Camacho v. Brewer

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

BARBARA CAMACHO, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

TORI BREWER, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 26-0072 FC
FILED 07-27-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2025-002448
The Honorable Marischa Hope Gilla, Judge

AFFIRMED

APPEARANCES

Barbara Camacho, Tucson
Petitioner/Appellant

CAMACHO v. BREWER
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Angela K. Paton joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Barbara Camacho appeals from the superior court’s denial of
her petition for in loco parentis visitation. For the reasons below, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Camacho and Tori Brewer (“Mother”) were in a domestic
relationship for about seven years. Mother was pregnant when the
relationship began, and Camacho was present at the birth of Mother’s child
(“Child”) in December 2017. Although the parties never married, Camacho
considered Child to be her own child. Camacho asserts she provided for
Mother and Child financially during the relationship and she stands in loco
parentis as Child’s parent.

¶3 The parties’ relationship ended in 2024. Mother then refused
Camacho’s requests to spend time with Child. Camacho petitioned the
superior court for in loco parentis visitation. The court held an evidentiary
hearing in December 2025, where each party testified, and Camacho
presented letters, pictures, and videos in support of her petition. In its
written ruling, the court denied Camacho’s visitation request.

¶4 Camacho timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under
A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶5 We review a third-party visitation award for an abuse of
discretion, Flanigan v. Kittelson, 260 Ariz. 498, 503, ¶ 10 (App. 2025), and
view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the superior
court’s ruling, In re Marriage of Friedman & Roels, 244 Ariz. 111, 120, ¶ 41
(2018).

¶6 The superior court may grant visitation rights to a person
other than the legal parent “on a finding that the visitation is in the child’s
best interests” and, as pertinent here, the “child was born out of wedlock

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CAMACHO v. BREWER
Decision of the Court

and the child’s legal parents are not married to each other at the time the
petition is filed.” A.R.S. § 25-409(C)(2). The party seeking third-party
visitation bears the burden of showing “by clear and convincing evidence
that the visitation is in the child’s best interests, and the court must find and
explain why the fit parent’s best-interests determination is incorrect.”
Flanigan, 260 Ariz. at 502, ¶ 2.

¶7 “Parents have a fundamental right, protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment, to the ‘care, custody, and control of their
children.’” Borja v. Borja, 254 Ariz. 309, 313, ¶ 8 (App. 2022) (quoting Troxel
v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000)). Arizona courts apply a longstanding
presumption that a fit parent acts in his or her child’s best interests. See
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68; Flanigan, 260 Ariz. at 503, ¶ 12. And “a parent is
presumed to be ‘fit’ until he or she has been adjudicated unfit.” Marriage of
Friedman, 244 Ariz. at 119, ¶ 33. A court’s consideration of a non-parent’s
visitation request must afford “‘some special weight’ to a fit parent’s
determination of whether visitation is in the child’s best interest.”
McGovern v. McGovern, 201 Ariz. 172, 177–78, ¶ 18 (App. 2001) (quoting
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 70). Thus, courts are “not free . . . to simply second-guess
the decision of a fit parent as to visitation rights.” Egan v. Fridlund-Horne,
221 Ariz. 229, 241, ¶ 43 (App. 2009).

¶8 Camacho raises several issues on appeal. First, she argues the
superior court misapplied A.R.S. § 25-409 by denying her visitation request
despite “undisputed evidence” that she served as Child’s parent for most
of Child’s life and shared a parent-child relationship with Child. Second,
she argues the court “improperly gave controlling weight to Mother’s
wishes as a fit parent” without analyzing Child’s best interests. And third,
Camacho claims the court erred by denying her visitation without any
finding that she was unsafe or unfit and by failing to explain how severing
their established parent-child relationship was in Child’s best interests. 1

1 Camacho also contends the superior court failed to provide factual
findings required under Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure 82 because
the court did not explain its conclusion that she presented “no clear
evidence.” Because Camacho did not file a motion requesting findings of
fact and conclusions of law under that rule, we do not address her
contention.

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CAMACHO v. BREWER
Decision of the Court

¶9 As an initial matter, Camacho has not provided a transcript of
the evidentiary hearing,2 and we “presume the items not included in the
appellate record support a trial court’s ruling.” Myrick v. Maloney, 235 Ariz.
491, 495, ¶ 11 (App. 2014). We also note that Mother failed to file an
answering brief, which we may treat as a confession of error. See In re
Marriage of Diezsi, 201 Ariz. 524, 525, ¶ 2 (App. 2002). But we decline to do
so here because a child’s best interests are involved. Id.

¶10 Section 25-401(1) defines “[i]n loco parentis” as “a person who
has been treated as a parent by a child and who has formed a meaningful
parental relationship with a child for a substantial period of time.” The
record supports the superior court’s conclusion that Camacho “acted as a
parental figure for” Child, and that she “has a close historical relationship
with [Child], and that for the first 6-7 years of [Child’s] life she acted in a
parental role.”

¶11 Despite that conclusion, the court found that Mother “is a fit
parent,” and as such, is entitled to the presumption that she acts in
furtherance of Child’s best interests. The court then afforded Mother’s
decision to bar contact between Camacho and Child “special weight
consideration.” It analyzed the requisite factors under A.R.S. § 25-409(E),
found that Mother objected to visitation in good faith and was “not acting
to punish [Camacho] for the end of their romantic relationship.” The court
concluded that Camacho had not established, by clear and convincing
evidence, that visitation was in Child’s best interests.

¶12 Given the limited record before us, which does not include a
transcript of the evidentiary hearing, Camacho has not shown the superior
court abused its discretion in denying her request for in loco parentis
visitation.

2 Camacho filed a motion to accept a narrative statement in lieu of a
transcript under ARCAP 11(d). But an “appellant must file the narrative
statement . . . within 30 days after filing the notice of appeal,” and
Camacho’s motion was untimely. ARCAP 11(d). Therefore, we do not
consider it.

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CAMACHO v. BREWER
Decision of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶13 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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