Mother’s relocation, the adjusted
parenting plan, and changing incomes, the court found a substantial change
in circumstances justified the modification.

¶6 Because Mother filed her modification petition in March 2023,
the modification’s presumptive start date was April 1, 2023. But, after
finding good cause to choose a later date, the court set December 1, 2025, as
the order’s effective date.

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PULSIPHER v. NORRIS
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¶7 Mother requested that the court include Father’s overtime
pay in calculating his child support income. Although Father had worked
overtime in the past, the court found—based on “Mother’s own
testimony”—that Father’s overtime constituted an extraordinary work
regimen. Therefore, the court excluded overtime from Father’s income for
child support calculation purposes.

¶8 Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S.
Sections 12-120.21(A)(1) and 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶9 We will affirm the court’s decision to modify a child support
award absent an abuse of discretion. Little v. Little, 193 Ariz. 518, 520 ¶ 5
(1999). A court abuses its discretion if the record, viewed in the light most
favorable to upholding the award, is “devoid of competent evidence” to
support the decision. Id. (cleaned up). We accept the court’s findings of fact
unless they are clearly erroneous. Nia v. Nia, 242 Ariz. 419, 422 ¶ 7 (App.
2017). “Factual findings are not clearly erroneous if substantial evidence
supports them, even if there is substantial conflicting evidence.” McNeil v.
Hoskyns, 236 Ariz. 173, 176 ¶ 13 (App. 2014). Evidence is substantial if it
allows a reasonable person to reach the court’s result. Castro v. Ballesteros-
Suarez, 222 Ariz. 48, 52 ¶ 11 (App. 2009) (citing cases). We review the court’s
interpretation and application of statutes de novo. Amadore v. Lifgren, 245
Ariz. 509, 514 ¶ 5 (App. 2018).

I. The Court Did Not Err by Setting the Modification’s Effective Date
as December 1, 2025.

¶10 Mother asserts the court erred by not modifying support as of
April 1, 2023, the presumptive effective date, given that she filed her
petition in March 2023. At the very latest, she contends, support should
have been modified effective September 2023 based on her relocation to
Wyoming.

¶11 Generally, a modification takes effect on the first day of the
month following notice of the filing of a petition, unless the court finds good
cause to choose a different date. A.R.S. § 25-327(A). Mother argues that once
the court found changed circumstances, it had to modify support to
correspond with those changes. Further, she argues the court’s good-cause
showing does not justify the delay. We disagree.

¶12 Here, the court made express findings on factors establishing
good cause for a prospective effective date. First, Father had already paid

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Decision of the Court

an “increased amount of child support pursuant to a vacated temporary
order.” He had also overpaid spousal maintenance and had not sought
reimbursement. Both parties took actions that contributed to significant
delays in the proceedings, resulting in a large gap between Mother’s
modification petition and the court’s final order. The court found that both
parties had “been able to meet the children’s reasonable needs” throughout
the process. Finally, the court noted that the parties’ “robust prior
agreement” had already accounted for the changes that led to Mother filing
her initial petition in March 2023.

¶13 Evidence in the record supports each of the court’s reasons for
deviating from the presumptive effective date. Therefore, the court acted
within its discretion when it set December 1, 2025, as the child support
modification’s effective date.

II. The Court Did Not Err by Excluding Father’s Overtime Income
from the Child Support Calculation.

¶14 Mother argues the trial court erred by failing to include
Father’s overtime in his gross income.

¶15 When calculating child support income, the court “generally
does not include more income than earned through full-time employment.”
Guidelines § II.A.3.a. Rather, the Guidelines provide that parents “should
have the choice of working additional hours through overtime or at a
second job without increasing the child support obligation.” Id.; see also
Hoobler v. Hoobler, 254 Ariz. 130, 140 ¶ 24 (App. 2022) (voluntary overtime
is generally excepted from the income calculation).

¶16 The court may consider a parent’s overtime income if it “was
historically earned and is anticipated to continue into the future.”
Guidelines § II.A.3.b. But the court generally will not attribute additional
income to a parent if it would require an “extraordinary work regimen.” Id.
An extraordinary work regimen is one “requiring excessive hours or an
onerous work schedule.” See McNutt v. McNutt, 203 Ariz. 28, 33 ¶ 21 (App.
2002) (quoting In re Marriage of Simpson, 841 P.2d 931, 936–37 (Cal. 1992)).
Determining whether a parent’s overtime rises to the level of an
“extraordinary” work regimen depends on all relevant circumstances,
“including the choice of jobs available within a particular occupation,
working hours, and working conditions.” Guidelines § II.A.3.b. The court
may also consider a parent’s relevant personal or medical circumstances.
Id.

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¶17 Here, the court noted Father had worked overtime in the past.
And the parties agree Father worked overtime on a voluntary basis. The
court did not make findings on whether Father’s overtime work was
anticipated to continue in the future. But it did not need to after finding
Father’s overtime constituted an extraordinary work regimen.

¶18 Mother contends that the record does not support the court’s
finding that Father’s overtime constituted an extraordinary work regimen.
But her arguments fail to meaningfully engage with the court’s express
finding, based on “Mother’s own testimony,” that Father’s overtime
constituted an extraordinary work regimen. Much of her reasoning goes
only to Father’s overtime being “historically earned” and “anticipated to
continue into the future.” See Guidelines § II.A.3.b. She also asserts Father’s
overtime work was “voluntary, not involuntary or obligatory,” which
“demonstrates that Father’s overtime is not extraordinary.” But Father’s
overtime being voluntary weighs against including it in the income
calculation, not in favor of it. See McNutt, 203 Ariz. at 32 ¶ 17 (excluding
non-mandatory overtime from support calculation “leave[s] to each parent
the choice of working additional hours . . . without exposing that parent to
the ‘treadmill’ effect of an ever-increasing child support obligation”).

¶19 The record contains substantial evidence to support the
court’s finding that Father’s overtime constituted an extraordinary work
regimen. As Mother acknowledges, Father’s occupation as a power lineman
inherently involves additional hours for emergencies, maintenance, and
seasonal demands. In her testimony, she stated that from 2018 to 2020,
Father “was always gone” for work. He would be “called out in the middle
of the night for a storm repair” or “work 10 or 12 hours a day, five, six,
seven days a week.” A reasonable person presented with this evidence
could conclude, as the court did, that inclusion of Father’s overtime would
mandate his undertaking “excessive hours” and an “onerous” schedule.
Therefore, the court did not err by excluding overtime from Father’s child
support income. Guidelines § II.A.3.b; McNutt, 203 Ariz. 28, 32 ¶ 17.

III. Attorneys’ Fees on Appeal

¶20 Both parties request an award of attorneys’ fees and costs on
appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-324. After considering the reasonableness of
the parties’ positions, we decline—in our discretion—to award fees to either
party. As the prevailing party, we award Father his costs on appeal,
contingent upon his compliance with ARCAP 21.

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CONCLUSION

¶21 We affirm the child support order.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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