PSG ENERGY v. BERECKIS

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

PSG ENERGY GROUP LLC, Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

JOHN W. BERECKIS, et al., Defendants/Appellants.

No. 1 CA-CV 26-0016
FILED 11-10-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2024-011075
The Honorable Gregory Como, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART, MODIFIED IN PART AND
REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

COUNSEL

Lorber, Greenfield & Olson, LLP, Phoenix
By Louis W. Horowitz
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee

Enara Law, PLLC, Scottsdale
By Ross P. Meyer
Counsel for Defendants/Appellants

PSG ENERGY v. BERECKIS, et al.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Daniel J. Kiley delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding
Judge Andrew M. Jacobs and Chief Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

K I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Certain business disputes between John Bereckis (“John”) and
PSG Energy Group, LLC (“PSG”) went to arbitration.1 PSG won, and the
arbitrator awarded it over $200,000 in attorney fees and related expenses.
PSG then filed an application in superior court to confirm the arbitration
award, obtaining a judgment in its favor.

¶2 When PSG tried to collect on the judgment, John and his wife
Jennifer Bereckis (“Jennifer”) asserted, among other things, that PSG was
not entitled to execute upon assets of their marital community because
Jennifer was not a party to either the arbitration or the subsequent
confirmation proceedings. PSG then brought a declaratory judgment action
against John and Jennifer to determine the marital community’s liability.
The superior court ruled in PSG’s favor. John and Jennifer appeal. We
affirm the declaratory judgment as modified.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3 In 2016 and 2017, John and a limited liability company he
owned, Universal Solar of America (“Universal”), entered a series of
agreements with PSG, including contracts to consult on three solar energy
projects. Each of the contracts contained a clause mandating arbitration of
any disputes.

¶4 A dispute over payment arose, and John filed a demand for
arbitration, asserting breach of contract and other claims. PSG, in turn,
asserted counterclaims alleging unjust enrichment and other theories of
recovery.

¶5 While the arbitration was underway, the parties stipulated to
add Universal as a claimant based on evidence that at least some of the
contracts identified Universal as a party. In testimony, however, John

1 To avoid confusion, we respectfully refer to parties who share a last name

by their first names.

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admitted, “I and Universal [sic] are the same—for legal purposes we’re one
and the same[.]”

¶6 After the evidentiary hearing, the arbitrator issued a decision
finding that neither John and Universal, on one hand, nor PSG, on the other,
had established entitlement to the damages they claimed. Determining that
PSG was the prevailing party, the arbitrator entered an award (the
“Arbitration Award”) denying all damage claims and awarding PSG
arbitration expenses, attorney fees and costs totaling $210,556.31, for which
John and Universal were jointly and severally liable.

¶7 PSG filed a confirmation action in superior court against John
and Universal, seeking confirmation of the Arbitration Award under A.R.S.
§ 12-3022. See John Bereckis et al. v. PSG Energy Group, LLC, Maricopa County
Superior Court Case No. CV2023-000956.2 John and Universal failed to
answer or otherwise respond, and the court entered a default judgment (the
“Confirmation Judgment”) against them that confirmed the Arbitration
Award, including “[t]he award to [PSG] in the amount of $210,556.31 for
fees, costs and expenses.”

¶8 After entry of the Confirmation Judgment, John and
Universal moved to set it aside, a request that the superior court denied.

¶9 To recover the sums awarded in the Confirmation Judgment,
PSG garnished a bank account John and Jennifer owned. They objected,
asserting that PSG could not recover from the assets of their marital
community because Jennifer was not a party to the arbitration or to the
confirmation action.

¶10 PSG then filed a declaratory judgment action against John and
Jennifer, seeking a declaration that John’s business dealings with PSG, and
his assertion of claims against PSG in arbitration, were undertaken for the
benefit of the Bereckis marital community, and therefore that the marital
community was liable for the $210,556.31 sum awarded in the Confirmation
Judgment. After motion practice and a bench trial, the superior court issued
a judgment (the “Declaratory Judgment”) determining that (1) the
“business dealings” that John and Universal had with PSG “all inured to
the benefit of the [Bereckis] marital community”; (2) “[John’s] initiation of,
and participation in, the arbitration proceeding with PSG was done on

2 Although PSG filed the confirmation action, it designated itself the
defendant and John and Universal the plaintiffs, evidently because John
and Universal were the claimants in the arbitration proceedings.

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behalf of the [Bereckis] marital community”; and (3) Section 25-215(D) did
not require PSG to name Jennifer as a party to the confirmation action. As a
result, the court concluded, “any judgment for attorney fees, costs or
discovery sanctions in favor of PSG” in the arbitration proceedings or the
confirmation action could properly be “collected against the [Bereckis]
marital community.”

¶11 John and Jennifer timely appealed. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12–120.21, -1837, and -2101(A)(1).

APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

¶12 The Bereckises challenge the Declaratory Judgment, arguing
that it is based on errors of both law and fact.

¶13 On appeal from a judgment, we review the superior court’s
legal conclusions, including its interpretation of statutory terms, de novo.
Stambaugh v. Killian, 242 Ariz. 508, 509, ¶ 7 (2017). We will affirm the
superior court’s factual findings after a bench trial unless clearly erroneous,
viewing the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the judgment.
Town of Florence v. Florence Copper Inc., 251 Ariz. 464, 468, ¶ 20 (App. 2021).
Even if the evidence conflicts, a factual finding is not clearly erroneous if it
is supported by evidence sufficient for a reasonable person to reach the
same conclusion. See In re Marriage of McCulloch and Parker, 257 Ariz. 195,
199, ¶ 9 (App. 2024) (“A finding of fact is not clearly erroneous if it is
supported by substantial evidence—that is, evidence sufficient for a
reasonable person to reach the same result.” (citation omitted)); Meno’s
Construction, L.L.C. v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 246 Ariz. 521, 524, ¶ 10 (App.
2019) (“A finding of fact is not clearly erroneous if substantial evidence
supports it, even if substantial conflicting evidence exists.” (citation
omitted)).

¶14 Section 25-215 provides in part that, with limited exceptions
inapplicable here, “either spouse may contract debts and otherwise act for
the benefit of the community.” A.R.S. § 25-215(D). Additionally, “[i]n an
action on such a debt or obligation the spouses shall be sued jointly[.]” Id.
Joining spouses in an action on a community debt or obligation protects
each spouse’s due process rights by giving each “notice and an opportunity
to defend.” Vikse v. Johnson, 137 Ariz. 528, 530 (App. 1983); see also Nat’l
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Greene, 195 Ariz. 105, 110, ¶ 20 (App. 1999) (holding
that due process entitled defendant’s non-party spouse to an “opportunity
to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner before she
can be deprived of her interest in the community property.” (citation

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modified)). A plaintiff’s failure to join a defendant’s spouse in an action on
a community debt bars the plaintiff from recovering from the defendant’s
marital community. Eng v. Stein, 123 Ariz. 343, 345-46 (1979).

¶15 An arbitration award may not be enforced until it is entered
as a judgment under Section 12-1514. Upon timely motion of a party to an
arbitration proceeding, the court must vacate an arbitration award if the
award was the result of corruption, fraud, partiality or other misconduct by
the arbitrator, if the arbitrator exceeded his powers, or if the manner in
which the arbitrator conducted the proceedings “prejudiced substantially
the rights of a party.” A.R.S. § 12-3023(A).

¶16 Arizona’s Declaratory Judgments Act allows courts to
“declare rights, status, and other legal relations” between parties, with
“such declarations” having “the force and effect of a final judgment or
decree.” A.R.S. § 12-1831.

DISCUSSION

I. PSG’s failure to join Jennifer as a party to the confirmation action
does not bar PSG from reaching assets of the Bereckis marital
community to satisfy the Confirmation Judgment.

¶17 The Bereckises argue that the superior court erred in
determining that their marital community was liable for the Judgment
because “Jennifer was never a party to the proceeding that created the
obligation now being enforced against her community.” PSG should have
named Jennifer as a party to the confirmation action, they maintain, if PSG
intended to hold the Bereckis marital community bound by the resulting
judgment. Had Jennifer been named as a party to the confirmation action,
they go on, she would have had a “full opportunity to contest” the
Arbitration Award before the Confirmation Judgment was entered. By
failing to name her as a party to the confirmation action, they contend, PSG
“deprived [Jennifer] of the procedural rights she was entitled to [exercise]
before her community’s assets were declared bound.” The Declaratory
Judgment should be vacated, they argue, and PSG should be required to
file a new confirmation action at which Jennifer will have “the right to
contest the award’s confirmation” on any statutorily-recognized ground.

¶18 The Bereckises’ argument cannot be reconciled with Lattin v.
Shamrock Materials, LLC, 252 Ariz. 352 (2022). In that case, a married woman,
Lattin, sued a defendant in a case to which her husband, DeRuiter, was not
a party. After the defendant prevailed, the court entered an award of
attorney fees in its favor. When the defendant attempted to collect the fee

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award by garnishing the couple’s joint bank account, the trial court quashed
the garnishment, finding that the Lattin/DeRuiter marital community
could not be held liable because DeRuiter was not a party to the underlying
case. Id. at 353-54, ¶¶ 2-4. On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court reversed,
holding that DeRuiter’s status as a non-party to the underlying case did not
bar the defendant from reaching assets of the Lattin/DeRuiter marital
community property to collect the fee award entered in its favor. Id. at 356,
¶ 15.

¶19 The Lattin court acknowledged that Section 25-315(D)
generally requires the joinder of the marital community when bringing “a
cause of action based on a community debt or obligation that can result in
a damage award.” Id. at 354, ¶ 10. The court held, however, that “a request
for attorney fees and costs after successfully defending a lawsuit is not itself
a cause of action,” and a fee award is not a “debt” for purposes of Section
25-315(D). Id. at ¶¶ 11-12. “[U]ntil the trial court enters a judgment for
attorney fees and costs for the defendant,” the Lattin court observed, “there
is no debt or obligation to sue on.” Id. at ¶ 11.

¶20 Acknowledging that due process entitled DeRuiter to “the
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner”
before being “deprive[d] . . . of his interest in” the couple’s joint bank
account, the Lattin court held that DeRuiter was afforded that opportunity
when the defendant garnished the account. Id. at 355, ¶ 14 (citations
omitted). Upon receiving notice of the garnishment, the court held,
DeRuiter was able to “intervene in the garnishment proceedings to argue
that the debt [was] Lattin’s alone.” Id. The Lattin court concluded that the
trial court erred by quashing the garnishment because “neither § 25-215(D)
nor due process requires a defendant seeking an award of attorney fees and
costs from a married plaintiff to join the plaintiff’s spouse in the lawsuit to
entitle it to later execute a judgment against community assets.” Id. at 356,
¶ 15.

¶21 Lattin makes clear that Section 25-315(D) does not bar
recovery, from community assets, of a judgment for attorney fees obtained
against only one of the spouses. Id. Further, Lattin holds that the non-party’s
due process rights are adequately protected as long as that spouse is given
an opportunity to defend against subsequent efforts to collect the judgment
from community assets. Id. In keeping with Lattin, we reject the Bereckises’
argument that Jennifer’s status as a non-party to the arbitration proceeding
and the confirmation action now precludes PSG from seeking to execute on
the monetary provisions of the Confirmation Judgment. Instead, Jennifer
was afforded the due process to which she was entitled when she was

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named as a defendant in the declaratory judgment action and given an
opportunity to defend her interest in the property from which PSG sought
to recover. See id. at 355-56, ¶¶ 13-15.

¶22 In an effort to distinguish Lattin, John and Jennifer point out
that the fee award in that case was not entered until the conclusion of the
suit that Lattin had filed. Here, by contrast, the Arbitrator’s Award,
including its monetary provision, had been issued before PSG filed the
confirmation action. According to the Bereckises, the monetary provision
of the Arbitration Award constituted a “debt” owed to PSG before it filed
the confirmation action, and therefore Section 25-315(D) required PSG to
name Jennifer as a party to confirmation action.

¶23 This distinction is not persuasive. PSG was not entitled to
collect the $210,556.31 sum awarded by the arbitrator until the Arbitration
Award was reduced to judgment in the confirmation action. See A.R.S. § 12-
1514 (providing that an arbitration award may “be enforced as any other
judgment or decree,” but only “[u]pon the granting of an order confirming,
modifying or correcting [it].”). Because PSG was not entitled to collect the
sum until entry of the Confirmation Judgment, Lattin’s holding—i.e., that a
plaintiff against whom attorney fees and costs are assessed owes no “debt”
under Section 25-315(D) “until the trial court enters a judgment,” 252 Ariz.
at 355, ¶ 11—controls here.

¶24 The Bereckises further argue that PSG admitted that the
monetary provisions of the Arbitration Award constituted a “debt,” and
therefore that PSG, and the superior court, were bound by that admission.
In support of their position, they point out that PSG used the word “debt”
in its complaint for declaratory relief—which stated, inter alia, that the
Arbitration Award constituted a “debt” that was “incurred on behalf of the
marital community”—and that PSG’s counsel used the word again when
he argued, at a hearing in the declaratory judgment action, that “the final
award is what was issued by the arbitrator. That’s the debt.” According to
the Bereckises, PSG’s repeated use of the word “debt” when referring to the
monetary provision of the Arbitration Award constitutes a binding judicial
admission that the $210,556.31 sum set forth in the Arbitration Award was
a “debt” within the meaning of Section 25-315(D). The superior court erred,
they conclude, by relying on Lattin “to nullify [PSG’s] admissions.”

¶25 We are not persuaded by the Bereckises’ contention that
PSG’s repeated use of the word “debt” determines the application and
scope of Section 25-315(D) in this case. Parties may stipulate to facts, but
they may not stipulate to the law. State v. Boggs, 103 Ariz. 328, 331 (1968)

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(“[A]lthough parties . . . may stipulate respecting facts they cannot
properly stipulate what the law is that is to govern their case[,] . . . as it is
the duty of the court to decide the applicable law.”). A party’s incorrect
statement of law thus cannot bind the court. See Stonecreek Bldg. Co. v. Shure, 216 Ariz. 36, 37, ¶ 5 n. 3 (App. 2007) (“This court is not bound by a
stipulation of the parties as to the law[.]”). Lattin holds that an award of
attorney fees is not a “debt” under Section 25-315(D), at least when the
award had not yet been reduced to judgment. 252 Ariz. at 355, ¶ 11. That
holding controls here. See Boggs, 103 Ariz. at 331; see also 8100 North Freeway,
Ltd. v. City of Houston, 363 S.W.3d 849, 852, 856 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012) (holding,
in adult business operator’s challenge to constitutionality of municipal
ordinance, that municipality was not bound by its employee’s incorrect
testimony about “the reach of the ordinance”; “A court . . . is not bound by
a witness’s incorrect statements of the law.”).

¶26 Acknowledging that parties’ admissions cannot bind the
court on questions of law, John and Jennifer nonetheless insist that PSG’s
use of the word “debt” constitutes an admission of fact, not of law. We
disagree. The facts surrounding the award of fees and expenses set forth in
the Arbitration Award and confirmed in the Confirmation Judgment—the
amount of the award, for example, and the fact that it was assessed against
John as well as against Universal—were never in dispute. The only dispute
about the award of fees and expenses is whether it constituted a “debt”
within the meaning of Section 25-315(D). Resolving that question requires
an interpretation of statute and case law, and so is not a question of fact
about which parties can make binding admissions. State v. Stone, 151 Ariz.
455, 460 (App. 1986) (“Parties cannot properly bind the court as to the law
governing their case or applicable to a given state of facts.”). The superior
court properly rejected the Bereckises’ argument that PSG’s imprecise
statements during the underlying proceedings required the superior court
to interpret “debt” in a manner incompatible with Lattin’s holding.

¶27 In their reply brief, the Bereckises argue that PSG’s failure to
name Jennifer as a party to the confirmation action violated her due process
rights, and that the violation was not cured when PSG named her as a party
to the declaratory judgment action. Had she been named as a party to the
confirmation action, they contend, she would have been entitled to
challenge the confirmation of the Arbitration Award by raising “any of the
grounds enumerated in A.R.S. § 12-3023.” By waiting until after the
Confirmation Judgment was entered to file a declaratory judgment action
naming Jennifer as a party, the Bereckises argue, PSG limited her to
challenging only whether “the arbitration was conducted on behalf of the
marital community.” As a result, they maintain, Jennifer had been denied a

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meaningful opportunity to challenge the arbitrator’s decision. She was not
permitted to “contest . . . the award’s validity,” they assert, but merely “her
community’s obligation to satisfy it.”

¶28 The Bereckises’ argument is unavailing. First, they waived it
because they didn’t raise it in their opening brief, see Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr.
Co. v. Pheasant Grove LLC, 245 Ariz. 325, 330, ¶ 17 n. 5 (App. 2018), or in the
declaratory judgment proceedings in superior court, see State v. LeBrun, 222
Ariz. 183, 186 (App. 2009) (holding that appellant waived due process claim
by failing to raise it in trial court).

¶29 Second, Jennifer has never raised any challenge under Section
12-3023 to the validity of the Arbitration Award or the Confirmation
Judgment. She has never alleged, for example, that the Arbitration Award
was “procured by corruption,” A.R.S. § 12-3023(1), that the arbitrator was
biased, A.R.S. § 12-3023(2)(a), or that the arbitrator “refused to consider
evidence material to the controversy.” A.R.S. § 12-3023(3).3 Jennifer cannot
establish her right to relief on appeal based on the purported denial of an
opportunity to raise an argument she never tried to raise in the first place.
See Walsh v. Walsh, 230 Ariz. 486, 494, ¶ 24 (App. 2012) (stating that an
appellant cannot secure reversal based on showing of error absent
prejudice, which “must appear affirmatively from the record.” (citation
omitted)). In the absence of any indication that Jennifer ever sought to
challenge the Arbitration Award under Section 12-3023, the Bereckises are
entitled to no relief on their claim that PSG’s failure to join Jennifer as a
party to the confirmation action prejudiced her by denying her the
opportunity to raise such a challenge. See id.

3 At oral argument, counsel for the Bereckises asserted that John raised a

Section 12-3023 challenge to the Arbitration Award in the confirmation
proceedings when he moved (albeit unsuccessfully) to vacate the
Confirmation Judgment on the basis that the arbitrator purportedly
“exceeded his powers,” A.R.S. § 12-3023(A)(4), by awarding attorney fees
to PSG even though PSG did not support its application with billing records
or time sheets pursuant to Schweiger v. China Doll Restaurant, 138 Ariz. 183
(1983). John’s motion to vacate the Confirmation Judgment is not in the
record before us. In any event, nothing in the record before us suggests that
Jennifer has ever raised a Section 12-3023 challenge to the Arbitration
Award.

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II. Record evidence supports the superior court’s finding that the
monetary award set forth in the Confirmation Judgment is a debt
of the Bereckis marital community.

¶30 The Bereckises argue the superior court erred in finding that
John was acting for the benefit of his marital community when he initiated
and pursued the arbitration proceedings. According to the Bereckises, the
evidence in the record established that John was acting on behalf of
Universal when he pursued claims in the arbitration proceedings. The mere
fact that John was the sole owner of Universal, they maintain, does not
establish that actions John took on behalf of Universal were also undertaken
on behalf of his marital community.

¶31 Ample evidence in the record supports the superior court’s
determination that John was acting on behalf of the marital community
when he arbitrated claims against PSG. It is undisputed that all of the work
for which John and Universal contracted with PSG was performed while
John and Jennifer were married; indeed, their 30-year marriage predated
the PSG contracts by over two decades. John testified that he formed
Universal using community property, and that he is its sole owner. Any
gains in the value of Universal, therefore, inured to the benefit of the marital
community. Stock v. Stock, 250 Ariz. 352, 355, ¶ 11 (App. 2020) (recognizing
that “the fruits of labor expended during marriage are community
property” (citation omitted)). Moreover, John made numerous statements
during his deposition during the arbitration that would support the finding
that he and Universal have an alter ego relationship. “John Bereckis and
Universal are the same,” he testified, later adding, “I and Universal [sic] are
the same—for legal purposes we’re one and the same[.]” Indeed, John
didn’t even think it necessary to name Universal as a party when he
initiated the arbitration proceedings. He signed the original arbitration
demand in his own name, only later adding Universal as a claimant.
Because at all relevant times John acted as though he personally contracted
with PSG, the superior court cannot be said to have abused its discretion in
determining that John’s business dealings with PSG, and his initiation of
arbitration proceedings, were undertaken for his own benefit, and thus the
benefit of his marital community. See id.

III. The Declaratory Judgment is overbroad.

¶32 In the Declaratory Judgment, the court determined that “any
judgment for attorney fees, costs or discovery sanctions in favor of PSG” in
the arbitration proceedings or the confirmation action could properly be
“collected against the [Bereckis] marital community (emphasis added).”

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The Bereckises take issue with the Declaratory Judgment’s reference to
“discovery sanctions,” asserting that PSG never sought, and therefore the
court could not properly issue, a declaration of the marital community’s
liability for discovery sanctions.

¶33 The Declaratory Judgment does not define the term
“discovery sanctions,” and the record does not make clear what it refers to.
PSG asserts that the term includes multiple sanctions and cost awards
issued over the course of various proceedings. According to PSG, the term
includes the sum of $9,072 that the arbitrator ordered John to pay as a
sanction for his failure, and that of his attorney, to comply with certain
disclosure deadlines.4 (The arbitrator did not include this $9,072 sum in the
$210,556.31 award for fees and expenses set forth in the Arbitration Award.)
Similarly, PSG asserts that the term “discovery sanctions” was intended to
include fees and costs of $4,428.40 that the court in the confirmation action
awarded to PSG in connection with John’s unsuccessful motion to vacate
the Confirmation Judgment.

¶34 We need not determine the intended meaning of the term
“discovery sanctions” as used in the Declaratory Judgment, however,
because the record shows that no such sanctions were within the scope of
the declaratory judgment action.

¶35 In the complaint in the declaratory judgment action, PSG
asked the court to determine that John’s “acts and omissions, including
initiating arbitration against PSG[,] was done . . . on behalf of the marital
community,” and so the marital community was liable for the $210,556.31
award of fees and expenses. PSG’s complaint said nothing about the marital
community’s liability for any discovery sanctions. Likewise, PSG made no
reference to discovery sanctions in the joint pretrial statement that the
parties filed before trial in the declaratory judgment action. And at trial,
PSG told the court, “We’re only asking for the relief that’s set forth in the
complaint, which is essentially a finding that the arbitration was on behalf
of the marital community.” Because PSG sought only a determination that
the Bereckis marital community was liable for the $210,556.31 sum awarded
by the arbitrator and confirmed in the Confirmation Judgment, the
Declaratory Judgment could not properly determine the marital
community’s liability for any additional sums. See Andrews v. Andrews, 126
Ariz. 55, 58 (App. 1980) (“The power of a court to render a valid judgment
is limited by the nature of the suit, and the issues raised by the pleadings.

4 The attorney who represented John at the arbitration is not the same

attorney who represented John and Jennifer in the subsequent proceedings.

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If the court's judgment exceeds those limits it is void.”); see also Diaz-Fonseca
v. Puerto Rico, 451 F.3d 13, 41 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing “the usual rule” that “the
scope of declaratory relief cannot exceed the issues raised by the pleadings
and supported by the evidence.” (citation omitted)).

¶36 Because the declaration of the Bereckis marital community’s
liability for “discovery sanctions” exceeded the relief PSG requested, we
will remand with directions to the superior court to modify the Declaratory
Judgment to delete this sentence:

Pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-1831, declaring that Jennifer Bereckis
does [sic] not need to be named in the arbitration proceeding,
or in CV2023-000956, for any judgment of attorney fees, costs
or discovery sanctions in favor of PSG in those proceedings to
be collected against the marital community.

and to replace it with this sentence:

Pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-1831, declaring that Jennifer Bereckis
did not need to be named in the arbitration proceeding, or in
CV2023-000956, for the judgment of arbitration expenses,
attorney fees, and costs of $210,556.31 in favor of PSG in those
proceedings to be collected against the marital community.

CONCLUSION

¶37 We remand to the superior court to modify the Declaratory
Judgment as directed in Paragraph 36, and otherwise affirm the Declaratory
Judgment.

¶38 Both parties request an award of fees and costs on appeal. In
the exercise of our discretion, we decline to award fees. PSG may recover
costs upon compliance with ARCAP 21.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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