Medina v. Riyahi
Medina v. Riyahi, No. 1 CA-CV 26-0074 FC (Ariz. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2026).
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Stover v. Kesmar 84 Ariz. 387
- Savord v. Morton 235 Ariz. 256
- O'Hair v. O'Hair 109 Ariz. 236
- In Re Marriage of Berger 140 Ariz. 156
- Bobrow v. Bobrow 241 Ariz. 592
- 257 Ariz. 195 not in our corpus
- State Ex Rel. Department of Economic Security v. Burton 205 Ariz. 27
- Vincent v. Nelson 238 Ariz. 150
- Volk v. Brame 235 Ariz. 462
Opinion text
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
In re the Matter of:
CHRISTOPHER MEDINA, Petitioner/Appellant,
v.
MAHJOUBA RIYAHI, Respondent/Appellee.
No. 1 CA-CV 26-0074 FC
FILED 09-23-2026
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FN2025-050728
The Honorable Julie Ann Mata, Judge
AFFIRMED
PARTIES
Christopher Medina, Phoenix
Petitioner/Appellant
Mahjouba Riyahi, Phoenix
Respondent/Appellee
MEDINA v. RIYAHI
Decision of the Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Veronika Fabian and Judge Michael S. Catlett joined.
C A T T A N I, Judge:
¶1 Christopher Medina appeals the superior court’s order
denying him reimbursement for money he sent Mahjouba Riyahi before
and during their marriage while she was living abroad. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 The parties began an online relationship in 2020 while Medina
lived in the United States and Riyahi was in Morocco. Medina asserts that
Riyahi pressured him to marry her, and they were married in March 2021
in Morocco. Medina visited Riyahi in Morocco for three weeks in 2021 and
three weeks in 2023, after which Riyahi moved to the United States in
November 2024.
¶3 In March 2025, Medina petitioned the court to annul the
marriage, asserting that Riyahi had married him under false pretenses and
that they had never had a spousal relationship. He also asserted that Riyahi
had promised she would reimburse him for more than $30,000 that he had
sent to help her family in Morocco. In December 2025, the superior court
conducted a hearing on the annulment and to address Medina’s request for
reimbursement for monies he gave Riyahi. The court granted the
annulment but denied Medina’s request for reimbursement, finding that
the monies he sent Riyahi were gifts. The court further found that Medina
failed to provide evidence of the requested amount.
¶4 Medina timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under
A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).
DISCUSSION
¶5 Medina asserts that the superior court erred by denying his
request for reimbursement from Riyahi. He argues that the financial
support he provided was not a gift because she promised she would
reimburse him after she moved to the United States. He also asserts that
the money could not have been a gift between a husband and wife because
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MEDINA v. RIYAHI
Decision of the Court
the marriage was fraudulent. Although Riyahi did not file an answering
brief, we decline to deem that failure a confession of error because Medina’s
appeal raises no debatable issue. See Stover v. Kesmar, 84 Ariz. 387, 388
(1958); Savord v. Morton, 235 Ariz. 256, 259, ¶ 9 (App. 2014).
¶6 A valid gift requires the donee to show, by clear and
convincing evidence, the donor’s donative intent and the donee’s
possession and control of the property. O’Hair v. O’Hair, 109 Ariz. 236, 239–
40 (1973). Although a donor’s intent to make a gift must be “clear,
unmistakable and unequivocal,” it need not be express and may instead be
inferred from the surrounding circumstances. In re Marriage of Berger, 140
Ariz. 156, 162 (App. 1983). Whether a gift has been made is a question of
fact, and we will not disturb the superior court’s determination unless it is
clearly erroneous, i.e., lacking sufficient supporting evidence for a
reasonable person to reach the same result. Bobrow v. Bobrow, 241 Ariz. 592,
595, ¶ 11 (App. 2017); In re Marriage of McCulloch, 257 Ariz. 195, 199, ¶ 9
(App. 2024).
¶7 Medina argues he testified that he provided financial
assistance to Riyahi while she was in Morocco and that he gave her
“approximately $500 each month” from March 2020 until January 2025. He
asserts that Riyahi promised to pay him back and that she did not provide
evidence the money was a gift. But Medina did not provide a transcript of
the hearing conducted in this case, and we thus assume that portion of the
record supports the superior court’s ruling. See ARCAP 11(c)(1)(A)–(B);
State ex rel. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Burton, 205 Ariz. 27, 30, ¶ 16 (App. 2003).
Medina also acknowledges that Riyahi testified at the hearing that his
support for her and her family was a “gift from husband to wife,” and her
testimony alone would provide a sufficient basis to affirm the superior
court’s ruling. See Vincent v. Nelson, 238 Ariz. 150, 155, ¶ 18 (App. 2015)
(noting that the superior court is in best position to assess and resolve
conflicting evidence). Additionally, the court considered text messages in
which Riyahi asked Medina for money, and Medina responded that he
would send it. None of Riyahi’s text messages admitted in evidence
reflected a promise to pay Medina back. Thus, and regardless of whether
there was a valid marriage, there was evidence from which the superior
court could reasonably conclude that Medina gifted Riyahi the money.
¶8 Medina also suggests that the court did not give him sufficient
time to present his evidence. But Medina’s failure to provide a transcript
precludes meaningful review of this issue as well. Moreover, Medina
acknowledges that he was permitted to testify and that he presented 28
exhibits. Accordingly, he has not established a due process violation.
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MEDINA v. RIYAHI
Decision of the Court
See Volk v. Brame, 235 Ariz. 462, 466–68, ¶¶ 14–18 (App. 2014) (noting that
due process requires that the parties be allowed to present testimony and
challenge the testimony of their opponent when contested issues depend
on credibility); see also id. at 468, ¶¶ 20–21 (noting the court’s authority to
set reasonable time limits that permit a meaningful opportunity to be
heard).
CONCLUSION
¶9 We affirm.
MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR
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