Cited by

("Arizona has long recognized 'that direct and circumstantial evidence have equal probative worth'; and our supreme court has long 'abandoned the rule that each link in a chain of circumstantial inference must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis.'" ()).

(“[I]t was wholly speculative whether [defendant’s] agents, in the absence of negligence, would have been positioned to prevent harm.”).

(“direct and circumstantial evidence have equal probative worth” in civil and criminal cases).

The Hospital contends, instead, P.2d 1306 (App. 1992), in which we declined to apply Thompson because the plaintiff had not offered sufficient evidence to create a jury question on the issue of causation.

See *54 , ( , ); , (finding that our supreme court has ruled that since direct and circumstantial evidence have the same probative value, circumstan

(“It is now well-settled .

Hosp., Inc., , (whether hospital’s failure to promptly operate deprived plaintiff of “some significant chance of survival or better recovery” was question for jury); -63 , -16 (App.1992) (addressing question whether defendants’ failure to conduct proper fire patrol caused loss of a substantial chance to avoid property loss from fire).

¶ 23 It is now well established “in civil and criminal cases, that direct and circumstantial evidence have equal probative worth.”

(contractual safety responsibilities were not essential to plaintiffs tort claim to take reasonable precautions against fire); Barmat, 155 Ariz. at 523, 747 P.2d at 1222 (professional malpractice based on duties implied by law by special relationship arises in tort, not contract)

But Arizona has long recognized “that direct and circumstantial evidence have equal probative worth”; and our supreme court has long “abandoned the rule that each link in a chain of circumstantial inference must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis.” , (citing, inter alia, , Andrews v. Fry’s Food Stores, , ).