SHARADA HOMES v. NORDINI

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

SHARADA HOMES LLC, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellees,

v.

PAOLO D. NORDINI, Defendant/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 26-0010
FILED 10-19-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2025-034970
The Honorable Jason Easterday, Judge Pro Tempore

VACATED AND REMANDED

APPEARANCES

Hull, Holliday & Holliday P.L.C., Phoenix
By Matthew R. Schlabach, Denise M. Holliday, Kevin W. Holliday
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellees

Paul D. Nordini, Scottsdale
Defendant/Appellant

SHARADA HOMES et al. v. NORDINI
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the Court’s decision, in
which Judge Anni Hill Foster and Vice Chief Judge David D. Weinzweig
joined.

W I L L I A M S, Judge:

¶1 Defendant Paulo D. Nordini (“Tenant”) appeals the superior
court’s order finding him guilty of special detainer and awarding damages
to Plaintiff Sharada Homes LLC (“Landlord”). For the following reasons,
we vacate the judgment and remand for a new initial hearing.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Landlord leased residential property to Tenant for a two-year
term. When the lease ended, the tenancy became month-to-month.
Landlord filed this action for special detainer, alleging Tenant had failed to
pay rent as required under the lease. Landlord sought immediate
possession of the property and damages for outstanding rent, late fees,
utilities, court costs, and attorneys’ fees.

¶3 Tenant did not answer the complaint and removed the action
to bankruptcy court. When that court remanded the case, the superior court
set a hearing.

¶4 The morning of the hearing, Tenant filed a motion to dismiss,
requesting in the alternative leave to file counterclaims. He alleged
possession was not at issue because he had returned the premises to
Landlord and urged the superior court to dismiss the complaint and direct
Landlord to file an amended complaint including only its claims for
monetary damages, not possession of the property. Tenant also asked the
court for leave to file counterclaims for “breach of lease, breach of [the
covenant of] good faith and fair dealing, breach of [the] covenant of quiet
enjoyment, retaliatory conduct and bad faith, constructive eviction,
negligence, and other federal claims . . . in excess of $100,000 . . .”

¶5 The superior court denied Tenant’s request to plead
counterclaims, finding the claims Tenant proposed were not permitted by
statute in a special detainer action. The court also ruled that Tenant had not
presented a legal basis for a defense to the complaint and therefore a trial
was not necessary. It found Tenant had not denied the rent was unpaid, and

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Decision of the Court

thus, he was responsible for special detainer. The court directed Landlord
to submit a proposed form of judgment. The court signed the judgment
later that day.

¶6 Tenant timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Article 6,
Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶7 Tenant contends the superior court erred by concluding that
no trial was required and by entering immediate judgment for Landlord.
He asserts the judgment lacked competent supporting evidence, and the
court denied Tenant due process by not affording him an opportunity to
object to it. Tenant also argues the court erred by refusing to permit him to
file his counterclaims. We review due process issues, as well as the
interpretation of statutes and court rules, de novo. In re Savord v. Morton, 235
Ariz. 256, 259–60, ¶ 16 (App. 2014); Iverson v. Nava, 248 Ariz. 443, 448, ¶ 10
(App. 2020).

A. The Superior Court Erred by Entering Judgment for
Landlord.

¶8 A landlord may bring a special detainer action when a tenant
does not comply with a rental agreement. A.R.S. §§ 33-1368, -1377; Keenen
v. Biles, 199 Ariz. 266, 267, ¶ 5 (App. 2001). The proceeding is designed to
“afford a summary, speedy and adequate remedy for obtaining possession
of the premises withheld by a tenant.” Olds Bros. Lumber Co. v. Rushing, 64
Ariz. 199, 204 (1946).

¶9 The court must hold an initial hearing within 3 to 6 days after
the date of the summons. A.R.S. § 33-1377(B). Although a defendant is
required to file an answer before the hearing date, see Rules of Procedure
for Eviction Actions (“RPEA”) 7, failing to do so does not prevent the
defendant from disputing the allegations at the hearing. RPEA 11(c)(1), (2).
Even if no answer is filed, the judge must still determine whether the
defendant has raised a valid legal defense if the defendant appears and
contests the complaint. RPEA 11(c)(1). The judge may do this by reviewing
the answer, if one exists, or by questioning the defendant in open court. Id.
If the court determines that a defense or proper counterclaim may exist, it
must order a trial on the merits. Id.

¶10 Landlord filed a complaint seeking $50,057 in rent, late fees,
court costs, and attorneys’ fees. Tenant did not answer. At the initial
hearing, in accordance with the RPEA, the superior court asked Tenant

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whether he contested the allegations in the complaint and, if so, which
factual or legal allegations he contested. RPEA 11(b)(3), (c)(1). Tenant
responded, “Absolutely, Your Honor. . . . I do contest the damages that
[Landlord] is seeking.” See RPEA 13(c)(2) (explaining that upon proof of a
factual and legal basis, the court may award “rent or any reasonable late
fees, attorney fees or other requested fees, charges or damages”). Tenant
affirmed that he had vacated the property, asserted that the amount of rent
due was at issue, and asked the court for the opportunity to respond to the
complaint.

¶11 The superior court found that a trial was not necessary
because Tenant had not denied the rent was unpaid and concluded there
was no legal basis for a defense to the complaint. The court’s ruling
contradicts the hearing record, as Tenant stated he disputed the allegations
in the complaint—specifically, the amount of rent owed. Indeed, if a
“defendant appears and contests any of the factual or legal allegations in
the complaint[,] . . . the judge should determine whether there is a basis for
a legal defense to the complaint either by reviewing a written answer . . . or
by questioning the defendant in open court.” RPEA 11(c)(1).

¶12 The court should have questioned Tenant further about the
factual or legal basis for Tenant’s assertion that the amount of rent owed
was in dispute. See Ashley Real Est. LLC v. Rubin Blattman, 1 CA-CV 20-0249,
2021 WL 871759, at *3, ¶ 16 (Ariz. App. Mar. 9, 2021) (as amended) (mem.
decision) (explaining the RPEA required the superior court to determine
whether defendant had any basis for a legal defense to landlord’s claim
where defendant appeared in a forcible entry and detainer action, entered
a not-guilty plea, and expressly disputed the complaint’s allegations); cf.
Flake v. Silva, 1 CA-CV 24-0871, 2025 WL 2452213, at *4, ¶¶ 24–25 (Ariz. App.
Aug. 26, 2025) (as amended) (mem. decision) (finding error in the entry of
judgment as a matter of law against defendant who presented a fact issue
by pleading in his answer and counterclaim that landlord failed to maintain
the property).1 Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand for a new
initial hearing.

¶13 Because we vacate the judgment, we need not consider
Tenant’s argument that the superior court erred by signing Landlord’s
proposed form of judgment without allowing Tenant an opportunity to
review the supporting evidence and without reviewing the evidence itself.

1 Although these memorandum decisions issued after January 1, 2015 are

not “precedential,” we cite them for their persuasive value. Ariz. R. Sup. Ct.
111(c)(1)(C).

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We note, however, Landlord admits that a portion of the evidence it
submitted with the proposed form of judgment pertained to a separate
matter and therefore did not properly support its attorneys’ fees request.

B. The Superior Court Should Have Allowed Tenant to Assert
Counterclaims.

¶14 Because a special detainer action is designed to allow a
landlord to quickly and summarily obtain possession of a premises
wrongly withheld by a tenant, Olds Bros. Lumber, 64 Ariz. at 204, it is
generally limited to the right of possession, as well as any damages,
attorneys’ fees, and court costs owed to the landlord. Iverson, 248 Ariz. at
448, ¶ 12; A.R.S. §§ 33-1368(C), -1377(D). “Unless specifically provided for
by statute, no counterclaims, cross claims, or third party claims may be filed
. . . .” RPEA 8(a).

¶15 In an action arising from nonpayment of rent, however, a
tenant may counterclaim for any amount recoverable under the rental
agreement if the landlord has not complied with its obligations under either
the rental agreement or Arizona law. A.R.S. § 33-1365(A); RPEA 8(d);
Iverson, 248 Ariz. at 448, ¶ 12; Mead, Samuel & Co., Inc. v. Dyar, 127 Ariz. 565,
569 (App. 1980) (noting the only tenant counterclaims that are permissible
in a special detainer action are those that have a specific basis in the rental
agreement or in the landlord-tenant act). A tenant is not permitted to assert
a counterclaim that merely arises in a broad or general way from the
landlord-tenant relationship. Id.

¶16 Tenant requested leave to plead counterclaims for breach of
lease, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment, retaliatory conduct and bad faith, constructive
eviction, negligence, and other unidentified federal claims. The superior
court concluded that Tenant was attempting to raise counterclaims
grounded in federal disability law that are not permitted in a special
detainer action. However, claims for breach of lease and breach of the
covenant of good faith may arise from a lease agreement or the statutes
governing landlord-tenant relations. A.R.S. §§ 33-1311, -1324, -1365; see also
Matthews v. Bridge III AZ Onnix LLC, 1 CA-CV 21-0700, 2022 WL 16842437,
at *4, ¶¶ 24–25 (Ariz. App. Nov. 10, 2022) (mem. decision) (explaining the
justice court had jurisdiction to consider tenant’s counterclaims for breach
of lease and bad faith filed under the Arizona Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act); Iverson, 248 Ariz. at 448, ¶ 14 (holding the superior court had
jurisdiction over counterclaim for breach of the covenant of good faith and

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fair dealing under A.R.S. § 33-1311 to the extent it was based on the lease
agreement).

¶17 Accordingly, on remand the superior court should determine
whether any of Tenant’s counterclaims are appropriate. RPEA 11(c)(1) (“If
the court determines that a defense or proper counterclaim may exist, the
court shall order a trial on the merits.”).

CONCLUSION

¶18 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the judgment and
remand to the superior court for a new initial hearing.

¶19 Landlord requests an award of attorneys’ fees on appeal
pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-341.01, 33-1368(C), 33-1377(D), and the parties’
lease agreement. Because Landlord has not prevailed on appeal, we deny
its request.

¶20 Tenant requests an award of attorneys’ fees on appeal
pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01. Tenant—an attorney who represented
himself in this matter—has not shown that he incurred any attorneys’ fees.
Accordingly, we deny his request. Lisa v. Strom, 183 Ariz. 415, 419 (App.
1995) (explaining self-represented attorney may not recover an award of
attorneys’ fees unless he or she has a genuine financial obligation to pay
such fees). Tenant is awarded his costs on appeal upon his compliance with
ARCAP 21.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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