ANGUIANO v. KILE

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

LAURA JO ANGUIANO,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

EMILY KILE, Special Administrator of
the ESTATE OF STEVEN NICHOLAS JAMES ROBERT WEST;
COMPTON PLUMBING SERVICES, LLC, and
COMPTON PLUMBING, INC. 1,
Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 26-0175
FILED 10-15-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2023-008615
The Honorable Scott A. Blaney, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Ahwatukee Legal Office, P.C., Phoenix
By David L. Abney
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant

1 This caption has been amended to reflect the correct parties on
appeal and shall be used in all future documents filed in this appeal.

Springel & Fink LLP, Phoenix
By Leonard T. Fink, Raven M. Yim
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Emily Kile

Koeller, Nebeker, Carlson & Haluck, LLP, Phoenix
By William A. Nebeker, Zahnie L. Soe Myint, Scott J. Pehoushek
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Compton Plumbing Services, LLC and
Compton Plumbing, Inc.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Angela K. Paton joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Laura Jo Anguiano challenges the superior court’s order
granting summary judgment in favor of Compton Plumbing Services, LLC
and Compton Plumbing, Inc. (collectively “Compton”) on her claims for
negligent entrustment and negligent supervision. For the following
reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 On the evening of August 26, 2021, Steven West and his friend
Trevor McCullough were driving a Ford F-150 truck owned by West’s
employer, Compton. They rear-ended Anguiano, causing “major damage”
to her car, and then fled the scene. A witness followed them, recorded the
license plate number, and then located the truck three miles away at the
scene of a second accident.

¶3 West denied driving the truck and told police officers that
McCullough was the driver. McCullough stated under oath that he has no
memory of the evening, but based on his review of the police report, he
believed West was driving. Several eyewitnesses to the accidents stated
that West was the driver, and the police report noted that West had red
marks leading from his left shoulder to his right side, “consisten[t] with the
driver seat belt being worn.” A witness at the scene of the second accident
reported McCullough drifting in and out of consciousness; he was
transported to the hospital for treatment of a drug overdose.

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¶4 A police officer tried to administer a field sobriety test to West
but stopped the test “for safety concerns” because West “nearly fell over.”
Officers arrested West for driving under the influence and issued him a
citation for leaving the scene of a collision.

¶5 As relevant to this appeal, Anguiano sued Compton for
negligent entrustment and negligent supervision, alleging Compton (1)
knew or should have known that West was incompetent to operate the
vehicle, and (2) negligently failed to supervise West.

¶6 About a year after the accidents and before he could be
deposed, West died. During a deposition, McCullough testified that West
told him he “got sent home drunk” from work on the day of the accident.
Through signed declarations and deposition testimony, a Compton
manager responded to that assertion, explaining that (1) she knew what
West looked like after he consumed alcohol; (2) he was not intoxicated
when he arrived at the Compton office on the morning of August 26 to get
his paycheck; (3) he was not on call; and (4) he was sent home in the truck
because the van he usually used for work was undergoing maintenance and
thus he could not perform service calls that day.

¶7 Compton’s driving policy prohibited employees from using
company vehicles for personal use and banned non-employee passengers
from riding in company vehicles. West signed the vehicle usage policy.
According to the Compton manager, the company completed a driving
record check when West was hired and “results returned indicated that [he]
had no DUI or accident record within at least the five years prior to the date
he was hired.” During his employment with Compton, he was not involved
in any “unsafe driving” and did not “demonstrate[] any incompetence at
driving.”

¶8 Compton moved for summary judgment, asserting that
Anguiano failed to show that Compton had reason to know West was
incompetent to drive. Because of this deficiency, Compton argued that the
claims for negligent entrustment and negligent supervision fail as a matter
of law. In response, Anguiano argued the motion was premature because
discovery was still open, and she claimed that McCullough’s deposition
account of West’s statements about being sent home from work while
drunk, in a company vehicle, established Compton’s negligence. Compton
countered that the statements were inadmissible hearsay.

¶9 After oral argument, the superior court granted Compton’s
motion, explaining that Anguiano “failed to identify admissible evidence

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establishing West’s incompetence and [Compton’s] knowledge of that
alleged incompetence.” The court entered final judgment under Arizona
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) and awarded taxable costs to Compton. After
Anguiano unsuccessfully sought a new trial and reconsideration, she
timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶10 Anguiano argues the superior court erred in granting
summary judgment because West’s statement—that Compton sent him
home drunk from work, in a company-owned truck—was admissible to
support her claims for negligent entrustment and negligent supervision.

¶11 “We review de novo a grant of summary judgment, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom
summary judgment was entered.” Roebuck v. Mayo Clinic, 260 Ariz. 384,
389, ¶ 7 (2025) (citation modified); see also Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“The court
shall grant summary judgment if the moving party shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”).

¶12 To establish a claim for negligent entrustment, a plaintiff must
show:

(1) that Defendant owned or controlled a vehicle; (2)
Defendant gave the driver permission to operate a
vehicle; (3) the driver, by virtue of his physical or mental
condition, was incompetent to drive safely; (4) the
Defendant knew or should have known that the driver,
by virtue of his physical or mental condition, was
incompetent to drive safely; (5) causation; and (6)
damages.

Verduzco v. Am. Valet, 240 Ariz. 221, 224, ¶ 8 (App. 2016) (citation modified).
Compton admits the first two elements. Anguiano argues that West’s
statement about being sent home drunk from work establishes the third and
fourth elements: West’s incompetence to drive and Compton’s knowledge
of West’s incompetence.

¶13 To establish a claim for negligent supervision, a “plaintiff
must first prove that an employee of the defendant committed a tort.”
Kuehn v. Stanley, 208 Ariz. 124, 130, ¶ 21 (App. 2004). If a plaintiff
establishes the threshold tort, then the plaintiff must also establish: (1) the
employee was not competent to provide certain care or perform a delegated

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task, (2) the employer knew or should have known of the employee’s
incompetence, and (3) the employer’s failure to supervise the employee
caused injury to the plaintiff. See Rice v. Brakel, 233 Ariz. 140, 145, ¶ 18 (App.
2013); St. George v. Plimpton, 241 Ariz. 163, 166, ¶ 15 (App. 2016). As best
we understand her argument, Anguiano asserts Compton knew or should
have known that West was not competent to drive and Compton’s failure
to supervise West caused her injury.

¶14 Given that West’s competency is central to both claims for
negligent entrustment and negligent supervision, we analyze whether any
admissible evidence established that Compton knew, or should have
known, that West was incompetent to drive. The primary evidence
Anguiano relies on is West’s statement to McCullough that he was sent
home, while he was drunk, in a company vehicle. The superior court found,
however, that Anguiano “failed to identify admissible evidence establishing
West’s incompetence and [Compton’s] knowledge of that alleged
incompetence.”

¶15 Anguiano argues the court abused its discretion by finding
West’s statement to McCullough is hearsay and thus inadmissible under
Arizona Rule of Evidence (“Rule”) 801(d)(2)(A). She asserts that West’s
admission that he was sent home drunk is an opposing party’s statement
and therefore excluded from the prohibitions governing hearsay. See Ariz.
R. Evid. 801(d)(2).2

¶16 We deferentially review the superior court’s evidentiary
rulings, including “questions of the admissibility of evidence in summary
judgment proceedings,” and we will affirm absent a “clear abuse of
discretion or legal error, and prejudice.” Mohave Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Byers, 189 Ariz. 292, 301 (App. 1997); cf. Arojojoye v. Allen, CV 25-0119-PR, 2026 WL
2451353, at *5, ¶ 26 (Ariz. Aug. 21, 2026) (holding that expert witness
qualifications are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, including in
summary judgment proceedings).

2 On appeal, Anguiano does not argue that West’s statement to
McCullough should be admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(D) (A statement is
not hearsay “if offered against an opposing party and was made by the
party’s . . . employee on a matter within the scope of that relationship.”).
Thus, Anguiano has waived any assertion that West’s statement is
admissible under that rule. See Schabel v. Deer Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No.
97, 186 Ariz. 161, 167 (App. 1996) (“Issues not clearly raised and argued in
a party’s appellate brief are waived.”).

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¶17 “Rule 801(d)(2) provides that [a statement] by a party
opponent is not hearsay and is therefore admissible if offered against the
person who made” the statement. State v. Bocharski, 200 Ariz. 50, 58, ¶ 37
(2001); cf. State v. Griffith, 247 Ariz. 361, 363, ¶ 7 (App. 2019) (explaining the
business record exception to the hearsay rules as a record that “includes
statements made by an opposing party and is offered against that opposing
party”) (emphasis added)); see also Stalbosky v. Belew, 205 F.3d 890, 894 (6th
Cir. 2000) (explaining that under the identical, federal counterpart to Rule
801(d)(2)(A), “a party’s statement is admissible as non-hearsay only if it is
offered against that party”). Because Anguiano seeks to offer West’s
statement against Compton, the statement is not admissible. See Secura
Supreme Ins. Co. v. Sudhoff, 1 CA-CV 19-0406, 2020 WL 1027664, at *2, ¶¶ 12–
14 (Ariz. App. Mar. 3, 2020) (mem. decision) (affirming the superior court’s
exclusion of an out-of-court statement by an employee in a personal injury
case because the employee’s statement was offered against the insurer, not
the employer).

¶18 Anguiano contends West was not competent to drive,
Compton knew of West’s incompetence, and Compton’s failure to
supervise West led to her injury. Compton does not concede that West was
the driver. But because Anguiano failed to offer any evidence beyond
West’s inadmissible statement to McCullough to establish Compton knew
of West’s alleged incompetence, her claim for negligent supervision fails no
matter who was driving the truck. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3)(B)(i)
(requiring the party opposing a motion for summary judgment to provide
“the specific, admissible parts of the record that establish” disputed facts
(emphasis added)). To the extent Anguiano’s briefing suggests that West’s
social drinking habits support her claims, she presented no admissible
evidence showing that West’s behavior outside the workplace affected his
physical or mental ability to safely operate company vehicles.

CONCLUSION

¶19 We affirm the superior court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of Compton. We deny Anguiano’s request for costs because she is not
the successful party on appeal.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR
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