Opinion text
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
JONAH DORI, Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
OM MANUFACTURING LLC, Defendant/Appellee.
No. 1 CA-CV 26-0046
FILED 09-16-2026
Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
No. S1300CV202500482
The Honorable John David Napper, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Jonah Dori, Phoenix
Plaintiff/Appellant
Rusing Lopez & Lizardi, PLLC, Tucson
By Gerd W. Stabbert, Jr.
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.
B A I L E Y, Judge:
DORI v. OM MANUFACTURING
Decision of the Court
¶1 Jonah Dori appeals the superior court’s dismissal of his
complaint and denial of his motion to amend. For the following reasons,
we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 On April 30, 2025, Dori filed a complaint against OM
Manufacturing LLC (“OM Manufacturing”), alleging he was wrongfully
terminated on April 9, 2023, for “refusing to conduct unsafe and illegal
construction practices.”
¶3 OM Manufacturing moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing
it was barred by the one-year limitations period provided in Arizona
Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 12-541(4). Dori then moved to amend his
complaint to state that he was terminated on April 9, 2024, not April 9, 2023.
OM Manufacturing objected, arguing that the amended complaint would
still be barred by the one-year statute of limitations.
¶4 After holding oral argument, the superior court dismissed
Dori’s complaint as untimely, denied his motion to amend as futile, and
awarded OM Manufacturing its costs. The court found that Dori “was
aware of his termination immediately,” “[h]is claim accrued the date he
[was] terminated,” and he filed suit “[o]ne year and 21 days after he was let
go.”
¶5 Dori timely filed his notice of appeal. We have jurisdiction
under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).
DISCUSSION
I. Sufficiency of Dori’s Notice of Appeal
¶6 In Dori’s notice of appeal, he indicated he was appealing
“from the judgment entered in this case on the 18th day of December 2025.”
But the superior court entered final judgment on December 16, 2025.
Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure (“ARCAP”) 8(c)(3) requires an
appellant to designate the judgment from which he is appealing. However,
“[a] defective notice of appeal does not necessarily deprive [us] of
jurisdiction.” Boydston v. Strole Dev. Co., 193 Ariz. 47, 50, ¶ 12 (1998). The
notice is sufficient “if it is neither misleading nor prejudicial to the
appellee”—which is the case here. See id.; Hanen v. Willis, 102 Ariz. 6, 8-9
(1967) (reinstating an appeal previously dismissed due to the appellant
including the incorrect date in the notice of appeal).
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DORI v. OM MANUFACTURING
Decision of the Court
II. Dori’s Briefing
¶7 We first note that Dori failed to provide a transcript of the
September 22, 2025, oral argument. “When a party fails to include
necessary items, we assume they would support the court’s findings and
conclusions.” Baker v. Baker, 183 Ariz. 70, 73 (App. 1995) (citation omitted);
see also ARCAP 11(c) (listing the appellant’s duty to order transcripts from
the superior court).
¶8 Further, Dori lists five issues in his opening brief but presents
argument on only four—and those arguments contain no legal or record
citations. See ARCAP 13(a)(7) (requiring opening briefs to contain
arguments with “citations of legal authorities and appropriate references to
the portions of the record on which the appellant relies.”). Failure to
develop arguments in an opening brief may waive an appellant’s legal
arguments. Ramos v. Nichols, 252 Ariz. 519, 521, ¶ 1 (App. 2022). Waiver
aside, we address the merits of Dori’s arguments and hold the superior
court correctly dismissed his action.
¶9 Dori first contends the superior court’s ruling contained
“[m]aterial [e]rrors” because it switched the terms “defendant” and
“plaintiff” when referring to the parties. The error Dori identifies appears
in the superior court’s under-advisement findings but is stated correctly in
the final judgment. Further, Dori cites no authority suggesting this error
warrants relief from the superior court’s order, and on this record, we find
no basis for reversal. See Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 27 (“No cause shall be
reversed for technical error in pleadings or proceedings when upon the
whole case it shall appear that substantial justice has been done.”).
¶10 He next argues the superior court erred in denying him leave
to amend. We review questions of law regarding statutes of limitations de
novo, “including when a particular cause of action accrues.” Satamian v.
Great Divide Ins. Co., 257 Ariz. 163, 169, ¶ 11 (2024) (internal quotations and
citations omitted). Section 12-541(4) requires a plaintiff to commence and
prosecute a damages claim for wrongful termination “within one year after
the cause of action accrues.” And “a cause of action accrues . . . when one
party is able to sue another.” Gust, Rosenfeld & Henderson v. Prudential Ins.
Co. of Am., 182 Ariz. 586, 588 (1995). “The ability to sue arises when the act
underlying the legal action occurs, ‘even though the plaintiff may be
unaware of the facts underlying his or her claim.’” Satamian, 257 Ariz. at
170, ¶ 11 (citing Gust, Rosenfeld & Henderson, 182 Ariz. at 588). In other
words, a claim accrues when “a plaintiff knows or, in the exercise of
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DORI v. OM MANUFACTURING
Decision of the Court
reasonable diligence, should know the facts underlying that claim.” Floyd
v. Donahue, 186 Ariz. 409, 412 (App. 1996) (citation omitted).
¶11 To determine when a cause of action accrues requires an
analysis of the elements of the claim presented. Glaze v. Larsen, 207 Ariz.
26, 29, ¶ 10 (2004). Under A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(i), an employee has a
wrongful termination claim when the employer terminates the
employment relationship in retaliation of “[t]he refusal by the employee to
commit an act or omission that would violate the Constitution of Arizona
or the statutes of this state.”
¶12 Here, the facts of the complaint demonstrate that Dori knew
he “was terminated from employment 1 hour after reprimand from the
Owner of OM Manufacturing . . . for reporting and refusing to conduct
unsafe and illegal construction practices as directed by [OM
Manufacturing].” See Liberti v. City of Scottsdale, 258 Ariz. 496, 499, ¶ 3 (App.
2024) (assuming the truth of all the complaint’s well-pleaded facts when
reviewing the superior court’s grant of a motion to dismiss). And contrary
to Dori’s argument, Sato v. Van Denburgh imposes no rule that a claim does
not accrue until the plaintiff knows the defendant’s action “was legally
actionable.” In Sato, our supreme court clarified that a cause of action
accrues when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know “of the
defendant’s negligent conduct,” or “when the plaintiff is first able to sue.”
123 Ariz. 225, 227 (1979). The superior court did not err in finding the date
of accrual to be Dori’s termination date which, even according to the
amended complaint, was too late under A.R.S. § 12-541(4).
¶13 OM Manufacturing requests attorneys’ fees and costs on
appeal pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and 12-349. In our discretion, we deny
OM Manufacturing’s request for fees but award OM Manufacturing its
taxable costs as the prevailing party upon compliance with ARCAP 21.
CONCLUSION
¶14 We affirm.
MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR
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