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Opinions in Arizona that cite Wells Fargo Credit Corp. v. Tolliver, 903 P.2d 1101.

35 citing documents.

Compass Bank v. Bennett 375 P.3d 950 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
¶ 15 The Bennetts argue Baker, , , require a creditor to do something affirmative and final—such as recording a written release of the deed of trust—to *62 waive the security interest and then sue on the note.
KCI Restaurant Management LLC v. Holm Wright Hyde & Hays PLC 341 P.3d 1156 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
KCI Restaurant Management LLC v. Holm Wright Hyde & Hays PLC 341 P.3d 1156 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
John Munic Enterprises, Inc. v. Laos 326 P.3d 279 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
They maintain “fairness dictates they be informed if the Judgment had been satisfied or extinguished before such obligation to request a valuation hearing should arise.” “Because this issue involves statutory interpretation and application, it is a question of law that we review de novo.”
In Re Marriage of Dougall 316 P.3d 591 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
est indicator of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute,” id., and “we will give terms ‘their ordinary meanings, unless the legislature has provided a specific definition or the context of the statute indicates a term carries a special meaning.’”
In Re Pinal County Mental Health No. Mh-201000029 240 P.3d 1262 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
In Re Pinal County Mental Health No. Mh-201000029 240 P.3d 1262 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
STATE EX REL. AZ. STR. PEST CONT. v. Taylor 224 P.3d 983 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
STATE EX REL. AZ. STR. PEST CONT. v. Taylor 224 P.3d 983 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
Industrial Commission v. Old Republic Insurance 219 P.3d 285 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
Industrial Commission v. Old Republic Insurance 219 P.3d 285 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
Robson Ranch Quail Creek, LLC v. Pima County 161 P.3d 588 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
Robson Ranch Quail Creek, LLC v. Pima County 161 P.3d 588 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
Cornman Tweedy 560, LLC v. City of Casa Grande 137 P.3d 309 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
Cornman Tweedy 560, LLC v. City of Casa Grande 137 P.3d 309 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
State of Arizona v. Derek Scott Oaks Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
“Statutory language is the best indicator of that intent and we will give terms ‘their ordinary meanings, unless the legislature has provided a specific definition or the context of the statute indicates a term carries a special meaning.’” -92 (App. 1999)
TANQUE VERDE UNIFIED SCHOOL v. Bernini 76 P.3d 874 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
TANQUE VERDE UNIFIED SCHOOL v. Bernini 76 P.3d 874 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
"Statutory language is the best indicator of that intent and we will give terms `their ordinary meanings, unless the legislature has provided a specific definition or the context of the statute indicates a term carries a special meaning.'"
Better Homes Construction, Inc. v. Goldwater 53 P.3d 1139 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
Better Homes Construction, Inc. v. Goldwater 53 P.3d 1139 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
3 See Wells Fargo Credit Corp. v. Tolliver, 183 * (“In interpreting a statute, [courts] look primarily to the language of the statute and give effect to the statutory terms according to their ordinary meanings unless the legislature has provided a specific definition ....”)
Bunker's Glass Co. v. Pilkington PlC 47 P.3d 1119 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
Bunker's Glass Co. v. Pilkington PlC 47 P.3d 1119 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
Thomas v. Thomas 49 P.3d 306 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
345, , 1103 (App. 1995).
Levitan v. State, Registrar of Contractors 33 P.3d 796 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
Levitan v. State, Registrar of Contractors 33 P.3d 796 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
Circle K Stores, Inc. v. Apache County 18 P.3d 713 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
Circle K Stores, Inc. v. Apache County 18 P.3d 713 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
¶ 6 , (“[W]e will give terms ‘their ordinary meanings, uniess the legislature has provided a specific definition or the context of the statute indicates a term carries a special meaning.’”) ( , ).
Tripati v. State 16 P.3d 783 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
Tripati v. State 16 P.3d 783 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
§ 1-213 (1995); , (explaining that statutory language is the best indicator of legislative intent and we will give terms their ordinary meanings).
State v. Affordable Bail Bonds 6 P.3d 339 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
State v. Affordable Bail Bonds 6 P.3d 339 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
§ 1-213 (1995); , (statutory language is the best indicator of legislative intent and we will give terms “their ordinary meanings”).
Arizona Department of Revenue v. Great Western Publishing, Inc. 3 P.3d 992 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
Arizona Department of Revenue v. Great Western Publishing, Inc. 3 P.3d 992 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
§ 1-213 (1995); , (statutory language is the best indicator of legislative intent and we will give terms “their ordinary meanings”).
Kessen v. Stewart 990 P.2d 689 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
Kessen v. Stewart 990 P.2d 689 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
Statutory language is the *491 best indicator of that intent and we will give terms “their ordinary meanings, unless the legislature has provided a specific definition or the context of the statute indicates a term carries a special meaning.”

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