Cheang v. Reyes

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

RADA C. CHEANG, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

CEFERINO P. REYES, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 26-0254 FC
FILED 10-27-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2019-093617
The Honorable Harla M. Davison, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

DiMaggio Law Office PLLC, Scottsdale
By Kaitlin DiMaggio
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

Ceferino Reyes, Chandler
Respondent/Appellee Pro Se

CHEANG v. REYES
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Chief Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs and Judge Daniel J. Kiley joined.

H O W E, Judge:

¶1 Rada Cheang (“Mother”) appeals the superior court’s order
modifying parenting time and child support. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Mother and Ceferino Reyes (“Father”) married in 2002 and
share four children, two of them currently minors. In 2019—when all the
children were minors—Mother and Father entered a consent decree
dissolving their marriage. They agreed to joint legal decision-making,
shared parenting time on a week-on week-off schedule, and that Father
would pay $625 per month in child support. Two years later, they agreed
to reduce Father’s child support obligation to $0.

¶3 In 2024, Mother petitioned to modify child support,
requesting that Father pay $748 per month. Father then petitioned himself
to modify legal decision-making, parenting time, and child support. Both
parents submitted affidavits of financial information (“AFI”).

¶4 The court held a hearing at which both Mother and Father
testified and submitted exhibits. The parties agreed about joint legal
decision-making and Father’s income, but disagreed about Mother’s
income, parenting time, and child support.

¶5 Father testified that “right after the divorce” the parents came
to an agreement under which he “t[ook] care of the kids most of the time,”
estimating it was 75 percent of the time. He offered calendar logs of “when
the kids were with [Father] and when they were with [Mother]” and
explained that, according to the log, Mother’s “exercis[ing] equal parenting
time” in the given year was “definitely” not possible. Father also presented
years of Mother’s Instagram posts showing her frequent travel. He testified
that his home was the one the children grew up in and was the primary
address for the children’s school. Father explained that the elder child
struggled with her mental health and that he believed her struggles were

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“because Mom’s not always available.” He elaborated that, though he was
not concerned with Mother’s parenting, he worried that when litigation
ended she would return to exercising her parenting time less frequently.

¶6 Father testified, relying on the Instagram posts in evidence,
that he “f[ou]nd it hard to believe that [Mother]’s able to sustain her lifestyle
with” the salary she indicated in her AFI—around $4,000 per month. He
specifically noted that her travel, her car, her house, and clothes suggested
to him that her AFI did not provide accurate financial information. He
submitted financial documentation showing that, although Mother’s AFI
claimed she paid $2,500 for her mortgage, the deed showed her home was
fully paid for. Father also submitted evidence that Mother had generated
roughly $3 million in sales as a real estate agent, and was continuing to sell
homes within the last year, despite listing no sales income on her AFI. He
also submitted exhibits showing that Mother had registered two businesses
since entry of the consent decree, neither of which she listed on her AFI.

¶7 Father testified that he believed Mother earned an amount
comparable to his own earnings, which the parties agreed was $14,995 per
month. He requested 75 percent of the parenting time because he “d[id]n’t
believe she’[d] be able to maintain a regular schedule to meet her parenting
time, whatever that may be” and felt he was “basically just asking for
what’s been happening for the last several years.”

¶8 Regarding the older child’s mental health, Mother admitted
“I don’t show a lot of affection” but testified that she would “try the best
[she could]” and “that’s all [she] can do.” Mother conceded that “there’s no
dispute as to the fact that she travels” but claimed that the parenting time
“all adds up” to “an equal amount of time by the end of the year.” She also
acknowledged that her boyfriend bought the house she lived in, in contrast
to her AFI which claimed she paid a $2,500 mortgage. She explained that
she earned $4,000 per month in wages from her boyfriend to help manage
his career as a comedian when he toured—and that he toured every week.
She conceded that she still worked in real estate and made sales. She
claimed her two businesses never resulted in any income.

¶9 Mother also testified that she was “confused” about the AFI
and that she “d[i]dn’t know” if she turned over any bank statements.
Father’s counsel avowed to the court that she “requested bank statements”
but did not receive them. Mother’s counsel confirmed that she received the
request for bank statements but by the time Mother provided the
statements it was “past the disclosure discovery deadline, so [she] did not
submit them as they would have been late.”

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¶10 The court found “a number of material changes in
circumstances,” most notably that “Mother consistently and routinely
travels—without the children—both domestically and internationally,”
leaving the children “alone in the home” often. It found it “clear” “Mother
has difficulty balancing her career, which requires her to frequently travel,
with having parenting time 50% of the time.” It awarded unequal parenting
time, giving Mother one week of parenting time per month and ordering
Father “to be reasonable and flexible with Mother’s choice in her one week.”

¶11 Regarding child support, the court found that

Mother’s income was difficult to determine due to the
following factors: Mother’s numerous entrepreneurial
endeavors, non-credible testimony regarding proceeds from
real estate sales, lavish lifestyle apparently afforded by
routine receipt of extraordinary gifts, inaccurate reporting on
her AFI (compare Exs. P20, R13 and R14), under or non-
reporting of income (compare Exs. P3, P20, R11, R14, and R34)
and lack of up to date tax returns. Mother testified that she
receives approximately $50,000 per year as income for her
position as talent manager. Mother’s most recent tax return
(2023) indicated that she earned $50,750 in real estate sales,
and $50,750 in income as road manager. (Ex. P10.) Therefore,
although the Court suspects Mother earns more, the evidence
supported that Mother earns at least $100,000 which the Court
Finds as her income.

It thus ordered Mother to pay Father $788 in child support per month.

¶12 Mother appealed and we have jurisdiction. A.R.S. §§ 12-
2101(A)(1), -120.21(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶13 Mother argues that the court abused its discretion in
modifying parenting time and determining her income. See Engstrom v.
McCarthy, 243 Ariz. 469, 471 ¶ 4 (App. 2018) (parenting time orders are
reviewed for abuse of discretion); Hoobler v. Hoobler, 254 Ariz. 130, 140 ¶ 22
(App. 2022) (child support orders are reviewed for abuse of discretion).

I. Parenting Time

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¶14 Mother argues that the court erred in finding a reduction of
her parenting time in the children’s best interests. We review orders
affecting parenting time for abuse of discretion, which occurs “when the
record is devoid of competent evidence to support the decision, or when
the court commits an error of law in the process of reaching a discretionary
conclusion.” Engstrom, 243 Ariz. at 471 ¶ 4 (cleaned up). If the court finds a
material change in circumstances affecting the children’s welfare, “it must
then determine whether a change in custody would be in the child’s best
interests.” Christopher K. v. Markaa S., 233 Ariz. 297, 300 ¶ 15 (App. 2013)
(citation omitted); see also A.R.S. § 25-403(A), (B). “As a general rule equal
or near-equal parenting time is presumed to be in a child’s best interests.”
Woyton v. Ward, 247 Ariz. 529, 531 ¶ 6 (App. 2019) (citation omitted). But
the court has discretion to determine parenting time based on all the
evidence before it. Id. at 531 ¶ 5.

¶15 The court found that Mother’s extensive travel resulting in the
children being left alone “frequently” while in her care constituted a
material change in circumstances affecting the children’s welfare. See
Backstrand v. Backstrand, 250 Ariz. 339, 343 ¶ 14 (App. 2020). It then made
findings on all the relevant A.R.S. § 25-403(A) best interests factors. In
particular, it found that although “Mother loves her children” she “has
difficulty balancing her career, which requires her to frequently travel, with
having parenting time 50% of the time.” See A.R.S. § 25-403(A)(1). It found
that “[e]ven if Mother has the children 50% of the time as part of the
parenting plan, she is not actually with the children that frequently” given
her travel schedule. See A.R.S. § 25-403(A)(2). The court also noted that
“[t]he children are well adjusted to school and community [] in Father’s
home” where he “continues to raise the children in the home in which they
grew up.” See A.R.S. § 25-403(A)(3). The court noted that the elder child was
“of suitable age and maturity for her wishes to be known, but very little
information was provided . . . about her wishes” while the younger child
was “too young for his wishes to be known.” See A.R.S. § 25-403(A)(4). It
“credit[ed] Father’s testimony that [the elder child] struggles with her
mental health because Mother is not always available” and found Mother’s
testimony about the subject not credible. See A.R.S. § 25-403(A)(5).

¶16 Mother “agrees that the court’s disagreement with her
position does not necessarily indicate a failure to consider relevant
evidence” but argues that “the court reached a conclusion despite relevant
evidence to the contrary.” But we do not reweigh the evidence on appeal
and “defer to the family court’s determinations of witness credibility and
the weight given to conflicting evidence.” Lehn v. Al-Thanayyan, 246 Ariz.
277, 284 ¶ 20 (App. 2019) (citation omitted). The court’s findings about the

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children’s best interests were sufficient and supported by the record. It did
not abuse its discretion.

II. Mother’s Income and Child Support

¶17 We review child support orders for an abuse of discretion.
Hoobler, 254 Ariz. at 140 ¶ 22. “We have a duty to affirm” a child support
order “where any reasonable view of the fact and law might support the
judgment of the family court.” Id. at 141 ¶ 26 (cleaned up). Income for child
support may come from “any source.” A.R.S. § 25-320 app. (“Guidelines”)
§ II(A)(1)(b), (d), (e).

¶18 Although Mother argues her AFI “provided her actual
earnings and financial information, which do not represent an income of
$100,000 per year,” the court is not bound to only rely on Mother’s AFI, and
her testimony and the financial records conflicted with her AFI. Her AFI
indicated that she was paying a mortgage, but she acknowledged that her
boyfriend bought the house she lived in. Both in her AFI and in her
testimony Mother claimed an income of $4,000 per month from one
source—managing her boyfriend’s career. But she also testified that she had
sold a condo in the past year that she had failed to include in her AFI.

¶19 Mother argues that her tax returns “are the most reliable
evidence of her income,” but the most recent tax return she provided (2023)
revealed that she received $50,750 from real estate work and a separate
$50,750 from her managerial work, which totals just above the $100,000
attributed to her by the superior court. And although “Child Support
Income from self-employment . . . means gross receipts minus ordinary and
necessary expenses as determined by the court,” Guidelines § II(A)(1)(e) the
court’s finding of Mother’s income did not solely rest on the gross income
reported on her 2023 tax return. The court considered all the financial
evidence, drew reasonable inferences from Mother’s financial records, and
weighed the parties’ testimony and credibility. See Lehn, 246 Ariz. at 284
¶ 20. Competent evidence supports the superior court’s determination of
Mother’s income and subsequent award of child support. The court did not
abuse its discretion.

III. Attorney’s Fees and Costs

¶20 Father requests his fees and costs on appeal. “[P]arties who
represent themselves in a legal action are not entitled to recover attorney
fees,” Munger Chadwick, P.L.C. v. Farwest Dev. & Const. of the Sw., LLC, 235
Ariz. 125, 126 ¶ 5 (App. 2014) (citation omitted), but as the prevailing party
we grant Father his costs upon compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil

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Appellate Procedure 21 (“Rule”). Mother requests her attorney’s fees
“[p]ursuant to Rule 21(a)(1) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate
Procedure.” We deny Mother’s request and note that Rule 21 is not an
independent basis for an award of fees. See ARCAP 21(a)(2).

CONCLUSION

¶21 For the reasons above, we affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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