CARRASCO v. HONORHEALTH

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

ALINA CARRASCO, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants,

v.

HONORHEALTH, et al., Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 26-0167
FILED 10-19-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2024-024716
The Honorable Susanna C. Pineda, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Alina Carrasco, Mesa
Plaintiff/Appellant

Evangelina Williams, Phoenix
Plaintiff/Appellant

Broening Oberg Woods & Wilson PC, Phoenix
By Kelley M. Jancaitis
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees

CARRASCO, et al. v. HONORHEALTH, et al.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Veronika Fabian and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

C A T L E T T, Judge:

¶1 Alina Carrasco and Evangelina Williams (collectively,
“Plaintiffs”) appeal the superior court’s judgment dismissing their medical
malpractice claim for failure to serve a preliminary expert opinion affidavit
required under A.R.S. § 12-2603. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Alfredo Carrasco (“Carrasco”) was diagnosed with acute
myeloid leukemia and passed away in September 2022. Almost two years
later, on September 9, 2024, Plaintiffs, who were self-represented at the
time, sued HonorHealth and other defendants. Within two weeks,
Plaintiffs amended their complaint. In November 2024, HonorHealth
moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim. After
Plaintiffs retained counsel, HonorHealth withdrew its motion and
stipulated that Plaintiffs could file a second amended complaint.

¶3 On January 2, 2025, Plaintiff’s filed a second amended
complaint containing a single cause of action for “Wrongful Death—
Medical Malpractice.” In the second amended complaint, Plaintiffs’
counsel certified “pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2603 . . . expert opinion testimony
is necessary to prove the healthcare professionals’ standard of care or
liability for the claim.”

¶4 In July 2025, Plaintiffs’ counsel moved to withdraw. In
response to that request, HonorHealth asked the court to set a deadline for
a joint report and proposed scheduling order. On September 16, 2025,
HonorHealth answered Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint. Under § 12-
2603(A) and (B), Plaintiffs were required to serve a preliminary expert
affidavit on HonorHealth by October 21, 2025. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 26.1(f)(1).

¶5 During a status conference on September 18, 2025, the
superior court allowed Plaintiffs’ counsel to withdraw and ordered the
parties to submit a joint report and proposed scheduling order by October

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20, 2025. The next day, HonorHealth wrote to Plaintiffs to notify them that
their initial disclosure statement and a preliminary expert affidavit were
due by October 21, 2025.

¶6 On October 20, 2025, HonorHealth submitted a separate
report and proposed scheduling order to the court. In response, Plaintiffs
requested that the court extend the deadline for serving an expert affidavit
to November 21, 2025. The court refused that request and confirmed
October 21 as the deadline.

¶7 When Plaintiffs did not serve an expert affidavit,
HonorHealth moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint. Plaintiffs opposed
that motion by indicating they were still reviewing medical records to
obtain expert reports. The superior court granted HonorHealth’s motion
and dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint without prejudice to refiling. The court
recounted that “[g]iven the age of the case, the scheduling order required
initial disclosures and submission of Plaintiff’s preliminary expert report
no later than October 21, 2025, nearly 14 months after the initial complaint
was filed.”

¶8 Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration, which the court denied.
Plaintiffs timely appealed.

JURISDICTION

¶9 Although a dismissal without prejudice is generally not
appealable, one that is entered after the statute of limitations has expired is
appealable. See Garza v. Swift Transp. Co., 222 Ariz. 281, 284 ¶ 15 (2009).
Because the statute of limitations for Plaintiffs’ claim had expired when the
superior court dismissed the complaint, we have jurisdiction. See A.R.S.
§ 12-2101(A)(3).

DISCUSSION

¶10 Plaintiffs argue the court (1) erred by dismissing their
complaints for failure to comply with § 12-2603; (2) abused its discretion by
failing to extend the deadline to comply with § 12-2603; and (3) violated
their due process rights by dismissing their complaint without first
considering a sur-reply they filed in opposition to HonorHealth’s motion to
dismiss.

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I. Compliance With § 12-2603

¶11 We review de novo the dismissal of a claim for failing to
comply with § 12-2603. Francisco v. Affiliated Urologists Ltd., 258 Ariz. 95,
100 ¶ 18 (2024).

¶12 Subsection 12-2603(A) requires a claimant in a medical
malpractice action to certify whether “expert opinion testimony is
necessary to prove the health care professional’s standard of care or liability
for the claim.” If a claimant certifies that expert testimony is necessary, the
claimant must then serve a preliminary expert opinion affidavit with the
initial disclosures required under Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure
(“Rule”) 26.1. A.R.S. § 12-2603(B). The affidavit must state how the
healthcare provider deviated from the applicable standard of care and how
that deviation contributed to the claimant’s damages. A.R.S. § 12-2603(B).
If the expert does not have personal knowledge about the case, then the
expert must “base an opinion on the facts as alleged by the plaintiff and
state that these facts, if true, violate the accepted standard of care.” Gorney
v. Meaney, 214 Ariz. 226, 230 ¶ 11 (App. 2007). If a claimant does not comply
with the affidavit requirement, the court must dismiss the claim without
prejudice. A.R.S. § 12-2603(F); Boswell v. Fintelmann, 242 Ariz. 52, 54 ¶ 7
(App. 2017) (stating the statute necessitates dismissal if the affidavit is not
served “after certifying an affidavit is necessary or the court has ordered
compliance”).

¶13 Plaintiffs maintain they could not comply with § 12-2603
because they were still reviewing medical records to obtain a qualified
expert. Plaintiffs contend the superior court required them to do the
impossible: review thousands of pages of records, locate and provide an
expert with those records, and obtain a preliminary expert opinion all “on
a single day.”

¶14 Contrary to Plaintiffs’ position, they had more than a single
day to obtain an expert affidavit. They filed their original complaint in
September 2024, and the court dismissed their claim in November 2025.
Thus, Plaintiffs had more than fourteen months to obtain an expert
affidavit. Moreover, Plaintiffs were not required to serve a final expert
affidavit based on discovery materials recently received from HonorHealth.
Rather, at the preliminary affidavit stage, Plaintiffs had only to explain to
an expert the facts as they understood them at the time. See Gorney, 214
Ariz. at 230 ¶ 11. The expert would then form an opinion about whether,
assuming Plaintiffs’ facts were true, HonorHealth deviated from the
standard of care. See id. at 230–31 ¶¶ 11–12. Thus, even if HonorHealth had

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not disclosed the entirety of the records in its possession, Plaintiffs could
still obtain a preliminary expert report satisfying § 12-2603. See Rasor v. Nw.
Hosp., LLC, 243 Ariz. 160, 164 ¶ 22 (2017). This is especially true considering
Plaintiffs admitted that they received 9,889 pages of documents from
HonorHealth in 2022 and 2023.

¶15 Plaintiffs also argued the court erred by dismissing their
complaint because they asserted additional claims that do not require a
preliminary expert affidavit. Plaintiffs are incorrect. At the time
HonorHealth moved to dismiss, the operative complaint contained a single
claim for medical malpractice. For example, Plaintiffs did not plead
revocation of a medical power of attorney as a stand-alone claim; instead,
they inserted the revocation allegation to support their single claim for
medical malpractice. And Plaintiffs’ counsel certified in the operative
complaint that an affidavit was required under § 12-2603. Plaintiffs’
argument that some of their claims did not require an expert affidavit fails
because they asserted only one claim—medical malpractice.

¶16 Because Plaintiffs’ sole claim was for medical malpractice and
they did not timely serve HonorHealth with an expert affidavit supporting
that claim, the court did not err by dismissing their complaint without
prejudice. See A.R.S. § 12-2603(F); Boswell, 242 Ariz. at 54 ¶ 7.

II. Time Extension

¶17 Plaintiffs assert the court abused its discretion in denying
their request to extend the preliminary expert affidavit deadline. Under
A.R.S. § 12-2063(C), the superior court may extend the time to serve an
expert affidavit on application and good cause shown. A.R.S. § 12-2603(C).
We therefore review a court’s denial of a request for an extension under that
subsection for an abuse of discretion. See Strategic Dev. & Constr., Inc. v. 7th
& Roosevelt Partners, LLC, 224 Ariz. 60, 66 ¶ 24 (App. 2010) (“Whether to
grant an extension of time is within the discretion of the court.”).

¶18 In response to HonorHealth’s proposed scheduling order,
Plaintiffs requested that the court give them until November 21, 2025, to
serve a preliminary expert affidavit. The court did not dismiss Plaintiffs’
complaint until November 20, and yet Plaintiffs had still not obtained an
affidavit by that time. To justify an extension, Plaintiffs said they had not
yet had time to obtain a preliminary expert affidavit because they had only
recently received medical records from HonorHealth and they believed
HonorHealth possessed more documents that it had not yet produced. But
Plaintiffs then admitted that they possessed 9,889 pages of documents

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received from HonorHealth in 2022 and 2023, and that they had consulted
with a prospective expert in January 2024. Other than consulting with that
expert, Plaintiffs did not explain what concrete steps (if any) they had taken
since January 2024 to retain an expert or how much time they still needed
to comply with the expert affidavit requirement. And as explained,
claimants are not expected to have complete information when obtaining a
preliminary expert affidavit. See Gorney, 214 Ariz. at 230 ¶ 11. Without
more, Plaintiffs did not show good cause for extending the deadline under
§ 12-2603(C).

¶19 To support their extension argument, Plaintiffs also rely on a
Maricopa County jury verdict in Griepentrog v. Banner Health, claiming it
shows that “accidentally lost” medical records establishes “good cause for
a modest extension[.]” But Plaintiffs have not shown how that verdict,
which is not legal authority, supports their argument that the court abused
its discretion. We conclude the court did not err by denying Plaintiffs an
extension.

III. Sur-Reply

¶20 Plaintiffs next contend the superior court violated their due
process rights by dismissing their complaint without considering a sur-
reply they filed in opposition to HonorHealth’s motion to dismiss. We
review de novo constitutional issues, including alleged violations of due
process. ADOT v. Ariz. Motor Vehicle, LLC, 255 Ariz. 139, 142 ¶ 14 (App.
2023).

¶21 The Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure permit parties to submit
a response and a reply to a motion. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 7.1(a). The rule does
not permit a response to a reply, known as a sur-reply. Atreus Cmtys. Grp.
of Ariz. v. Stardust Dev., Inc., 229 Ariz. 503, 511 ¶ 34 (App. 2012); see Ariz. R.
Civ. P. 7.1(a).

¶22 Due process entitles a party to “notice and an opportunity to
be heard in a meaningful manner and at a meaningful time.” Wassef v. Ariz.
State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 242 Ariz. 90, 93 ¶ 12 (App. 2017). In the motion
to dismiss context, due process is satisfied when the party opposing the
motion has an opportunity to file a written response. See Belen Loan Invs.,
LLC v. Bradley, 231 Ariz. 448, 452 ¶ 7 n.7 (App. 2012). Plaintiffs cite no
authority supporting that due process requires a court to consider a sur-
reply before resolving a motion, and we can locate none.

¶23 The superior court gave Plaintiffs an opportunity to respond
to HonorHealth’s motion to dismiss and they did so. See id. (opportunity is

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satisfied “when a party had the opportunity to file a written response or
reply”); Douglas N. Higgins, Inc. v. Songer, 171 Ariz. 8, 12 ¶ 4 (App. 1991)
(“[B]asic due process was satisfied when notice and an opportunity to
defend the action was afforded[.]”). The superior court then honored
Plaintiffs’ due process rights by considering Plaintiffs’ response before
resolving HonorHealth’s motion to dismiss. The superior court did not
violate Plaintiffs’ due process rights.

CONCLUSION

¶24 We affirm the superior court’s judgment.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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