HERNANDEZ v. CITY OF GLENDALE

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

BLANCA E. HERNANDEZ, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants,

v.

CITY OF GLENDALE, Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 26-0319
FILED 11-12-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2025-036192
The Honorable Michael D. Gordon, Judge Retired

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Browne Law Group, Gilbert
By Byron F. Browne, Adam J. Gorski, John J. Daller
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants

Glendale City Attorney’s Office, Glendale
By Michael D. Bailey, Ashley E. Wallace
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

HERNANDEZ, et al. v. CITY OF GLENDALE
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

B A I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Blanca Hernandez, Arthur Hernandez, and Leopoldo Gomez
(“Claimants”) appeal the superior court’s dismissal of their complaint
against the City of Glendale. We affirm because Claimants’ notice of claim
did not include “a specific amount for which the[ir] claim[s] [could] be
settled.” See A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In March 2025, Claimants served a notice of claim on the City
that described an October 2024 vehicle collision allegedly caused by a City
police officer. After providing a brief account of the collision, the notice set
forth what Claimants asserted their specific “Monetary Damages” were:
“Blanca Hernandez: $200,000.00 (Medical, general, & Property Damage),”
“Arthur Hernandez: $150,000.00 (Medical & general damages),” and
“Leopoldo Gomez: $150,000.00 (Medical & general damages).”

¶3 The City did not reply to the notice of claim, so it was deemed
denied after sixty days. See A.R.S. § 12-821.01(E). Claimants later filed a
complaint against the City1 seeking damages for the collision. The City
moved to dismiss under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6),
arguing that Claimants’ notice of claim was insufficient under Arizona
Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 12-821.01. After full briefing on the motion,
the superior court found Claimants’ notice of claim did not comply with
A.R.S. § 12-821.01 because it failed to “communicate a specific settlement
amount that, if agreed to by the City, [would] settle the claim” and granted
dismissal.

1 The complaint also named as defendants the City police officer involved

in the collision and the Glendale Police Department. Claimants later
voluntarily dismissed the claims against those defendants with prejudice.

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HERNANDEZ, et al. v. CITY OF GLENDALE
Decision of the Court

¶4 Claimants timely appealed the dismissal. We have
jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and
A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶5 We review de novo both the dismissal of a complaint under
Rule 12(b)(6) and whether a notice of claim complies with A.R.S. § 12-
821.01. Yahweh v. City of Phoenix, 243 Ariz. 21, 22, ¶ 6 (App. 2017).

¶6 A claimant seeking to sue a public entity such as the City must
first serve on the entity a notice of claim that complies with the
requirements of A.R.S. § 12-821.01. Id. at 23, ¶ 7. Claimants must strictly
comply with A.R.S. § 12-821.01’s requirements. City of Mesa v. Ryan, 258
Ariz. 297, 300, ¶ 9 (2024). The statute’s purpose is to “permit the public
entity to investigate the claim, assess liability, consider settlement before
litigation, and budget for possible future litigation.” Id.

¶7 At issue here is the requirement that a notice of claim must
“contain a specific amount for which the claim can be settled.” A.R.S. § 12-
821.01(A). We have interpreted this provision to mean that a notice of claim
must “present a valid settlement offer to the public entity [the claimant]
wishes to sue.” Yahweh, 243 Ariz. at 23, ¶ 8. “An offer is the manifestation
of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person
in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude
it.” Id. (citation omitted). A valid settlement offer gives the public entity
“the ability to reach an agreement ending [the] dispute or lawsuit through
payment” of a specific, identified amount. Yollin v. City of Glendale, 219
Ariz. 24, 28, ¶ 9 (App. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶8 A notice of claim must identify the amount for which a
claimant is willing to settle, not the amount he or she will allege as damages
in litigation. See Yahweh, 243 Ariz. at 23, ¶¶ 7-8. “Simply reciting the
amount a claimant will demand [in damages] is insufficient to satisfy § 12-
821.01, because such a statement does not express a willingness to accept
[that amount] in settlement.” Id. at ¶ 8. That is because a claimant’s alleged
damages amount may differ from the amount the claimant would be
willing to accept in settlement, as an acceptable settlement amount “is
rarely based on questions of liability alone, but includes factors such as the
cost of litigation and the anticipated trial verdict.” Id.

¶9 Here, we agree with the superior court that Claimants’ notice
“d[id] not communicate a settlement offer.” While the notice provided
amounts of “Monetary Damages,” it gave no indication of the amount for

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HERNANDEZ, et al. v. CITY OF GLENDALE
Decision of the Court

which Claimants would be willing to settle. A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A) requires
that a notice contain not only a “specific amount,” but a “specific amount
for which the claim can be settled.” Contrary to Claimants’ argument,
requiring them to expressly communicate a settlement offer does not create
a “magic language” requirement that is not imposed by the statute’s plain
text. The defect in Claimants’ notice is not that it omitted particular
language, but that it included no language that stated Claimants were
offering to settle. Because Claimants’ notice did not make an offer to settle,
it did not comply with A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A), and dismissal was therefore
proper.

¶10 Claimants argue that this case resembles Yollin. It does not.
In Yollin, the claimant’s notice expressly offered to “release the City of
Glendale and their agents and employees from any liability associated with
th[e] claim” for $150,000. Yollin, 219 Ariz. at 27, ¶ 2 n.1. The issue in Yollin
was whether this offer was negated by other language in the notice which
indicated that Yollin was “still incurring medical expenses, wage loss[,] and
pain and suffering and was willing to negotiate.” Id. at 28, ¶ 10. We
determined the “qualifying” language did not invalidate the settlement
amount provided because the claimant still made an unequivocal offer and
would have been bound if the City had accepted it. Id. But here, Claimants
included no such settlement language in their notice and therefore find no
relief from Yollin.

¶11 Claimants’ notice of claim more closely resembles the notice
in Yahweh. Yahweh’s notice of claim stated that he was “seeking damages
for 1.5 million dollars” in lost earnings but also stated claims for defamation
and “violations of the Family Medical Leave Act.” 243 Ariz. at 22, ¶ 3. We
held the notice insufficient because “[w]hile [it] stated Yahweh would sue
for $1.5 million for loss of projected earnings, it made no mention of the
amount of damages he would seek for his Family Medical Leave Act claim.”
Id. at 23, ¶ 9. Further, we found “no indication in the [notice] demonstrating
a willingness to settle all claims against the City for any stated amount.” Id.
In other words, even to the extent Yahweh’s notice identified a specific
amount, it provided only the amount of damages he would be seeking at
trial.

¶12 Alternatively, Claimants argue that “the only reasonable
interpretation of the identified figures is that they represented the amounts
for which [Claimants] were willing to settle their claims,” given that two
Claimants were still being treated when the notice was submitted and thus
the amounts could not be read as the full extent of their medical expenses.
But the City was not required to disregard the notice’s explicit text or

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HERNANDEZ, et al. v. CITY OF GLENDALE
Decision of the Court

speculate about Claimants’ subjective intent. See Terborg v. Town of Payson,
___ Ariz. ___, ¶¶ 16-17, 596 P.3d 1151, 1155-56 (2026). Because Claimants’
notice provided no amount for which their claims could be settled, the court
properly dismissed their complaint for noncompliance with A.R.S. § 12-
821.01(A).

¶13 Because we find Claimants’ notice did not offer a specific
amount for which they would settle, we need not address whether the
notice provided sufficient facts to support the amount of Claimants’
“Monetary Damages.”

CONCLUSION

¶14 We affirm the dismissal of Claimants’ complaint. We deny
Claimants’ request for costs under A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and -342.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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