1 CA-CV 26-0002 Nonprecedential Affirmed Processed

Waller v. Sagmit

Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One · Filed September 23, 2026

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Opinion text

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

CECILLE DOROMAL WALLER, Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

ROLAN SAGMIT, Defendant/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 26-0002
FILED 09-23-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2025-038827
The Honorable Mary Collins Cronin, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Cecille Doromal Waller
Plaintiff/Appellee

Rolan Sagmit, Gilbert
Defendant/Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Veronika Fabian and Judge Daniel J. Kiley joined.

WALLER v. SAGMIT
Decision of the Court

J A C O B S, Judge:

¶1 Rolan Sagmit appeals from the superior court’s grant of an
injunction against harassment preventing him from contacting Cecille
Waller. Because the record reveals no reversible error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In October 2025, Waller petitioned the superior court for an
injunction against harassment, describing four instances of alleged
harassment by Sagmit at events hosted by members of a civic organization
in which Waller and Sagmit both participated.

¶3 The court issued an injunction barring Sagmit from contacting
Waller and another person for one year. Sagmit objected to the injunction
and requested an evidentiary hearing, filing a “Declaration of Truth in
Response to Injunction of Harassment and Request for Hearing.” He
denied he “harassed, threatened, intimidated, or made unwanted contact
with [Waller] in any way.” And he claimed Waller’s petition was brought
as retaliation for a “Declaration of Truth/Affidavit” he had earlier filed
with the Maricopa County Recorder’s Office.

¶4 The court set a hearing for November 26, 2025, and set a
deadline for the pre-hearing disclosure of witnesses and exhibits. Waller’s
list of exhibits included Sagmit’s social media posts and other
communications between them. Sagmit did not submit additional exhibits
beyond those included in his “Declaration of Truth” and request for
hearing. Sagmit and Waller each appeared at the hearing and testified.
Others also testified, and the court admitted several exhibits.

¶5 After the hearing, the court found by a preponderance of the
evidence that Sagmit “has committed acts of harassment or may commit an
act of harassment in the future,” so it ordered that the injunction would
remain in effect.

¶6 Sagmit appealed.1 We have jurisdiction. Ariz. Const. art. 6, §
9; A.R.S. § 12-2101(A).

1 The day Sagmit appealed, he also filed several notices, statements, and

motions in the superior court, seeking relief from the injunction and
alleging irregularities at the hearing. Divested of jurisdiction over these
filings by Sagmit’s appeal, the superior court properly declined to rule on
them.
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WALLER v. SAGMIT
Decision of the Court

DISCUSSION

¶7 Sagmit raises two issues on appeal: (1) the injunction fails as
a matter of law for lack of the “series of acts” A.R.S. § 12-1809 requires; and
(2) the evidentiary hearing violated his rights to due process.

¶8 Waller didn’t file an answering brief, which would amount to
a confession of reversible error had Sagmit raised debatable issues. Savord
v. Morton, 235 Ariz. 256, 259
¶ 9 (App. 2014). But he didn’t (as we next
explain), so we don’t treat Waller’s omission as a confession of error.

I. Sagmit Failed to File a Transcript of the Hearing, so His Argument
That the Record Doesn’t Support the Injunction Fails.

¶9 Sagmit first argues the injunction fails as a matter of law
because “[h]arassment requires a series of acts, not isolated allegations,”
but “[t]he record reflects only isolated or insufficient allegations,” so the
“absence of a qualifying ‘series of acts’ is dispositive.” We disagree.

¶10 “We review orders granting injunctions under a clear abuse
of discretion standard,” LaFaro v. Cahill, 203 Ariz. 482, 485 ¶ 10 (App. 2002)
(citing Ariz. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Superior Court, 190 Ariz. 490, 494 (App.
1997)
), deferring to the superior court’s determinations of a witness’s
credibility. Vanwormer v. Lopez, 259 Ariz. 87, 89 ¶ 6 (App. 2025) (citing Hurd
v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 52
¶ 16 (App. 2009)). The evidence is construed in the
light most favorable to affirming the court’s decision. Mahar v. Acuna, 230
Ariz. 530
, 534
¶ 14 (App. 2012) (citing Hurd, 223 Ariz. at ¶ 19 (App. 2009)).

¶11 But in the absence of a transcript, we not only defer to the
superior court’s findings, we “presume that the record supports” its
rulings. Kohler v. Kohler, 211 Ariz. 106, 108 ¶ 8 n.1 (App. 2005). Here, Sagmit
didn’t furnish us with a transcript, so we presume the transcript supports
the court’s ruling that the evidence supported continuing the injunction.
The court received evidence and heard testimony from Waller, Sagmit, and
others, and was in the best position to weigh the evidence and judge the
witnesses’ credibility. Without a transcript, we see no grounds for reversal.

II. Sagmit Demonstrates No Violation of His Rights to Due Process.

¶12 Sagmit next argues he did not receive due process at the
hearing. He claims his interpreter was deficient, and the court: admitted

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WALLER v. SAGMIT
Decision of the Court

undisclosed evidence; unevenly applied court rules; improperly relied on
statements from a non-testifying individual; and exhibited bias.

¶13 Due process claims are reviewed de novo. Savord, 235 Ariz. at
260 ¶ 16. “Due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Yavapai-Apache Nation v.
Fabritz-Whitney, 227 Ariz. 499, 508 ¶ 48 (App. 2011) (quoting Huck v.
Haralambie, 122 Ariz. 63, 65 (1979)
). Arizona’s Rules of Protective Order
Procedure, which govern injunctions against harassment, likewise require
that “both parties have an opportunity to be heard, to present evidence, and
to call and examine and cross-examine witnesses.” Ariz. R. Protect. Order
P. 38(g)(1). And again, when there is no transcript in the record on appeal,
the missing record is presumed to support the superior court’s decision.
State v. Mendoza, 181 Ariz. 472, 474 (App. 1995).

¶14 Here, we have no transcript of the hearing, so the law requires
us to assume the record would support the court’s rulings, which means
we must assume the record would not support Sagmit’s specific arguments
against the court’s rulings. See Kohler, 211 Ariz. at 108 ¶ 8 n.1.

¶15 Moreover, nothing in the available record suggests Sagmit
did not receive notice and an opportunity to be heard. Sagmit had notice
of the evidentiary hearing. The court set the hearing at his request,
notifying him of its time and date. Sagmit appeared at the hearing. The
court heard Sagmit’s testimony and considered evidence he offered. On
this record, we cannot say Sagmit demonstrated he was denied due process
at the evidentiary hearing.

CONCLUSION

¶16 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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