Garcia v. Defrates

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In Re the Matter of:

LORENA GARCIA, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

DUSTIN EARL DEFRATES, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 26-0031 FC
FILED 09-17-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2023-004367
The Honorable J. Justin McGuire, Judge Pro Tempore

VACATED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Jaburg & Wilk, PC, Phoenix
By Laurence B. Hirsch, Ilya Prokopets, David N. Farren
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Dustin Earl DeFrates, Scottsdale
Respondent/Appellant

GARCIA v. DEFRATES
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

B A I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 After Dustin Earl DeFrates (“Father”) and Lorena Garcia
(“Mother”) settled their dissolution case, the superior court entered a
decree using parenting and property-division terms prepared by Mother.
The court found that Father waived his right to provide input on the final
terms based on a deadline prescribed by the settlement agreement. We hold
that the deadline provision is ambiguous, and that the parties’ conduct did
not clarify the ambiguity. We therefore construe the provision against
Mother as its drafter and conclude that the court erred by finding waiver.
We vacate the decree and remand for all proceedings necessary for entry of
a decree consistent with the parties’ settlement agreement.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 The parties married in 2011 and have two children together.
In 2023, Mother filed for dissolution.

¶3 In March 2025, the parties entered a settlement agreement
under Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure (“Rule”) 69 (the “Rule 69
Agreement”). The parties notified the court that they would “work on
preparing and agreeing to final documents (Consent Decree, Property
Settlement Agreement, Parenting Plan) pursuant to the process set forth in”
the Rule 69 Agreement once the court adopted that agreement. The Rule 69
Agreement articulated the plan as:

We [Mother] will prepare the first draft of the final
documents. [Father] will provide comments, in redline,
within 14 calendar days of receipt of the draft documents. If
[Father] does not timely provide comments, [Father] and
[Mother] agree that any objection to the draft documents by
[Father] is automatically waived and the draft documents
provided by [Mother] will be considered final and will be
lodged by the Court as final orders.

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GARCIA v. DEFRATES
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The court promptly approved and adopted the Rule 69 Agreement. The
court then granted several inactive-calendar continuances to permit the
parties to finalize the settlement documents.

¶4 On May 9, 2025, Mother (through counsel) emailed Father
(who was then unrepresented) a draft Parenting Plan, asked him to “review
and provide us with your comments, redlines and proposed revisions as
per the terms of settlement filed with the Court,” and informed him that
“[w]e will be forwarding you drafts of the Appointment Order for the
Parenting Coordinator and the Property Settlement Agreement under
separate cover for your further review.” Father responded by email on June
11, stating that he would “begin my review this week.” He later provided
his feedback on the draft Parenting Plan, which Mother incorporated in a
revised draft that she emailed to him on July 24. She asked him to provide
his feedback on the revised draft within ten days. In a separate email also
sent on July 24, she asked him to review and sign a draft Order Appointing
the Parenting Coordinator “soon.”

¶5 Meanwhile, Mother sent Father a draft Property Settlement
Agreement on July 3. Father did not respond. In her July 24 email sending
the revised draft Parenting Plan, Mother noted Father’s lack of feedback on
the draft Property Settlement Agreement and stated that she was
“await[ing]” it. Father provided no response to either the revised draft
Parenting Plan, the draft Order Appointing the Parenting Coordinator, or
the draft Property Settlement Agreement.

¶6 On August 19, Mother emailed Father that due to his
unresponsiveness, she had moved forward with drafting a Consent Decree,
which she provided “for your review and comment,” and she intended to
lodge the settlement documents with the court “later this week.” Father
responded immediately, asserting that he would need time to have his civil
counsel review the draft Property Settlement Agreement. Accusing Mother
of timing-based gamesmanship, he explained that he had missed the email
transmitting the draft Property Settlement Agreement due to his summer
travel, the email’s provision the day before a holiday, and the high volume
of emails he receives. He further explained that he had seen the email
sending the revised draft Parenting Plan but had deliberately delayed his
review because he intended to look at it in a “block[]” with the property-
settlement terms. He did not discuss that Mother’s email sending the
revised draft Parenting Plan referenced her earlier provision of the draft
Property Settlement Agreement.

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¶7 The next week, Father emailed Mother to say that he had edits
for both the revised Parenting Plan and the draft Property Settlement
Agreement. The parties also scheduled a phone call to discuss the matter.
Father emailed Mother his redlined versions of the Parenting Plan, Property
Settlement Agreement, and Consent Decree on September 2.

¶8 Meanwhile, on August 29, Mother moved the superior court
to enter her draft Consent Decree incorporating her versions of the
Parenting Plan and the Property Settlement Agreement. She argued that
Father had waived his objection rights by failing to act within fourteen days
of receiving each of her drafts. Father objected and moved the court to enter
his versions of the same documents, arguing that the settlement
agreement’s fourteen-day deadline began to run only once he received the
full set of the settlement documents.

¶9 The court granted Mother’s motion, finding that “Father
waived any objections to Mother’s submitted documents by failing to
timely object, pursuant to the terms of their [Rule 69 A]greement.” The
court entered the decree in substantially the form Mother provided. The
court summarily denied Father’s motion for post-judgment relief under
Rule 83.

¶10 Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Arizona
Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 12-2101(A)(2).

DISCUSSION

¶11 Father argues that he provided his objections to Mother’s
draft settlement documents timely under the terms of the Rule 69
Agreement, and that the superior court therefore erred by finding waiver.
Mother argues otherwise. Mother further argues that Father’s waiver was
immaterial because, given that both parties provided their draft documents
to the court, the court implicitly found that Mother’s drafts were more
faithful to the Rule 69 Agreement’s terms.

¶12 To start, we decline Mother’s invitation to impute to the court
an unstated analysis. To be sure, we do not see (and Father does not claim)
that either party invoked Rule 82(a)’s requirement for express findings, so
we may infer findings reasonably supported by the evidence. See Ariz. R.
Fam. L.P. 82(a); Coronado Co. v. Jacome’s Dep’t Store, Inc., 129 Ariz. 137, 139
(App. 1981). But we may engage in such extrapolation only where implied
findings would comport with the express findings and serve as necessary
grounds to sustain the judgment. Id. We should not resort to inference
where it is clear the court intended to rule only on its stated grounds. See

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id.; see also Rinegar v. Rinegar, 231 Ariz. 85, 89, ¶ 19 (App. 2012). That is the
case here. The court found that Father waived his right to object to Mother’s
documents because he failed to act timely. The court therefore did not reach
any substantive analysis, and we will not speculate that it silently did so.

¶13 Accordingly, we examine only whether the court correctly
construed the Rule 69 Agreement to find waiver. We review the court’s
interpretation of the Rule 69 Agreement de novo. See Buckholtz v. Buckholtz, 246 Ariz. 126, 129, ¶ 10 (App. 2019) (Rule 69 agreements are contracts);
Grosvenor Holdings, L.C. v. Figueroa, 222 Ariz. 588, 593, ¶ 9 (App. 2009)
(contracts are reviewed de novo on appeal). We hold that the court erred
by finding waiver under the agreement.

¶14 The goal of contract interpretation is to effectuate the parties’
intent. Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 175 Ariz. 148, 152 (1993). If
the contract language is unambiguous, the inquiry ends. Grosvenor
Holdings, 222 Ariz. at 593, ¶ 9. If the language is ambiguous, however, the
parties’ intent must be discerned by examining external evidence.
Associated Students of Univ. of Ariz. v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 120 Ariz. 100, 104
(App. 1978). “Language is ambiguous when it can reasonably be construed
in more than one sense and such construction cannot be determined within
the four corners of the instrument.” Id. Where language is ambiguous,
“[t]he acts of the parties themselves, before disputes arise, are the best
evidence of the meaning of [the] doubtful contractual terms.” United Cal.
Bank v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 140 Ariz. 238, 266 (App. 1983). But if the
parties’ intent cannot be determined, we will resort to construing the
ambiguous language against its drafter. MT Builders, L.L.C. v. Fisher Roofing,
Inc., 219 Ariz. 297, 302, ¶ 10 (App. 2008).

¶15 Here, the Rule 69 Agreement provided that the parties would
prepare final settlement documents in the form of a Parenting Plan, a
Property Settlement Agreement, and a Consent Decree. The Rule 69
Agreement further specified that Father would waive his right to object to
Mother’s “first draft of the final documents” if he did not act within 14 days
of “receipt of the draft documents.” The parties dispute whether this
language means Father’s response deadline began only when he received a
complete set of the multiple settlement documents, or whether it means he
had staggered response deadlines tied to his receipt of each part of the set.
We hold that the language is reasonably susceptible to either reading, and
the parties’ intent cannot be determined within the confines of the contract.
See Associated Students, 120 Ariz. at 104. Accordingly, we examine the
parties’ pre-dispute conduct. See United Cal. Bank, 140 Ariz. at 266.

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¶16 The parties’ conduct did not clarify their intent. When
Mother sent Father the initial draft Parenting Plan, she asked him to
respond “as per the terms of settlement” and described her intent to
separately send him other documents for his “further review.” She did not
define what she understood “the terms of settlement” to mean, but her
reference to “further review” arguably suggested she expected piecemeal
responses. And Father did ultimately provide a separate response to the
draft Parenting Plan. But he did so well after fourteen days of his receipt,
and Mother made no reference to a fourteen-day deadline either before or
after Father responded.1 Indeed, she integrated his feedback into the draft
without comment almost eleven weeks after her initial missive. Similarly,
when Mother again suggested her expectation of separate responses by
describing herself as “await[ing]” Father’s feedback on the draft Property
Settlement Agreement, she did not refer to any deadline or other
requirement underlying her expectation. And at that point, three weeks
had passed since Father received the draft. Mother then waited more than
three additional weeks to confront Father about delay—and even at that
point did not mention any specific contractual deadline. Nor did she cite
the Rule 69 Agreement or its deadline in asking Father to “review and
comment” on the draft Consent Decree she provided for the first time.

¶17 In sum, the parties’ conduct was not sufficiently consistent to
show their intent under the Rule 69 Agreement. To be sure, in some ways
they acted as though they intended a piecemeal settlement-finalization
process. Specifically, Mother suggested several times that she expected
separate responses, and Father met that expectation one time. But in other
ways, the parties acted as though the Rule 69 Agreement did not apply to
Mother’s trickled-out drafts. Mother let months pass without ever
mentioning or attempting to enforce the agreement’s deadline. On this
record, we cannot say that the parties’ conduct resolved the contract
ambiguity. We cannot discern the parties’ intent.

¶18 We therefore resort to construing the Rule 69 Agreement’s
deadline provision against the contract drafter. See MT Builders, 219 Ariz.

1 When Mother integrated Father’s feedback, she called for him to respond

to the revised draft Parenting Plan within ten days. Father argues that
Mother’s use of a non-fourteen-day deadline shows she did not believe the
contractual deadline applied. But Mother was prescribing a deadline for
second-round revisions—a matter outside of the contract’s contemplation.
Her statement therefore has no bearing on the inquiry before us. The same
is true of her call for Father to respond “soon” to the parenting-coordinator-
appointment document that the settlement agreement did not mention.

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at 302, ¶ 10. Because Mother was the drafter, we must read the agreement
to mean that Father’s deadline to respond to the draft settlement documents
did not start running until he had the complete set. That occurred when he
received the draft Consent Decree on August 19, and he provided feedback
on all the documents exactly fourteen days later.2 Because Father’s
response was timely, the superior court erred by entering Mother’s drafts
based on waiver.

CONCLUSION

¶19 We vacate the decree and remand for all proceedings
necessary for entry of a decree consistent with the parties’ settlement
agreement. We deny Mother’s request for attorneys’ fees on appeal.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

2 We note that even under Mother’s view of the deadline, Father timely

objected to the Consent Decree and Mother prematurely moved for its
entry.

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