Tuanaki v. Ally

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

WILLY ALOHALANI TUANAKI, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

ALLY FINANCIAL INC., Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 26-0036

FILED 07-21-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2024-012762
The Honorable Scott A. Blaney, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Willy Alohalani Tuanaki, Scottsdale
Plaintiff/Appellant

Bradley Arant Boult Cummings, LLP, Birmingham, AL
By Robin-Renee Keys
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Daniel J. Kiley and Judge Veronika Fabian joined.
 TUANAKI v. ALLY
Decision of the Court

J A C O B S, Judge:

¶1 Willy Tuanaki appeals the superior court’s grant of summary
judgment under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 56 in favor of
Ally Capital Corp. d/b/a Ally Bank (“Ally”) and the resulting award of
attorneys’ fees and costs. Because there was no genuine dispute of material
fact under Rule 56(a) as to Ally’s right to enforce a form retail installment
sales contract (the “ Contract”), we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Tuanaki Defaulted Under the Contract, After Which Ally
Repossessed and Sold the Vehicle.

¶2 In May 2019, Tuanaki bought a 2017 Ford Mustang from
Chapman Scottsdale Autoplex, LLC (the “dealership”). To finance the
purchase of the Mustang, Tuanaki executed the Contract with the
dealership. It required him to make 75 monthly payments of $450.70
beginning June 2019. The dealership assigned its rights under the Contract
to Ally.

¶3 Tuanaki made payments to Ally under the Contract for
several years. He defaulted in September 2023 when he stopped making
payments, and by failing to make any payments due thereafter. Ally
notified Tuanaki that his account was delinquent and told him the amount
needed to cure the default.

¶4 Rather than making a monetary payment, Tuanaki mailed
Ally a packet of documents that included an “Instruction Letter” and a
“Declaration of Revocation of Security Interests.” In those documents,
Tuanaki contended he discharged his obligations under the Contract. He
claimed he was rescinding his grant to Ally of a security interest in the
Mustang, thus revoking Ally’s security interest and extinguishing its right
to repossess. On September 15, 2023, Ally rejected those documents as
unacceptable and informed Tuanaki it would reject further such efforts.
Ally also restricted Tuanaki’s account to accept only certified funds.

¶5 In October 2023, Ally sent Tuanaki a notice of default
informing him that he could cure the delinquency under the Contract by
paying $1,026.93, the amount due by November 1, 2023. The notice also
informed Tuanaki that unless he cured his default, Ally might exercise its
“rights under the law,” including “repossessing the [Mustang].”

2
 TUANAKI v. ALLY
Decision of the Court

¶6 Tuanaki did not cure his default. In December 2023, Ally,
through a third-party, repossessed the Mustang. Ally notified Tuanaki it
intended to sell the Mustang unless he redeemed it by paying the full
amount he owed before December 28, 2023, which was $2,350.87. Tuanaki
made no such payments. In February 2024, Ally sold the Mustang for
$7,200 and applied the sale proceeds to the balance that Tuanaki owed
under the Contract. Ally later notified Tuanaki that he owed a deficiency
amount of $10,246.58, after crediting the sale proceeds and related charges.

B. Tuanaki Challenged Ally Bank’s Authority to Enforce the
Contract and Sought Discovery Concerning Ownership and
Securitization of the Debt.

¶7 In May 2024, Tuanaki sued Ally Financial, Inc., asserting
claims for breach of contract, wrongful repossession, fraudulent
concealment, theft of deposit, interference with commerce, and deceptive
practices under 16 C.F.R. § 433.2. Tuanaki alleged Ally Financial, Inc.:
improperly rejected his attempted payment; unlawfully restricted the
methods by which he could make payments; failed to respond to his
requests concerning the ownership and securitization of the Contract;
lacked authority to enforce the debt or repossess the Mustang; and
wrongfully retained interests and proceeds associated with the promissory
note.

¶8 Ally Financial Inc. and Ally answered the complaint, denied
liability, and asserted that Ally — not Ally Financial Inc. — was the proper
party to the action. Ally argued the dealership assigned the Contract to it
shortly after its execution and before any payments became due or any
default occurred. Ally also asserted a counterclaim for the deficiency
balance remaining after the repossession and sale of the Mustang.

¶9 The parties thereafter engaged in discovery. In December
2024, Tuanaki sought documents concerning the ownership, funding,
transfer, servicing, and alleged securitization of the Contract, including
records he contended would establish whether Ally was entitled to enforce
the Contract and repossess the Mustang.

¶10 On April 2, 2025, Ally moved for summary judgment. It
argued that: undisputed evidence established it held the Contract; Tuanaki
defaulted by failing to make the required payment; and the repossession
and sale of the Mustang were authorized by the Contract. Ally further
argued that Tuanaki’s claims concerning his attempted tender of payment,
the alleged securitization of the debt, and Ally’s authority to enforce the

3
 TUANAKI v. ALLY
Decision of the Court

Contract failed as a matter of law. Ally also sought judgment on its
counterclaim for the remaining deficiency balance.

¶11 Two days later, the parties filed a Rule 26(d) statement
concerning a discovery dispute. The parties stated that Tuanaki sought
additional document production concerning the handling, monetization,
and alleged securitization of the Contract, as well as related tax and
accounting records. Ally objected that: certain requested materials
contained confidential or proprietary information; certain requested tax
documents did not exist because the debt had not been cancelled or
forgiven; and other requests exceeded the scope of permissible discovery
or sought information irrelevant to Tuanaki’s claims and defenses. Ally
further advised that it intended to seek a protective order before producing
certain documents to restrict the disclosure of confidential and proprietary
information to third parties.

¶12 On April 10, 2025, the court ruled that Ally was not required
to produce documents that did not exist or were not within its possession,
custody, or control. The court ordered the parties to meet and confer
regarding a proposed protective order before it would address any further
disputes and directed Ally to move for a protective order if the parties were
unable to reach an agreement. Ally later did so, while Tuanaki maintained
that the requested materials were necessary to challenge Ally’s asserted
interest in the debt and its authority to repossess the Mustang.

¶13 On July 8, 2025, the superior court granted Ally’s motion to
strike numerous filings submitted by Tuanaki, including his motion to
compel discovery and opposition to the motion for protective order. The
court found that Tuanaki had “improperly, unilaterally changed the case
captions on his filings without leave of court” and had “improperly,
unilaterally changed the name of the Plaintiff in this case from his own to
ONYX Enterprise Trust” while claiming to act as its “fiduciary.” The court
further found that Tuanaki “continue[d] to file documents with the Court
that lack a legal or factual basis, and in which he asserts legal theories that
have no basis in law, despite prior warnings from the Court,” and had
“unnecessarily expanded these proceedings and wasted the time and
resources of Defendant and this Court with his baseless filings.” The court
thus struck numerous filings and sanctioned Tuanaki, ordering him to
reimburse Ally for the attorneys’ fees and costs it incurred in preparing the
motion to strike.

¶14 Despite that ruling, Tuanaki continued filing documents with
the superior court. On July 14, 2025, he filed amended versions of his

4
 TUANAKI v. ALLY
Decision of the Court

motion to compel discovery and opposition to Ally’s motion for protective
order, along with a supplemental exhibit packet supporting his discovery
requests. He also filed a motion for summary judgment, a motion for
retroactive default judgment, various notices concerning alleged
procedural errors and discovery issues, and additional filings relating to
damages and the ownership of the claims asserted in the action. In the
weeks that followed, Tuanaki filed additional notices, motions, and
responses relating to attorneys’ fees, summary judgment, and case-
management issues. Tuanaki never filed a Rule 56(d) motion, however,
asking to pause summary judgment briefing to seek additional, specified
discovery that would allow him to resist summary judgment.

C. The Court Granted Summary Judgment and Entered
Judgment for Ally.

¶15 On August 19, 2025, the superior court granted Ally’s motion
for summary judgment. The court noted that Tuanaki failed to respond to
the motion and therefore did not controvert Ally’s statement of facts. After
independently reviewing the record, the court found that the dealership
assigned the Contract to Ally, that Ally remained entitled to enforce the
Contract, and that Tuanaki defaulted by failing to make the required
payments. The court further found that the documents Tuanaki submitted
to Ally did not constitute payment under the Contract, that Ally properly
repossessed and sold the Mustang after Tuanaki failed to cure the default,
and that no genuine dispute of material fact existed. The court entered
judgment in Ally’s favor on all claims and counterclaims and deemed
Tuanaki’s remaining motions moot.

¶16 Following entry of summary judgment, Ally moved for
attorneys’ fees and costs. Tuanaki responded by filing a motion to strike
one of Ally’s exhibits, a motion for leave to file an untimely opposition to
the fee application, and an opposition to the fee request. Ally also moved
to designate Tuanaki a vexatious litigant.

¶17 On October 22, 2025, the superior court entered final
judgment. Consistent with its summary judgment ruling, the court entered
judgment in favor of Ally Capital Corp. d/b/a Ally Bank, which the
judgment notes was “erroneously sued as Ally Financial Inc.” The court
entered judgment in favor of Ally on all of Tuanaki’s claims and on Ally’s
breach-of-contract counterclaim. The court awarded Ally $10,246.58 as the
remaining balance owed under the Contract, $63,050.00 in attorneys’ fees
and $7,121.52 in costs as the prevailing party under the Contract and A.R.S.
§ 12-341.01, and an additional $4,320.00 in attorneys’ fees and $435.51 in

5
 TUANAKI v. ALLY
Decision of the Court

costs incurred in connection with Ally’s successful motion to strike. The
court entered a total judgment of $85,173.61 and certified the judgment as
final under Rule 54(c).

¶18 Tuanaki subsequently moved to alter or amend the judgment
under Rules 52(b), 59(d), and 60(a)–(b). In that motion, Tuanaki argued that
the superior court entered judgment before resolving several pending
motions, including his motion to compel discovery, opposition to Ally’s
motion for protective order, opposition to Ally’s application for attorneys’
fees, and opposition to Ally’s motion to designate him a vexatious litigant.
He further asserted that the court improperly granted summary judgment
while discovery disputes remained unresolved, failed to make independent
findings supporting its attorneys’ fees award, and adopted Ally’s proposed
judgment without modification. Tuanaki requested that the court vacate or
amend the judgment, reopen discovery, and adjudicate the motions he
contended remained pending at the time judgment was entered.

¶19 Tuanaki appealed. We have jurisdiction. Ariz. Const. art. 6,
§ 9; A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. The Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment Because Tuanaki
Failed to Identify a Genuine Dispute of Material Fact.

¶20 We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, reviewing
the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Amtrust
Bank v. Fossett, 223 Ariz. 438, 439 ¶ 4 (App. 2009). When a defendant
moving for summary judgment shows that the plaintiff has insufficient
evidence to carry their ultimate burden of proof at trial, the burden shifts to
the non-moving party to present sufficient evidence demonstrating the
existence of a genuine factual dispute as to a material fact. Nat’l Bank of
Ariz. v. Thruston, 218 Ariz. 112, 119 ¶ 26 (App. 2008); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(c),
(e). Moreover, “Rule 56 does not require that discovery be completed
before a court rules on a motion for summary judgment.” Hormel v.
Maricopa County, 224 Ariz. 454, 461 ¶ 29 (App. 2010).

¶21 Tuanaki argues the court prematurely granted summary
judgment because discovery remained pending. He contends the requested
discovery would have shown Ally lacked authority to enforce the Contract
because of alleged assignment or securitization of the debt. Ally responds
that Tuanaki never identified evidence creating a genuine factual dispute,
failed to rebut the undisputed evidence establishing Ally’s right to enforce
the Contract, and never sought relief under Rule 56(d). We agree with Ally.

6
 TUANAKI v. ALLY
Decision of the Court

¶22 First, Tuanaki did not respond to Ally’s motion for summary
judgment disputing the material facts established by Ally’s evidence. The
superior court found Tuanaki failed to timely respond and therefore did
not controvert Ally’s statement of facts.

¶23 Second, the record establishes that Tuanaki executed the
Contract, the dealership assigned the Contract to Ally shortly after
execution, Tuanaki defaulted by failing to make the required payments,
and Ally exercised its contractual remedies after Tuanaki failed to cure the
default. Rather than making the required payments, Tuanaki submitted
self-generated documents that the court found were not a valid form of
payment under the Contract. After Tuanaki failed to cure the default, Ally
repossessed the Mustang, provided the required statutory notices, sold the
vehicle, and applied the sale proceeds to the outstanding balance.

¶24 Tuanaki points to no evidence contradicting those facts. He
identifies no evidence that: the dealership did not assign the Contract to
Ally; he satisfied his payment obligations; or that any alleged securitization
deprived Ally of its right to enforce the Contract. Instead, he relies on
conclusory assertions that discovery might reveal such evidence. But
speculation that evidence may exist is insufficient to defeat summary
judgment. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3)(B).

¶25 Third, while Tuanaki argues the superior court erred by
granting summary judgment while he was seeking discovery, he never
made a request under Rule 56(d) to defer consideration of Ally’s motion for
summary judgment to allow him to obtain specific, necessary discovery
that would create an issue of material fact. Even on appeal, while Tuanaki
asserts that additional discovery would reveal information concerning
“standing,” “entitlement to enforce,” “chain-of-title,” and “securitization,”
he never identifies what evidence he expected to uncover or explains how
it would have created a genuine dispute of material fact.

¶26 As such, Tuanaki’s argument that the superior court ruled
prematurely likewise fails. Although discovery disputes remained
pending, Rule 56 did not require the superior court to postpone ruling on
Ally’s properly supported motion for summary judgment while discovery
continued. See Hormel, 224 Ariz. at 461 ¶ 29. Tuanaki has shown no error
in the superior court’s choice to decide the summary judgment motion
before discovery concluded.

7
 TUANAKI v. ALLY
Decision of the Court

¶27 Tuanaki has shown no genuine dispute of material fact as to
Ally’s right to enforce the Contract. As such, he has failed to show any error
in the court’s grant of summary judgment.

II. The Court Properly Awarded Attorneys’ Fees Because Ally Was
the Successful Party in an Action Arising Out of the Contract.

¶28 Tuanaki argues the court erred by awarding Ally its
attorneys’ fees for the same reasons he argues summary judgment was
improper and because he says the court failed to make sufficient findings
supporting the award. Because Ally prevailed on all claims and
counterclaims arising from the Contract, it was entitled to attorneys’ fees
under the Contract.

CONCLUSION

¶29 We affirm. Ally requests an award of attorneys’ fees on
appeal pursuant to the terms of the Contract, and under A.R.S. § 12-341.01
and ARCAP 21(a)(1). We grant Ally its reasonable attorneys’ fees under the
Contract upon compliance with ARCAP 21.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

8