Byrd v. Aurora

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

KAYLA BYRD, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

AURORA BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SYSTEM LLC, Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 26-0413
FILED 11-12-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2025-029570
The Honorable Frank W. Moskowitz, Judge

APPEAL DISMISSED

COUNSEL

Kayla Byrd, Mesa
Plaintiff/Appellant

Wood Smith Henning & Berman, LLP, Phoenix
By Jason R. Mullis, Jeremy J. Butler
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Veronika Fabian and Judge Michael S. Catlett joined.

BYRD v. AURORA
Decision of the Court

C A T T A N I, Judge:

¶1 Kayla Byrd challenges the superior court’s dismissal of her
complaint against former employer Aurora Behavioral Health System LLC.
Because Byrd’s notice of appeal was premature, we lack jurisdiction and
thus dismiss the appeal.

¶2 Byrd sued Aurora claiming that racial discrimination and
retaliation led to her wrongful termination. Aurora moved to dismiss,
asserting that the complaint lacked any allegations of fact showing (or
supporting a reasonable inference of) race-based actions or discrimination.
The court gave Byrd leave to amend her complaint to address the
deficiencies noted in Aurora’s motion. Byrd then filed an amended
complaint that mirrored the original complaint but added an allegation
about Aurora’s motion to dismiss.

¶3 The superior court granted (on reconsideration) Aurora’s
renewed motion to dismiss, which was again premised on the complaint’s
lack of any factual allegations tying adverse consequences to discriminatory
motives or intent. The court did so in an unsigned minute entry that
directed Aurora to submit a proposed form of judgment. The minute entry
ruling did not address attorney’s fees, which Aurora had requested in its
answer.

¶4 Aurora submitted a proposed form of judgment dismissing
all claims with prejudice, directing that each side bear its own attorney’s
fees, and including a Rule 54(c) certification. Byrd then filed two motions
(captioned “Motion to Oppose Entry of Final Judgment Pursuant to Rule
54(c)” and “Motion to Alter Judgment”) that, in substance, objected to the
form of judgment: suggesting that the dismissal ruling did not resolve
certain claims, objecting to the dismissal being with prejudice, and asserting
a technical defect in the Rule 54(c) certification. Byrd then moved to strike
Aurora’s response to one of the motions. The court denied the motion to
strike, then denied Byrd’s motion for reconsideration of that ruling.

¶5 Before the superior court ruled on Byrd’s objections to the
form of judgment and before the court entered judgment, Byrd filed a notice
of appeal. Three weeks later, the superior court denied Byrd’s remaining
motions, then entered a Rule 54(c) judgment dismissing all claims with
prejudice and ordering each side to bear its own attorney’s fees. Byrd did
not file a notice of appeal thereafter.

2

BYRD v. AURORA
Decision of the Court

¶6 Although neither side contests appellate jurisdiction, we have
an independent duty to determine our jurisdiction over this appeal. See
Sorensen v. Farmers Ins. Co., 191 Ariz. 464, 465 (App. 1997). As relevant here,
an appeal lies from a final judgment, and a notice of appeal filed before
entry of final judgment is premature. See Camasura v. Camasura, 238 Ariz.
179, 181, ¶ 6 (App. 2015); see also A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1). Here, Byrd filed
her notice of appeal prematurely, three weeks before the superior court
ultimately entered a final judgment.

¶7 In limited circumstances, a premature notice of appeal may
relate forward to a later-entered judgment, but only if the court had already
resolved all issues. See ARCAP 9(c) (premature notice of appeal “filed after
the superior court announces an order or other form of decision—but before
entry of the resulting judgment that will be appealable—is treated as filed
on the date of, and after the entry of, the judgment”); Camasura, 238 Ariz. at
183, ¶¶ 15–16 (concluding ARCAP 9(c) does not save a premature notice of
appeal if the order being appealed did not dispose of all issues); see also
Smith v. Ariz. Citizens Clean Elections Comm’n, 212 Ariz. 407, 415, ¶ 37 (2006)
(noting a “limited exception to the final judgment rule” permitting a
premature notice of appeal after final decision but before entry of a formal
judgment only “if no decision of the court could change and the only
remaining task is merely ministerial”).

¶8 Here, at the time Byrd filed her notice of appeal, the superior
court had not ruled on attorney’s fees, which Aurora had requested in its
answer. Cf. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(h)(1) (requiring claims for fees be resolved
before entry of a Rule 54(c) judgment). Although the later-entered final
judgment disposed of the fees issue (by requiring each side to bear its own
fees), that does not save Byrd’s premature notice of appeal because a ruling
on fees is not a merely ministerial act. See AU Enters. Inc. v. Edwards, 248
Ariz. 109, 112, ¶ 10 (App. 2020); Fields v. Oates, 230 Ariz. 411, 415, ¶ 13 (App.
2012). Byrd’s premature notice of appeal was thus ineffective and a nullity,
see Camasura, 238 Ariz. at 181, 183, ¶¶ 6, 16, and we lack jurisdiction to
consider her appeal.

¶9 Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR
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