STROLE v. FAIRGROUNDS

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

SHERRI STROLE, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

FAIRGROUNDS RV LLC, et al., Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 26-0059
FILED 09-15-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
No. S1300CV202401162
The Honorable John David Napper, Judge

VACATED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Sherri Strole, Prescott Valley
Plaintiff/Appellant

Fairgrounds RV LLC
Defendant/Appellee

Mark Wirth, Tempe
Defendant/Appellee

Orchard Ranch Park LLC
Defendant/Appellee

STROLE v. FAIRGROUNDS, et al.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Veronika Fabian delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Michael S. Catlett joined.

F A B I A N, Judge:

¶1 Sherri Strole appeals from the superior court’s judgment
dismissing her complaint with prejudice and awarding appellees $21,255 in
attorney fees and $398.80 in costs. Although the superior court properly
dismissed Strole’s case from the dismissal calendar under Arizona Rule of
Civil Procedure 38.1(d)(2), that rule provides only for a dismissal without
prejudice. Therefore, we vacate the judgment and remand for further
proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Strole is an indigent, self-represented litigant who lives in a
recreational vehicle. In January 2023, she rented a campsite at Fairgrounds
RV Park (“RV Park”). Fairgrounds RV LLC operates the campground. Mark
Wirth is a member of, and the statutory agent for, Fairgrounds. Orchard
Ranch Park LLC is also a named defendant. We refer to the three defendants
together as “Fairgrounds.”

¶3 Shortly after moving to the RV Park, Strole complained about
the condition of her site, and she alleged unauthorized access to her
property. Although Fairgrounds attempted to resolve the issues, Strole was
not satisfied. In late 2024, she filed complaints in three separate forums: a
housing-discrimination complaint with the Arizona Attorney General; a
civil complaint in federal district court; and a civil complaint in the Yavapai
County Superior Court, alleging various causes of action including
violations of the Arizona Fair Housing Act (Count I) and the Arizona
Mobile Home Parks Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (“the mobile
home act”) (Count II).

¶4 Fairgrounds moved to dismiss Strole’s superior court
complaint for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), Ariz. R. Civ. P., in
January 2025. They argued that the superior court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction on three grounds: 1) the Attorney General’s investigation was
still open, thus precluding Count I based on the Fair Housing Act; 2) the

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STROLE v. FAIRGROUNDS, et al.
Decision of the Court

federal case came first; and 3) the mobile home act (Count II) does not apply
to the RV Park. Strole responded in February, defending her complaint and
asking in the alternative for leave to amend under Rule 15(a)(2), Ariz. R.
Civ. P. Fairgrounds timely replied. The court never ruled on Fairgrounds’
motion to dismiss or on Strole’s request to amend her complaint.

¶5 What followed was ten months of filings that did not advance
the case. Strole moved repeatedly to disqualify the assigned judge for cause,
even though the first request, and each subsequent one, was denied after
review by a separate judge who found no evidence of bias. She filed
motions to add new defendants, motions for protective orders, writs of
mandamus, emergency motions, and motions for sanctions. She also
unsuccessfully petitioned this Court for special action relief. But she filed
no disclosure statement, served no discovery, and never submitted a joint
report or proposed scheduling order. Nor did she appear at multiple
hearings intended to move the case forward.

¶6 On July 18, 2025, the superior court issued an order setting the
case for oral argument for July 30 on Strole’s pending requests for
emergency relief and Fairgrounds’ motion to dismiss. Separately on July 18,
the clerk placed the case on the dismissal calendar. This was required under
Rule 38.1(d)(1), Ariz. R. Civ. P., because more than 210 days had elapsed
since Strole filed her complaint and the parties had not yet filed a joint
report and proposed scheduling order under Rule 16(c), Ariz. R. Civ. P. The
notice informed Strole that the case would be dismissed on September 16
unless, among other things: 1) the parties filed a joint report and scheduling
order under Rule 16(c), or 2) Strole showed good cause why the matter
should be continued on the dismissal calendar.

¶7 Strole did not appear at the July 30 hearing. During the
hearing, the court explained it intended to give Strole a chance to provide a
“legal reason” for her absence, noting that another hearing on the motion
to dismiss would be scheduled if she did so, or that her case would be
dismissed if she did not. When counsel for Fairgrounds asked if the
dismissal would be with prejudice, the court replied that it “believe[d] it
would.” After the hearing, the superior court entered a minute entry
denying Strole’s requests for emergency relief without ruling on the motion
to dismiss. The court also (for a second time) placed the matter on the
“Dismissal Calendar for 60 days, after which it will be dismissed unless
there is a filing in the interim explaining the failure to appear at the
hearing.”

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STROLE v. FAIRGROUNDS, et al.
Decision of the Court

¶8 On September 13, Strole filed: 1) a motion to continue on the
dismissal calendar or vacate notice of dismissal, and 2) an amended
response to the motion to dismiss. Fairgrounds subsequently filed a
response to the motion and a reply to the amended response.

¶9 The court did not address Strole’s amended response to the
motion to dismiss. It did, however, issue a minute entry denying her motion
to continue on the dismissal calendar. It further ordered Fairgrounds to file
a proposed judgment and denied all pending motions, presumably
including Fairgrounds’ motion to dismiss, as moot.

¶10 Nothing in the record shows that Fairgrounds filed a
proposed judgment with the court or served it on Strole. Yet the judgment
the superior court eventually signed bore the name of Fairgrounds’ counsel
in the caption. Thus, Fairgrounds’ counsel most likely prepared it. The
signed judgment accurately reflected the court’s decision to deny the
motion to continue on the dismissal calendar. However, the judgment also
added language not found in the minute entry: dismissing the complaint
“with prejudice” and further finding it was “without foundation.”

¶11 Fairgrounds also applied for fees and costs claiming it was the
“prevailing party.” The court’s signed judgment awarded Fairgrounds
$21,255 in fees and $398.80 in costs. Strole timely appealed. Fairgrounds
filed no answering brief.

¶12 We have jurisdiction under Article VI, Section 9 of the
Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶13 Strole raises five issues on appeal: violation of her due process
rights, fraud on the court, abuse of discretion through what she calls
tampering with the record, judicial misconduct and bias, and denial of the
right to counsel.

¶14 Strole’s opening brief does not comply with the Arizona Rules
of Civil Appellate Procedure. It has no table of citations, no specific citations
to the record, and no relevant supporting authority. See Ariz. R. Civ. App.
P. 13(a)(2), (7). Although we could treat every issue as waived on that basis,
see MacMillan v. Schwartz, 226 Ariz. 584, 591 ¶ 33 (App. 2011), in our
discretion, we address the arguments we can identify, specifically, that the
superior court erred in entering the judgment of dismissal with prejudice.

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STROLE v. FAIRGROUNDS, et al.
Decision of the Court

¶15 Fairgrounds filed no answering brief. We may treat that
silence as a confession of reversible error as to any debatable issue Strole
raises, but we are not required to. See Nydam v. Crawford, 181 Ariz. 101, 101
(App. 1994); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 15(a)(2). Consistent with our treatment of
Strole’s potential waiver, we resolve this appeal on the record rather than
on Fairgrounds’ silence.

I. Preliminary Matters.

¶16 Strole requested that transcripts of the superior court
proceedings be provided to her at no cost. This Court denied her request.
While an indigent defendant in a criminal appeal is entitled to have the
county pay for transcripts, see A.R.S. § 13-4034, no such right exists for civil
appeals. As a civil appellant, it is Strole’s responsibility to order and pay for
transcripts. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 11(c)(1), (5).

¶17 Strole also argues she was denied counsel. She asked the
superior court to appoint a lawyer for her, and the court either denied or
never addressed the request. But there is no right to appointed counsel in
an ordinary civil case. Powell v. State, 19 Ariz. App. 377, 378 (1973).

¶18 Additionally, Strole asks us to order repairs, enter injunctions
to prevent defendants from engaging in general misconduct, and hold
various people accountable. We can enter injunctions “necessary and
proper to the complete exercise of [our] appellate jurisdiction,” but that is
not the type of injunction Strole seeks. A.R.S. § 12-120.21(A)(3). Nor can we
provide the other relief she requests. See A.R.S. § 12-2103(A).

II. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Denying Strole’s Motion to
Continue on the Dismissal Calendar.

¶19 The superior court’s minute entry indicates that it was
dismissing the case because Strole failed to show good cause as to why the
matter should be continued on the dismissal calendar. See Ariz. R. Civ. P.
38.1(d)(2). We review the denial of a motion to continue on the dismissal
calendar for an abuse of discretion. See Slaughter v. Maricopa County, 227
Ariz. 323, 326 ¶ 14 (App. 2011). In exercising this discretion, the superior
court may consider, among other things, whether a party has vigorously
pursued her case. Jepson v. New, 164 Ariz. 265, 270 (1990).

¶20 By the time Strole filed her motion to continue, the case had
been pending for ten months due to her continuous filing activity that did
not advance her case. Activity in a case is not the same as prosecuting it. See
Olen v. Couch, 1 CA-CV 24-0180, at *4 ¶¶ 19-21 (Ariz. App. Nov. 26, 2024)

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(mem. decision) (affirming dismissal under Rule 38.1(d) where counsel
pursued discovery and settlement discussions but missed court deadlines).
Strole did not appear at the June 30 status conference, where the court set
argument on all pending motions, and she did not appear at the subsequent
July 30 argument hearing either.

¶21 In her motion to continue, Strole attempted to explain why
she had not attended the July 30 hearing. She asserted that she could not
attend in person because she was without a vehicle and she could not verify
with court staff whether she could attend telephonically. But Strole knew
about the hearing by July 23 and had previously attended hearings via
Teams. She did not explain why she could not have made further attempts
to verify a virtual appearance option in the week before the hearing, or why
she did not file a motion with the court requesting to appear remotely or to
continue the hearing.

¶22 Strole also claimed she was unable to file a joint report and
scheduling order because Fairgrounds’ counsel refused to participate due
to the pending motion to dismiss. Fairgrounds’ refusal to participate might
constitute good cause to continue on the dismissal calendar. However, the
August 18th email from Fairgrounds’ counsel attached to Strole’s motion
says exactly the opposite: “There is no option, the court is requiring the Joint
Report and Scheduling Order by the date in the order. We need to prepare
one.” Therefore, Fairgrounds’ counsel was willing to file a joint report and
scheduling order, which would have removed the case from the dismissal
calendar. Strole, for whatever reason, chose not to.

¶23 Strole did not show good cause for her failure to appear at the
July 30 hearing. Similarly, she did not show that she diligently pursued her
case or provide any other reasons justifying relief. Thus, the superior court
did not err by denying her motion to continue on the dismissal calendar
and by dismissing her case. See Jepson, 164 Ariz. at 270 (no abuse of
discretion in denying a motion to continue on the dismissal calendar where
the plaintiff did not diligently pursue his case).

III. The Superior Court Erred in Dismissing Strole’s Complaint with
Prejudice.

¶24 Although dismissal was proper under Rule 38.1(d)(2), that
rule provides only for a dismissal without prejudice. Here, the judgment
found that the complaint “was without foundation” and dismissed Strole’s
complaint “with prejudice.”

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STROLE v. FAIRGROUNDS, et al.
Decision of the Court

¶25 As noted above, the “without foundation” and “prejudice”
language was not in the court’s minute entry denying Strole’s motion to
continue on the dismissal calendar. Instead, it first appeared in the signed
judgment bearing Fairgrounds’ counsel in the caption. And although the
court had noted at the hearing that it “believed” the dismissal would be
with prejudice during the hearing, such a dismissal is not contemplated
under Rule 38.1(d)(2).

¶26 A dismissal with prejudice was improper here. The only
pending motion to dismiss was one for lack of jurisdiction and thus any
dismissal would be without prejudice. See Chavez v. Indiana for Logansport
State Hosp., 122 Ariz. 560, 562 (1979), abrogated on other grounds by World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), and Burger King Corp.
v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (“Since the dismissal was based on lack of
jurisdiction, and not on the merits, the trial court should have dismissed the
claim without prejudice.”).

CONCLUSION

¶27 Because dismissal with prejudice was improper, we vacate
the judgment, including the fees and costs award, and remand for the
superior court to enter a judgment for dismissal without prejudice. We
leave it to the superior court’s discretion to determine whether an award of
fees and costs is appropriate for a dismissal without prejudice.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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