Opinion text
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
KENNETH KIRUI, Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
TODD LAPORTE, Defendant/Appellee.
No. 1 CA-CV 26-0137
FILED 8-11-2026
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV 2025-017215
The Honorable Michael Valenzuela, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Kenneth Kiprono Kirui, Phoenix
Plaintiff/Appellant
Holden & Armer, PC, Phoenix
By Scott A. Holden, Nathan S. Ryan
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
KIRUI v. LAPORTE
Decision of the Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Vice Chief Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court,
in which Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge Anni Hill Foster
joined.
W E I N Z W E I G, Vice Chief Judge:
¶1 Kenneth Kirui appeals the superior court’s dismissal of his
special action against Todd LaPorte. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 A jury convicted Kirui of two counts of sexual assault and one
count of kidnapping in July 2024. State v. Kirui, 1 CA-CR 25-0282, 2026 WL
323319, *1, ¶ 2 (Ariz. App. Feb. 6, 2026) (mem. decision). The State relied in
part on a sexual assault nurse examiner’s testimony and evidence she
collected. State v. Kirui, 1 CA-CR 24-0622, 2026 WL 950755, **1, 3, ¶¶ 5, 16
(Ariz. App. Apr. 8, 2026) (mem. decision). The examining nurse was an
employee of Scottsdale HonorHealth Hospitals (“HonorHealth”) where
LaPorte is CEO.
¶3 After his conviction, Kirui sent at least two letters to LaPorte
seeking internal hospital policy documents concerning the use of personal
emails for official business. He claimed the nurse committed fraud when
she used her personal email during his criminal case in violation of the
hospital’s code of conduct. LaPorte did not respond, so Kirui petitioned the
superior court for special action relief to order that LaPorte disclose the
documents under public records laws. See A.R.S. § 39-121.02(A)
(petitioning for special action is the appropriate course for public records
law disputes).
¶4 LaPorte moved to dismiss, arguing HonorHealth is not a
public body, he is not an officer covered by the statute and the documents
sought are not public records. The superior court agreed and dismissed
Kirui’s complaint with prejudice. Kirui timely appealed. We have
jurisdiction. A.R.S. §§ 12-2101(A)(1), -120.21(A)(1).
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KIRUI v. LAPORTE
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DISCUSSION
¶5 Kirui argues the superior court erroneously dismissed his
petition because HonorHealth and LaPorte are subject to Arizona’s public
records law.
¶6 We review de novo the superior court’s ruling on a 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss. Liberti v. City of Scottsdale, 258 Ariz. 496, 501, ¶ 17 (App.
2024); see also Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
should be granted if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. On appeal, we “must assume the truth of all of the
complaint’s material allegations, [and] accord the plaintiffs the benefit of all
inferences which the complaint can reasonably support.” Gatecliff v. Great
Republic Life Ins., 154 Ariz. 502, 508 (App. 1987). But “we do not accept as
true allegations consisting of conclusions of law, inferences or deductions
that are not necessarily implied by well-pleaded facts, unreasonable
inferences or unsupported conclusions from such facts, or legal conclusions
alleged as facts.” Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Ariz., 211 Ariz. 386, 389, ¶ 4 (App.
2005).
¶7 Arizona’s public records law requires that “[a]ll officers and
public bodies shall maintain all records . . . reasonably necessary or
appropriate to maintain an accurate knowledge of their official activities,”
and “[a]ny person may request to examine or be furnished copies . . . of any
public record not otherwise available.” A.R.S. § 39-121.01(B), (D)(1). The
“public records law serves to open government activity to public scrutiny,”
and we interpret it to favor disclosure. Lake v. City of Phoenix, 222 Ariz. 547,
549, ¶¶ 7–8 (2009) (citation modified).
¶8 The public records statute defines “officer” as:
[A]ny person elected or appointed to hold any elective or
appointive office of any public body and any chief
administrative officer, head, director, superintendent or
chairman of any public body.
A.R.S. § 39-121.01(A)(1). The statute defines “public body” as:
[T]his state, any county, city, town, school district, political
subdivision or tax-supported district in this state, any branch,
department, board, bureau, commission, council or
committee of the foregoing, and any public organization or
agency, supported in whole or in part by monies from this
state or any political subdivision of this state, or expending
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Decision of the Court
monies provided by this state or any political subdivision of
this state.
A.R.S. § 39-121.01(A)(2).
¶9 The superior court dismissed Kirui’s petition because LaPorte
is an executive at HonorHealth, not an officer of a public body subject to
public records law. We agree. Despite the statute’s broad definitions and
the reasonable inferences on a motion to dismiss, the CEO of a private
hospital falls outside the definitions of “officer” or “public body.” See
A.R.S. § 39-121.01(A).
¶10 Kirui argues that HonorHealth acted as an agent of the
Maricopa County Attorney’s Office because the hospital performs medical
exams used in prosecutions and receives money for those services. That
argument fails. The purpose of public records law is to “open government
activity to public scrutiny,” not to open the books of every private
organization that contracts with the state. Lake, 222 Ariz. at 549, ¶¶ 7–8.
¶11 Even if we were to accept Kirui’s argument, his claim would
fail because the documents sought are not public records. Our courts have
articulated three definitions of public records:
(1) a record made by a public officer in pursuance of a duty,
the immediate purpose of which is to disseminate
information to the public; (2) a record required by law to be
kept, or necessary to be kept in the discharge of a duty
imposed by law or directed by law to serve as a memorial and
evidence of something written, said or done; or (3) any
written record of transactions of a public officer in his office,
which is a convenient and appropriate method of discharging
his duties, and is kept by him as such, whether required by
law or not.
Lunney v. State, 244 Ariz. 170, 174, ¶ 8 (App. 2017) (citation modified). Only
documents with a “substantial nexus to government activities qualify as
public records.” Lake, 222 Ariz. at 549, ¶ 8 (citation modified).
¶12 Here, Kirui requested “any policy in [LaPorte’s] organization
that allows official communications using email, and whether private
emails are allowed.” HonorHealth’s internal email policies were not
created to inform the public, do not document a transaction by a public
officer and are not kept pursuant to any duty or a law. See Lunney, 244 Ariz.
at 174, ¶ 8. Nor do the internal email policies of a private corporation share
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a “substantial nexus” with government activities. See Lake, 222 Ariz. at 549,
¶ 8. Therefore, the superior court properly dismissed Kirui’s petition.
CONCLUSION
¶13 We affirm.
MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JT
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