Ulrich v. Courteau

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

DEAN ULRICH, Plaintiff/Judgment Creditor/Appellee,

v.

CLIFFORD M. COURTEAU, Defendant/Judgment Debtor/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 26-0129
FILED 10-27-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2025-064360
The Honorable Jason Easterday, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Alexander R. Arpad, Phoenix
Counsel for Plaintiff/Judgment Creditor/Appellee

Clifford M. Courteau, Scottsdale
Defendant/Judgment Debtor/Appellant

ULRICH v. COURTEAU
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Andrew J. Becke and Chief Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1 Appellant Clifford Courteau ("Courteau") appeals from the
superior court's denial of his Motion to Vacate a Notice of Filing Foreign
Judgment under Arizona's Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Act, A.R.S. §§ 12-1701–1708 ("UEFJA"). We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 This matter arises from probate proceedings in the Los
Angeles County Superior Court concerning the administration of the
Bypass Trust established under the Donald G. Ulrich and Adel J. Ulrich
Revocable Living Trust. Following a two-day trial, the California probate
court issued an order on January 6, 2025 (the "Judgment After Trial"),
overruling Courteau's objections and approving the trustee's final
accounting, ratifying the trustee's acts, authorizing the distribution of trust
assets, and determining the allocation of attorney fees.

¶3 The probate court later entered a separate April 1, 2025 order
approving the trustee's petition for award of attorney fees and costs ("Fee
Petition Order"). Both orders made the fees and costs chargeable against
Courteau's distributive share of the trust and against him personally.

¶4 Dean Ulrich, as Successor Trustee ("Ulrich"), filed a Notice of
Filing Foreign Judgment attaching both the Judgment After Trial and Fee
Petition Order in Arizona, as required by the UEFJA. Courteau moved to
vacate the Notice of Filing Foreign Judgment, arguing that the California
orders were not "final" under California and Arizona law, and thus could
not be enforced in Arizona. The superior court denied the motion.
Courteau timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §
12-2101(A)(2).

DISCUSSION

¶5 On appeal, Courteau argues that the California probate
orders are not final and therefore cannot be recognized or enforced in

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ULRICH v. COURTEAU
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Arizona. He maintains that the absence of a final judgment in California
deprived him of a meaningful opportunity to pursue an appeal in that
jurisdiction. He also asserts that Ulrich lacks standing to seek enforcement
because the judgments belong to the trust rather than to the individual
trustee. Finally, he contends that writs of garnishment filed after the notice
of appeal are invalid for similar reasons, including the lack of a final,
enforceable judgment.

¶6 Courteau's argument centers on his assertion that the
California probate court left unresolved matters within the Bypass Trust
that, in his view, require further judicial action. He claims the court must
determine his distributive share, apply a credit against the fee awards, and
decide any amount owed after that credit is applied. He argues that these
steps render the orders "uncertain and undetermined" and therefore not a
complete, final determination of the parties' rights under California law.

¶7 The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States
Constitution, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1, "requires that a judgment validly
rendered in one state's court be accorded the same validity and effect in
every other court in the country as it had in the state rendering it." Lofts v.
Superior Court, 140 Ariz. 407, 410 (1984). "Whether a foreign judgment is
entitled to full faith and credit is a question of law we review de novo."
McDaniel v. Banes, 249 Ariz. 497, 500, ¶ 10 (App. 2020).

¶8 In Arizona, the UEFJA provides a mechanism for enforcing
judgments issued by other states. Grynberg v. Shaffer, 216 Ariz. 256, 257, ¶
6 (App. 2007). A foreign judgment filed in Arizona and properly
authenticated "has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures,
defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment
of a superior court of this state . . . ." A.R.S. § 12-1702. Arizona must give
such judgments full faith and credit when they are final and enforceable
under the law of the state that rendered them. Grynberg, 216 Ariz. at 258, ¶
8. As the judgment debtor, Courteau "bears the burden of proving the
foreign judgment should not be accorded full faith and credit." Costaras v.
Costaras, 257 Ariz. 208, 213, ¶ 17 (App. 2024) (citation modified). Thus, we
look to California law to determine whether the judgments are entitled to
full faith and credit and enforceable under the UEFJA.

¶9 California probate proceedings follow a statutory scheme
distinct from ordinary civil litigation. Godoy v. Linzner, 327 Cal. Rptr. 3d
323, 328–29 (Cal. Ct. App. 2024). The "final judgment" rule does not apply
in probate matters. Young v. Hartford, 327 Cal. Rptr. 3d 297, 301 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2024). As Young explains, probate and trust proceedings often involve

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multiple independent disputes, so the California probate code ("Probate
Code") designates which rulings constitute final, appealable orders. See id.
at 301–02; Cal. Prob. Code §§ 1300–1304.

¶10 Orders settling a fiduciary's account, approving or
confirming fiduciary acts, authorizing distribution of property, and
awarding compensation or attorney fees are specifically designated as
appealable probate orders. Cal. Prob. Code §§ 1300(b)–(f), 1304. California
law considers appealable orders under the Probate Code to be final and
enforceable. See Est. of Stoddart, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 775 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)
("It is well established that appeals which may be taken from orders in
probate proceedings are set forth in the Probate Code, and its provisions
are exclusive." (citation modified)); Young, 327 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 301–02
(explaining the Probate Code's appealability scheme expressly incorporates
the concept of finality by designating certain probate and trust orders as
final for purposes of appeal).

¶11 The Judgment After Trial approved the trustee's account,
resolved all objections, ratified prior fiduciary acts, and authorized
distribution of the trust corpus. Each ruling reflects the probate court's
authority under California Probate Code § 17200 to adjudicate petitions
concerning the internal affairs of a trust—including settling accounts,
approving trustee acts, and directing the disposition of trust property—and
each falls squarely within the Probate Code's designation of appealable
trust orders. See Cal. Prob. Code §§ 1300(b), (c), (f); 1304(a) (making final
orders under § 17200 appealable). Likewise, the Fee Petition Order is
expressly identified as an appealable order under § 1300(e). An appeal may
be taken from an order "[f]ixing, authorizing, allowing, or directing
payment of compensation or expenses of an attorney." Cal. Prob. Code
§ 1300(e).

¶12 Courteau asserts that before the orders can be considered final
and enforceable, the court must determine his distributive share, apply a
credit against the fee awards, and decide any amount owed after that credit
is applied. These concerns do not affect the legal finality of the California
orders. A probate order is final when it resolves the substantive issues
before the court. See Young, 327 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 302 (stating orders settling
an account and fixing, authorizing, allowing, or directing payment of
compensation or expenses of an attorney are "substantive in character").
The probate court here conclusively approved the trustee's accounting,
resolved all objections, fixed attorney fees, and determined the manner of
their allocation. Courteau offers no authority supporting his assertion that
the probate court, rather than the trustee, must do the math of applying the

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fee awards against his distributive share. See Powell v. Tagami, 236 Cal. Rptr.
3d 765, 768 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (treating a fee award charged first to a
beneficiary's trust share and then personally as a final order despite the
absence of any determination of the beneficiary's remaining share).
California law presumes that trustees carry out trust-administration tasks
without continued judicial supervision. Cal. Prob. Code § 17209. Once the
probate court fixed the fee amounts and directed their allocation, no further
judicial action was required. The Judgment After Trial and Fee Petition
Order are therefore final and enforceable under California law.

¶13 Courteau's additional arguments concerning his right to
appeal, standing, and garnishment are likewise unavailing. First, as noted
above, the orders at issue in this case were appealable under California law,
supra ¶ 10–12, and the record contains no basis on which to conclude he was
denied appellate rights in California. Second, to the extent Ulrich was
required to identify more precisely that he was pursuing enforcement of the
California orders on behalf of the trust rather than in an individual capacity,
that misstep does not affect the validity or enforceability of the judgments.
See Miller v. Eloie Farms, Inc., 128 Ariz. 269, 271 (App. 1980) (holding that
technical noncompliance with UEFJA procedures does not defeat
enforcement where the judgment debtor had actual notice and the
underlying foreign judgment remained valid). Last, Courteau's Notice of
Appeal was limited to the superior court's order on his Motion to Vacate
which was ruled on before Ulrich filed any writs of garnishment. Because
"our review is limited to matters designated in the notice of appeal" and the
garnishments were filed after the notice of appeal, we do not address
Courteau's arguments related to garnishment. Gray v. GC Servs., LP, 256
Ariz. 480, 483, ¶ 6 (App. 2023).

¶14 Ulrich requests an award of fees and costs on appeal under
A.R.S. §§ 12-341, 14-11004(B), and 14-1105(A). In our discretion, we
conclude that Courteau's failure to engage with the governing Probate
Code provisions and presentation of otherwise meritless arguments
constitutes unreasonable conduct. Accordingly, we award Ulrich a portion
of his reasonable fees under A.R.S. § 14-1105(A) and all taxable costs upon
compliance with ARCAP 21.

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ULRICH v. COURTEAU
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CONCLUSION

¶15 The Judgment After Trial and Fee Petition Order are final and
enforceable under California law and therefore entitled to full faith and
credit in Arizona under the UEFJA. The superior court properly denied
Courteau's Motion to Vacate the Notice of Filing Foreign Judgment.

¶16 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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