Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Davis v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 893 P.2d 26.

38 citing documents.

Michael v. Crescent Hotels Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
Michael v. Crescent Hotels Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
Amanda Watts v. Medicis Pharmaceutical Corporation 365 P.3d 944 Ariz. 2016
Amanda Watts v. Medicis Pharmaceutical Corporation 365 P.3d 944 Ariz. 2016
Foam Indus., Inc., –03, –81 (App. 1996) (assessing factors to determine when, under the LID, the “manufacturer’s duty to warn is ordinarily satisfied”); (applying the LID “to determine whether [a manufacturer] satisfied its duty to warn”); see also Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod.
Watts v. Medicis Pharmaceutical Corp. 342 P.3d 847 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Watts v. Medicis Pharmaceutical Corp. 342 P.3d 847 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Id.; (applying the learned intermediary doctrine to a manufacturer of airplane parts).
Engel v. Landman 212 P.3d 842 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
Engel v. Landman 212 P.3d 842 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
ARCAP 13(b)(3) (“The appellate court may direct that the judgment be modified to enlarge the rights of the appellee or to lessen the rights of the appellant only if the appellee has cross-appealed seeking such relief.”)
James Colt Jones v. Cochise County Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
James Colt Jones v. Cochise County Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
reckon[] the retroactivity of a higher court’s opinion”); -37, -37 (App. 1994) (citing Zavala and declining to address argument that supreme court opinion should only apply prospectively).
Patterson v. Thunder Pass, Inc. 153 P.3d 1064 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
Patterson v. Thunder Pass, Inc. 153 P.3d 1064 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
(noting that a party should not be required to take precautions that are unreasonable).
Kelley v. Abdo 105 P.3d 167 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
Kelley v. Abdo 105 P.3d 167 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
See Perez; , (“The improper admission of evidence is reversible error if we are unable to conclude that the jury would have reached the same verdict without the evidence.”)
Parker v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n 59 P.3d 806 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
Parker v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n 59 P.3d 806 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
Horton v. Mitchell 29 P.3d 870 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
Horton v. Mitchell 29 P.3d 870 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
(recognizing that this Court lacks jurisdiction to review an issue that lessens an appellant's rights on appeal here, the Hortons' right to enforce the Restrictionsunless a cross-appeal has been taken pursuant to Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure 9(a)).
Larsen v. Decker 995 P.2d 281 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
Larsen v. Decker 995 P.2d 281 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
we conclude that the trial court did not err in excluding the SSA report on the grounds of unreliability.
Brown v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. 977 P.2d 807 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
Brown v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. 977 P.2d 807 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
Meineke v. GAB Business Services, Inc. 991 P.2d 267 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
Meineke v. GAB Business Services, Inc. 991 P.2d 267 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
Knauss v. DND Neffson Co. 963 P.2d 271 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
Knauss v. DND Neffson Co. 963 P.2d 271 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
Dole Food Co. v. North Carolina Foam Industries, Inc. 935 P.2d 876 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
Dole Food Co. v. North Carolina Foam Industries, Inc. 935 P.2d 876 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
However, “[u]nder the ‘learned intermediary doctrine,’ ‘the manufacturer’s duty to warn is ordinarily satisfied if a proper warning is given to the specialized class of people that may prescribe or administer the product.’ ” , (quoting Piper, 180 Ariz. at 178 n. 3, 883 P.2d at 415 n. 3); -33 , -78 (1978).
Randall v. Alvarado-Wells 928 P.2d 732 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1996
Randall v. Alvarado-Wells 928 P.2d 732 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1996
Under the circumstances, however, the trial court could have concluded as a matter of law that defendant did not breach her duty of care to plaintiff or other motorists, c -33 , -33 (App.1994), or that plaintiff presented insufficient evidence of causation.
State v. Soto-Fong 928 P.2d 610 Ariz. 1996
State v. Soto-Fong 928 P.2d 610 Ariz. 1996
(holding that plaintiffs did not waive their objection to the admission of a report because, ”[a]lthough plaintiffs were the first to refer to [the report] after it was admitted, the reference was an effort by plaintiffs to draw the sting____”); , 609
Tellez v. Saban 933 P.2d 1233 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
Tellez v. Saban 933 P.2d 1233 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
(duty obliges one to act reasonably in the light of foreseeable and unreasonable risks); see also Petolicchio v. Santa Cruz County Fair & Rodeo Assoc., Inc., , (whether duty exists is decided by the court).
Riddle v. Arizona Oncology Services., Inc. 924 P.2d 468 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1996
Riddle v. Arizona Oncology Services., Inc. 924 P.2d 468 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1996
“In the absence of precedent, unraveling the legal doctrines pertaining to duty and applying them to a particular situation is often a difficult task.”
Rudolph v. Arizona B.A.S.S. Federation 898 P.2d 1000 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
Rudolph v. Arizona B.A.S.S. Federation 898 P.2d 1000 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
Davis v. Cessna Aircraft Corp,, , Rogers, 170 Ariz. at 402, 825 P.2d at 23 (“[W]hether the risk was unreasonable ...