Cited by

See, –35, ¶ 7 (App. 2009); –30 (App. 1996); Sw.

–48 (App. 1996) (pedagogical devices may not represent nonexistent or inaccurate evidence); see also U.S. v. Wood, 943 F.2d 1048, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991) (pedagogical devices summarize documents already admitted into evidence).

¶12 –31 (App. 1996), to claim he was “among a limited group of people reasonably expected to receive, and potentially rely upon” CLA’s audit report.

“Induce” is not statutorily defined, but we have interpreted the term narrowly to avoid “sweep[ing] within the statute any outsider to a securities transaction—no matter how remote from the transaction—who provided information that foreseeably contributed to, and thereby influenced, a buyer or seller’s decision to engage in the transaction.” (as amended).

(as corrected) ("Confusion of the jury is a proper basis for concluding that a verdict 'is not justified by the evidence or is 5 The product recall endorsement was provided by Truck Insurance to Patisserie retroactively in 2016, was not part of the insurance policy in 2014, and provided $100,000

(consequential damages are “a proper measure of damages in a fraud action”); Bechtel, 534 F.2d at 1341 (in addition to the benefit of the bargain, “the buyer may recover any consequential damages that may have proximately resulted from the fraudulent conduct of the seller”); (“Consequential damages are losses ‘not inherent in the nature of the transaction.’”) (quoting Restatement § 549 cmt.

"Although the existence of a fiduciary duty is generally a question of fact, 'when the evidence is insufficient to support a verdict, the [superior] court has a duty to decide the issue.'" (quoting Gemstar Ltd. v. Ernst & Young, -05 (1996)).

see also, e.g., Crist v. Loyacono, 65 So.

It is well established that “[t]he weight and credibility to be given expert testimony are matters to be decided by the factfinder.” , , , (“the weight and credibility of [expert] testimony ...

(gravamen of a negligence claim against a provider of professional information is negligent misrepresentation).

(“Our case law treats a motion for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence as a pre-requisite to a later motion for [judgment as a matter of law].”); ¶ 38 n.10, n.10 (App. 2007) (stating that the appellants

In our review, we search the record “for a reasonable way to read the verdicts as expressing a coherent view of the case.” (citation omitted).

v. Price Waterhouse, , (citing Toner v. Lederle Lab., 828 F.2d 510 , 512 (9th Cir.1987)).

Though it is improper to refer to matters not in evidence during closing argument, references may be made to subjects that are “common knowledge or are illustrations drawn from common experience, history or literature.”

Nevertheless, “the rule that issues not objected to at trial are waived is procedural, not jurisdictional, and we may suspend it at our discretion.” (citations omitted); (recognizing that “[the rule] an appealing party may not urge as grounds for reversal a theory which he failed to present below .

(recognizing a reviewing court’s obligation to search for a reasonable way to view the jury’s verdict “as expressing a coherent view of the case”).

¶37 P.2d 317 (App. 1996), shows that the foundation was not adequate.

See Grand, 225 Ariz. at 175 ¶ 21, 236 P.3d at 402 (–22, –33 (App. 1996)).