Cited by

(holding that court violated wife’s right to procedural due process by entering judgment against both spouses based on arbitration award entered after arbitration proceedings to which husband alone was a party).

See Smith, 227 Ariz. at 174-75, ¶ 13 (addressing the UAA and noting that the “superior court may consider [a] challenge to confirmation of [an] arbitration award only on statutorily enumerated grounds” ()).

(holding wife’s due process rights were violated when judgment against husband was converted to judgment against both husband and wife following proceeding at which wife was not a party).

The extinguishment of the prior claim “includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose.” (App. 1993) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(1) (1982)).

§ 25–215(B)) (holding, in an action by creditor to recover attorneys’ fees accrued in prosecuting husband’s premarital obligation from community property, “A premarital debt of one spouse can be recovered from community property, but only to the extent of the value of the debtor spouse's contribution to the community.”); (holding creditor’s judgment against husband could not be satisfied out of community property without first showing that the community was liable).

Discussion ¶6 On appeal, MCA argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the disgorgement order because MCA was a “third-party vendor” that was “never appointed receiver” or “joined as a party to the case.” Relying on precedents in which we have declined to uphold rulings against non-parties who were not given “a full opportunity to contest” their liability, see also Spudnuts, MCA argues that the court’s ability to approve the receiver’s expenses did not obviate the joinder requirement b

¶22 Nor are we persuaded by the Paynes’ P.2d 110 (App. 1993).

A single claim cannot be “split,” and “‘includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose.” Heinig v. Hudman, 177 Ariz. 66, 71, quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (1982).

(superior court may consider challenge to confirmation of arbitration award only on statutorily enumerated grounds); see *175 infra ¶ 24.

See, 7 592 (1967) (“A dismissal without prejudice does not go to the merits of the plaintiff’s cause and does not bar plaintiff from later filing on the same cause of action.”); cf. Phillips v. Ariz. Bd.

However, that statute does not permit a trial *549 court to modify an award; it may only “decline to confirm and [sic] award and enter judgment.” Id., , (Section 12-1512 only permits superior court to confirm or reject arbitration award).

§ 44-1007(A)(2); , (holding that an appropriate remedy for an intentionally fraudulent conveyance is to set that conveyance aside).

71 n. 3, , 115 n. 3 (App.1993) (res judicata did not bar plaintiff from filing a new action against the marital community when wife could not be joined in the original arbitration proceeding); cf. Northwestern Nat’l Ins.

Workers, 634 F.2d 453 (9th Cir.1980) (applying Arizona law and identifying “same evidence” test, but stating that dispositive question was whether litigant previously had a fair opportunity to litigate the claim); , (applying Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (1982)).

t held that this statute requires joinder of the nondebtor spouse in an action by the creditor to recover against community property “because the [nondebtor spouse’s] joint interest in the community necessarily includes the right to litigate both the premarital debt and the value of the husband’s contribution to the community that may be subject to the premarital debt.”